재일한인의 집단 북송에 관한 문제
Problem Paper
February 2, 1959
QUESTION OF THE SO-CALLED GROUP REPATRIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN TO "NORTH KOREA "
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The long pending question of those Korean residents in Japan who are allegedly desirous of going to north Korea was precipitated to the forefront by the Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama's statement of January 30, that the Japanese Government would take immediate measures to repatriate as soon as possible the Koreans in question to "north Korea." According to the cable-report fromour Mission in Tokyo, the Japanese Government has not made its final decision yet, but it is said that the Government decision might be made at the cabinet meeting to be held sometime this week. It is, however, reported that Prime Minister, "Kishi" and Foreign Minister, "Fujiyama" have already agreed to the principle of repatriation of the Koreans to "North Korea."
Concrete measures under consideration by the Japanese Foreign Ministry seen to be that, firstly, the Japanese would, request the ICRC in Geneva through the Japanese Red Cross to dispatch an investigation team of ICRC to Japan for its investigation on the situation of the so-called group repatriation movement to "North Korea " and, secondly, the Japanese Government would consider actual repatriation measures according to the results of investigations and recommendations of ICRC.
According to the latest press report, it is said that the Japanese Government, met with strong opposition from our Government, will postpone its final decision on this question until the end of February.
II. PRESUMED REASONS FOR THE JAPANESE DETERMINATION
TO REPATRIATE THE KOREA TO NORTH KOREA.
It was the long cherished desire of the Japanese Government to drive out of Japan as many Korean residents as possible. The Japanese Government is apparently going to take this opportunity to satisfy the said desire.
The Japanese Government took this particular moment presumably for the following reasons:
1. The Japanese Government gave up the hope that it would be able to find a clue for realizing a mass deportation of Koreans by the Korea-Japan talks.
2. The intrar-party fend of the Government Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, has at least temporarily been ceased with the election of "Kishi" as president of the Party on January 24.
3. Our patrol vessel seized two Japanese fishing boats for their violation of our Peace Line on January 22. The Japanese Government feels it opportune to make reprisal against our Government.
4. The good fishing season around the Korean penninsula is going to be over, so that the Japanese Government does'nt have to worry much about the seizure by our patrol vessels of the Japanese fishing boats being.
5. The North Korean puppet regime announced its readiness to accept the Koreans is question, thus encouraging the Japanese Government to take measures to repatriate them to north Korea.
6. The Japanese Red Cross Society which was presumably abetted by the Government courses passed a resolution on January 20, to the effect that the question of the repatriation should quickly be settled from the so-called humanitarian viewpoint free from politics in the light of a resolution of the 19th International Conference of Red Cross held in New Deli in 1957, and urged the Japanese Government to repatriate the Koreans to north Korea, thus providing the Japanese Government with a ground for its determination.
7. The so-called Choryun, grasping this opportunity, stepped up its movement for the repatriation with possible disturbance of the public order of Japan, thus providing the Japanese Government with an excuse to take necessary measures.
III. THE REASONS WHY WE HAVE TO OPPOSE THE REP ATRIATION PLOT.
1. The Republic of Korea's prestige vis-a-vis north Korean puppet regime would be greatly harmed, if the group repatriation were to be really materialized.
2. The communist elements in south Korea would first smuggle into Japan for the purpose of proceeding to north Korea instead of the Armistice Line. Thus the route for communist elements to north korea will be wide open with adverse consequence to our security.
3. Most of Korean residents in Japan are floating elements politically. The fest that, if they ever want or have to return to Korea, they may be allowed only to choose south Korea has apparently played a role of safety valve preventing them from joining the communists. If they become free to go to north Korea, we will Lose one of the safety valves. This was evidenced by the fact that when we signed an agreement with the Japanese Government for the resumption of the Korea-Japan talks on December 31, 1957, a great number of Korean residents who had not been very cooperative with our Mission in Tokyo became cooperative.
4. Some of fervent communists repatriated to north Korea from Japan might undertake in north Korea the so-called sealed-training for espionage and might be sent back to Japan which might in turn become an excellent espionage center against the Republic of Korea.
