Geneva, July 16,1959

REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPORTATION ISSUE IN GENEVA
I. In accordance with urgent Government instructions dated June 13, I hastened to Geneva to continue our effort to persuade the ICRC to stay away from the Japanese scheme of deporting our people in Japan to Communist-occupied Northern Korea. Thus, I left Tokyo on June 15 and arrived here in Geneve on June 17.
The situation on the issue at the time when I left Tokyo is briefly summarised as follows :
1. On June 10, the Japanese and Korean Communists arrived at agreement in principle on the deportation scheme virtually on the Communist terms. The arriving at the above agreement in principle was done by dint of Japan's repeated concessions toward the Communist demand.
2. The Japanese and Communists announced that they would establish the so-called drafting committee immediately after having arrived at agreement in principle, and that the drafting committee to be composed of two representatives each from the two sides would start its functions from June 15 and complete the draftitg of the documents concerned on the basis of the points agreed on June 10 within one week or ten days.
3. It was further rumoured that, after the completion of the drafting, Japanese would present the so-called agreement to the International Committee of the Red Cross for its approval.
Thus the situation has changed to a great extent from that when the Japs first made request to the ICRC sometime in Feb. and the ICRC sent a note to our side on March 23, 1959.
II. After my arrival here, I tried very hard to find out what the Japanese and Communists will do in regard to the so-called agreement in principle on the deportation issue. And I came to realize that, without putting signatures to the so-called agreement, Japs will submit the so-called agreement to the ICRC for its approval as soon as possible. Japanese even thought that they could obtain the ICRC approval of the so-called agreement within a short period of time, if possible, on July 2 when the ICRC monthly committee meeting was originally scheduled to be held. Mr. Boissier, President of the ICRC, was at Venice on about onemonth vacation from the early part of June.
Under the circumstances, I was determined to block the Japanese attempt by all means, and started visiting ICRC officials, other foreign diplomats and officials of the League of Red Cross Societies from person to person to persuade them to use their influence upon the committee meeting not to give approval to the Japanese request. I met Vice-president Junod, Executive director Gallopin, Legal affairs director Pilloud, Far Eastern affairs officer Maunoir, Presidential Secretary Borsinger, Committee member Miss Odier and Vice-president Shiordet. I also met American Minister Villard, his Deputy Popper, British Consul-General, Messrs. Dunning and Phillips, Secretary-General and Under Secretary-General of the League of the Red Cross Societies, respectively, and Mr. Schaffeur, American Red Cross representative at the League. All these visits and conversations with them were purported to block the Japanese attempt to obtain the ICRC approval of the so-called agreement within a short period of time.
On the other hand, Inoue, Jap Red Cross representative, presented to the ICRC French translation of the document on the so-called agreement on June 2,. Our Delegation's effort was intensified, as July 2 was drawing near. (I reported to the Government briefly on this by cable. )
Mr. Boissier did not come back to Geneve by July 2 and the ICRC announced that the committee meeting would not be held on July 2 "for technical reasons". Japs expressed their anxiety over the ICRC 's " lukewarm" attitude toward their request, while the Communists became/ about the Japanese excuses for not signing the so-called impatient agreement.
In the meantime, our energetic effort to persuade ICRC officials not to give approval to the Japanese request was continued. It was on July 5 that Mr. Boissier,came back to Geneve and resumed the charge of the ICRC. The committee meeting which had not been held on June 2 was at length held from 3 p.m. on July 6. After the meeting Mr. De Paquier, spokesman of the ICRC, reported to the press that no decision was made on the so-called agreement between the Japanese and Communists and that it was quite natural that it should take "a long time" for the ICRC to give a careful study and the decision to the problem at issue as it also took several weeks for the Japanese and Korean Communists to arrive at understanding on the so-called repatriation issue.
