March 28, 1956

TO: Minister Yong Shik Kim
From: The President
U. S. Mediation Re K-J Relations
We did not say much to either Mr. Dulles or Mr. Robertson. If they got the impression from here that this Government desires U. S. mediation I do not wish to confirm that information. I have been telling Americans that U. S. mediation is not acceptable at the present time because U. S. hesitates to urgy the Japs that they must do what is right. For instance U. S. knows that Japan should not hesitate to withdraw the property claim which is positively a violation of the San Francisco Treaty and the State Department must tell them so publicly. So long as S. D. declines to do that it is clear the Department is afraid to mediate on any problems the Japs are unwilling to agree to settle with justice.
We would welcome mediation if the U. S. fairly and positively tells the Japs that what they insist on demanding from Korea is unjust.
Fishery Line
Japan should agree to support the Peace Line because it is for the equal benefit of both countries. There is no unfair idea in that plan. If U. S. does not want to call a spade a spade what hopes are there that U. S. mediation will settle the problems on the basis of justice and fairness?
I think we ought to make some special effort to settle all our cutstanding problems now. Japan delays to settle any of them because it finds the situation unfavorable to the Japs at the present time, therefore, it is trying to win over American support with the hope of settling the problems to its advantage. I think we should tell American authorities in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington that if the Japs refuse to settle these urgent questions now, we will give up the idea of settling anything satisfactory to us and instead demand reparations which should be about 10 times the amount they promised to pay to the Philippines. Once in a while you should make a public statement to that effect to let the Japs know that if they do not settle all problems now we will break up the whole negotiation with the Japs and demand reparations.
I understand that some American begin to think that the Fishery Line cannot be ignored now because of the fact that Communist infiltration and threats are very serious. By using this opportunity I think we should raise the question that the Japs are starting to worry about it. As I had told you before, you should use your own judgement in telling the Japs that if they withdraw the property claim and the Kubota statement we would be willing to open the preliminary talks. But the moment they know that we are not pressing them they will think we are trying to be reconciled to the matter.
The Japs had been in the habit of gaining every point whenever they had conference with American high authorities and naturally they had thought that Dulles' visit would give them other big concessions but when it turned out to the contrary they were peeved. However, I noticed that in other places Mr. Dulles is still supporting the idea of Japan being the leader in Asian questions. Mr. Dulles has come down considerably since he found out that Japs are not as soft as be had thought but we want him to abandon the idea that Japan should be built up to the extent that it becomes a dominating nation again.
One thing we tried to impress on Mr. Dulles was that it would be a grave mistake on the part of U. S. to continue the policy of giving aid to South-east Asian countries in order to buy Japanese goods with the aid funds so as to build up Japan's economy.
Mr. Dulles indicated to the Japs that should change its Constitution so as to be able to send troops abroad and thus be eligible to join the SEATO Pact.
I would like to know more in detail what the technological pact between U. S. and Japan means. If the U. S. agreed to reveal all the information regarding strategic war machines and arms including atomic bombs and other modern weapons, it is a most important matter and we must demand to have the same privilege. I wish you would investigate this matter quite throughly and as soon as you have the information we should take it up with our American friends.
While Mr. Dulles think much more about Korean friendship and alliance, he still believes Japs are superior in every way and we should correct that impression. The opinion among high ranking U. S. officials is that Korea is a better and more important ally and unless we can persuade the S. D. to share that feeling the danger of Japs aggression in the Far East cannot be eliminated.
You will realize how I feel about all the question mentioned above and I wish you could in some secret way find one what the S. D. is really trying to do for Japan.