Sir H.S. Parkes to The Earl of Derby.—(Received February 12, 1876)

(No. 182 Confidential)
Yedo, December 31, 1875

My Lord,

MR. PLUNKETT'S despatches Nos. 167 and 171 of the 9th and 13th instant will have informed your Lordship of the determination taken by the Japanese Government to deal with the Corean question by dispatching to that country a High Commissioner and Special Envoy charged with the negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce, and supported by considerable naval and military force.
In my last despatch to your Lordship on this subject (No. 165 of the 6th instant) I observed that action of this nature had been advocated in the Cabinet; that I believed the Japanese Government contemplated the possibility of having Soon to engage in hostilities with Corea, and that such an issue might, at any time, be occasioned either by the internal condition of Japan or by the casual occurrence of circumstances which might seem to favour such a movement.
It can scarcely be doubted that the resolution to send a High Commissioner to Corea, which appears to have been taken about the time I wrote that despatch, is eminently calculated to bring about such an issue, and, therefore, unless the Coreans should act towards this Mission in a manner very different to that which may be expected of them, I look upon a collision between the two countries as imminent.
Since my return to Yedo on the 22nd instant I have endeavoured to learn why the Japanese Government adopted this step at the present time, and how far the execution of their plans had advanced.
The Foreign Minister stated to me on the 24th instant that, having once taken the determination to send a High Commissioner to Corea, the Government thought it desirable to carry it out promptly. Such a mission was judged necessary because events had shown how hopeless it was to attempt to treat with the local Corean officials at Fusankai, and the relations of Japan with Corea could no longer remain on their present unsatisfactory footing. In order to effect the necessary changes, certain essential conditions would be required at once, while others might be obtained gradually. Those which would at once be demanded from the Coreans were:—
Firstly, the opening of one or more Corean ports, to which the Japanese should be admitted to trade freely.
Secondly, proper provision for the treatment of shipwrecked Japanese, and for the relief of Japanese vessels requiring shelter from stress of weather.
Thirdly, a satisfactory explanation of the attack upon the “Unyokan,” and an assurance that the Japanese flag should not again be exposed to similar outrage.
The Japanese Government had, at one time, supposed that the first and second conditions might have been obtained by means of the arrangement made by the Japanese Agent Moriyama with the local Corean officials last year. The Coreans then agreed to receive a letter from the Japanese Government, and to dispatch an Envoy in return to Yedo. But when Moriyama returned with the letter this year they refused to receive him. The trifling traffic now carried on bu the Japanese at Sôriô could not be called trade. The Japanese admitted to that settlement were supposed to belong to the Island of Tsushima only, and they could only buy and sell such commodities as the Corean officer in the settlement chose to permit.
Shipwrecked Japanese were not properly treated by the Coreans, nor were Corean cast-a-ways received from the Japanese in a becoming manner; and the firing on the “Unyokan” proved that Japanese vessels might be attacked if they approached the Corean shores. If the Corean Government refused to concede these three points when demanded by the High Commissioner, the refusal would be regarded as a rupture of relations. In that event, or if the High Commissioner were not received, or encountered insult or attack, he would have to return and leave it to the Government to take the course they would then be compelled to adopt. But, considering the moderate nature of the Japanese demands, he (Terashima) did not see why negotiations should not be successful. Every allowance would be made for the prejudices of the Coreans, and only such an amount of intercourse, whether official or commercial would be asked for as the Coreans in their present condition could grant. The Japanese Government were quite willing to reserve for a later period the question of whether a resident Minister should be sent to Corea. The force sent with the High Commissioner was only intended for his protection.
In reply to my inquiry as to when Kuroda, the High Commissioner, would be despatched, Mr. Terashima stated that the precise time was uncertain. It had been suggested that the navigation of the river leading to the Corean capital might be impeded at this season by ice. That contingency had not been thought of when it was proposed that he should leave on the 25th instant.
In discussing the subject the same day with another Japanese Minister, he observed that the Coreans would be fully informed of the approach of Kuroda, and of the objects of his mission. Mr. Hirotsu, the officer who had been sent to Sôriô to give them notice, had already arrived there. The announcement which he would make to the local Corean officials at Fusankai could be forwarded by them to the Government at the capital by the 25th instant. Mr. Kuroda would not arrive off the river leading to the capital before the 20th of January, and thus the Corean Government would receive nearly a month's notice of his arrival. He would endeavour to obtain, by friendly negotiation, the right of trade, protection to navigation, and an explanation of the attack on the flag. The latter point would be easily adjusted if the two former were conceded, but, if they were refused, then Japan would be at liberty to treat the firing on the “Unyôkan” as a hostile act, and to exact signal reparation. The possibility of the Coreans refusing to treat was more readily allowed by this Minister than by Mr. Terashima; and, in order to meet the contingencies of war, the Government, he said, were preparing a force of 12,000 men. The consequences might be serious, but, if the Government had not taken up the question at this time, naive agitators would have made much of the subject, and, at a later date, might have forced the hand of the Government, and obliged them to act with less caution and moderation.
