Drew와 부평부사, 강화유수와의 ‘장대 서신’ 보고
ON BOARD FLAG-SHIP COLORADO,
Near Boisée Island, Corea, June 20, 1871 (Received August 21)
Near Boisée Island, Corea, June 20, 1871 (Received August 21)
Sir:
My dispatches Nos. 70
and 71
informed you of all that had occurred up to the 2d instant, including the hostile reception the smaller vessels met with while absent on a surveying expedition. In addition, the latter contained my opinions with reference to what should be done immediately, without waiting further instructions, to prevent danger to the lives and property of our people in China as well as Corea. A careful review of the situation in consultation with the admiral, confirmed me in the opinions I had formed; and also that the dignity of the Government of the United States would be seriously compromised unless reparation be sought, and enforced if necessary, for the unprovoked assault upon the vessels. It also seemed reasonable that a demonstration such as was contemplated would, if successful, convince the Government that we would not tamely submit to insult and injury, and so impress it with a sense of our ability to redress wrongs as to cause it to be more careful in the future. Nor did it seem likely that such a step would by any possibility lessen the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them, for evidences were multiplying that all our overtures made in a conciliatory spirit would be peremptorily rejected. Although fully impressed with this belief, and skeptical in regard to any favorable results coming through delay, I still deemed it my duty to discourage hasty action, and advised delay in seeking forcible redress and retaliation until the Government should have had time to learn the facts and disavow its responsibility for the outrage, if the course of the military authorities was unauthorized. In this view the admiral fully concurred; and besides, our success would be rendered more certain by a delay of ten days, as the state of the tides would then be more favorable, which would insure greater safety to the vessels and more efficiency to their co-operation. It was also decided to confine the movement to the capture and destruction of the forts that had participated in the attack upon our vessels, and not go beyond that point, although abundant precedent could be found to justify the infliction of the most extreme punishment and damage upon this government and people, after unprovoked hostilities had once been inaugurated by them in such a treacherous manner. I was the more inclined to confine our hostile efforts within these limits, because I doubted whether the President contemplated the use of force further than the redress of wrongs and insults, and because the capture and destruction of these defensive works would be likely to produce the same effect upon the government as any more extensive operations which did not include the occupation of the capital.
The correspondence with the local officials, copies and translations of which are herewith inclosed, will show the earnest and persistent efforts that were made to adjust the difficulty amicably, and the stubborn reticence of the government touching this particular affair, as well as all matters connected with my mission.
I deem it proper to observe, in this connection, that the history of negotiations and intercourse between western nations and oriental governments goes to prove that every artifice which human ingenuity can devise will be resorted to maintain their own superiority, and prove to their people the absolute inferiority of foreigners. Refusal to negotiate is usually the first step, and when compelled by force or otherwise to recede from that position, every effort is made to induce foreign ministers to treat with native officials of low rank and position. In illustration of this peculiarity, I beg to call your attention to the communication from the King of Corea to the board of rites, Peking, (inclosure 5). You will observe that a reply to my letter is evaded rather than refused. The King affirms, however, that “a minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state,” and prays “that the Emperor (of China) will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct” me in my duties.
My own observation and experience, as well as the experience of others, convinced me that concession on these points would lower my position, lessen my influence, and thus render the task more difficult; I therefore determined to adopt a firm and dignified policy ― to demand as a right, and not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one nation to another; to submit to no semblance of inferiority by consenting to consult of correspond with officials of inferior rank that might, and probably would, be put forward to meet me; to seek such guarantees as would render reasonably safe the lives and property of American citizens that might be wrecked upon these shores as a right which the United States could properly claim for its citizens and not as a concession which Corea could grant or refuse with equal propriety. This course I have steadily pursued; and when officials of low rank came in person or wrote letters the secretaries were deputed to meet them and reply to their communications. This will explain why it is that the correspondence with the local officials has been conducted in the name of Mr. Drew.
The local official near here and his superior, the governor of Kang Hoa, were informed that a disavowal of responsibility for the outrage was expected form the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress (See inclosures 2 and 6). The replies of these officials (inclosures 3 and 4) contain, you will observe, nothing that can be construed into an apology. They simply express regret at the necessity, but approve of the acts of the military authorities. Indeed I feel sure that the governor of Kang Hoa has military as well as civil jurisdiction, and is really the person who planned the attack and issued the orders to fire upon the vessels. So great was the anxiety of the admiral as well as myself to avoid, if possible, further hostilities, that orders were given to Captain Blake and Mr. Drew (inclosures 7 and 8) to cause hostilities to be suspended whenever they could obtain any reasonable assurance that peaceful negotiations would be assented to by the government. They did receive, while on the way up to the forts and before the attack was made, a communication from the Kang-Hoa magistrate, (inclosure 9) but as it contained only a repetition of his former statement they very properly paid no attention to it.
