THE KOREAN POSITION ON THE PEACE LINE
With the coming into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, by which Japan regained its sovereignty, the MacArthur Line -- established by SCAP directives with a view to regulating Japanese fishing activities and preventing possible fisheries frictions between Korea and Japan -- was discontinued. But the vital interests of the Republic of Korea demanded the reimposition of such a demarcation. On January 19 of 1952,this Government therefore announced a Presidential Proclamation setting forth a boundary(Peace Line) in the seas adjacent to Korea and within which the Republic of Korea would exercise Jurisdiction for purposes of defense and the conservation of natural resources.
The Peace Line has multiple purposes. First of all it protects the fishing resources of this country. During the forty-year occupation of Korea, the Japanese monopolized fishing in Korean wasters. Japan's fishing fleets, equipped with modern gear, had been engaged in the intensive exploitation of fishing resources all around the Korea peninsula. The MacArthur Line has prevented such spoliation in the years immediately after the 1945 defeat of Japan. But it was obvious that with the lifting of this demarcation, Japanese fishing fleets would flood back into Korea's contiguous seas and quickly exhaust marine resources that provide the Korean people with 85 per cent of their animal protein. This also would have meant collapse of the slowly recovering Korean fishing indu stry and a loss of livelihood by tens of thousands of our people.
Secondly, the Peace Line was intended to preserve the peace between Korea and Japan until such time as the two peoples could live together in friendship and mutual trust. Without an effective measure to take the place of the MacArthur Line, the swarming of Japanese fishing boats into Korean fishing grounds unquestionably would have led to bitter and perhaps violent clashes with Korean fisherman. Such clashes would have led to further deterioration of re ations between the two countries and, inview of recent history, quite probably to extremely serious conseqnences.
Thirdly, the Peace Line is an inherent segment of Korea's sea defenses against Communist infiltration and aggression. The need for such a measure was clearly recognized in the MacArthur Line and subsequently in the Clark Line, proclaimed in 1952. It is generally r recognized that a state or belligerent may establish a defense zone in wartime. The Republic of Korea was at war when the Peace Line was proclained, and still remains technically and actually in a state of war with the Communists. Without the protection afforded by the Peace Line, Communists agents would materially increase their infiltrations via the sea routes from the north.
The Peace Line also has full legal juriediction under international law and precedents. Both the law and these precedents were carefully studied before the proclamation, and it was further true that the Line did not have the sole purpose of keeping Japanese fisherman out of waters adjacent to Korea. Proclamation was a fully regitiate exercise of Korea's sovereign right to make regulation for fishing and to defend itself. So-called freedom of the high seas is not unrestricted, but carries with it the responsibility of conserving resources, especially on the part of the continental state, and also is subject to modification in time of war of national emergency.
In this connection, attention can be called to the proclamations issued numerous countries which are similar to that of the Peace Line in its nature. They had the effect of expending the jurisdiction of these countries for limited purposes, much as does the Peace Line. Some international fisheries conferences have implemented a similiar line of thought. The Rome Fishry Conference of 1956, for example, adopted recommendations concerning the special rights of coastal states in preservation of maritime resources. This principle then was adopted at Geneva Conference on the Law of the sea in 1958.
Japan has sought to maintain that Korea is apprehending and incarcerating its fisherman without basis of legality. This is not true. The Japanese Government was fully notified of the Peace Line proclamation and of Korea's intentions. These treasures of this Government have the full force and effect of domestic law. Had Japan recognized the justice and validity of the Peace Line, and taken steps to prevent its fisherman from violating the demarcation, there would have been no violations and no fishery-frictions between the two countries. Disputes over the issue Line and apprehension of offending fisherman therefore are wholly the responsibility of Japan.
Furthermore, all Japanese fisherman who had completed their sentences were repatriated in strict accordance with the Korea-Japan Agreement of December 31, 1957, and only those who were not then eligible for repatriation, or who have been apprehended and convicted since, remain at Pusan. These fisherman number one hundred and fifty-three.
But Japan still detains - at the OMURA camp -more than 1000 Korean, including women and children. Many of them have been held for several years. This is a direct and flagrant violation of the detainee mutual release provisions of the agreement of December 31, 1957. In that accord, Japan pledged itself to repatriate those detainees who had smuggled themselves into Japan after the August 15, 1945, end of the World War II. Japan continues to refuse to repatriate these Korea nationals.
For any permanent and satisfactory settlement of the problem of the Japanese fisherman, it is necessary for Korea and Japan to work out definite fishing arrangements, This can be done only through direct negotiations of the two countries, and it was Korea's belief that this would be achieved at the formal Korea-Japan Conference which began last year. Questions of fishing occupied a prominent place on the aganda, and status of the fishermen held at Pusan was to be discussed. But instead of entering into such talk spirit of friendship and connciliation, the Japanese attempted to involve the International Committee of the Red Cross in a matter that is essentially political. At the same time, Japan has undertaken to conduct direct talks with the Communist of the northern part of Korea on an illegal, unfriendly plan to send Korean residents of Japan to territory under the temporary control of Communism. The dual nature of such diplomacy is clearly evidenced by Japan's hesitation in reopening of the Korea-Japan Conference despite the unequivocal suggestion of the Republic of Korea that this be done immediately.
Japan still declines, through one pretext or another, to turn over such properties as old books, art treasures, and silver and gold bullion that rightly belong to Korea. It also refused to discuss any of the critical issues that disrupt friendly relations between the two countries and that threaten the peace and security of East Asia.
An unfortunate implication seems to be that Japan cilings to its old ambitions towers Korea. This Government repeats to Japan and to the countries with which it is associated diplomatically, that the only way out of the currenty impasse is for the Japanese to give proof of fairness and sincerity. In that case, all problems between Korea and Japan can be settled quickly and satisfactory through renewed negotiations at the Korea-Japan Conference.