The Government were trying to control and guide the popular feeling on the subject, and, in taking it up at this time, were not actuated solely by a desire to divert attention from home topics, such as the much agitated question of the pensions of the Samurai, or taxation and popular representation.
I afterwards saw the Prime Minister, who observed to me that the Government had resolved to close with the Corean question, because they thought that it could not longer be deferred. Some arrangement of the long-standing differences between the two countries had become necessary. This arrangement might be effected by peaceable means, but he was alive to the consideration that the Japanese overtures might be rejected by the Coreans; and, in that case, collision would prove unavoidable.
From the Vice-Prime Minister I obtained more important information than that supplied me by the previous informants. He visited me on the 25th instant, and commenced his observations on the subject by impressing on me the peaceable objects of the Government.
In order, however, to satisfy their own people, it was necessary, he said, that something should now be done to secure for Japan an improved condition in Corea. Sôriô, their present settlement, was little better than a prison, and they, therefore, wanted to obtain a port where trade might be conducted in a reasonable manner. Considering what the state of Japan was twenty years ago, he could not loudly complain of Corea being now in a similar condition. He was also mindful of the opinion which I had frequently expressed, and in which he entirely concurred, that the independence of corea was of the first importance to Japan. He considered it essential to the security of Japan that Corea should remain interposed between Japan and Russia. Being impressed with this feeling, the Government would do all in their power to compose their differences with Corea without coming to an open breach with that country.
I observed that I did not for a moment question the peaceable objects of the Government, but felt, as he probably did, that the measures they were now taking entailed the risk of hostilities. He had, doubtless, therefore, well weighed all the contingencies that would arise from war, and among these the danger to the independence of Corea, upon which he set so jest a value. No one, I was, aware, had given greater attention to the subject than his Excellency, and he had, of course, considered the steps which Russia was likely to take in the event of war; probably he had already fully discussed the question with the Russian Minister.
He replied that he had not done so, though, as the conversation proceeded, I elicited from his Excellency that discussion had taken place between the Russian Minister and the Japanese Foreign Office, and that the result arrived at was that Russia approved of Japan engaging in war with Corea, and had promised to come to the assistance of Japan if she needed help. In giving me this information his Excellency urged me to treat it with the strictest confidence.
I observed that he was, of course, prepared to find that Russia would help herself at the same time that she helped Japan. This he admitted was a natural consequence, but he hoped that danger might be avoided by the understanding that Russia was not to intervene until desired to do so by Japan.
His Excellency had thus in the same breath dwelt upon the importance to Japan of the independence of Corea, and had then admitted that his Government had become a party to a scheme which is eminently calculated to destroy that independence.
The disclosure is so important that I cannot altogether attribute it to an unintentional admission made in the course of conversation, or to the confidence resulting from our long acquaintance, or the many and intimate conversations we have held with each other on the Corean subject. I therefore think that it may have occurred to him that the best way of preventing Russia deriving more advantage than is desirable from her proposed co-operation with Japan would be to endeavour to impose a check upon her action through the medium of another Power.
The danger of a combination in which Russia would be the only Power allied with Japan against Corea is too great to be overrated. It would afford her an opportunity of repeating the policy which she played so successfully when the Allied Powers were before Peking in 1860. She then extended her coast line on the Pacific from latitude 52° to latitude 42°; but the southernmost ports which she thus acquired—Vladivostok and Possiette—are obstructed by ice in several of the winter months, and it is significant how little she has done to construct at either of those ports establishments or defences of a permanent character. The two principal ports on the eastern coast of Corea are Port Lazareff, in latitude 39° 20′, and Fusankai (Chosan Harbour of our charts), in latitude 35°. I am not aware whether the former port is free from ice throughout the year, although I may mention that a Russian officer lately stated at Yokohama that the Russian Government are in the habit of sending a vessel of war to winter there. The Harbour of Fusankai is, however, of far higher importance than Port Lazareff; it is very safe and capacious, may be easily defended, and commands the China, Japan, and Yellow Seas, It is within sight of Tsushima, from which island, as your Lordship is aware, the Russians were dislodged by Admiral Sir James Hope in 1861. It is within two days’ sail of Shanghae and the Yangtse River, and within twelve hours sail of the western entrance of the inland sea of Japan, through which all traffic between China and Japan passes. If Russia, therefore, were to obtain possession of Fusankai, or any other equally commanding position in the south of Corea, she would be able to control, whenever she wished to do so, the whole foreign trade of China and Japan. Both port Lazareff and Fusankai could be occupied and held with the utmost ease, as against the Coreans, by the force which Russia now has in Eastern Siberia and Saghalin. This occupation might be effected before any other European nation became aware of the fact, as our men-of-war seldom cruise on the Corean coast.
