다울링 대사와의 대화
POLITICAL AFFAIRS BUREAU Document No.
Date Aug.16, 1957
MEMO
To :
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○ For your information
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○ Urgent
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Vice M's Convention with Amb. Dowling
August 13, 1957
TO : MR. Chung, Cho, Foreign Minister
From : Long Jo Kim, Vice-Minister
Subject : Conversation with Ambassador Dowling
At a ln choon given by Ambassador Dowling in honor of Ambassador Molik of Pakistan in Japan at 12:30 ◆…◆. Monday, August 12, Where I ◆…◆ were sole Korean invitees, Ambassador Dowling, asked so, showing ◆reat interest, about the latest development on the Korea-Japan relations. The following is a gist of conversation conducted between Ambassador Dowling and ◆◆◆◆◆◆:
Kim:
You tell us that it would be to the best interest of the Republic of Korea to settle k-j problems at the carliest possible date, but the Japanese attitude toward for Korea since 1951 can never be regarded as sincere. As you any recall, the Japanese Government failed to implement the Agreement on the release of detainees under the excuse that a disparity of opinion existed among the ministries concerned. Korea's suspicion toward the Japanese attitude is well grounded in view of our past experiences with the Japanese.
You know it very well that our side has always been ready to resume negotiations with the Japanese site at all time, but it is a matter to be regretted that Japanese side is rejecting our proposal on property claims Issue. The U.S. Memorandum contains para◆◆◆◆s giving favorable interpretation to the Japanese position, and this part of the memorandum cannot be accepted by our side. ◆ an of the view that, since the U.S. Memorandum was protected to our side on informal. basis, we do not r◆◆◆rd ourselves legally bow to abide by the memorandum.
You tell us that it would be to the best interest of the Republic of Korea to settle k-j problems at the carliest possible date, but the Japanese attitude toward for Korea since 1951 can never be regarded as sincere. As you any recall, the Japanese Government failed to implement the Agreement on the release of detainees under the excuse that a disparity of opinion existed among the ministries concerned. Korea's suspicion toward the Japanese attitude is well grounded in view of our past experiences with the Japanese.
You know it very well that our side has always been ready to resume negotiations with the Japanese site at all time, but it is a matter to be regretted that Japanese side is rejecting our proposal on property claims Issue. The U.S. Memorandum contains para◆◆◆◆s giving favorable interpretation to the Japanese position, and this part of the memorandum cannot be accepted by our side. ◆ an of the view that, since the U.S. Memorandum was protected to our side on informal. basis, we do not r◆◆◆rd ourselves legally bow to abide by the memorandum.
Dowling:
I agree that Japanese side was insincere toward Korea in the past. When I visited Japan last time, I decided with Ambassador MacArthur on the issues of K-J relations. As you know, Amb. MacArthur is not a pro-Japanese. nor dose he belong to a pro-Japanese school. He talked with Premier Kishi. on K-J Issues on two occasions, and according to Amb. MacArthur, Kishi was saying that he was doing his best to make Japanese Foreign Ministry's bureaucrats not to stick to the legality of the issues too much, but come to terms with Korea by accepting Korean position to the maximum extent possible, but since he had to go through the Diet over which he had no control, he said he could not guarantee that he would get Diet's nod on the property class issues on the Korean terms. Kishi is further quoted to have request Amb. MacArthur to ◆…◆ him saying that he would do his utnest in settling property claims issues item by item when ◆…◆ issues. Amb. MacArthur as well as myself believe Premier Kishi to be a trustworthy ◆◆◆ and we do not think that the Japanese Government under Kishi would be as ◆…◆ as the previous ◆◆◆◆.
The U.S. Memorandum ◆…◆ the constant policy of the U.S. Government applied to the disposition of ◆◆◆◆y properties during and after the world war II, in other words, the U.S. Government takes the stand that the ◆…◆ properties should be considered in the settlement of counter property claims ◆…◆. This principle was called to the settlement of property claims against Germany of France, Britain and Austria.
I had an occasion to discuss this issue with president Rhee and the President told he that he did not like the U.S. Memorandum but since it came into existence is a result of Korea's request for a U.S. interpretation, he could not but accept it as such. Since you are the official in charge of handling K-J problems at the Foreign Ministry, you should take account of this position of President Rhee, I believe.
I agree that Japanese side was insincere toward Korea in the past. When I visited Japan last time, I decided with Ambassador MacArthur on the issues of K-J relations. As you know, Amb. MacArthur is not a pro-Japanese. nor dose he belong to a pro-Japanese school. He talked with Premier Kishi. on K-J Issues on two occasions, and according to Amb. MacArthur, Kishi was saying that he was doing his best to make Japanese Foreign Ministry's bureaucrats not to stick to the legality of the issues too much, but come to terms with Korea by accepting Korean position to the maximum extent possible, but since he had to go through the Diet over which he had no control, he said he could not guarantee that he would get Diet's nod on the property class issues on the Korean terms. Kishi is further quoted to have request Amb. MacArthur to ◆…◆ him saying that he would do his utnest in settling property claims issues item by item when ◆…◆ issues. Amb. MacArthur as well as myself believe Premier Kishi to be a trustworthy ◆◆◆ and we do not think that the Japanese Government under Kishi would be as ◆…◆ as the previous ◆◆◆◆.