The expedition started on the 10th and returned on the 12th instant. The work it was sent to do was successfully and fully accomplished. Five forts were taken, which, with the munitions of war found in them, were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty of the enemy’s dead were counted lying on the field, fifty flags and several prisoners were captured and brought away; among the latter were some wounded. Several books, manuscripts, orders, &c., were found. The contents of these documents are interesting, and enable a better and more reliable estimate to be made respecting the attitude and action of the government than was possible from our previous sources of information.
It was deemed advisable to bring away but few prisoners, only a number sufficient to demonstrate that we do not treat prisoners that fall into our hands cruelly, and that wounded men, although enemies, are humanely and tenderly cared for. Our loss was three killed and nine wounded. For full participants of the engagement I beg to refer you to the Navy Department, where complete reports of the admiral will be found.
All accounts concur in the statement that the Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equaled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to prisoners, they concluded to perish fighting, even after all hope of success was gone; either this, or that their government had threatened the soldiers defending that particular fort with dire retribution in case of defeat. Some such reasons must have existed, because there were outside of the fort, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept at bay by the field artillery with small effort. Instead of recklessly rushing on to destruction, these troops showed little inclination to come within the range of the weapons of our troops. A proposition was made to release the prisoners on parole, (inclosure 10), to which a reply was returned (inclosure 11) saying that the prisoners had incurred a severe penalty from their own government by surrender, and it was immaterial whether they were released or not. After a detention of a few days they were all unconditionally released. It is to be hoped that our humane treatment and release of these prisoners may disabuse the minds of the common people of their unjust suspicions regarding foreigners, and induce the government to spare the lives of those who may by misfortune or reverses in war fall into their hands.
The officers and men engaged in the expedition all behaved nobly. Their gallantry and heroism were conspicuous, reflecting upon themselves great credit, and upon the Navy and the Government represented by it honor and renown. I should be doing less than my duty were I to omit to add my testimony to these acts of devotion, or to acknowledge my obligations for the cheerful co-operation of Admiral Rodgers, and the zealous and efficient support of the officers of the fleet in all things where the honor or interests of the United States are involved.
On the 15th instant, I addressed a dispatch to the King, (inclosure 15), and caused it to be sent to the perfect of Foo-Ping-Foo with a request that it should be sent to the capital. It was returned on the 17th instant with a note from the prefect (inclosure 16) saying that he dare not forward a dispatch to his sovereign. To this I caused a reply to be sent (inclosure 17) requesting him either to send the dispatch or inform the court that I desired to communicate with His Majesty or a high minister. This met with the same refusal as the former one had, (see inclosure 18).
The first opportunity that offers will be availed of to open communication with the government, if it can be done without discredit, nor will my efforts to accomplish what the Government desires be relaxed until all reasonable and honorable means are exhausted, and I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I have, however, little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms. Everything goes to prove that the government from the first determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even discussion; and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of defiance to all other nations.
I have the honor, &c.,
My dispatches Nos. 70
and 71
informed you of all that had occurred up to the 2d instant, including the hostile reception the smaller vessels met with while absent on a surveying expedition. In addition, the latter contained my opinions with reference to what should be done immediately, without waiting further instructions, to prevent danger to the lives and property of our people in China as well as Corea. A careful review of the situation in consultation with the admiral, confirmed me in the opinions I had formed; and also that the dignity of the Government of the United States would be seriously compromised unless reparation be sought, and enforced if necessary, for the unprovoked assault upon the vessels. It also seemed reasonable that a demonstration such as was contemplated would, if successful, convince the Government that we would not tamely submit to insult and injury, and so impress it with a sense of our ability to redress wrongs as to cause it to be more careful in the future. Nor did it seem likely that such a step would by any possibility lessen the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them, for evidences were multiplying that all our overtures made in a conciliatory spirit would be peremptorily rejected. Although fully impressed with this belief, and skeptical in regard to any favorable results coming through delay, I still deemed it my duty to discourage hasty action, and advised delay in seeking forcible redress and retaliation until the Government should have had time to learn the facts and disavow its responsibility for the outrage, if the course of the military authorities was unauthorized. In this view the admiral fully concurred; and besides, our success would be rendered more certain by a delay of ten days, as the state of the tides would then be more favorable, which would insure greater safety to the vessels and more efficiency to their co-operation. It was also decided to confine the movement to the capture and destruction of the forts that had participated in the attack upon our vessels, and not go beyond that point, although abundant precedent could be found to justify the infliction of the most extreme punishment and damage upon this government and people, after unprovoked hostilities had once been inaugurated by them in such a treacherous manner. I was the more inclined to confine our hostile efforts within these limits, because I doubted whether the President contemplated the use of force further than the redress of wrongs and insults, and because the capture and destruction of these defensive works would be likely to produce the same effect upon the government as any more extensive operations which did not include the occupation of the capital.The correspondence with the local officials, copies and translations of which are herewith inclosed, will show the earnest and persistent efforts that were made to adjust the difficulty amicably, and the stubborn reticence of the government touching this particular affair, as well as all matters connected with my mission.