Although these considerations naturally occurred to me when the Vice Prime Minister informed me of the secret understanding arrved at between Japan and Russia, I had no opportunity of observing how far they were present to his mind, as, after making the above disclosure, he seemed anxious to avoid further conversation on the subject, and took his leave. But at a second interview which I had with him on the 29th instant, he allowed me to return to the topic, and on my observing that I thought it very undesirable that a third Power should become mixed up in the questions now arising between Japan and Corea, his Excellency volunteered the remark that he was aware that Russia wished to take part in those questions, and that he also knew that she was not satisfied with Possiette and Vladibostok, and would like to acquire some other better situated port.
It is evident, therefore, that his Excellency is aware that Russian aid is not to be obtained without compensation. That the Japanese have considered this point is evident from the remark made by Mr. Soyejima to Mr. Plunkett, as reported by the latter to your Lordship in his despatch No. 171. Russia, he said, would watch events, ready to take advantage of any opportunities which might arise, but he did not think that Japan had much to fear from Russia, even if she did secure some harbour for herself further south than Possiette.
As far as is yet known, Port Lazareff and Fusankai are the only good harbours on the east coast of Corea, and perhaps Mr. Soyeshima, or the Japanese Government, may think that the former of these would satisfy the Russians. It is so freatly inferior, however, in point of position to Fusankai, that I question whether they would be content with it.
In this second conversation the Vice Prime Minister observed that if hostilities should break out with Corea Japan must guard against complications with Russia, should break out with Corea Japan must guard against complications with Russia, by taking care that the war should prove short and decisive. But, looking to the stubborn character of the Coreans, I doubt very much whether the Japanese will find it easy to make a short and decisive war. Russia, on the other hand, will certainly know how to play her game as well as Japan, and is not likely to lose an opportunity which she has been looking forward to for years, of completing the advance which she made in 1860 by acquiring a position whence she could control, in the event of war, the foreign trade of China and Japan.
I think it is now easy to see, my Lord, that the understanding which has been effected between Russia and Japan on the Corean question has not been suddenly formed. My despatches Nos. 92, 94, and 105 will have shown that I strongly suspected the existence of such an understanding as early as last July. If I did not now know from Vice Prime Minister that it is an accomplished fact, the information contained in Mr. Doria's despatch of September the 22nd to your Lordship, which you forwarded to me in despatch No. 99, would go far to confirm that suspicion.
A great deal must have been said at St. Petersburgh on the subject before the Japanese would think of proposing to land troops in a Russian port to attack Corea. I venture to doubt whether they ever made such a proposal, for no movement could be less profitable in a military point of view. It would be like attempting to attack Berlin by way of Archangel. A Japanese force operating from Possiette would first have to make a sea voyage of upwards of 1,000 miles, presuming Yedo to be the point of departure, and would then have to undertake a difficult march of more than 200 miles through a mountainous part of Corea before it could reach a point where it could strike an effective blow; whereas the same force might be thrown directly, and with far greater ease, upon several vulnerable and important points on the Corean coast, say, for instance, Fusankai, which is within forty-five miles fo{for} Tsushima, or it might be sent round to Kôkwa on the west coast, and landed in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital.
The mention, however, of such a proposal as that of landing troops in one of Russian Siberian ports shows that the Corean question was discussed at St. Petersburgh, and in connection, as I think, with the transfer of Saghalin and the Kuriles. The Japanese would have made bot an indifferent bargain if they only obtained a chain of rocks in a frozen sea in exchange for the more valuable territory which they surrendered in Saghalin; and it is now evident that they secured, in addition, the approval of Russia to a war with Corea, and the promise of assistance in that war if help were needed.