IV. POSSIBLE COUNTER-MEASUPES TO BE TAKEN BY OUR GOVERNMENT
AND POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
1. This question of the so-called group repatriation is long pending since 1955, despite the earnest Japanese desire to materialize the group repatriation. The Japanese Government has withheld its enforcement apparently in the hope that it can make use of it for ensuring better bargaining position in settling other various pending questions between Korea and Japan. Therefore, if we concede somewhat to the Japanese position on other questions or give the Japanese Government a hint to do so, there is a possibility that it will again withhold its enforcement. For instance, if we give a hint of concession in the question of deportation criteria for Korean residents in Japan or in the question of fisheries, the Japanese Government may withhold its enforcement for the time being.
2. To retaliate the possible group repatriation, we will seize as many Japanese fishing boats as possible when they violate our Peace Line thus making it clear to the Japanese Government that the group repatriation would be very costly.
3. We will show our firm determination to block the possible repatriation even with employment of force, even if they are transported aboard a vessel of a third country, thus making the Japanese hesitate to transport the Koreans in question to north Korea.
V. IN CASE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ENFORCE THE GROUP REPATRIATION, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
1. We have no choice other than to break the 4th Korea-Japan talks. If the Japanese Government enforces group repatriation despite our firm objection and determination, it would be an unmistakable evidence that the Japanese Government has no intention to get along with us in settling various other pending problems. Therefore, even if we continue the talks, no tangible result will come out of it unless we agree to the Japanese terms in every question including the question of legal status of Korean residents in Japan. However, it would be unwise to break the talks so far as the Japanese Government is hesitating to enforce the repatriation, since the talks may serve as a deterrent against the enforcement.
2. We will take the measures as envisaged in the above. (2 and 3 of IV)
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The long pending question of those Korean residents in Japan who are allegedly desirous of going to north Korea was precipitated to the forefront by the Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama's statement of January 30, that the Japanese Government would take immediate measures to repatriate as soon as possible the Koreans in question to "north Korea." According to the cable-report fromour Mission in Tokyo, the Japanese Government has not made its final decision yet, but it is said that the Government decision might be made at the cabinet meeting to be held sometime this week. It is, however, reported that Prime Minister, "Kishi" and Foreign Minister, "Fujiyama" have already agreed to the principle of repatriation of the Koreans to "North Korea."
Concrete measures under consideration by the Japanese Foreign Ministry seen to be that, firstly, the Japanese would, request the ICRC in Geneva through the Japanese Red Cross to dispatch an investigation team of ICRC to Japan for its investigation on the situation of the so-called group repatriation movement to "North Korea " and, secondly, the Japanese Government would consider actual repatriation measures according to the results of investigations and recommendations of ICRC.
According to the latest press report, it is said that the Japanese Government, met with strong opposition from our Government, will postpone its final decision on this question until the end of February.
II. PRESUMED REASONS FOR THE JAPANESE DETERMINATION
TO REPATRIATE THE KOREA TO NORTH KOREA.
It was the long cherished desire of the Japanese Government to drive out of Japan as many Korean residents as possible. The Japanese Government is apparently going to take this opportunity to satisfy the said desire.
The Japanese Government took this particular moment presumably for the following reasons:
1. The Japanese Government gave up the hope that it would be able to find a clue for realizing a mass deportation of Koreans by the Korea-Japan talks.
2. The intrar-party fend of the Government Party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, has at least temporarily been ceased with the election of "Kishi" as president of the Party on January 24.
3. Our patrol vessel seized two Japanese fishing boats for their violation of our Peace Line on January 22. The Japanese Government feels it opportune to make reprisal against our Government.
4. The good fishing season around the Korean penninsula is going to be over, so that the Japanese Government does'nt have to worry much about the seizure by our patrol vessels of the Japanese fishing boats being.
5. The North Korean puppet regime announced its readiness to accept the Koreans is question, thus encouraging the Japanese Government to take measures to repatriate them to north Korea.
6. The Japanese Red Cross Society which was presumably abetted by the Government courses passed a resolution on January 20, to the effect that the question of the repatriation should quickly be settled from the so-called humanitarian viewpoint free from politics in the light of a resolution of the 19th International Conference of Red Cross held in New Deli in 1957, and urged the Japanese Government to repatriate the Koreans to north Korea, thus providing the Japanese Government with a ground for its determination.
