억류자 문제에 관한 4월 2일자 협정에 대한 일본의 반응에 대한 특별보고
April 19, 1956
CONFIDENTIAL
To: Office of the resident
From: Minister Yong Shik Kim
Subject: Special Report regarding Reactions in Japan on the April 2 Agreement on Jetainees Issue.
From: Minister Yong Shik Kim
Subject: Special Report regarding Reactions in Japan on the April 2 Agreement on Jetainees Issue.
I. As reported previously, Japanese newspapers ditorially commented that Foreign Minister shirenitsu made the "one-sided concessions to the Korean side regarding the year-old detainees issue by agreeing to the Korean request that those Korean detainees at Omura who entered Jagan before the end of world War II be unconditionally released in Japan and that since the Japanese Government agreed on their release in the light of the importance of the easing of the existing undesirable Korean-Japan relations, the Korean side was also requested to reciporcate by taking it into consideration in the forthcoming talks at the working level that the Japanese aide "really" showed its "sincerity! toward the settlement of outstanding is. ues with korea. And at the same time, the japanese Justice sinistry raised various complainte about the April 2 Agreement, charging that Foreign Minister Shigentsu unilaterally accepted the Korean request. Justice Kinistry has continuously objected to Mr. Shigemitsu's arrangements with this Office, on the pretext that the Japanese Government has the right to the deportation of such Koreans belonging to the pre-war-end category because they became automatically aliens upon the termination of the War and that once they are released, it would seriouiy affect the public security of Japan.
Thus, the Foreign Ministry and the Justice Ministry have so far been at odds with each other due to their different views on the detainees issue.
In the meantime, Shigemitsu is now placed in a hard position, because the Jajanese Diet intervened in his agreement with the Korean side on the detainees issue. On April 13, Shigemitsu was invited to the lower louse Judicial Committee and the following questions and answers were exchanged between member of the Diet and Shigenitsu: Question:"we hear that Foreign Minister Shigenitsu agreed with Minister him on the release of Korean detainees in Japan in exchange for Japanese fisherman now detained in Korea. Kas the agreement been made on the basis of the Cabinet decision or of your own judgement?" Shironi tau: "Tha Sbigemitau-Kim agreementwas reached, based on the Cabinet decision."
Question: " Now, if Japan releases such korean detainees from ◆mura, will the Korean side confirm that such Koreans are of the RoK nationality?"
Shigemitsu: " Such questions could be discussed when and if the formal Korean-Japan Conference is opened. He can not take up such fundamental issues at this stage."
Now, in conaction with the detailnees issue, it is very intestating to note that Japanese are now placed in the derenaive position and that they are arguing between theliselves. And at the same time, the Govement Party also began to take up this matter, since the two Ministries ( Forsien and justice Mnistries) concerned are still arguing with each other, thus giving an unfavourable imression to the Japanese public in general as well as diglomatic circles here. Thus, the Foreign Affaires search Connittee of Libral -Democratic .arty, on April 13, startad adjusting the different views held between the two Ministries concerned. And the Committee decided that this Government should try to settle the detaines issue, together with other pending issues between Korea and Japan through exploratory talk between the two countries.
Thus, the Foreign Ministry and the Justice Ministry have so far been at odds with each other due to their different views on the detainees issue.
In the meantime, Shigemitsu is now placed in a hard position, because the Jajanese Diet intervened in his agreement with the Korean side on the detainees issue. On April 13, Shigemitsu was invited to the lower louse Judicial Committee and the following questions and answers were exchanged between member of the Diet and Shigenitsu: Question:"we hear that Foreign Minister Shigenitsu agreed with Minister him on the release of Korean detainees in Japan in exchange for Japanese fisherman now detained in Korea. Kas the agreement been made on the basis of the Cabinet decision or of your own judgement?" Shironi tau: "Tha Sbigemitau-Kim agreementwas reached, based on the Cabinet decision."
Question: " Now, if Japan releases such korean detainees from ◆mura, will the Korean side confirm that such Koreans are of the RoK nationality?"
Shigemitsu: " Such questions could be discussed when and if the formal Korean-Japan Conference is opened. He can not take up such fundamental issues at this stage."
Now, in conaction with the detailnees issue, it is very intestating to note that Japanese are now placed in the derenaive position and that they are arguing between theliselves. And at the same time, the Govement Party also began to take up this matter, since the two Ministries ( Forsien and justice Mnistries) concerned are still arguing with each other, thus giving an unfavourable imression to the Japanese public in general as well as diglomatic circles here. Thus, the Foreign Affaires search Connittee of Libral -Democratic .arty, on April 13, startad adjusting the different views held between the two Ministries concerned. And the Committee decided that this Government should try to settle the detaines issue, together with other pending issues between Korea and Japan through exploratory talk between the two countries.