The U.S. Memorandum ◆…◆ the constant policy of the U.S. Government applied to the disposition of ◆◆◆◆y properties during and after the world war II, in other words, the U.S. Government takes the stand that the ◆…◆ properties should be considered in the settlement of counter property claims ◆…◆. This principle was called to the settlement of property claims against Germany of France, Britain and Austria.
I had an occasion to discuss this issue with president Rhee and the President told he that he did not like the U.S. Memorandum but since it came into existence is a result of Korea's request for a U.S. interpretation, he could not but accept it as such. Since you are the official in charge of handling K-J problems at the Foreign Ministry, you should take account of this position of President Rhee, I believe.
Kim:
Slice the U.S. Memorandum was handed to our side on informal basis and since we do not regard the interpretation to be appropriate, we would like to request ◆…◆ to consider it again.
Slice the U.S. Memorandum was handed to our side on informal basis and since we do not regard the interpretation to be appropriate, we would like to request ◆…◆ to consider it again.
Dowling:
The U.S. ◆…◆ the constant policy of the U.S. Government and it in no way ◆…◆ Japan against Korea or treat Korea in a ◆…◆. Amb. MacArthur was of the opinion that he was not in a position to interfere into the K-J relations any further so long as the pending issues between the two countries are related to the property claims issues which are ◆◆◆tered around the U.S.Memorandum. I share this opinion of Amb. MacArthur.
The U.S. Government ◆…◆ support home to ◆…◆ reparations from Japan and the U.S. Government also cannot alter its position on the U.S. Memorandum, but it can assure the Korean side that it can be instrumental in having Japan come to agree 100% to the Korean claims such as:
The U.S. ◆…◆ the constant policy of the U.S. Government and it in no way ◆…◆ Japan against Korea or treat Korea in a ◆…◆. Amb. MacArthur was of the opinion that he was not in a position to interfere into the K-J relations any further so long as the pending issues between the two countries are related to the property claims issues which are ◆◆◆tered around the U.S.Memorandum. I share this opinion of Amb. MacArthur.
The U.S. Government ◆…◆ support home to ◆…◆ reparations from Japan and the U.S. Government also cannot alter its position on the U.S. Memorandum, but it can assure the Korean side that it can be instrumental in having Japan come to agree 100% to the Korean claims such as:
Korea's national treasures, Japanese Government debts, National or Public bonds, ◆…◆, Labor draftees' compensations etc.
and let Japanese side pay in full sum to Korea. it can also help Korea by advising Japan to ◆…◆ with Korea on a few claims itons and pay about 50% of the Korean claims. I think Korea would get a few million dollars from Japan and there is a probility for ◆…◆ a few million dollars of long-ters loans Japan.
Kim:
Even in the Case of the Philippines which was under Japanese occupation only for 3-4 years, Japan agreed to pay 3600-million, If we are to demand in the ◆…◆portion, we will be demanding 8-billions from Japan for their illegal occupation of Korea nor nearly 40 years. ◆…◆personal view and I do not exactly recall the definite ◆…◆ of Korean claims against Japan.
Regarding the possibility of Japanese long-terms loans to Korea, I personality do net the Korean Government accepts such an offer from Japan.
I agree with you that we should negotiate through diplomatic channels to reach autually acceptable compromise, but if it is true that Japan is prepared to pay only a few million dollars to Korea, I would say the settlement of Property claims issues is hardly possible. the Peace Liue issuse is also an issue in which we are deoply concerned, and we know that the Government is taking a position favorable to the Japanese side.
Even in the Case of the Philippines which was under Japanese occupation only for 3-4 years, Japan agreed to pay 3600-million, If we are to demand in the ◆…◆portion, we will be demanding 8-billions from Japan for their illegal occupation of Korea nor nearly 40 years. ◆…◆personal view and I do not exactly recall the definite ◆…◆ of Korean claims against Japan.
Regarding the possibility of Japanese long-terms loans to Korea, I personality do net the Korean Government accepts such an offer from Japan.
I agree with you that we should negotiate through diplomatic channels to reach autually acceptable compromise, but if it is true that Japan is prepared to pay only a few million dollars to Korea, I would say the settlement of Property claims issues is hardly possible. the Peace Liue issuse is also an issue in which we are deoply concerned, and we know that the Government is taking a position favorable to the Japanese side.
Dowling:
I think the Japanese side will eventually come to recognize the Peace Liue, and ◆…◆ctory settle of the fishery issues is quite possible if the Korean ◆…◆ant ◆…◆ Japanese foreign to operate issues the Peace ◆◆◆◆ in a limited ◆…◆ Japanese positions ◆…◆Australia and the ◆…◆ accept such terms.
I think the Japanese side will eventually come to recognize the Peace Liue, and ◆…◆ctory settle of the fishery issues is quite possible if the Korean ◆…◆ant ◆…◆ Japanese foreign to operate issues the Peace ◆◆◆◆ in a limited ◆…◆ Japanese positions ◆…◆Australia and the ◆…◆ accept such terms.
