September 5, 1956

At the executive committee meeting this morning, Shigemitsu was showered with questions concerning his recent negotiations with the Russians at Moscow. Shigemitsu was asked by the Committee to clarify and make known the true situation regarding his meeting with Bulganin and what he learned from the Soviet Prime Minister that a secret promise had been made with Kono during the latter's visit to Moscow last April. Shigemitsu replied that he is at the moment compiling his report and that when it is finished he will give his answer to the question. When queried why it was so difficult for him to give an oral reply, Shigemitsu was unable to answer that question. Shigemitsu was also asked what he thought of Hatoyama's intention to visit Moscow and if he expected any good results from the trip. Shigemitsu replied he saw no room or further discussion because the Russians will not make any concessions and that Hatoyama will not be able to achieve any better results. He also stated that he found, after his return from London, that a certain person was pushing forward the adoption of the Adenauer formula with the Soviet Union, which he was very much against because although Adenauer formed such a peace treaty with the Russians, German prisoners are still detained in Russia and the only thing the treaty achieved was the exchange of ambassadors which is giving Germany a very big headache. If Japan adopts such a formula, she will be faced with the same problems as Germany faces now, with no hope of getting into the UN, the immediate return of the prisoners a far-distant reality, a disadvantageous fishery agreement, except for the exchange of ambassadors which will give rise to many complications.
This morning's meeting was a secret one. One of the members then asked Shigemitsu whether or not when he met Allison before his departure for Moscow, he had said to the U.S. ambassador that even at the risk of losing the S. Kuriles, Japan will have to accent the Russian terms. Shige-mitsu replied that he made such a statement because he felt that without U.S. help there could be no solution to the problem and that not only through Allison but also through Jap Ambassador in Washington did he request the U.S. to clarify the Yalta agreement since the agreement was made solely by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. When it is was rejected by the U.S. Shigemitsu said he told Allison there was no alternative for Japan but to agree to a peace treaty with Russia by recognizing Russian sovereignty over the S. Kuriles. There were no further questions on this natter.
Concerning Hatoyama's proposed trip to Moscow, not only the government and party leaders but even the financial circles are against it. As you know, if our politicians get no help from these quarters, they cannot do anything. If Hatoyama goes to Moscow, it will lead to the eventual collapse of the cabinet. This needs no explanation with the Upper House elections a failure for the conservative party and the Soviet-Japan talks at a deadlock. If Hatoyama insists on ▣▣ing despite opposition from his financial backers, he will have to change his cabinet and the first thing he will have to do before his departure is to remove Shigemitsu. lf that happens, the progressives in the party and the anti-Hatoyama group will support Shigemitsu, and a reshuffle in cabinet members ▣i▣▣t not take place. And If Hatoyama still persists on having his way, the cabinet will collapse immediately after is return.
This matter will be brought no when the foreign relations committee meets. In his talk with Dulles, Shigemitsu stated that Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty has no binding power on Japan since the peace treaty stipulated that the article will cease to exist three years after the first coming into force of the treaty and that Japan has no further need to abide by this provision. Shigemitsu made such a statement, however last June when he was asked the same question, he gave me a different answer. When Matsumoto was due to leave for Moscow, this writer asked Shigemitsu at the Diet whether or not article 26 of the peace treaty has bearing on the territorial problem, and he said that it did. This time he made a very controversial statement at San Francisco and also at the airport on his arrival.
Dulles' interpretion of Article 26 of the SF peace treaty is very correct. Legally, and from every aspect of view, Japan has to abide by the article. To be frank, the scars of a lost war through unconditional surrender take a long time to heal. Americans are not fools. Allison yesterday said the same things. The American Embassy is keenly interested in collecting records of the Diet proceedings. Allison referred to this too and said there was no further need for explanation on the matter again."
When Fujita asked Kitazawa if this should not be made public, Kitazawa said he would not object since a cabinet collapse is inevitable.
Concerning a successor to Hatoyama, although Ishibashi, the minister of international Trade and Industrial was for a while thought as the one mostly likely to succeed Hatoyama, there are very few in the Diet who support him. As to Kishi, he is not supported by the Upper House members. Ishii, at present, is considered most likely because he is very popular at the Diet and the successor to Hatoyama will have to be elected by the Diet.
A Diet dissolution is not feasible and unlikely. The conservatives know they will lose to the Socialists, and however stubborn and dumb Hatoyama and Kono might be, they will not do anything so foolish as to work for their own downfall and the fall of the Conservative party.