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한일관계에 관한 사항

 
  • 날짜1961년 3월 31일
  • 문서종류보고서
  • 형태사항영어 
March 31, 1961

FACTS ABOUT THE KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS
 

The Republic of Korea, since its independence in 1948, had engaged from 1951 to 1959 in a series of four Korea-japan conferences, in order to settle down the aftermaths of the separation of the two countries and thus to lay down the foundation for renewed friendly relationship between the two neighbor countries. The conferences, however, all ended ineffectually due to wide discrepancy of opinions between the two sides. After the establishment of Second Republic in Korea, the Fifth Korea-Japan Talks which were opened in October last year are now being held in Tokyo, Japan.
In the following pages, a brief summaries of past four conferences and of the current fifth conference are presented for your reference.
1. In the summer of 1951 when the San Francisco Peace treaty was under negotiation, the then-Supreme Commander for the allied Powers felt it necessary to define the status of Korean residents in Japan who, according to the SCAP, were "non-Japanese having special status." Therefore, the SCAP authorities sponsored the meeting between the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the occupied Japan mainly for the purpose of defining the occupied Japan mainly for the purpose of defining the status of Koreans in Japan. By the time of the end of the Pacific War, Koreans in Japan numbered more than two Million, most of whom had been brought over to Japan as military or labor draftees. After the end of the War, 1.4 million returned to the Republic of Korea, thus more than 600,000 Korean remaining in Japan. Thus, the Korea-Japan conference was held on October 20 under the auspices of the SCAP. At this meeting, both sides agreed that agenda items should be expanded to other various problems pending between the two countries. But Japan gradually revealed her reluctancy to discuss various problems in a sincere manner because she believed that the negotiation could be conducted more favorably after April 28, 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have come into force. Whenever the Korean side urged the Japanese side to discuss without delay some problems, the latter used to reply that it was not prepared to do so.
2. In the light of the background of the first Korea-Japan conference, the problem of Korean residents who have been residing in Japan since prior to the termination of World War II was discussed with priority. From the beginning, the Japanese side refused to admit the historical fact that during forty years of the Japanese occupation of Korea, hundreds of thousands of Koreans, deprived of their rights of employment in the home land, were completed to immigrate into Japan to work in the Japanese factories or a number of them were compulsorily drafted for forced labor in Japan's munition factories. In dealing with the problem for which they were responsible, the Japanese Government closed eyes to the historical background.
3. At the above meeting (1951), the Korean side pleased the Japanese side to commence an immediate negotiation for conclusion of a fishery agreement since it undertook the obligation to do so vis-avis the Republic of Korea under the provisions of Articles 9 and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But this sincere proposal by the Korean side was rejected by the Japanese side under the pretext that the Japanese side had no preparation for such talks though it had almost finished negotiation with the United States and Canada for conclusion of a tripartite fishery convention.
During the Occupation period, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), the then reigning authority in Japan, was also cognizant of the need for regulating Japanese fishing activities and consequently issued several Directives to the Japanese Government on the matter. SCAP memoranda to the Japanese Government dated January 22, 1946; October 28, 1947; and June 30, 1949 are most noteworthy. In compliance with SCAP Directives, the Japanese Government itself enacted several laws and regulations to enforce the Directives. Namely, they announced "Essentials for regulating westward bottom dragnet fishing and trawler fishing" dated June 16, 1949 and also promulgated "Law for preventing exhaustion of marine resources" dated May 10, 1950.
The SCAP Directives set up a demarcation line in the centre of the East Sea beyond which Japanese fishing vessels were not allowed to go out for fishing but to prevent possible frictions over fishery between Korea and Japan. However, Japanese fishing boats ignored the boundary line, crossed it, came near Korean coast and recklessly exploited marine resources in the seas adjacent to Korea, thus ruining the very purpose for which the demarcation line was established. It was estimated that some 2,500 Japanese fishing vessels involving 40,000 Japanese fishermen were being engaged in secretly exploiting the marine resources in Korea with the annual net fishing amount of nearly 230,000 tons. As many as 83 cases of violation of the MacArthur Line were reported during the period between 1947 and 1951. They are only known cases and there are naturally many more unknown cases of violations. It is reminded in this connection that the Japanese monopolized fisheries industry of Korea during the forty years of the Japanese occupation of Korea.