The above are a brief sketch of how the Japanese failed in their attempt to obtain the ICRC approval of the so-called agreement in the early part of July. At this stage, the Communists pressed hard the Japanese for an immediate signing of the so-called agreement. Japs, under various excuses, evaded the signing.
The Communists who became very impatient requested the Japanese to have the "final meeting". The so-called final meeting was held from 3 to 3:50 on the July 7 afternoon. At this "final meeting", too, no signing took place. The Communists threatened Japs, saying that they would go home on July 8 as they were tired of waiting. They held a press conference at 11:00 p.m. on the same day, where they issued a statement accusing the Japanese of the Latter's "insincere attitude towards the so-called bilateral talks. The Communists statement particularly poitedpointed out that the Japanese "purposely demanded ICRC approval to throw all the responsibility upon the ICRC, thereby concealing and trying to justify their insincere position". However, the Communists expressed their reddiness to return whenever the Japanese are ready to sign the so-called agreement.
The Communists except "two liason officers" left Geneve for home on the July 8 morning. On the other hand, one Japanese left Geneve on the same day evening and Kasai, chief Japanese negotiator,left Geneve on the July 9 morning. On July 15, the remaining two Communists left for home, saying that they were also tired of waiting. Thus, now in Geneve, there remain Inoue and Ota for the Japanese side.
We have thus tided over the difficult position in the early part of July and blocked the Japanese move at this stage.
III. Our Delegation again started visiting the ICRC frequently to find out where the situation stands and the possibility of our launching offensive tactics. On July 8 Dr. Kim visited Boissier, while Minister Kim and myself met him at noon on the following day. Our repeated visit to Boissier revealed that the ICRC mad no decision on the Japanese request, that the ICRC would take no decision without careful study and that the document in question was under study by ICRC executive officers.
I met Mr. Eaunoir, far Eastern Affairs Chief, at 3 p.m. on July 9. After the exchange of heated conversations, I was able to grasp the whole picture of the situation rather clearly. (All these have already reported to the Government by my cables via Paris. ) The followings are the summary of where the situation stands by July 13:
1. The Japanese request is that the ICRC give "approval" to to the so-called agreement before the signing.
2. Gallopin physically received french translation of the document in question on June 24
3. Icrc executive officers reported to the committee meeting held on July 6 that they phsycally received the document submitted by Inoue.
4. The July 6 committee meeting must have given at least a tacit understanding that executive officers study the document in question at any rate, leaving undecided the question on whether or not the document was formally accepted for study" or "examination".
5. The fact is that the document in question is now under study, anyhow, by the ICRC executive officers.
IV. With a view to pressing the ICRC not to take any action in Japan's favour, Minister Kim and myself met Gallopin at 3:00 p.m. on July 14. He made the following remarks:
1. Although he and his staff are studying the so-called agreement, there are several points which are ambiguous, regarding the proposed ICRC role. And therefore, they are presently asking the Japanese to clarify those points.
2. The ICRC 'S decision, if any infuture, will be only concerned with its " role".
3. When the ICRC is going to take decision, the ROK side will definitely be informed in advance, and the ICRC will have the ROK side enjoy chances to formally express its views once again before taking the decision.
4. Mr. Gallopin said that he does not know at present how soon the Japanese can clarify various questions regarding the ICRC role and that it is not yet known whether or not such Japanese clarifications could, after all, be satisfactory to the ICRC. (Please refer to my cable report via Paris dated July ,14. ) Therefore,he does not know when the ROK side will come to express its formal views as referred to in Item 3 above.
V. The Summary of the Facts about the Issue on the Basis of Which our Counter-meaaures May Be Studied.
1. The ICRC has been faced with the "new" situation that the so-called agreement has been reached between the Japanese and Communists.
2. The ICRC refused to give immediate answer to the Japanese request in the early part of July, while its executive officers started studying the so-called agreement, regardless of its formality.
3. Our Delegation, as a unit, approached the ICRC tactfully and, so far, has been able to persuade the ICRC to refrain from giving answer to the Japanese request.