Russia, it may be concluded, will take care that her shall be needed. If hostilities occur, the Japanese will probably endeavour to capture Kôkwa (or Kwang-Kwa in Chinese), the city which the French took in 1866. It is situated on capital, which is about twenty miles distant. But I doubt whether this movement and the blockade of the capital would have the effect, as Mr. Soyeshima told Mr. Plunkett it would, of bringing the Corean Government to reason. I learn from an Englishman, who once took a British ship up to Kôkwa, that the capital is not dependant on the sea for supplies, and that the junk trade on the river is not large. From Kôkwa, as their base, the Japanese could attack the capital, Séoul; but, even if they succeeded in capturing it, that success might not prove conclusive if the King and the Court were to escape into the interior. I find that well-informed Japanese are of opinion that the Coreans, if driven out of Séoul, would probably retire upon Ping-Yang, a city to the north of the capital, and from that again to a third city in the same direction. The tide of the struggle would, therefore, set towards the north, and this, if it became protracted, would cause commotion in the direction of the Russian frontier. Russia would then have as good a reason for occupying the eastern provinces of Corea as she now has for occupying the Chinese Province of lli, and might, therefore, take such a step on this ground independently of her promise to assist Japan.
The latter would, doubtless, be deeply chagrined to see Russia’s assistance take the form of the occupation of Fusankai, or any other point of similar importance in Corea. Her chief inducement in seeking that assistance, if indeed, it were sought by her in the first instance, and not offered by Russia, was, I believe, to use the latter Power as a shield against China. Resenting, as China does, the part taken by Japan in the Formosa question, it is not likely that she should entertain at the present moment any good will for Japan, and, in the event of war, her sympathies would naturally be with Corea, which still pays her some of the outward homage of a tributary State. It would not be strange if China should give Corea more than moral support, or that the history of the last Japanese invasion should be repeated. China then sent a considerable army to the assistance of Corea, and by means of this assistance the Japanese invaders were driven from the country. If Russia should prevent China from giving active support to Corea in the present instance, she would certainly render Japan material service, and would establish a claim to the territorial compensation which, if she be allowed to shape her own course, she will scarcely fail to secure.
The necessity of furnishing China with an explanation of their proceedings in Corea has naturally occurred to the Japanese Government, and hence the mission of Mr. Arinori Mori, which was referred to in my despatch No. 165 of the 6th instant. He is to explain the peaceable objects of Japan, that she seeks to make no conquest in Corea, but only to establish friendly and commercial intercourse; and that she is not sending there a miliary expedition, but only a diplomatic mission. Japan would be well pleased if China would advice Corea to treat with Japan, but, as the Vice-Prime Minister observed to me, Japan cannot ask China to do this. Japan has done little to improve her relations with China since the Formosan affair, for as soon as that was concluded the Japanese Minister left Peking, and has not since returned. The Chinese Government will, therefore, connect the reappearance of a Japanese Minister at Peking with some unpleasant associations, and Mr. Arinori Mori will probably endeavour to effect his objects through the foreign Representatives, and may try to move them to urge China to dissuade Corea from resistance.
The Vice-Prime Minister observed to me that Mr. Mori counted upon receiving great assistance from Sir Thomas Wade.
The notice of the Japanese Mission to Corea which Mr. Mori conveys to Peking will be too brief, however, to admit of anything being done by China before it is known whether the Mission is received or opposed, and probably this is part of the Japanese plan. Mr. Mori was dispatched at too late a date to allow of his arriving off the Peiho before the river was frozen, and he was accordingly landed at Chefoo. The journey from that port to Peking overland will take time, and then, if the present arrangements be adhered to, he will arrive at his destination about a fort night befor the High Commissioner Kuroda reaches Kôkwa. China will, therefore, be able to exercise no influence over the reception of Mr. Kuroda, which is probably what Japan desires. Nor could China, in midwinter, render Corea any direct assistance, even if she were disposed to do so.
A Report has reached the Japanese Government that the Coreans, alarmed at the possible consequences of their having fired upon the Japanese vessel “Unyôkan,” sent to Peking to ask for assistance, and that the Chinese Government are divided in opinion as to whether this should be granted. They have also heard that the Chinese have been told by some foreign Minister that if China assists Corea against Japan she will become liable to claims for indemnity from the French and United States’ Governments for the repulse of their respective expeditions by the Coreans. Perhaps this diplomatic pressure may mark the commencement of the assistance that Japan has contracted for with Russia.