With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September, 1951, and the subsequent restoration of sovereignty by Japan, the MacArthur Line was to be lifted. Obviously, however, the necessity for such a line remained. It was all to certain that, with the abolition of the MacArthur Line, the swarming Japanese fleets thus freed would in a matter of months devour the fishery resources in the seas adjacent to the Korean peninsula which had been conserved by Korea for the past many decades. The Korean Government had no alternative but filling a vacuum left by the lifting of the Line which the Supreme Commander established for the occupation period to preserve peace between Japan and her neighbors when the Japanese Government refused early conclusion of a fishery agreement. The Peace Line was thus proclaimed by the Government of the Republic of Korea, in the light of the growing international tendency that coastal stats's preferential right over its adjacent waters should be observed.
4. Another purpose in proclaiming the Peace Line was to safeguard the sea defense of Korea against aggression. In 1953, General Mark W. Clark, the United Nations Commender, proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone, covering largely the same area encompassed by the Peace Line. However, this Sea Defense Zone was lifted shortly after the signing of the Armistice. There was, therefore, an urgent need for the Government of the Republic of Korea to take measures to fill the vacuum created by lifting of the Sea Defense Zone, for the need for such a zone still remained as Korea was still, technically as well as practically, war with the Communists. It was incumbent upon the Korean Government to guard against Communist infiltration, subversion, and other disturbances by way of the sea routes. The Japanese side closes eyes to the fact that the Peace Line accordingly undertook the same purpose which had been served by the Sea Defense Zone before its lifting.
5. The question of return of vessels had actually and already been solved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in SCAPIN No.2168 and USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No.33, which specifically directed that those vessels registered with the Korean authorities and those located in Korea as of August 9, 1945, would be considered Korean vessels. Under these directives, considerable tonnage of vessels should have been transferred to Korea, but the Japanese Government did not fulfill these U.S. directives. At the meeting in 1951 the Japanese delegation merely spent time to argue about the so-called legal interpretation of the directives in its own way, and, constantly, adjourned the meetings on the excuse that more detailed study of the vessels affected by the directives was necessary, etc. Then, unexpectedly, the Japanese delegation proposed that the directives be completely ignored, and that Japan would "donate" to Korea certain tonnage of vessels. Needless to say, the Korean side firmly rejected this "solution", and demanded that Japan carry out the provisions of the SCAP and USAMGIK directives, which Japan denied.
6. In February, 1952, the Korean Delegation presented its 8-point proposal for the korean claims against Japan. this proposal included:
1) To return the classical books and documents, arts, and silver bullions taken away from Korea; 2) to repay the obligations and debts of the Government of Japan owed to the former Government-General of Chosun as of August 9, 1945; 3) to return the monetary accounts transferred or remitted from Korea on and or since August 9, 1945; 4) to return the properties in Japan of the juridical persons with head offices in Korea as of August 9, 1945; 5) to repay the national and/or public bonds and the Bank of Japan notes, issued by the Japanese authorities, which are in possession of Korean nationals and/or juridical persons, the Japanese obligations to the conscripted Korean laborers, and other claims of Korean national or its juridical persons against the Government of Japan and/or its nationals; 6) to recognize the legality of the Korean national and/or juridical persons's ownership of the shares or other securities issued by Japanese juridical persons; 7) to return all the interests as had been or would have been yielded by the afore-mentioned properties and/or claims; 8) to put into execution all these above-mentioned returns and repayments of accounts relating to obligations within six months at the latest after the conclusion of this Agreement. Instead of giving consideration to the above proposal, the Japanese side came out with its absurd counter-proposal for the so-called claims for the former Japanese properties in Korea, which was lawfully vested in the U.S. Military Government in Korea in accordance with its Ordinance No.33 and later transferred to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the ROK-US Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement of 1948. It was said that the so-called claims by the Japanese side were presented not to satisfy the claims themselves but to overshadow the Korean claims which would oblige Japan to repay a tremendous amount of debt.
7. In January, 1953, at the invitation of General Clark, ex-President Syngman Rhee visited Japan where he met then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida to lay down the groundwork for the settlement of various problems between the two countries. Both heads of Governments agreed to solve the outstanding issues with sincerely and the Second Korea-Japan talks was held thereafter. It ended, however, in an empty pledge on the part of Japan which only played delaying tactics.