I deem it proper to observe, in this connection, that the history of negotiations and intercourse between western nations and oriental governments goes to prove that every artifice which human ingenuity can devise will be resorted to maintain their own superiority, and prove to their people the absolute inferiority of foreigners. Refusal to negotiate is usually the first step, and when compelled by force or otherwise to recede from that position, every effort is made to induce foreign ministers to treat with native officials of low rank and position. In illustration of this peculiarity, I beg to call your attention to the communication from the King of Corea to the board of rites, Peking, (inclosure 5). You will observe that a reply to my letter is evaded rather than refused. The King affirms, however, that “a minister of the Emperor must not have relations with a foreign state,” and prays “that the Emperor (of China) will send forth a special edict to exhort and instruct” me in my duties.
My own observation and experience, as well as the experience of others, convinced me that concession on these points would lower my position, lessen my influence, and thus render the task more difficult; I therefore determined to adopt a firm and dignified policy ― to demand as a right, and not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one nation to another; to submit to no semblance of inferiority by consenting to consult of correspond with officials of inferior rank that might, and probably would, be put forward to meet me; to seek such guarantees as would render reasonably safe the lives and property of American citizens that might be wrecked upon these shores as a right which the United States could properly claim for its citizens and not as a concession which Corea could grant or refuse with equal propriety. This course I have steadily pursued; and when officials of low rank came in person or wrote letters the secretaries were deputed to meet them and reply to their communications. This will explain why it is that the correspondence with the local officials has been conducted in the name of Mr. Drew.
The local official near here and his superior, the governor of Kang Hoa, were informed that a disavowal of responsibility for the outrage was expected form the government, and that, to enable this to be done, a reasonable time would be allowed; and it was clearly intimated that the failure of the government to comply with this reasonable demand would leave the admiral at liberty to pursue such a course as he might deem proper to obtain redress (See inclosures 2 and 6). The replies of these officials (inclosures 3 and 4) contain, you will observe, nothing that can be construed into an apology. They simply express regret at the necessity, but approve of the acts of the military authorities. Indeed I feel sure that the governor of Kang Hoa has military as well as civil jurisdiction, and is really the person who planned the attack and issued the orders to fire upon the vessels. So great was the anxiety of the admiral as well as myself to avoid, if possible, further hostilities, that orders were given to Captain Blake and Mr. Drew (inclosures 7 and 8) to cause hostilities to be suspended whenever they could obtain any reasonable assurance that peaceful negotiations would be assented to by the government. They did receive, while on the way up to the forts and before the attack was made, a communication from the Kang-Hoa magistrate, (inclosure 9) but as it contained only a repetition of his former statement they very properly paid no attention to it.
The expedition started on the 10th and returned on the 12th instant. The work it was sent to do was successfully and fully accomplished. Five forts were taken, which, with the munitions of war found in them, were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty of the enemy’s dead were counted lying on the field, fifty flags and several prisoners were captured and brought away; among the latter were some wounded. Several books, manuscripts, orders, &c., were found. The contents of these documents are interesting, and enable a better and more reliable estimate to be made respecting the attitude and action of the government than was possible from our previous sources of information.
It was deemed advisable to bring away but few prisoners, only a number sufficient to demonstrate that we do not treat prisoners that fall into our hands cruelly, and that wounded men, although enemies, are humanely and tenderly cared for. Our loss was three killed and nine wounded. For full participants of the engagement I beg to refer you to the Navy Department, where complete reports of the admiral will be found.
All accounts concur in the statement that the Coreans fought with desperation, rarely equaled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts. They exhibited a bravado and recklessness that it is hard to account for upon any other hypothesis than that finding there was no chance for escape, and believing that no quarter would be shown by us to prisoners, they concluded to perish fighting, even after all hope of success was gone; either this, or that their government had threatened the soldiers defending that particular fort with dire retribution in case of defeat. Some such reasons must have existed, because there were outside of the fort, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept, but in the immediate vicinity, several thousand troops which were kept at bay by the field artillery with small effort. Instead of recklessly rushing on to destruction, these troops showed little inclination to come within the range of the weapons of our troops. A proposition was made to release the prisoners on parole, (inclosure 10), to which a reply was returned (inclosure 11) saying that the prisoners had incurred a severe penalty from their own government by surrender, and it was immaterial whether they were released or not. After a detention of a few days they were all unconditionally released. It is to be hoped that our humane treatment and release of these prisoners may disabuse the minds of the common people of their unjust suspicions regarding foreigners, and induce the government to spare the lives of those who may by misfortune or reverses in war fall into their hands.
