송환문제의 국제재판소 제소라는 정부의 결정은 현명한 외교적 공세
Translation
EDITORIAL of the CHOSUN ILBO
EDITORIAL of the CHOSUN ILBO
December 13, 1959 (Evening edition)
GOVERNMENT DECISION TO BRING THE DEPORTATION CASE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IS A WISE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE MEASURE:
On December 14, 1959, a first batch of about 1,000 poor Korean residents in Japan aboard two Russian vessels sailing from Niigata port will be mercilessly deported to Communist slave camps in the northern Korea which is under forcible occupation of the north Korean puppet regime.
Faced with this grave racial tragecy, the entire Korean people are clenching their fist with indignation and voices accusing this treachery of the Imperialistic Japan are resounding throughout Korea, As things stand now, however, the situation appears to have developed to a last stage where no measures are likely to bring fruits in blocking the deportation of Korean resident to the northern Korea by Japan. Our Government that exerted pertinacious efforts for full ten months in conducting diplomatic negotiations to attain peaceful settlement of the issue, finally decided on December 12, 1959 to refer the case to the International Court of Justice and sounded out the intention of the Japanese Government as to whether they would contest the suit.
Since the Japanese Government is determinedly going ahead with its deportation plan as a fait accompli, it is doubtful whether they would easily agree to refer the case to the ICJ. Unless a third Party miraculously succeeds in mediating the issue between the two countries or some special change in the situation takes place, the prospects are very gloomy. Our Government's decision to institute a legal case before the ICJ as a means of blocking Japan's deportation plot, much too late as it may be, can nevertheless be regarded as wise measure in view of the fact that such decision, although little can be expected therefrom in substance, will serve as a proof that the Korean Government is making sincere efforts for peaceful settlement of the diplomatic dispute. Even if the Japanese side should manipulate diplomatic strategy by inventing an excuse that it was too late or by counter-proposing that they would contest the suit if only the Korean side likewise agreed to contest the suits raised by Japan on the "Peace Line issue" and "Dokto issue", the Government's decision would have an effect of giving to third party countries an impression that the Korean Government did its best to settle the dispute through peaceful means in accordance with the international law and order with patience until the last moment. The decision is considered to have offered the Korean side a good "moments to turn from a diplomatic defensive position to an offensive position. We only regret why our Government failed to think of instituting a legal suit before the ICJ early enough. If this same measure had been taken either immediately after the ICRC last June decided to participate in the deportation plot even in indirect way, or before the severing of economic relations with Japan, the situation might have been different. In this regards, our Government's decision cannot but be regarded as being too late.
The reason why we consider the Government decision to bring the case before the ICJ to be wise is that, in addition to the effect of giving to the international society a proof that Korea was sincere in settling the dispute through peaceful means, it makes Japan lose ground to bring the knotty ICJ problems before the ICJ or seek mediation of the U.N. therefor, should Japan refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the present issue. It is recalled that Japan earlier staged a big propaganda campaign by announcing its intention to institute a legal suit before the ICJ on the Peace Line and Dokto issues. They also dispatched representatives of families of Japanese fishermen detained in Pusan to ICRC Headquarters in Geneva last summer in an attempt to make a tearful appeal. They utilized the occasion for propagandizing Korea as a "breacher of international law and order", If the Japanese should refuse to agree to refer this case to the ICJ as means of peaceful settlement of the dispute, it would expose to the world that the past international propaganda of Japan were nothing but a selfish and unilateral gesture on the part of Japan. The Government's decision also has an advantage in that there might emerge a strong possibility of mediation by a third party country.
It cannot be denied that through distorted-propaganda, Korea in the past was known to the international society as having been stubbornly adamant on its position which they thought was the main cause of deteriorated relations between the two countries, while Japan was regarded as being moderate and earnest in seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute. This may largely be attributed to the lack of diplomatic skills on our part. Our officials in charge of foreign relations, by using too frank and blunt diplomatic terminology, might have given an impression to foreign diplomats that our diplomacy was still in a crude infancy, Now that we have shown a concrete and sufficient sign of sincerity for settling the deportation issue in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law and order, it should have offered an occasion to dispel any misunderstanding concerning our "stubborn diplomacy" and open a road for an active third party mediation - particularly by the United States - between Korea and Japan,
According to the established principles of international law, no country may refer any international dispute to the International Court of Justice without the consent of the other party involved. Furthermore, as the Republic of Korea is not yet a member of the United Nations, even when the other party should consent to refer the case to the ICJ, Korea can become a party to the statute of the ICJ only "on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council " according to Article 93 of the U.N. Charter, But, since we have a ground to claim that "the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957 " is a part of treaty or agreement, if we should exhaust all measures and sincerity to settle the issue through peaceful efforts, it is not at all impossible to expect an unexpected change in the situation surrounding the Korea-Japan relations.
We positively support the wise measure taken by our Government and, even if the best means of stopping the sailing of first batch of deportation vessels should be found futile, the Government should make continuous efforts, keeping constant wisdom and determination to secure next best measures of blocking the second batch of deportation vessels from sailing.
On December 14, 1959, a first batch of about 1,000 poor Korean residents in Japan aboard two Russian vessels sailing from Niigata port will be mercilessly deported to Communist slave camps in the northern Korea which is under forcible occupation of the north Korean puppet regime.