The conclusion I have formed is that Japan has entered into the Corean question deliberately and in conjunction with Russia, the understanding arrived at having been effected at St. Petersburgh. With such an alliance Japan hopes that she can insure success either in negotiation or in war; and that while raising her reputation as a spirited nation and a champion of progress in the East, the Government will succeed in gaining the good opinion of the Samurai, and in diverting attention from troublesome home questions. The programme required that the transfer of Saghalin should first be effected. This has accordingly been done; the principal Agent employed on the side of the Japanese Government to make the transfer being Mr. Kuroda, the present High Commissioner to Corea, whose intercourse with the Russian authorities for some time past has been of an intimate character. I also believe that the despatch of the two Japanese gun-vessels to Corea in May last, nominally to survey, but really to reconnoitre the coast, formed also a feature of the plan. The Japanese Foreign Minister was careful to deny, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatches Nos. 65 and 91, that these vessels were being sent to Corea at all. They did, however, reconnoitre the whole of the east coast of Corea, from Possiette to Fusankai; they then visited the south coast, and also Port Hamilton, and it was in pushing their reconnaissance on the west coast as far as the river leading to the capital, that the fire of the Coreans, which was probably anticipated, was eventually encountered. This incident, which occurred on the 20th September, was not immediately taken up by the Japanese Government, and their Agent, Mr. Moriyama, remained in Corea until the end of October without demanding any explanation from the Corean Government. By that time all the Commissioners, Japanese and Russian, had returned from Saghalin and the Kuriles, and by the end of November the despatch of Kuroda to Corea had been determined on.
The 18th of December was first named as the date of his departure, and then the 25th, but when that time came a fresh delay occurred. It was explained that information was needed by the Government as to whether Kôkwa could be reached in winter, and whether the navigation of the river would be impeded by ice. The Russian Minister asked me whether I was acquainted with the cause of the delay, which he appeared to think unnecessary, and whether I thought that trouble would be caused to foreign interests by the expedition. With regard to the latter point, I replied that I thought not, if the Coreans and Japanese were allowed to settle their differences by themselves; and he then observed that trouble might occur to the present Government if the Japanese sustained any reverse in Corea, or found their undertaking more serious than they had at first anticipated. The 6th of January is now named for the departure of the expedition, the object of the Government in despatching it at this inclement season of the year being doubtless to have the spring available for military operations, in case these should become necessary. Ten military officers of carious grades, from that of General downwards, have been added to Mr. Kuroda’s staff, and Mr. Inouye Bunda has been appointed Second Commissioner.
This appointment is significant, as it shows that the Government think it worth their while to recover the adherence of Mr. Inouye and his friends, as a compensation, perhaps, for the recent defection of Shimadzu Saburô and Itagaki, which I reported in despatch No. 159. Mr. Inouye Bunda, or Kaoru, had charge of the finances, as Vice-Minister, during the absence in Europe, as Ambassador, of Mr. Okubo, the Minister of Finance. While in this position Mr. Inouye thought it necessary to resign office, and, in doing so, he wrote and published a Memorial, in which he denounced the policy of the Government, and made some very damaging statements relative to the finances of the country. I reported this occurrence in my despatch No. 20 of 1873. For this indiscretion he was prosecuted and fined, but though he has not since been employed in office, it is known that, in his private capacity, he has obtained many of the Government contracts for cloth or war material. He was made a member of the inchoate Senate, called the Geuroin, on the 27th instant, as a preliminary to his present appointment.
It is curious to note that the dispatch of kuroda’s mission to Corea awakens no enthusiasm on the part of the native press. I inclose translations of two articles which almost predict failure and misfortune, and declare that the chances are greatly on the side of a war in which China is very likely to come to the assistance of Corea. I also add two translations of two other articles, the contents of which have probably been derived from official sources, in order to satisfy the popular cry for information as to the intentions of the Government. A statement purporting to be instructions issued to Mr. Mori is given in the first of these. The second (the Hioron), after supplying the explanation of the pacific policy of the Government, and the course they propose to take to guard against collision, states Plainly, on its own part, that, if the Government really do not want war, they should allow the Corean question go drop; but that to send an Envoy to Corea in the present state of affairs, trusting only to the turn of events for the result, is a policy that will defeat itself, and will surely involve war.
In conclusion, I may mention that it is no part of the plan of Japan to negotiate with Corea in the interest of other foreign Powers. Her objects may be legitimate enough, bit whether the gain will repay the cost and risk which she incurs is a point that she can only determine for herself. It is solely in her own interest, however, that she undertakes this expedition, and it is natural to suppose that the Power with whom she has allied herself will also only be actuated by the same motives. I ventured to inquire in my despatch no. 165 of the 6th instant, whether the Corean question was of sufficient interest to those Powers who have large material interests in China and Japan, to induce them to take some steps to persuade Corea to accept foreign intercourse on terms which would be beneficial alike to all nations, and which, by preserving the independence of Corea, would at the same time prove most conducive to her own interests. It appears to me that this is a question which, in view of the circumstances related in this despatch, increases in importance, and that I may be excused for again submitting it to your Lordship’s notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed)　　HARRY S. PARKES