The officers and men engaged in the expedition all behaved nobly. Their gallantry and heroism were conspicuous, reflecting upon themselves great credit, and upon the Navy and the Government represented by it honor and renown. I should be doing less than my duty were I to omit to add my testimony to these acts of devotion, or to acknowledge my obligations for the cheerful co-operation of Admiral Rodgers, and the zealous and efficient support of the officers of the fleet in all things where the honor or interests of the United States are involved.
On the 15th instant, I addressed a dispatch to the King, (inclosure 15), and caused it to be sent to the perfect of Foo-Ping-Foo with a request that it should be sent to the capital. It was returned on the 17th instant with a note from the prefect (inclosure 16) saying that he dare not forward a dispatch to his sovereign. To this I caused a reply to be sent (inclosure 17) requesting him either to send the dispatch or inform the court that I desired to communicate with His Majesty or a high minister. This met with the same refusal as the former one had, (see inclosure 18).
The first opportunity that offers will be availed of to open communication with the government, if it can be done without discredit, nor will my efforts to accomplish what the Government desires be relaxed until all reasonable and honorable means are exhausted, and I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I have, however, little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms. Everything goes to prove that the government from the first determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even discussion; and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of defiance to all other nations.
I have the honor, &c.,
F. F. LOW
Inclosures
No. 1. Paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, from the prefect of Fu-Ping, 3d of June, 1871.
No. 2. Reply of Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, an explanation or disavowal of the attack of June 1 required, 5th June, 1871.
No. 3. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew. Reply to foregoing will be made by his superior officer, 7th June, 1871.
No. 4. Kang-Hoa high magistrate’s reply to No. 2; attack of June 1 regretted but justified, 6th June, 1871.
No. 5. King of Corea to board of rites, Peking.
No. 6. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate; his letter(No. 4) not satisfactory, 7th June, 1871.
No. 7. Admiral Rodgers’s instructions to Captain Blake for Fort du Conde expedition, 9th June, 1871.
No. 8. Mr. Low’s instructions to Mr. Drew, for same expedition, 9th June, 1871.
No. 9. Kang-Hoa high magistrate, to Mr. Low in reply to No. 6, 9th June, 1871.
No. 10. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate, prisoners will be released on parole, 13th June, 1871.
No. 11. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew, in reply to No. 10, 14th June, 1871.
No. 12. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; indignant comments on the capture of Fort du Conde, 12th June, 1871.
No. 13. Memorandum of intimations that a reply is wanted to No. 12, 13th and 14th June, 1871.
No. 14. Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, in reply to No. 12, inclosing dispatch from Mr. Low to King of Corea, 15th June, 1871.
No. 15. Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King of Corea, 14th June, 1871.
No. 16. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. drew; he declines to forward and returns Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King, 17th June, 1871.
No. 17. Mr. Drew to the prefect of Fu-Ping, 18th June, 1871.
No. 18. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; reply to No. 17; still declines to forward the dispatch to the King; reasons assigned, 20th June, 1871.
No. 2. Reply of Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, an explanation or disavowal of the attack of June 1 required, 5th June, 1871.
No. 3. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew. Reply to foregoing will be made by his superior officer, 7th June, 1871.
No. 4. Kang-Hoa high magistrate’s reply to No. 2; attack of June 1 regretted but justified, 6th June, 1871.
No. 5. King of Corea to board of rites, Peking.
No. 6. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate; his letter(No. 4) not satisfactory, 7th June, 1871.
No. 7. Admiral Rodgers’s instructions to Captain Blake for Fort du Conde expedition, 9th June, 1871.
No. 8. Mr. Low’s instructions to Mr. Drew, for same expedition, 9th June, 1871.
No. 9. Kang-Hoa high magistrate, to Mr. Low in reply to No. 6, 9th June, 1871.
No. 10. Mr. Drew to Kang-Hoa high magistrate, prisoners will be released on parole, 13th June, 1871.
No. 11. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew, in reply to No. 10, 14th June, 1871.
No. 12. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; indignant comments on the capture of Fort du Conde, 12th June, 1871.
No. 13. Memorandum of intimations that a reply is wanted to No. 12, 13th and 14th June, 1871.
