Sir:-

In obedience to your several instructions given to me when in Washington, I have the honor to submit this memorandum, in reference to the duties of Commodore Shufeldt as naval attaché to the Legation in Peking.
On May 9, 1881, Commodore Shufeldt was directed by Mr. Blaine to report to the American Minister, Mr. Angell.
He was instructed to stop at Tientsin and inquired “as to the readiness of the Corean Government to resume the negotiations for a treaty of a amity and commerce”, which he had been instructed to conclude on a “visit to the Kingdom,”
He was instructed to report fully- “on the military and naval organization of the Chinese Empire, and the present condition and probable extension of our commerce there.”
In a despatch of the same date, Mr. Blaine writes to Minister Angell at length in reference to the mission of Commodore Shufeldt. The special point in this despatch is, “a desire for more precise knowledge, not only of the direct interest to the United States of a treaty with Corea, but of the general conditions of the political relations of the East.”
Mr. Blaine alludes to the possibility of the Chinese Government desiring to engage American naval officers in its service. He expresses the President's willingness that Commodore Shufeldt should accept any offer of that nature from the Chinese Government.
On November 1st, 1881, Mr.Blaine writes to Commodore Shufeldt as to the stipulations in a proposed treaty with Corea. Seamen were to be protected. One or more ports were to be opened for trade.- The principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction as it now exists in China and Japan was accepted. Corea was to be at liberty to determine her own tariffs with the understanding that the United States would always stand with the most favored nations.
On the same day a despatch was addressed by Mr.Blaine to J.W. Holcombe, Charge d’Affairs, which contemplated an objection from the diplomatic Representatives of the other Power to the appointment of Commodore Shufeldt to a high command in the Chinese Navy. J.W. Holcombe was instructed to insist that the Chinese{Chosen} Government shall be allowed to act as an independent power.
On February 4, 1882, Mr. Holcombe wrote an important despatch detailing a conversation at the Foreign Office, Pekin. The Foreign Office was anxious that the King of Corea, should enter into treaty relations with the outside powers, and more particularly with the United States.- This Mr.Holcombe, believes, arose from the fear on the part of China, “that sooner or later the autonomy of Corea would be threatened by the aggressions of Russia and Japan, and that this serious danger could be best met by bringing the Peninsular Kingdom into the family of nations.”
In other words the geographical position of Corea was such that whoever annexed or governed the Kingdom would be in a position to menace the independence and integrity of China. If therefore the United States could be induced to recognize the independence of Corea, -Russia or Japan would hesitate before carrying not the policy attributed to them, the policy of annexation- Corea on treaty isolations{negotiations} with the United States would in some way place its independence under the moral protection of the United States. This would be another’s guarantee to the Chinese of the freedom from invasion.
In April 19, 1882, Commodore Shufeldt telegraphed from Tientsin that Treaty negotiation with Corea were in progress,—that the Chinese wished an article admitting the dependence of Corea upon China, as a tributary power,—which China concealed sovereign rights to Corea.—
This telegraphic message read in the light of the confidential despatch of Mr. Holcombe, a summary of which I have just presented, would seem to incite the question as to whether the proposed treaty was for the benefit of China or Corea.
How far should be commit ourselves to a convention which China would regard as protecting her frontiers from some dreaded ultimate danger on the part of Russia, or Japan and which Russia and Japan might deem an unwarranted interference in Asiatic politics.- It is difficult for any Western Power to determine the delicate and lazy conditions pertaining to the “Independence” of Asiatic Powers.- Thus Siam claims independence,- and its King has long ceased to pay tribute to China.- China has never relinquished sovereign rights, and may at any time service them.- The Loo Choo Islands have long been tributary to China. Japan not long since assented sovereign rights, dethroned the King,-annexed his dominions to the Empire as one of the Departments, and carried him as a prisoner to Tokio.- The same thing may be seen in Corea at any time.
If Corea is an independent Kingdom, then we can treat with its sovereign without regard to China.- If Corea is a province of the Chinese Empire, then we should treat directly with the Pekin Foreign Office.- If the question is in doubt, as is most probably the cast,- then we should consider the wisdom of the United States endeavoring to settle it by the indirect method of a commercial treaty.
I am not insensible to the value of a commercial treaty with Corea. I should also be disposed to think that as far as our good offices could be gracefully and efficiently given they should be used to protect Corea either in the “Independence” which China will recognize- or in the tributary position which the Peking Government is indisposed to surrender.—

I am Sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.
John Russel Young.