Faced with this grave racial tragecy, the entire Korean people are clenching their fist with indignation and voices accusing this treachery of the Imperialistic Japan are resounding throughout Korea, As things stand now, however, the situation appears to have developed to a last stage where no measures are likely to bring fruits in blocking the deportation of Korean resident to the northern Korea by Japan. Our Government that exerted pertinacious efforts for full ten months in conducting diplomatic negotiations to attain peaceful settlement of the issue, finally decided on December 12, 1959 to refer the case to the International Court of Justice and sounded out the intention of the Japanese Government as to whether they would contest the suit.
Since the Japanese Government is determinedly going ahead with its deportation plan as a fait accompli, it is doubtful whether they would easily agree to refer the case to the ICJ. Unless a third Party miraculously succeeds in mediating the issue between the two countries or some special change in the situation takes place, the prospects are very gloomy. Our Government's decision to institute a legal case before the ICJ as a means of blocking Japan's deportation plot, much too late as it may be, can nevertheless be regarded as wise measure in view of the fact that such decision, although little can be expected therefrom in substance, will serve as a proof that the Korean Government is making sincere efforts for peaceful settlement of the diplomatic dispute. Even if the Japanese side should manipulate diplomatic strategy by inventing an excuse that it was too late or by counter-proposing that they would contest the suit if only the Korean side likewise agreed to contest the suits raised by Japan on the "Peace Line issue" and "Dokto issue", the Government's decision would have an effect of giving to third party countries an impression that the Korean Government did its best to settle the dispute through peaceful means in accordance with the international law and order with patience until the last moment. The decision is considered to have offered the Korean side a good "moments to turn from a diplomatic defensive position to an offensive position. We only regret why our Government failed to think of instituting a legal suit before the ICJ early enough. If this same measure had been taken either immediately after the ICRC last June decided to participate in the deportation plot even in indirect way, or before the severing of economic relations with Japan, the situation might have been different. In this regards, our Government's decision cannot but be regarded as being too late.
The reason why we consider the Government decision to bring the case before the ICJ to be wise is that, in addition to the effect of giving to the international society a proof that Korea was sincere in settling the dispute through peaceful means, it makes Japan lose ground to bring the knotty ICJ problems before the ICJ or seek mediation of the U.N. therefor, should Japan refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the present issue. It is recalled that Japan earlier staged a big propaganda campaign by announcing its intention to institute a legal suit before the ICJ on the Peace Line and Dokto issues. They also dispatched representatives of families of Japanese fishermen detained in Pusan to ICRC Headquarters in Geneva last summer in an attempt to make a tearful appeal. They utilized the occasion for propagandizing Korea as a "breacher of international law and order", If the Japanese should refuse to agree to refer this case to the ICJ as means of peaceful settlement of the dispute, it would expose to the world that the past international propaganda of Japan were nothing but a selfish and unilateral gesture on the part of Japan. The Government's decision also has an advantage in that there might emerge a strong possibility of mediation by a third party country.
It cannot be denied that through distorted-propaganda, Korea in the past was known to the international society as having been stubbornly adamant on its position which they thought was the main cause of deteriorated relations between the two countries, while Japan was regarded as being moderate and earnest in seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute. This may largely be attributed to the lack of diplomatic skills on our part. Our officials in charge of foreign relations, by using too frank and blunt diplomatic terminology, might have given an impression to foreign diplomats that our diplomacy was still in a crude infancy, Now that we have shown a concrete and sufficient sign of sincerity for settling the deportation issue in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law and order, it should have offered an occasion to dispel any misunderstanding concerning our "stubborn diplomacy" and open a road for an active third party mediation - particularly by the United States - between Korea and Japan,
According to the established principles of international law, no country may refer any international dispute to the International Court of Justice without the consent of the other party involved. Furthermore, as the Republic of Korea is not yet a member of the United Nations, even when the other party should consent to refer the case to the ICJ, Korea can become a party to the statute of the ICJ only "on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council " according to Article 93 of the U.N. Charter, But, since we have a ground to claim that "the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957 " is a part of treaty or agreement, if we should exhaust all measures and sincerity to settle the issue through peaceful efforts, it is not at all impossible to expect an unexpected change in the situation surrounding the Korea-Japan relations.
We positively support the wise measure taken by our Government and, even if the best means of stopping the sailing of first batch of deportation vessels should be found futile, the Government should make continuous efforts, keeping constant wisdom and determination to secure next best measures of blocking the second batch of deportation vessels from sailing.
END.
색인어
- 지명
- Niigata port, the northern Korea, Korea, the northern Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Pusan, Geneva, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, the United States, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea
- 관서
- THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, the north Korean puppet regime, the International Court of Justice, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Korean Government, the Korean Government, the International Court of Justice
- 단체
- the ICJ, the ICJ, the ICJ, the ICRC, the ICJ, ICJ, the ICJ, the U.N., the ICJ, the ICJ, ICRC, the ICJ, the United Nations, the ICJ, the ICJ, the Security Council
- 문서
- the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Charter, the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957
- 기타
- Korean residents in Japan, the Imperialistic Japan, the deportation of Korean resident, the "Peace Line issue", "Dokto issue", the Peace Line, Dokto issues, the deportation issue, the Korea-Japan relations