8. The Third Korea-Japan Conference was held in October, 1953 to discuss and settle the outstanding problems between the two countries. However, the Japanese Delegation did not come for the settlement of the pending issues but come for slandering. Then Chief Japanese Delegate Kangichiro kubota made insulating remarks even challenging the legality of the independence of the Republic of Korea. The absurd remarks by the Japanese Chief Delegate covered the following points:
(1) The evacuation of the Japanese from Korea in 1945 was a violation of international Law.
(2) The establishment of an independent Korean state before a Japanese peace treaty was signed was a violation of international law.
(3) Japan's property claims in Korea are inviolable.
(4) The Cairo Declaration describing the "enslavement" of the Korean people to Japan was based on wartime hysteria.
(5) Japan's occupation of Korea was beneficial to the Korean people.
Despite the Republic of Korea's repeated requests that the so-called Kubota statement be withdrawn, the Japanese side came out with breaking off of the Third Korea-Japan Conference.
9. After Japan regained her sovereignty since the coming into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952, every sort of discriminatory measures and pressure have been applied to 600,000 Korean residents in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese Government started arresting these people to detain in the Detention Camp in Kyushu for unilateral deportation of these people. the Japanese side unilaterally sent to Pusan 125 Korean residents of pre-war category in May, 1955, but our immigration officials at the port of Pusan were obliged to refuse to receive them and returned them to Japan. The Japanese side, however, sneakingly sent 77 of them back to Korea again by producing forged papers as if they had been simple "illegal" entrants after the end of the World War II. Needless to say, the Japanese Government cannot unilaterally deport those Koreans who have entered Japan and established their domicile since prior to the termination of World War II.
In January, 1955, the Japanese Government proposed that 404 "pre-war" category Koreans be released while the Korean side accept the deportation of "simple illegal entrants." The Japanese side further mentioned that it would refrain from arresting those Koreans who belonged to the "pre-war" category thereafter. With that understanding, the Korean side accepted the deportation of 707 "simple illegal entrants" from January through May, 1955. The Japanese Government released 277 out of 404 "pre-war" Koreans who were under detention at that time. It was revealed, however, that the Japanese authorities again arrested 257 pre-war category Koreans in breach of their commitment not to do so.
10. Late in 1955 and early in 1956, Korea has sincerely sought an equitable settlement of the issue of the Korean detainees at Omura and Japanese detainees at Pusan. The negotiation for this purpose was all but successful in November 1955 when the Korean Minister Kim in Tokyo and Japanese Justice Minister Hanamura agreed on the settlement of the issue. The terms of the agreement were:
(a) Japan shall release all of the Korean detainees at detention camps in Japan who entered Japan before August, 1945, and instead,
(b) Korea shall return to Japan those Japanese fishermen who completed their prison terms and also accept the deportation of Koreans who entered Japan illegally after August 1945.
But this agreement could not be materialized because of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's disavowal of the agreement itself. The issue, therefore, had to remain deadlocked until the end of March, 1956 when another agreement was made between minister Kim and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. The terms of the Agreement were substantially same as the formar agreement, viz.
(a) The Korean Government shall release Japanese fishermen who completed their prison terms;
(b) The Korean Government will accept the deportation of illegal Korean entrants after the World War II;
(c) The Japanese Government shall release all Korean detainees who entered Japan before the end of the World War II.
Pursuant to the above agreement, a working Committee was composed, and negotiations started. But strange to say, the Japanese side refused to implement the terms agreed on for the reason that the Ministry of Justice could not agree to the Foreign Ministry. Thus, the Japanese Government failed to honor the terms which its Foreign Minister agreed with a foreign envoy.
11. In her earnest desire to iron out all these sources of troubles between the two countries, the Government of the Republic of Korea made exhaustive efforts to pave the way for the resumption of the overall talks. Thus the Korea-Japan preliminary talks were concluded on December 31, 1957 with the signing of various agreements and arrangements for the resumption of the overall talks. These agreements included the mutual release of detainees, the return of Korean art objects by Japan, and the withdrawal of Japanese claims against Korea.
12. Thus, by virtue of conclusion of preliminary talks between the two governments, the Fourth Korea-Japan overall talks were resumed on April 15, 1958. Both sides agreed to set up four major committees to discuss and settle major agenda items. These Committees are: Committee on Basic Relations; Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line; Committee on Problems of Korean Residents in Japan; and committee on Korean Claims which is subdivided into two sub-committees;
a) sub-committee on vessels and b) sub-committee on other claims (regarding return of gold and silver bullion and other monetary claims submitted by the Korean side and return of korean art objects).
