(Enclosure of Woijung No.2897)

July 29, 1958

Instructions - Part II
To : Ambassador Limb and Minister Yiu
The Oral Statement as referred to in Item one of the Ministry's Instructions - Part-I is to be delivered by Ambassador Limb and Minister Yiu to the Japanese Foreign Minister. The points to be delivered are as follows:
1. As the Korean side repeatedly told the Japanese side, the Japanese unilateral decision to release on parole 26 out of 92 Korean detainees, who are allegedly desirous of going to north Korea, is a violation of the terms agreed upon on December 31, 1957. It is to be also recalled that at the Korea-Japan Working Committee, the Japanese Delegate clearly stated that "all those Koreans in question will be repatriated to the Republic of Korea in principle and that none of them will be sent to north Korea or be released in Japan."
2. In discussing on the problem of deportation of illegal Korean entrants, the Japanese side is quoting its own version of summary record of the so-called Kim-Nakagawa informal talks, which were held on an off-record basis. The Korean side doubts with surprise whether, in the light of rules practised in diplomatic meeting, an informal off-the-record remarks can supersede the Agreed Minutes duly signed or remarks formally made by responsible delegate at formal session of the conference. The Japanese side is also quoting the terms of the so-called Kim-Shigemitsu understanding of April 2, 1956 for its own convenience. But it is well-known fact that the above understanding proved abortive whereas the Japanese Government refused to honor the terms for a reason or reasons which are unknown to the Korean side.
3. If, as the Japanese Government insists, the Kim-Nakagawa conferees confirmed there was no obligation on the Japanese part to repatriate Korean illegal entrants to the Republic of Korea, the Korean side is at a loss to understand what the Japanese Government had in mind when signing Article 2 of the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957, which stipulated, ".... at the overall talks.... the problem of the deportation of illegal entrants will also be a subject of discussion."
4. In the early part of July, 1958, the Japanese side first told the Korean side that those 26 Korean detainees in question were exposed to imminent danger of life after a hunger strike, and were to be released in Japan. But recently the Japanese side told the Korean side that those 26 Korean detainees at Omura "who had been under detention for more than three years" would be released. Now, the Korean Government cannot but wonder whether the Japanese side is taking up the issue really from humanitarian standpoint or from political standpoint. The Japanese Government seems to have realized, at least, consequences which might arise from such release of detainees. It may be so in view of the fact that 9 out of those detainees who desire to go to the Republic of Korea were already released without knowledge of the Korean Government, while the case of the 26 persons was notified to Korean side.
5. For its own argument, the Japanese Government stated that the list of 1,259 Korean detainees, which was handed to the Korean side on January 27, 1958, was "not that of deportees" but "plainly that of detained Korean illegal entrants ". Granting such argument to be grounded, the Korean Government seriously wonders why the Japanese Government had to hand to the Korean Government the list including those who have nothing to do with deportation.
6. The question is not number of detainees which might be released, but real motives of the Japanese Government in reaching such decision. The Korean Government cannot but be seriously concerned over this Japanese decision. For consequences which might ensue from the release of the 26 detainees in question, the Japanese Government should be solely responsible.
7. The Korean Government, however, has no intention of coming to a hasty conclusion to cope with the present circumstances, still believing that this question can be reasonably settled without impeding the smooth proceeding of the Korea-Japan Conference, only if the Japanese side is ready to show its sincerity to consult with the Korean side on this issue. If the Korean detainees in question are found really to be in imminent danger of life, the Korean Government is ready to give them utmost humanitarian consideration, for instance, paying paroles and undertaking guarantors for those whose release is contemplated, if the Japanese regulations so requires, with understanding that such release would in no way affect their detainee status.

(End)