II. Anyhow, the Japanese Foreign linistry has almost overcome the domestic problems regarding the detainees issue, for, on April 17, it notified to this Office that the Japanese representatives at the working Committee were pre-pared to meet their korean counterparts at 10:10 on April 20, to which this Office also agreed. Thus, the working Commnittee will begin its function from the coming friday. And this Office is also ready to request at the Committee meeting that Japan should return the trouble-making koreans here in Japan.
During the period of serious arguments which arose between the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry, this Office has continuously given pressure to Jap anese, requesting for an early implementation of the agreed terms between the two countries. Thus, it is obvious that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has been on the horns of a dilemma because of the domestic politics and external pressures.
During the period of serious arguments which arose between the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry, this Office has continuously given pressure to Jap anese, requesting for an early implementation of the agreed terms between the two countries. Thus, it is obvious that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has been on the horns of a dilemma because of the domestic politics and external pressures.
III. Another important feature relewant to the April 2 Agreement is its effect which has been caused upon the Korean residents in Japan as a whole. Those Koreans who belong to the Korean insidents Union in Japan (loyal horeans' ◆sociation) are most-heartedly welcoming the April 2 Agreement, commenting that the Korean Government has succeeded in Pretecting their residence right in Japan by "its untiring efforts" so far made over a period of more than four years. Their groundless complaints which had been liable to be made about the home Govermanent's "indifferent attitude toward their interests in Japan" which is just reverse of the truth have entirely been got rid of from the date of the announcement of the April 2 Agreement through Japanese newspapers. Some of them openly expressed their appreciation to the "hard work" done by this Office under the instruction from the home Government. And it is of a great significance that a number of Koreans who formerly followed the middle-on-the-roadism or the leftist line have begant to change their mind to be admitted into the loyal Koreans camp. This fact will clearly show that the prestige of our loyal Koreens here has been greatly enhanced and that they have come to support our Government even stronger than ever.
On the other hand, those Koreans who belong to the leftist camp have been quite at a loss how to maintain their force in Japan. They are Particularly disapointed to see that all the korean Smigglers including Communist elements now detained at Osmira are to be deported to the Republic of Korea, in the light of the fact that they had repeatedly appealed to the Japan Red Cross society as well as the Socialist party for realization of their repatriation to North Korea instead of the Republic of Korea.
On the other hand, those Koreans who belong to the leftist camp have been quite at a loss how to maintain their force in Japan. They are Particularly disapointed to see that all the korean Smigglers including Communist elements now detained at Osmira are to be deported to the Republic of Korea, in the light of the fact that they had repeatedly appealed to the Japan Red Cross society as well as the Socialist party for realization of their repatriation to North Korea instead of the Republic of Korea.
Under the circumstances, this office sent ◆…◆ Choi to the Japanese Foreign Ministry on March 30 in order to strongly demand that the Japanese Government refrain from allowing any of such Koreans to return to North Korea either individually or in prouds. And this Office reminded the Japanese Foreign Office that if would ◆ean that Japan basically upsets ◆◆e a◆◆eement on the detainees inssue itself, toward such as strong request from this Office, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office confirmed the Korean atand at the press conference held on April, 1956. He hold the press that the Korean Government is strongly opposed to repatriation of Koreans to North Korea under any circumstances.
Ⅳ. After the April 2 Agreement was reached, both the North Korean puppet regime and leftist Koreans here very much disappointed and discouraged. On April 8, the North Korean puppet regime is◆◆◆d through Pyungyang radio a statment that the Japanese Government decided to deport Korean detainees at Omura to South Korea in exchange for Japanese fisherman detained in ◆usan, but such an action should not have been taken by the Japanese Government unilaterally, ect.
On April 11, the North Korean Red Cross sent the Japanese Red Cross a telegram in an effect that the latter was requested to render its good offices for enabling about 90 Korean detainees desirous of going to North Koreaa to get aboard the "Kojima" Maru, a Japanese Red Cross boats, which was bound for North Korea on April 17 to pick up about 60 Japanese nationals now in North Korea. But the Japanese Red Cross, after inquiring of the intention of the Japanese Foreign Office, dispatched an answering telegram to North Korea, saying that Japan can not allow such Koreans to get aboard the Kojima Maru because it will fail to obtain from the ROK side the safe-conduct of the vessel in its voyage to North Korea if it allows them to do so. Thus, the North Korean communists request was rejected by Japan.