No. 14. Mr. Drew to prefect of Fu-Ping, in reply to No. 12, inclosing dispatch from Mr. Low to King of Corea, 15th June, 1871.
No. 15. Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King of Corea, 14th June, 1871.
No. 16. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. drew; he declines to forward and returns Mr. Low’s dispatch to the King, 17th June, 1871.
No. 17. Mr. Drew to the prefect of Fu-Ping, 18th June, 1871.
No. 18. Prefect of Fu-Ping to Mr. Drew; reply to No. 17; still declines to forward the dispatch to the King; reasons assigned, 20th June, 1871.
별지: No. 1
Translation of paper found attached to a pole on Guerriere Island, June 3, 1871, and brought on board the Colorado.
별지: No. 2
Reply to a communication found on Guerriere Island, on Saturday morning, June 3.
별지: No. 3
Li. Guardian General of Fu-Ping Fu to Mr. Drew, June 7th.
별지: No. 4
Translation of dispatch brought on board Colorado from Kang-Hoa high official.
별지: No. 5
Translation of duplicate of the King of Corea’s dispatch to the board of rites, Peking, in reference to his excellency Mr. Low’s Letter, of 7th March, sent to the King through the board.
별지: No. 6
Edward B. Drew to guardian of Kang-Hoa and ex officio general and governor, June 7, 1871
별지: No. 7
Admiral Rodgers to Commander H. C. Blake.
U. S. S. COLORADO, ISLE BOISÉE ANCHORAGE,
Corea, June 9, 1871
Corea, June 9, 1871
Sir:
The attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River, which recently treacherously fired on our surveying party, is committed to you.
The attacking force will consist of the Monocacy, Palos, the four armed steam launches, and the armed launches and boats of the fleet; the latter conveying the landing force detailed from the ships, under the immediate command of Commander L. A. Kimberly.
The vessels are to approach the point selected for anchorage, shelling the forts and drawing out the soldiers occupying them, before the boats are permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.
When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works, the force under Commander Kimberly will effect a landing, the armed launches supporting and covering the debarkation. The most serious difficulties which I apprehend lie in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal water, and furious currents; and if it should be found impossible to hold the vessels in the position necessary to secure the boats and to cover the force on shore, you will embark the landing party at your discretion.
The object sought in this expedition being simply to take and destroy the forts which have fired on our vessels, and to hold them long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present purpose to withdraw the whole force after a period of about twenty-two hours has elapsed, or at the last of the flood-tide of the day following the capture.
Should you decide that the position gained may be held indefinitely long, or that there is a prospect of any material advantage in doing so, you will then, by steam launch, communicate with me.
The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make such a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the Government to secure, if he may; and you will therefore take advantage of any overtures which may be made toward peace, if they shall seem to you to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the ends which the Government has in view, or to afford a cover for the withdrawal of your force should that be desirable; referring, of course, the matter of terms to be granted to the minister and myself.
All that I have here written has been amply discussed; but should incidents arise giving an unexpected complexion to the aspect of affairs, you must use your discretion.
Anything you shall decide upon will, I am sure, meet deserved approval.
Wishing you and your command success and a safe return,
I am, &c.,
The attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River, which recently treacherously fired on our surveying party, is committed to you.
The attacking force will consist of the Monocacy, Palos, the four armed steam launches, and the armed launches and boats of the fleet; the latter conveying the landing force detailed from the ships, under the immediate command of Commander L. A. Kimberly.
The vessels are to approach the point selected for anchorage, shelling the forts and drawing out the soldiers occupying them, before the boats are permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.
When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works, the force under Commander Kimberly will effect a landing, the armed launches supporting and covering the debarkation. The most serious difficulties which I apprehend lie in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal water, and furious currents; and if it should be found impossible to hold the vessels in the position necessary to secure the boats and to cover the force on shore, you will embark the landing party at your discretion.
The object sought in this expedition being simply to take and destroy the forts which have fired on our vessels, and to hold them long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present purpose to withdraw the whole force after a period of about twenty-two hours has elapsed, or at the last of the flood-tide of the day following the capture.
Should you decide that the position gained may be held indefinitely long, or that there is a prospect of any material advantage in doing so, you will then, by steam launch, communicate with me.
The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make such a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the Government to secure, if he may; and you will therefore take advantage of any overtures which may be made toward peace, if they shall seem to you to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the ends which the Government has in view, or to afford a cover for the withdrawal of your force should that be desirable; referring, of course, the matter of terms to be granted to the minister and myself.
All that I have here written has been amply discussed; but should incidents arise giving an unexpected complexion to the aspect of affairs, you must use your discretion.