4. The ICRC officials have become very cautious and do not easily open their mouth concerning the deportation issue.
5. As of July 15, there are no more north Korean Communists here in Geneve. There are two Japanese Red Cross officials now.
6. The so-called agreement is now under study by the ICRC executives and they are asking the Japanese to clarify various ambiguous points regarding the so-called ICRC role as provided in the so-called agreement.
7. Withregard to the question on when the so-called decisive stage arrives, observations vary from person to person. A certain ICRC official says that it might take two months from July 1 for the ICRC to give the decision (Legal affairs director Pilloud 's words given to me on June 30 ), while others say that it will take "some time", "a considerable length of time", or "a certain period of time". ICRC spokesman De Paquier told the press that "it is quite natural that it should take a long time for the ICRC to take decision...." But the point is that he avoided any reference to the actual period of time itself, but only referred to logice.
8. One fact that can be derived from such different stories as above is that even ICRC officials are quite at a loss how to deal with this problem.
9. The following words are the definite words given to us by responsible ICRC officials recently:
a) The ICRC will not take any decision in a "precipitant manner". (Vice-president Junod 's words )
b) The ICRC will not take decision without prior notification to us. It will listen to formally to our views prior to the decision. Gallopin said that he does net know when such stage will arrive. (Gallopin 's words on. July 14 )
c) Mr. Boissier said on July 8 and 9 that if the ROK RED CROSS has any counter-proposal, it would be better for the ROKRC to submit it "as soon as possiblpossible".
He also stated that various foreign Governments are interested to know about the issue.
VI. A brief observation on how we act
1. As far as I see as a result of my frequent contact with various ICRC officials,there is very little doubt about the fact that the ICRC 's true intention is to employ a sort of "drag-on" tactics, if possible, But I have a feeling that ICRC executives are being gradually driven to the point where a certain opinion (at least a tentative one ) has to be formulated one way or other so as to be in time for the next committee meeting. (in the early part of August ) As a general rule, the opinion to be submitted by the ICRC executives to the Committee meeting is formulated at the Presidential Council (which is composed of President , two Vice-presidents and three Committee members and Executive Director Gallopin ). It is to be noted that the so-called Presidential Council meeting will precede the Committee meeting. The Presidential council meeting is also called " the Executive Council meeting". It is in this sense that we can not deny the possibility that something might happen in the latter part of July although it may not be a decisive one.
2. It is almost certain that the ICRC is also thirsy for any sort of excuses for dragging on the so-called decision to the Japanese scheme, which is by no means harmful to our cause, for as far as the deportation issue is concerned, time is running agaist the Japanese.
3. At this point, I think that there are ample reasons for us to take advantage of the present situation to launch a diplomatic offensive,
4. I think that this is quite a good chance for us to take a tactful action. By taking a certain overture to the ICRC, we will be able to gain the following points:
a) We can effectively and positively prevent the ICRC from taking any actions to the Jap scheme, which will eventually put the Japs and puppets into confusion,
there by causing them to split away widely.
b) We shall be able to gain much more time, and eventually to win this case. I again wish to state that time is running for us and agaistagainst the Japanese so far as the deportation issue is concerned.
c) For the Government's reference, it is noted that during the period of almost one century the ICRC has never flatly refused any sort of request from national RED CROSS societies although there were many cases where it had not taken any actions to such request. Therefore, no action or no decision is its refusal according to the ICRC 's terminology. They say that the ICRC is an independent private organ and it only renders services and that, therefortherefore, there can not be any refusal of the request for its assistance although there are cases where it can not act or take decision on such request for various reasons.
d) It is in this sense that our Delegation's draft proposal is worth trying at this stage with the Government's authorisation.
Remarks: Our Delegation's recommenuation is hereby attached for Copy of Government's reference. It is believed that the recommendation has already been received by the Government.
K.H.C.