Then, korean Communist elements here mobilized about 300 Korean pro-communists and petitioned to the Japanese Diet, the Foreign Office and the Japan Red Cross Headquaters for obtaining permission from the Japanese Government for the said 90 Koreans to go North Korea aboard the Kojima Maru. Such demonstrations on the part of pro-communist Koreans lasted for more than a week from April 8 to April 15. Many of them undertook a sit-down strike at the Japan Red Cross Office, requesting for their demand to be accepted by the Japanese Government.Under the circumstances, the Japn Red Cross was obliged to request to the police for mobilizations of the police force to let these pro-Communist demonstrators be diapersed from the Red Cross Office building.
Thus, these pro-communist Koreans were forced to move out of the Red Cross without attaining their aim.
On April 11, the North Korean Red Cross sent the Japanese Red Cross a telegram in an effect that the latter was requested to render its good offices for enabling about 90 Korean detainees desirous of going to North Koreaa to get aboard the "Kojima" Maru, a Japanese Red Cross boats, which was bound for North Korea on April 17 to pick up about 60 Japanese nationals now in North Korea. But the Japanese Red Cross, after inquiring of the intention of the Japanese Foreign Office, dispatched an answering telegram to North Korea, saying that Japan can not allow such Koreans to get aboard the Kojima Maru because it will fail to obtain from the ROK side the safe-conduct of the vessel in its voyage to North Korea if it allows them to do so. Thus, the North Korean communists request was rejected by Japan.
Then, korean Communist elements here mobilized about 300 Korean pro-communists and petitioned to the Japanese Diet, the Foreign Office and the Japan Red Cross Headquaters for obtaining permission from the Japanese Government for the said 90 Koreans to go North Korea aboard the Kojima Maru. Such demonstrations on the part of pro-communist Koreans lasted for more than a week from April 8 to April 15. Many of them undertook a sit-down strike at the Japan Red Cross Office, requesting for their demand to be accepted by the Japanese Government.Under the circumstances, the Japn Red Cross was obliged to request to the police for mobilizations of the police force to let these pro-Communist demonstrators be diapersed from the Red Cross Office building.
Thus, these pro-communist Koreans were forced to move out of the Red Cross without attaining their aim.
Ⅴ. As briefly mentioned in the forgoing paragraphs, the April 2 Agreement on the detainees issue aroused a flare of sensation among the Japanese and Foreign circles as well as the Korean Communists here to the advantage of our Government. And the effects of the Agreement are summarized as follows:
1. The Aprill 2 Agreement has virtually placed the Japanese Government on the compete defensive, marking the Japanese Foreign Office be on the horns of a dilemma. It also arouse internal disputes on the part of Japanese Ministries concerned.
2. The Agreement has given a serious embarrasuant as well as disappointment to the pro-Communist Korean community in Japan and also caused a vital blow to the North Korean puppet regime. And it will be easily concluded that the pro-Communist korean force will be weakened gradually as the Agreement is being imulemented.
3. In the other hand, those Koreans belonging to the Korean Restdents union in Japan(loyal korean's Association) have been greatly encouraged and many of the middle-on the-road Koreans have begun to reconsider their past attitude to the Republic of Korea. In fact, a number of koreans here will change their mind and get to suport our Government strongly from now on. ◆sychological effects of the Agreament upon Korean residents in japan could by no means be underastimated.
4. The fact that Japanese Ministries concerned have been arguing with each other after Shigemitsu, in his copacity as the Foreign Minister of Japan, agreed with the Korean side on the detainees issue, has greatly served as an important factor of making a spectacle of themselves particularly in the eyes of diplomatic deals with Korean and evidence of their adamant attitude toward Korea.
As enumbrated above, indeed the April 2 Agreement has brought about a number of unexpected results to the advantage of our side, but our side should be continuously on alert against the possible Japanese excuse at the working Committee meetings which will be held from Aprill 20. And if Japanese should eat their words at the Committee meetings in formulating the making plans for the Agreement, we will Le ready to counter Japanese arguments, stating that such attitude of Japan is a clear-cut evidence of her dual diplomacy. And this Office, as instructed by the Governant, will let our representatives raise the question of troubls-making Koreans in Japan at the forthcoming working Committee meetings. Developments at the meetings will be resorted to the Government in Succession.