Anything you shall decide upon will, I am sure, meet deserved approval.
Wishing you and your command success and a safe return,
I am, &c.,
JOHN RODGERS
A true copy.
H. G. B. FISHER, Secretary.
H. G. B. FISHER, Secretary.
별지: No. 8
F. F. Low to Edward B. Drew.
Sir:
It is the intention of the admiral to send an expedition to-morrow to Fort du Conde to take and destroy it, if possible. The whole will be under the immediate command of Homer C. Blake, esquire, U. S. N., who will be furnished with full and explicit instructions by the admiral. I desire you to accompany Captain Blake on the Palos to facilitate communicating with the native officials, if opportunity offers.
As the object of my visit to Corea is to open negotiations with a view to making a treaty, this fact should be kept prominently in view; and the admiral has so instructed Captain Blake. The naval forces are simply a means to an end. If, therefore, at any time during the absence of the expedition, overtures should be made by which it would appear that there is a reasonable prospect of a minister being sent to confer and consult with me, and that further offensive operations would be likely to embarrass friendly negotiations, it is my desire that all hostile action should cease as soon as it can be done with safety and honor. The decision touching this latter point will rest with Captain Blake, guided by his instructions; but you are at liberty to make known my views to him if you deem it advisable.
I am, &c.,
It is the intention of the admiral to send an expedition to-morrow to Fort du Conde to take and destroy it, if possible. The whole will be under the immediate command of Homer C. Blake, esquire, U. S. N., who will be furnished with full and explicit instructions by the admiral. I desire you to accompany Captain Blake on the Palos to facilitate communicating with the native officials, if opportunity offers.
As the object of my visit to Corea is to open negotiations with a view to making a treaty, this fact should be kept prominently in view; and the admiral has so instructed Captain Blake. The naval forces are simply a means to an end. If, therefore, at any time during the absence of the expedition, overtures should be made by which it would appear that there is a reasonable prospect of a minister being sent to confer and consult with me, and that further offensive operations would be likely to embarrass friendly negotiations, it is my desire that all hostile action should cease as soon as it can be done with safety and honor. The decision touching this latter point will rest with Captain Blake, guided by his instructions; but you are at liberty to make known my views to him if you deem it advisable.
I am, &c.,
FREDERICK F. LOW
True copy: EDWARD B. DREW
True copy: EDWARD B. DREW
별지: No. 9
Translation of dispatch brought by a junk and intercepted by the expedition to Fort du Conde, on the 10th June.
별지: No. 10
Mr. Drew to Cheng, guardian of Kang-Hoa prefecture, ex-officio general and governor.
별지: No. 11
Translation of a dispatch received 15th June, 1871, on Guerriere Island, by hand of two messengers from the magistrate of Fu-Ping prefecture.
별지: No. 12
Translation of dispatch brought on board United States steamer Colorado, June 12, 1871.
별지: No. 13
On Tuesday morning, 13th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, which read thus:
Messengers from the guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture [are in want of a reply to the letter brought by them on Monday, 12th June].
On Wednesday morning, 14th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, in which the Fu-Ping Prefecture again urges for a reply to his letter of the 12th June. It reads thus:
To his excellency, Mr. Drew, chief secretary of the minister: On the 25th day of this moon (June 12) I sent your excellency a letter. I cannot sustain my anxiety that it has not yet been answered, and again send this to trouble you for a reply.
Sin Wei year, 4th moon, 27th day (14th June, 1871)
From Li, guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture.
Messengers from the guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture [are in want of a reply to the letter brought by them on Monday, 12th June].
On Wednesday morning, 14th June, a paper was found attached to a pole on Guerrière Island, in which the Fu-Ping Prefecture again urges for a reply to his letter of the 12th June. It reads thus:
To his excellency, Mr. Drew, chief secretary of the minister: On the 25th day of this moon (June 12) I sent your excellency a letter. I cannot sustain my anxiety that it has not yet been answered, and again send this to trouble you for a reply.
Sin Wei year, 4th moon, 27th day (14th June, 1871)
From Li, guardian general of Fu-Ping Prefecture.
별지: No. 14
Edw. B. Drew to Guardian of Foo-Ping Prefecture.
