Data for Mr. Sulzburger
KOREA-JAPAN TALKS AS THEY NOW STAND

October 4, 1957

Prepared By Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Republic of Korea and Japan held conferences in Tokyo three times, the first in 1951-52, the second in 1953 and the third again in 1953, to reach the ultimate goal for normalization of relations between the two countries. These conferences sought a way of settlement of a number of problems, which resulted from the Japanese occupation of Korea for thirty-six years. Those problems were: 1) Korean residents in Japan; 2) property claims; and 3) fishery agreement and so forth. It was disclosed in the course of talks that the real intention of the Japanese side was to delay the settlement of the outstanding problems until the day when the Japanese Government would stand in a stronger bargaining position.
To the surprise of the Korean side, however, Japan in the early days of negotiation presented an absurd claims to its former properties in Korea, obviously abrogating Article 4 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Moreover, in the conference held in October, 1953, Japanese Chief Delegate Kanichiro Kubota made remarks so fantastically insulting that the Korean side could not seriously question the Japanese sincerity to bring the Korea-Japan talks to successful end. (His remarks were: 1) The evacuation of the Japanese from Korea in 1945 was a violation of international law; 2) The establishment of an independent Korean state before a Japanese peace treaty was signed was a violation of international law; 3) Japan's property claims in Korea are inviolable; 4) The Cairo Declaration describing the "enslavement" of the Korean people to Japan was based on wartime hysteria; 5) Japan's occupation of Korea was beneficial to the Korean people.) Thus, efforts by the Korean Government to normalise relations with Japan can to naught. In order to resume the Korea-Japan talks and if such talks were to be in any prospect, it was absolutely necessary for Japan to withdraw its unfounded claims presented in 1952 and retract the so-called Kubota statement.
Korea's effort to resume the Korea-Japan conference was renewed in the spring of 1956. Put in the view of the Korean Government at that time, the repetitious way of opening formal conference would bring little chance of adjusting difference of opinions on the various outstanding problems. It was indispensable to previously outline some fundamental principles on which the two Governments would proceed at the formal conference table. Such Korean position being agreed on by the Japanese side, the representatives of the two Governments met again in informal way to prepare themselves for the resumption of formal Korea-Japan conference, and at the same time, to effect the simultaneous release of Korean detainees in Japanese Detention Camps and Japanese fishermen in Pusan.
Throughout these preliminary talks, the prime objective for the Japanese side has been to repatriate their fishermen who served out their sentences on charges of violation of the Korean law for Conservation of Fishery Resources and have been under detention in Pusan Aliens Camp. The Japanese original assertion was that the release of detainees was a prerequisite to any further talks between the two countries on pending issues. As for the resumption of the formal conference, they did not show an adequate sincerity though they had no objection to the resumption of the formal conference itself if it enabled them to repatriate Japanese fishermen.
On the contrary, the Korean side considered it necessary to resume without delay the formal conference and, prior to such resumption of the conference, to seek an agreement on some fundamental principles on which the conference, if reopened, would smoothly proceed, so that it might not come again to deadlock as the previous the previous three sessions did so. In the view of the Korean side, the simultaneous release of the Korean detainees and Japanese fishermen who served out their sentences was, of course, an important problem to be settled urgently, but it was to be effected simultaneously with the resumption of the formal conference, because the detainee issue did never happen if the basic issues pending between the two countries were settled. In this atmosphere, the preliminary talks spent almost one year without reaching any important agreement.
After appointment of Ambassador Yu Taik Kim as new chief of the Korean 'Mission in Japan on May 16, 1957, the Republic of Korea renewed its efforts to conclude the proscrastinated preliminary talks. The main problems discussed in those talks were as follows:
1. The problem on withdrawal of the so-called Kubota statement and of Japanese claims to property in Korea;
2. The problem on measures to be taken in releasing Korean detainees in Japan and Japanese fishermen in Korea, and related matters;
3. Agenda for the formal conference to be resumed, and some principles on which the formal conference, if convened, should proceed on major issues, including the matter concerting confirmation of the fact that treaties and agreements concluded in and before 1910 are null and void.
4. The problem of returning Korean art objects, the immediate transfer of which is possible.
Aside from the wording question, it may be said that difference of opinion's which was the subject for discussion for long duration of the present preliminary talks, was almost adjusted. One of the most important points which remains unsettled is on the property claims issue, particularly due to the Japanese distortion of interpretation of Article 4 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. If the Japanese side agrees to withdraw the claims to their former property in Korea made by the Japanese delegation at the Korea-Japan talks on March 6, 1952, in other words, if it fulfills its obligation under the Peace Treaty under reference which is self-explanatory in its terminology, the talks would come to successful end. But the settlement of this single point at issue is being delayed by a strange sophistication of the article concerned on the part of the Japanese Government. The gist of the Japanese argument is that the Japanese side may withdraw their unfounded claims to its former property in Korea, but only if the Korean side renounces the substantial part of its claims to Japan, which Japan is legally obligated to pay in accordance with civil-code-like principle, and which is entirely separate matter from the problem of the former Japanese property in Korea.
In the Korean view, the problem of property claims between Korea and Japan is to be settled not by any sophisticated theory or by any opinion of any source but by faithful application of the article now in effect. The Said Treaty contains nothing whatsoever which even vaguely stipulates cohesion between the disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals, on one hand, and the Korean claims against Japan, on the other hand.
The Japanese claims to its former property in Korea, which it presented at the conference held in 1952, is estimated approximately eighty-five per cent of total property in Korea. If as the Japanese side asserts, this sort of Japanese claims is given consideration, the independence of Korea would be totally undermined in economic sense. The Japanese claims, therefore, is tantamount to threatening the very existence of Korea as an independent state. If the Japanese side intends to counter the Korean claims against Japan by its alleged claims there would be no substance which the Korean claims against Japan bring to Korea. There is an obstinate attempt on the part of the Japanese to set off the Korean claims which is legally justified from every aspect of legality by what the Japanese is really not possessed of. It is Japan's refusal to pay what it is legally obligated that prevents Korea and Japan from normalizing their relations.
It was learned from the past experience that a basic fator deterring the proceeding of the Korea-Japan talks is that Japan frequently shows its unwillingness to honor the term it formally promised. Korea's bitter memory is recalled in this regard. As for the long pending detainee issue, in November, 1955, the negotiation for releasing those detainees in Japan and Korea was all but successful when the Korean Minister to Japan and Japanese Justice Minister agreed on the settlement of the issue. But this Agreement could not be materialized simply because Japanese Foreign Ministry was opposed to the agreement. Thus, the issue had to remain deadlock until in the spring of 1956 when the Korean Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister reached an agreement on the same points for releasing detainees. But now, the agreement could not be materialized because of strong opposition voiced by the Japanese Ministry of Justice. Under these circumstances, it may be said that any chance of successful conclusion of Korea-Japan agreement on the pending issues and its materialization will come only when the Japanese demonstrates, not by lip-service but by action, that it is sincere to honor the terms it signed.