These talks went on rather smoothly and entered into a temporary recess on the occasion of year end and new year holidays. Both Government agreed that the talks would be resumed in the early party of 1959. A few days before the resumption of the Korea-Japan overall talks, on January 30, 1959, the Japanese foreign Minister unilaterally declared at the Japanese Diet that Korean residents in Japan will be "allowed to go to the Communist north", without making any prior consultation with the government of the Republic of Korea, despite that the problem on the so-called repatriation of Korean residents in Japan constituted an integral part on the agenda on the Korean residents in Japan, which has been agreed upon by the two governments to be discussed at the Korea-Japan overall talks. Japan finally went so far as to make unilateral decision on the Japanese Foreign Minister's statement as a governmental policy at the Cabinet Meeting held on February 13, 1959. This unilateral action on the part of the Japanese Government constituted a flagrant violation of an agreement reached between the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Japan on December 31, 1957, and caused the breakdown of whole talks.
13. In an attempt to give this deportation scheme a facade of "humanitarianism", the Japanese side tried to have the ICRC participate in the deportation work. Despite the fact that the Japanese side was endeavoring to unilaterally dispose of the Korean residents issue which is a diplomatic issue of legal nature, the Government of the Republic of Korea proposed on July 30, 1959 the unconditional resumption of the Korea-Japan overall talks. The Fourth Korea-Japan overall talks were thus resumed on August 12, 1959 and it was agreed between the two delegations that the problem of Korean residents in Japan was to be discussed with priority to other issues. On August 26, 1959, both sides agreed that there are three categories of Korean residents, namely, (1) those Koreans who wish to remain in Japan, (2) those Koreans who wish to repatriate to the Republic of Korea, and (3) those Koreans who neither wish to remain in Japan nor wish to repatriate to the Republic of Korea, if any. In her most sincere desire to forestall unnecessary friction between Korea and Japan due to issues on 600,000 Korean residents in Japan, the Republic of Korea proposed that she would be ready to receive the repatriation of all these Koreans regardless of their political affiliation, provided that the Japanese Government pay due compensation for their sufferings in the past and no restriction be placed in their taking away of properties in their repatriation to the Republic of Korea. This proposal was rejected by the Japanese side and the talks bore no fruits.
While accepting the Korean proposal for the unconditional resumption of the Korea-Japan talks, the Japanese Government and Red Cross demonstrated their determination to go ahead with the deportation scheme by formally signing the so-called "Calcutta Agreement" and actually taking measures for implementation of the said agreement. The Government of the Republic of Korea in her sincere desire to attain a peaceful settlement of the dispute relating to the deportation problem in a fair and legal manner, proposed on December 11, 1959 to refer the case to the International Court of Justice, but the Japanese set sail two deportation ship on December 14, 1959 and refused to respond to the peace appeal of the Republic of Korea on December 18, 1959 under unconvincing reasons.
14. Upon the establishment of the Second Republic as the result of "April Revolution" in August, 1960, the new government of the Republic of Korea formed under the leadership of Prime Minister John M. Chang decided to do the best to solve the long-pending Korea-Japan problems with renewed efforts. In this effort, Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka was invited to Korea for the first time since the end of World War II, and during his visit it was agreed between the two countries that a preliminary conference for the Fifth Korea-Japan formal talks would be held in Tokyo on October 25, 1960. Thus the current Fifth Korea-Japan Preliminary Talks was held as scheduled and lasted until the end of the year, when they entered into the year-end recess.
In the course of the meetings, it was agreed that four committees (i.e., the Committee on Basic Relations, the Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line, the Committee on Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan, and the Committee on Korean Claims subdivided by three sub-committees) would be again established to deal with the outstanding issues separately, and that when some sizable agreements be reached between the two sides on each issue, they would hold immediately a formal conference where they may handle the issues politically and thus settle them as a whole.
However, unexpectedly, the talks made little progress. Although there happened to be a general election in Japan in November of the year which caused a provisional state of political vacuum on the part of Japan and the general election could possibly stall the proceeding of the conference, it was obvious that the Japanese side scarcely had any sincere attitude toward the talks.
Little progress was made particularly in the discussions of the problem of Korean claims and that of Fisheries and Peace Line, which are considered to be the most difficult ones. However, it was fortunate that, on the problem of Korean Residents in Japan, substantial views were exchanged between the two sides considerably.
