영국의 함대 파견 문의에 관한 답변 및 열강의 동태 보고
USS Colorado (First Rate)
Flag Ship of Asiatic Fleet
Wusung, China, April 10, 1871
Below Shanghai
Flag Ship of Asiatic Fleet
Wusung, China, April 10, 1871
Below Shanghai
Sir:
I received lately a letter from our minister in PeKing in which he informed me that the British Charge des Affaires had enquired whether there would be objections to the British Admiral sending a vessel-of-war at the same time your fleet goes (to Corea) provided Admiral Kellet and yourself agree to such an arrangement. In reply I said that, if the British Admiral chose to send one or more vessels to the coast of Corea, at or about the same time you go thus, he has an undoubted right to do so: nor did I think there would be any objection to such an action; at the same time it was only proper for me to say that any instructions did not contemplate joint action between our government an any other.
I closed by saying that the fleet is under your command and control, and, that any arrangement you might make in reference to this matter would, without doubt, prove entirely agreeable to me.
But while I see no special objections to such an arrangement with the British, the case entirely different with the French.
That government has a cause of grievance with Corea which the French Admiral attempted but failed to redress in 1866; and the presence of French vessels-of-war there now, night hazard and possibly defeat our attempt at peaceful negotiations.
In view of all this it would, I think, be wise to be well to avoid as much as possible anything that has the appearance of an alliance, that will do no good and may be productive of mischief.
I shall be somewhat embarrassed should the English and Russians offer to cooperate with us in order to obtain a treaty such as we wish to make.
The United States, in endeavoring to make the treaty proposed, has no selfish ideas of national glory to be gratified; she seeks no increase of territory; she aims at no undivided advantages; but the benefits she may confer upon the distressed mariner will be for general advantage of civilized nations.
In so broad an aim, where all Christendom must reap alike the benefits of our new treaty, I see no sufficient reason for refusing co-operation which would increase our chances of success and divide the odium of failure, while it would also divide the expense of any ulterior measures used in prosecuting our claims.
While of course neither Mr. Low nor myself without instructions could enter into an alliance with the Authorities of another nation for co-operation in this matter, I see no objections to an identical letter stating the objects of our coming to Corea, provided always the friendly power sought no other ends than those we seek.
I have strong hopes of success; but I foresee that failure is possible since the French failed with a greater force than we can bring.
I cn land some six hundred (600) men from the vessels, but this is a small army to invade a brave and hardy nation, variously estimated to consist of from ten (10) to twenty millions of people, defended moreover by a momentous and otherwise difficult country.
It is impossible at this time to lay any definite plan before you, for circumstances may on the spot prove that other plans are better; but I expect to succeed in our aims.
I received lately a letter from our minister in PeKing in which he informed me that the British Charge des Affaires had enquired whether there would be objections to the British Admiral sending a vessel-of-war at the same time your fleet goes (to Corea) provided Admiral Kellet and yourself agree to such an arrangement. In reply I said that, if the British Admiral chose to send one or more vessels to the coast of Corea, at or about the same time you go thus, he has an undoubted right to do so: nor did I think there would be any objection to such an action; at the same time it was only proper for me to say that any instructions did not contemplate joint action between our government an any other.
I closed by saying that the fleet is under your command and control, and, that any arrangement you might make in reference to this matter would, without doubt, prove entirely agreeable to me.
But while I see no special objections to such an arrangement with the British, the case entirely different with the French.
That government has a cause of grievance with Corea which the French Admiral attempted but failed to redress in 1866; and the presence of French vessels-of-war there now, night hazard and possibly defeat our attempt at peaceful negotiations.
In view of all this it would, I think, be wise to be well to avoid as much as possible anything that has the appearance of an alliance, that will do no good and may be productive of mischief.
I shall be somewhat embarrassed should the English and Russians offer to cooperate with us in order to obtain a treaty such as we wish to make.
The United States, in endeavoring to make the treaty proposed, has no selfish ideas of national glory to be gratified; she seeks no increase of territory; she aims at no undivided advantages; but the benefits she may confer upon the distressed mariner will be for general advantage of civilized nations.
In so broad an aim, where all Christendom must reap alike the benefits of our new treaty, I see no sufficient reason for refusing co-operation which would increase our chances of success and divide the odium of failure, while it would also divide the expense of any ulterior measures used in prosecuting our claims.
While of course neither Mr. Low nor myself without instructions could enter into an alliance with the Authorities of another nation for co-operation in this matter, I see no objections to an identical letter stating the objects of our coming to Corea, provided always the friendly power sought no other ends than those we seek.
I have strong hopes of success; but I foresee that failure is possible since the French failed with a greater force than we can bring.
I cn land some six hundred (600) men from the vessels, but this is a small army to invade a brave and hardy nation, variously estimated to consist of from ten (10) to twenty millions of people, defended moreover by a momentous and otherwise difficult country.
It is impossible at this time to lay any definite plan before you, for circumstances may on the spot prove that other plans are better; but I expect to succeed in our aims.
I have the honor to be
Very Respectfully
Your Obt Servant
John Rodgers
Read Admiral
Commander in Chief of Asiatic Fleet
Very Respectfully
Your Obt Servant
John Rodgers
Read Admiral
Commander in Chief of Asiatic Fleet
Hon’l
Geo M Robeson
Secretary of the Navy
Washington DC
Geo M Robeson
Secretary of the Navy
Washington DC
색인어
- 이름
- Kellet, Low
- 지명
- PeKing, Corea, Corea, The United States, Corea