July 30, 1959

TO : Foreign Minister
FROM : Vice-Foreign Minister
SUBJECT : Conversation with Ambassador Dowling on Korea-Japan Talks
At my request for an urgent meeting, Ambassador Dowling accompanied by First Secretary Williom Jones came to my office at 6:30 p.m., July 29, 1959, where Political Affairs Director Kim was also present. We had a conversation which lasted for about twenty minutes, the gist of which is as follows:
Kim : According to a UPI dispatch, the Japanese Cabinet had decided to let the Japan Red Cross sign the so-called JRC -puppet agreement on the deportation of Koreans in Japan to the northern part of Korea. Do you have any information on this report?
Dowling : I read the report myself but I think it is not authentic because there is a high possibility that the ICRC would make some sort of decision on the JRC -puppet agreement at its general meeting on August 6, 1959. There is no urgency for Japan that she cannot wait the signing of the said agreement until that date.
Kim : According to some information, the U.S. side is said to have endorsed or will endorse the JRC -puppet agreement. Is it true?
Dowling : Definitely not.

Kim

: In the Oral Statement which Foreign Minister Cho delivered to you the other day, it was clearly stated that the resumption of the Korea -Japan talks will be unconditional. It appears that the U.S. still feels some difficulties in rendering its good offices for the resumption of the Korea -Japan talks even when the Korean side made it clear that it would be "literally unconditional". Why is it so?

Dowling

: The U.S. side feels that the following two prerequisite conditions should be met in order that it may extend its good offices for the resumption of the Korea -Japan talks. That is:
(1) Korea should give an assurance that she would not break off again the resumed Korea -Japan talks even when the Japanese side should re-open its talks with the puppet side.
(2) The U.S. side is ready to give financial help for the settlement of the "compensation" issue, but since it is impossible to force Japan accept the term of "compensation", the payment should be made under the name of "financial settlement" instead of "compensation".
Unless these two prerequisite conditions are met, the U.S. is unable to render its good offices for the settlement of Korea -Japan problems. There still is a time for the Korean Government to make its decision, and today is better than tomorrow but next week will be no good for Korea. The ICRC is going to have its general meeting on August 6, 1959 in which some sort of decision is likely to be made on the JRC -puppet agreement. Situation seems to be rapidly developing.

Kim

: At this moment, we are not sure whether or not there would be any JRC -puppet talks again, nor do we know what sort of further talks there would be between the two parties. Under such circumstances, it is too much to ask the Korean side to give an assurance that it would not break off the resumed Korea -Japan talks. Such a request therefore is hardly acceptable to us.
Regarding the matter of "compensation", although it may appear to be a matter of mere wording, it has a significant meaning, and we cannot accept the term of "financial settlement".
When we talk about unconditional resumption of the Korea -Japan talks, we mean to discuss and settle all these problems through negotiations with the Japanese side. If we are to resume the talks only after all these problems are settled in advance, then it would not be an "unconditional resumption" of the talks. It was the United States that urged Korea to resume the talks unconditionally, and if the U.S. were to demand these two prerequisite to be met in advance, then what is the unconditional resumption of the talks?

Dowling

: Well, unless all these things are assured, the United States will not be able to use its good offices.

Kim

: If this is the definite position of the United States, we can not force you to use your good offices for the settlement of Korea -Japan problems. In the absence of U.S. good offices, there will, be no other alternative but to approach Japan directly for unconditional resumption of the talks. If Japan should refuse to comply with our request for unconditional resumption of the talks, then again we can not force Japan to return to conference table for the settlement of problems between the two countries. I, however, still think we have to continue our sincere efforts to the last for the settlement of these problems. Now we must make up our mind to do our best.

Dowling

: I am awfully sorry to say that the Korean refusal to accept the U.S. advice would bring about a more serious situation than a situation which might arias in case of Korea's acceptance thereof. The consequences would be far more serious than what we two may visualize.
OBSERVATION
Ambassador Dowling 's remarks does not contain any new points. It is mostly a mere repetition of what he has made known to us through his past conversations. He, however, clearly emphasized on two difficulties which made the United States hesitant to use its good offices in the Korea -Japan problems.
He definitely stated that the United States cannot extend its good offices without first having these two prerequisite conditions met, which are hardly acceptable to our Government.
Under the circumstances, it turned out clear that it is futile to seek any U.S. good offices if we are to uphold our present basic principles for the settlement of Korea -Japan problems. Since we have no time to lose and since the prospect for obtaining U.S. good offices is not very bright, it is considered best that Ambassador Yiu be instructed, as His Excellency the President already decided on July 24, to deliver the Aide Memoirs to Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama on July 30, 1959.

Most respectfully,