Kim:
I wish to remand you of the fact that the Peace Lime is purported not only for the preservation of ◆…◆ resourses in the Korean ◆…◆ but also for the protections of national economys well as Korea's society. This fact in ◆…◆ overlooked by the ◆…◆ the Japanese ◆…◆ an important fact. I think it would be difficult for Korea to permit Japanese fishermen to come in the Peace ◆…◆ fishing operations.
I wish to remand you of the fact that the Peace Lime is purported not only for the preservation of ◆…◆ resourses in the Korean ◆…◆ but also for the protections of national economys well as Korea's society. This fact in ◆…◆ overlooked by the ◆…◆ the Japanese ◆…◆ an important fact. I think it would be difficult for Korea to permit Japanese fishermen to come in the Peace ◆…◆ fishing operations.
II. ◆…◆ THE ◆…◆
Taking the advantage of Ambassador Dowling's remarks about Under-◆◆◆◆tary of ◆…◆ Christian ◆…◆ and Amb. Richard who are to visit Korea after their attendance at the ◆…◆ration Germany of Malaya's independence, I asked him whether he thought the Pdedration of Malaya would invite Korea to attend the ◆…◆ ceremony. To this he answered that, junging from her foreign policies of ... with neutral ◆…◆of the Amb. ◆…◆ he thinks it would not invite any of the ◆…◆ countries such as Germany, Vietnam and Korea, but if the ◆…◆should use its good offices, it might be possible that Korea be ◆…◆ to the ceremony. He joined ◆…◆ "Why don't you ◆…◆yourself?"
Taking the advantage of Ambassador Dowling's remarks about Under-◆◆◆◆tary of ◆…◆ Christian ◆…◆ and Amb. Richard who are to visit Korea after their attendance at the ◆…◆ration Germany of Malaya's independence, I asked him whether he thought the Pdedration of Malaya would invite Korea to attend the ◆…◆ ceremony. To this he answered that, junging from her foreign policies of ... with neutral ◆…◆of the Amb. ◆…◆ he thinks it would not invite any of the ◆…◆ countries such as Germany, Vietnam and Korea, but if the ◆…◆should use its good offices, it might be possible that Korea be ◆…◆ to the ceremony. He joined ◆…◆ "Why don't you ◆…◆yourself?"
III. REGARDING THE ◆…◆ KOREA
Ambassador Dowling said that he feels cer◆…◆ that the coming session of the ◆…◆ Assembly will ◆◆◆◆ up the Korean unification issues with greater woight than that of the last year. He ◆…◆ his ◆…◆ on the following:
1) A portion of the ◆◆◆◆tice provisions has been ◆.....◆
2) A general eleation is expected to be held in north Korea at the and of August; and
3) A general election is scined to be held in the Republic of Korea ◆◆ today.
He said our ◆…◆arc◆naturally ◆◆◆◆ly concerned with the Issuse ◆…◆ but it must also be ◆…◆that ◆◆◆◆◆, too, is ◆eanly ◆…◆ issues because of the following reasons:
1) ◆◆◆◆ has China and Japan standing as rivals in her bid for leadership in Asia. in this ◆…◆ is desirous of ◆…◆ the unification of Korea ender her initiative and thround for efforts because such would ◆…◆tly in i◆…◆sing India's prestige in Asia.
2) Korea is a ◆…◆.
3) India's ◆…◆ foreign policies are ◆..◆for ◆…◆and a ◆◆◆◆◆ police.
India may here differant ◆....◆of attanding the unificetion of Korea from ◆…◆as ours, and this, Amb, bowling said, is the person why he believes that there would be an earnest discussion on the issue of Korea's unification.
Ambassador Dowling said that he feels cer◆…◆ that the coming session of the ◆…◆ Assembly will ◆◆◆◆ up the Korean unification issues with greater woight than that of the last year. He ◆…◆ his ◆…◆ on the following:
1) A portion of the ◆◆◆◆tice provisions has been ◆.....◆
2) A general eleation is expected to be held in north Korea at the and of August; and
3) A general election is scined to be held in the Republic of Korea ◆◆ today.
He said our ◆…◆arc◆naturally ◆◆◆◆ly concerned with the Issuse ◆…◆ but it must also be ◆…◆that ◆◆◆◆◆, too, is ◆eanly ◆…◆ issues because of the following reasons:
1) ◆◆◆◆ has China and Japan standing as rivals in her bid for leadership in Asia. in this ◆…◆ is desirous of ◆…◆ the unification of Korea ender her initiative and thround for efforts because such would ◆…◆tly in i◆…◆sing India's prestige in Asia.
2) Korea is a ◆…◆.
3) India's ◆…◆ foreign policies are ◆..◆for ◆…◆and a ◆◆◆◆◆ police.
India may here differant ◆....◆of attanding the unificetion of Korea from ◆…◆as ours, and this, Amb, bowling said, is the person why he believes that there would be an earnest discussion on the issue of Korea's unification.