별지: No. 15
The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to China, charged with a special mission to Corea, had the honor to announce by letter, written and sent from Peking in March last, that the Government of the United States desired to come to some definite understanding with that of His Majesty with reference to the protection and rescue of seamen who might be wrecked upon the islands and coasts of Corea, and thus remove in advance all cause of a rupture of friendly relations between the two countries. To carry out this intention and allow an opportunity for all matters to be discussed and settled in a spirit of amity and good will, His Majesty was informed that the undersigned would leave his post in China temporarily and go to Corea; that he would go in ships of war, accompanied by and admiral, in order to add dignity to his mission, and not with any design of harming the people as long as the vessels and the men on board were treated with consideration and kindness. His Majesty was also informed that as we were animated by friendly motives we should expect to be received and treated in a friendly way, and the undersigned expressed the hope that a minister of suitable rank would be deputed to meet him, upon the arrival of the ships on the coast, to whom full particulars of the business could be made known, and with whom it could be discussed with a view to amicable settlement. Upon his arrival at this point no persons of suitable rank presented themselves, nor were those who came furnished with any evidence of their having been sent by the government. These men were received with politeness by the person next in rank to the envoy. They were informed that the undersigned would remain at this place some days, in order that His Majesty might send a suitable person to meet him; in the mean time some of the smaller vessels of the fleet would be engaged in exploring the channels and islands. They were requested to inform the local magistrates and the people of the admiral’s intention, so that no cause of difficulty might arise between the surveying vessels and the people. The views and intentions of the undersigned were frankly explained to the persons who came, in the full expectation that as soon as His Majesty became aware of them no delay would occur in taking steps to comply with the reasonable requests made.
After a delay of one day to allow the admiral’s intentions to be made known, the surveying vessels started on their errand of humanity, and after proceeding a few miles from the anchorage, they were, without notice, want only fired upon by forts and masked batteries, to which the vessels replied. No gun was fired from the vessels, or menace made, until after the batteries on shore commenced the attack. After silencing the batteries the vessels returned and reported the outrageous conduct of the military authorities. Even after all this had occurred, so great was the desire of the admiral and the undersigned for peace that it was concluded to allow ten days to elapse before taking any further action, in the hope that it would be found that the attack was unauthorized, and that His Majesty would cause a suitable apology to be sent, and also a minister, as had been suggested. The local magistrate here and the magistrate at Kang-Hoa were informed of our lenient disposition in order that future hostilities might be avoided. These peaceful overtures being declined, or neglected, left no other course open to the admiral than to seek redress by arms, as is usual among all civilized nations, for the wrongs and insults which our vessels had suffered. This has been fully done. The forts have been destroyed, and the armies defending them routed and scattered. Many hundreds of the soldiers were killed and wounded, and others are prisoners on board our ships.
The latter will be treated with humanity and kindness, and, upon a proper engagement being entered into that they shall not again take up arms against us, will be released and sent to their homes. It is the custom of my country to treat all prisoners that fall into our hands with humanity, and the undersigned begs to assure His Majesty that those now held captive on board our ships will suffer neither insult nor injury.
The events of the past few days afford convincing proofs of our power whenever we choose to exert it. In the present instance the admiral concluded to go no further than destroying the fortifications that had assaulted his vessels, although well-established precedent would sanction the moving of our forces against any and all places of the kingdom. Although possessed of the power, my Government does not seek war or conquest. It does not wish to acquire a single inch of your territory; nor does it seek control over your people. It has no desire to disturb the institutions of the country, or interfere in any matters of local concern. On the contrary, it desires to cultivate friendly relations with His Majesty as the sovereign of an independent nation. My Government wishes to be at peace with all countries, neither giving just grounds for offense, nor allowing unprovoked assaults or insults to its vessels or people to go unredressed. When its citizens offend against the laws and customs of other countries they are duly apprehended and punished. This cannot be done unless some arrangement is made by which they can be arrested and given up for trial and punishment. Arrangements now exist for doing this in China and Japan. Why should not Corea enter into similar engagements? Will not a definite understanding on this point prevent irritation and ill-feeling? To discuss and arrange this question, as well as to provide for the protection and rescue of those who may, by misfortune, be cast upon the shores of your kingdom, are the chief objects which the undersigned had in view in coming here.
These objects he is still anxious to accomplish, and is prepared to exercise patience and forbearance in order that further hostilities may be avoided. It remains for His Majesty to decide whether the ends aimed at shall be attained peaceably, in accordance with the earnest desire of the undersigned and his Government, or whether our peaceful overtures will be met in the future, as they have been in the past, by force of arms.
The undersigned trusts that His Majesty will, upon a careful review of the whole question, conclude to meet these advances in a just and friendly spirit, and that a person of suitable rank will soon be sent to consult, with a view of arranging the questions which are likely to disturb amicable relations. The undersigned hopes for a speedy and frank reply to this note.
The undersigned has the honor to wish His Majesty health and happiness.