7. The so-called Choryun, grasping this opportunity, stepped up its movement for the repatriation with possible disturbance of the public order of Japan, thus providing the Japanese Government with an excuse to take necessary measures.
III. THE REASONS WHY WE HAVE TO OPPOSE THE REP ATRIATION PLOT.
1. The Republic of Korea's prestige vis-a-vis north Korean puppet regime would be greatly harmed, if the group repatriation were to be really materialized.
2. The communist elements in south Korea would first smuggle into Japan for the purpose of proceeding to north Korea instead of the Armistice Line. Thus the route for communist elements to north korea will be wide open with adverse consequence to our security.
3. Most of Korean residents in Japan are floating elements politically. The fest that, if they ever want or have to return to Korea, they may be allowed only to choose south Korea has apparently played a role of safety valve preventing them from joining the communists. If they become free to go to north Korea, we will Lose one of the safety valves. This was evidenced by the fact that when we signed an agreement with the Japanese Government for the resumption of the Korea-Japan talks on December 31, 1957, a great number of Korean residents who had not been very cooperative with our Mission in Tokyo became cooperative.
4. Some of fervent communists repatriated to north Korea from Japan might undertake in north Korea the so-called sealed-training for espionage and might be sent back to Japan which might in turn become an excellent espionage center against the Republic of Korea.
IV. POSSIBLE COUNTER-MEASUPES TO BE TAKEN BY OUR GOVERNMENT
AND POSSIBLE REACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
1. This question of the so-called group repatriation is long pending since 1955, despite the earnest Japanese desire to materialize the group repatriation. The Japanese Government has withheld its enforcement apparently in the hope that it can make use of it for ensuring better bargaining position in settling other various pending questions between Korea and Japan. Therefore, if we concede somewhat to the Japanese position on other questions or give the Japanese Government a hint to do so, there is a possibility that it will again withhold its enforcement. For instance, if we give a hint of concession in the question of deportation criteria for Korean residents in Japan or in the question of fisheries, the Japanese Government may withhold its enforcement for the time being.
2. To retaliate the possible group repatriation, we will seize as many Japanese fishing boats as possible when they violate our Peace Line thus making it clear to the Japanese Government that the group repatriation would be very costly.
3. We will show our firm determination to block the possible repatriation even with employment of force, even if they are transported aboard a vessel of a third country, thus making the Japanese hesitate to transport the Koreans in question to north Korea.
V. IN CASE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ENFORCE THE GROUP REPATRIATION, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
1. We have no choice other than to break the 4th Korea-Japan talks. If the Japanese Government enforces group repatriation despite our firm objection and determination, it would be an unmistakable evidence that the Japanese Government has no intention to get along with us in settling various other pending problems. Therefore, even if we continue the talks, no tangible result will come out of it unless we agree to the Japanese terms in every question including the question of legal status of Korean residents in Japan. However, it would be unwise to break the talks so far as the Japanese Government is hesitating to enforce the repatriation, since the talks may serve as a deterrent against the enforcement.
2. We will take the measures as envisaged in the above. (2 and 3 of IV)
색인어
- 지명
- NORTH KOREA, north Korea, north Korea, Tokyo, North Korea, Geneva, Japan, North Korea, Japan, the Korean penninsula, north Korea, New Deli, Japan, south Korea, Japan, north Korea, north korea, Japan, Korea, south Korea, north Korea, Tokyo, north Korea, Japan, north Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, north Korea
- 관서
- the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, The North Korean puppet regime, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, north Korean puppet regime, the Japanese Government, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, The Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government
- 단체
- the ICRC, the Japanese Red Cross, ICRC, ICRC, the Liberal-Democratic Party, The Japanese Red Cross Society
- 기타
- GROUP REPATRIATION OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN, Korean residents in Japan, repatriation of the Koreans, REPATRIATE THE KOREA TO NORTH KOREA, deportation of Koreans, the Korea-Japan talks, Peace Line, 19th International Conference of Red Cross, repatriate the Koreans to north Korea, the Armistice Line, the Korea-Japan talks, Korean residents in Japan, Peace Line, the 4th Korea-Japan talks, legal status of Korean residents in Japan
