Mr. Low to Earl Granville.―(Received February 28)

Shanghae General Chamber of Commerce,
Shanghae, January 17, 1883

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to convey to your Lordship the thanks of the Committee of this Chamber for the copy of the British Treaty with the Corea which you have been good enough to forward, as well as for the expression of your willingness to listen to their views upon the question.
Acting upon your kind permission, I now have the honour to lay before you the Chamber's observations carry weight, and are worthy of consideration.
It must first be noticed that the Treaty is said to have been drawn up in the Tsung-li Yamên, and negotiated through the Chinese Government, and this alone is a sufficient reason for examining carefully how far the making of Concessions to the Coreans may bear upon existing Treaties with the neighbouring countries, in the event of their revision at a future time, when the waiving of certain privileges contained in the latter may be claimed on the ground that they are omitted from the former, and this knowledge of the real origin of the Corean Treaty makes it almost certain that it has been framed with this object, while it further appears that the Concessions made are so hampered with restrictions as to be in many instances useless for the purposes of trade, which it is understood it is the main object of the Treaty to develop.
Taking the Articles seriatim then:
Article I. Under the guise of friendly feeling, as the object of making the Treaty is to be very plainly seen that the real object was to hinder the carrying out of the threatened annexation of the Corea by Russia, a step to be dreaded alike by both Chinese and Coreans.
Article [II] provides for the appointment of Consuls at the open ports, which, however, are not specified; and as merchant Consuls are prohibited, the maintenance of these officials will be rather a serious burden in a country where the resources of the trade are not for some time likely to be very great, more especially under the restrictions contained in subsequent Articles.
Article III may be passed without comment, as a necessary provision in the event of accident.
Article IV deals with the punishment of criminal offences and the settlement of differences between foreigners and natives, but it contains no provision that the judgements of the native Courts will be enforced in the event of a foreigner suing a Corean, and experience of such matters in China gives little hope that the foreign interest will have due protection without some special proviso for the purpose.
The concluding paragraph with regard to the cessation of exterritoriality so soon as the laws of Corea are assimilated to those of Great Britain is hardly likely to come into effect, and as other nationalities whose laws differ from ours may claim the same privilege, there might be some difficulty in compiling such a Code as would meet all the exigencies of the case. It is true that the British Government is to be the Arbiter in such a case, but the clause is likely to be claimed for insertion into neighbouring countries’ Treaties, and may lead to complications which at the least will be vexatious and troublesome.
The same general remark applies to the 4th paragraph of Article V, which states that “articles of daily use” are to pay duty at not exceeding 10 per cent. ad valorem, while the duty on “luxuries,”―foreign wines, foreign tobacco, clocks, and watches, is not to exceed 30 per cent. ad valorem; but although there is a proviso that no further duties are to be charged on such goods on passing into the interior, it will be very difficult to provide with certainty for the free passage of such goods, and still more difficult to get proof in the event of the imposition of further inland taxation, which will probably only be discovered when such goods are found to be unremunerative and declined by the natives by reason of the extra imposts.
The term “articles of daily use” is extremely vague, and includes, no doubt, “stores” imported for foreign consumption, which are duty free under the Chinese Treaties. Foreign tobacco is also specifically mentioned as distinct from Chinese, so that Chinese tobacco will escape, while the article imported for foreign use will bear a heavy tax.
The tax, moreover, is put at too high a figure, at all events until the capabilities of the country for trade are ascertained with more certainty than at present, unless, which is not improbable, the object is to hold out as little inducement to foreign residence and trade as possible, and at the same time secure all the advantages of an alliance with a powerful nation.
The rate of tonnage dues is in excess of that charged in China, and there is, moreover, no provision for the application of the moneys arising therefrom in lighting and guarding the coast, so that foreign vessels will have to pay the tax and take the chances of any dangers which may exist, without any efforts on the part of the native authorities to prevent them.
Article VI is again very one-sided, as, while allowing Coreans free access to Great Britain and her possessions, British subjects are to be confined to the Treaty ports without leave to go into the interior for any purpose, or to send or purchase goods there. Such a stipulation nullifies the value of the whole Treaty, and reduces the prospects of any advantage of trade to such a point as to make it very unlikely that any one would avail of it. Moreover, the Japanese in their Treaty have a radius of 30 miles from ports which are open to them, while the Chinese are free of the country for mining purposes and the purchase of any goods they may require, and although Article XIV specially introduces the favoured nation clause, which would apparently render that part of Article VI a dead letter, the clause has doubtless not been introduced for nothing.
It will be further observed that Article VI allows British subjects to pursue (at the ports) their various “callings and avocations,” and they are permitted to traffic there in “all merchandize,” but not a word is said about the various “industries,” the introduction of which will probably be the most remunerative trade that will be done for some years to come. It is the ambiguous wording of the similar clause in the Tien-tsin Treaty which gave the Chinese the opportunity to attempt to stop several such industries in Shanghae at a recent date, and it would certainly be advisable that the legality of such institutions should be placed beyond question.
Article VII prohibits all dealing in opium, the only result of which will be to encourage the smuggling of the drug, while it will be a most convenient precedent for the Chinese to obtain the removal of the opium clauses from their Treaty.
The remaining clauses may be passed without remark, further than those made with regard to Article XIV, which would seem to render Article VI unnecessary, as the restrictions therein provided have been relaxed in the Treaties with both Chinese and Japanese.
Taken as a whole, the Treaty appears to have drawn up with two distinct objects, neither of which is in any way to the advantage of the Western Power. Corea, while securing for herself the alliance with a nation powerful enough to keep her dreaded enemy in check, gives little more than the empty privilege of residence in certain fixed spots, of which few will care to avail, since the facilities to trade are so hampered with restrictions as to leave but little hope of any profitable result. The coasting trade is given to the Chinese, while both Chinese and Japanese are more or less free of the interior. The imposts are heavier than in either China or Japan, and there is not the slightest warranty that even these will not be exceeded, and the so-called “privilege of trade” be practically nullified. But although it is not perhaps intended that Great Britain should be a gainer in any way by a Treaty which circumstances have forced on Corea to enable her avoid a threatened danger, it is pretty evident that China, under the pretence of assisting Corea, has been looking well after herself, and that the restrictions and Tariffs suggested by them to the Coreans as the basis of their Treaty with Great Britain are to serve as the foundation of a claim for similar stipulations in their own Treaties with foreign Powers when the time comes for their revision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E.G. LOW, Vice-Chairman