After a delay of one day to allow the admiral’s intentions to be made known, the surveying vessels started on their errand of humanity, and after proceeding a few miles from the anchorage, they were, without notice, want only fired upon by forts and masked batteries, to which the vessels replied. No gun was fired from the vessels, or menace made, until after the batteries on shore commenced the attack. After silencing the batteries the vessels returned and reported the outrageous conduct of the military authorities. Even after all this had occurred, so great was the desire of the admiral and the undersigned for peace that it was concluded to allow ten days to elapse before taking any further action, in the hope that it would be found that the attack was unauthorized, and that His Majesty would cause a suitable apology to be sent, and also a minister, as had been suggested. The local magistrate here and the magistrate at Kang-Hoa were informed of our lenient disposition in order that future hostilities might be avoided. These peaceful overtures being declined, or neglected, left no other course open to the admiral than to seek redress by arms, as is usual among all civilized nations, for the wrongs and insults which our vessels had suffered. This has been fully done. The forts have been destroyed, and the armies defending them routed and scattered. Many hundreds of the soldiers were killed and wounded, and others are prisoners on board our ships.
The latter will be treated with humanity and kindness, and, upon a proper engagement being entered into that they shall not again take up arms against us, will be released and sent to their homes. It is the custom of my country to treat all prisoners that fall into our hands with humanity, and the undersigned begs to assure His Majesty that those now held captive on board our ships will suffer neither insult nor injury.
The events of the past few days afford convincing proofs of our power whenever we choose to exert it. In the present instance the admiral concluded to go no further than destroying the fortifications that had assaulted his vessels, although well-established precedent would sanction the moving of our forces against any and all places of the kingdom. Although possessed of the power, my Government does not seek war or conquest. It does not wish to acquire a single inch of your territory; nor does it seek control over your people. It has no desire to disturb the institutions of the country, or interfere in any matters of local concern. On the contrary, it desires to cultivate friendly relations with His Majesty as the sovereign of an independent nation. My Government wishes to be at peace with all countries, neither giving just grounds for offense, nor allowing unprovoked assaults or insults to its vessels or people to go unredressed. When its citizens offend against the laws and customs of other countries they are duly apprehended and punished. This cannot be done unless some arrangement is made by which they can be arrested and given up for trial and punishment. Arrangements now exist for doing this in China and Japan. Why should not Corea enter into similar engagements? Will not a definite understanding on this point prevent irritation and ill-feeling? To discuss and arrange this question, as well as to provide for the protection and rescue of those who may, by misfortune, be cast upon the shores of your kingdom, are the chief objects which the undersigned had in view in coming here.
These objects he is still anxious to accomplish, and is prepared to exercise patience and forbearance in order that further hostilities may be avoided. It remains for His Majesty to decide whether the ends aimed at shall be attained peaceably, in accordance with the earnest desire of the undersigned and his Government, or whether our peaceful overtures will be met in the future, as they have been in the past, by force of arms.
The undersigned trusts that His Majesty will, upon a careful review of the whole question, conclude to meet these advances in a just and friendly spirit, and that a person of suitable rank will soon be sent to consult, with a view of arranging the questions which are likely to disturb amicable relations. The undersigned hopes for a speedy and frank reply to this note.
The undersigned has the honor to wish His Majesty health and happiness.
TUNG-CHIH, 10th year, 4th moon, and 27th day, (June 14, 1871)
FREDERICK F. LOW
FREDERICK F. LOW
NOTE.
This dispatch was returned by the prefect with a note, saying that he dare not forward it.
This dispatch was returned by the prefect with a note, saying that he dare not forward it.
별지: No. 16
Translation of dispatch from the magistrate of Foo-Ping-Foo, received from Guerrière Island at 10 a. m. on Saturday, June 17.
별지: No. 17
Mr. Drew, acting secretary of legation, makes the following communication to Ki, guardian general of Fu Ping prefecture.
별지: No. 18
Translation of a dispatch from the prefect of Foo Ping to Mr. Drew; received June 20, 1871.
색인어
- 이름
- Drew, Blake, Drew, Mr. Drew, Drew, Rodgers’s, Blake, Low’s, Drew, Low, Drew, drew, Drew, Low’s, Edward B. Drew, Rodgers, H. C. Blake, L. A. Kimberly, Kimberly, Homer C. Blake, Blake, Blake, Blake, Drew, Drew
- 지명
- China, Corea, the United States, Corea, the Peiho River, Guerriere Island, Peking, Fort du Conde, Fort du Conde, Guerriere Island, Fu-Ping, Peking, the Salée River, Fort du Conde, Corea, Fort du Conde, Guerriere Island, Guerrière Island, Guerrière Island, China, Corea, Peking, China, Corea, China, Japan, Corea, Guerrière Island
- 관서
- the Government of the United States, the Navy Department, the government, the Government of the United States