At the beginning of this year, the conference was reopened on the 25th of January. And since around March the talks seem to be going rather smooth, as substantial discussions are exchanged in the Committee on Korean Claims as well as in the Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line. The Japanese side, for the first time since the beginning of the first conference, agreed to the discussion on the eight point property claims of Korea, while, in the Fisheries Committee, discussions on the resources in the waters related to both sides are now being conducted rather earnestly. The Committee on Korean residents in Japan made some progress on a few hard points.
However, there still lie many difficulties to be ironed out, in order to reach a total agreement on every issue. Some of them are essential ones.
For instance, the Japanese attitude that the problem of fisheries and Peace line and that of Korean Claims should be settled down in a lump ought to be modified. It is crystal clear that the problem of Korean claims, since it is, in its nature, one of the prerequisites for the liquidation of the past, belongs to the category that must be cleared before the normalization of the relationship between the two countries.
This does not, however, mean that the Korean side sticks to the contention that the two problems should be dealed with separately. What the Korean side wants for the Japanese side is that the Japanese side show more sincerity on the discussion and the satisfactory conclusion of the problem of Korean claims. We do not see any reason why the Japanese side should hesitate to repay its own debts. It is our position that only the display of sincerity on the problem of Korean claims by Japan may lead to an amicable solution of the fisheries problem and finally of the pending issues as a whole.

 
별지 : 요약본해제
 
  • 날짜1961년
  • 문서종류기타
  • 형태사항영어 
SUMMARY
 

1. At the first Korea-Japan talks convened on and from October 20, 1952, the Japanese side employed every tactic to delay the proceedings of the talks because it believed that it could bargain in a stronger position after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.
2. In dealing with the problem of those Koreans who had been forcibly brought to Japan during the wartime, the Japanese side closed eyes to the special historical background of them.
3. In the fall of 1951, the Korean side proposed to the Japanese side for an early conclusion of a fishery agreement for which Japan undertook obligation by the Peace Treaty, the Japanese side declined to commence negotiation stating that it was not prepared to do so. As the MacArthur Line was to be lifted at that time, the Korean side could not but take a measure. Thus the Peace Line was proclaimed.
4. The purpose of the Peace Line is multiple. It is to conserve fishery resources and to prevent unnecessary frictions at sea between Korea and Japan. Another function of the Line is to prevent the Communists from infiltratinginto the Republic of Korea, as the Clark Line intended to do. Japan denied it.
5. When the question of return of vessels was discussed at the first Korea-Japan talks in 1951, the Japanese side evaded its obligations directed by the SCAP, presenting a ridiculous theory of "donation," of vessels.
6. In 1952, the Japanese side came out with an absurd assertion that it has claim to the defunct Japanese properties in Korea, solely for the purpose of countering our claims against Japan,
7. Early in 1953, Japanese Prime Minister agreed with President Syngman Rhee to settle the issues pending between the two countries as soon as possible. This ended in an empty pledge.
8. At the third Korea-Japan talks in 1953, the Japanese Delegation came to the conference table to question even the legality of the independence of the Republic of Korea. Japanese Chief Delegate Kubota made remarks insulting the Republic of Korea covering five points of argument.
9. As soon as Japan regained her sovereignty in April, 1952, the Japanese Government redoubled its efforts to take a discriminatory measure against Korean residents in Japan and deport as many Koreans as possible. In 1955, Japan actually transported some to Pusan though the Korean Government sent them back to Japan.
10. In 1955, Chief of the Korean Mission in Japan agreed with Japanese Minister of Justice for mutual release of detainees, but it could not be implemented because the Japanese Foreign Ministry voiced an objection thereto. In 1956, Chief of the same Mission agreed with Japanese Foreign Minister on the same subject, but the agreement became abortive because the Japanese Ministry of Justice opposed its implementation.
11. The Korean Government completely fulfilled its obligations undertaken by the terms signed on December 31, 1957 for releasing Japanese detainees in Pusan, while the Japanese Government failed to reciprocate by repatriating the Korean detainees at Omura.
12. According to the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957, the Japanese Government cannot unilaterally dispose of the problem of Korean residents in Japan. But it did so in carrying out deportation of Koreans to the Communist north.
13. After the Fourth Korea-Japan talks were resumed on August 12, 1959, the Japanese side agreed to place on the agenda "the problem of those who neither wish to remain in Japan nor wish to repatriate to the Republic of Korea" for discussion at the overall talks. Despite the said understanding, it carried out the deportation of Koreans in Japan to the Communist north on December 14, 1959. Japan even rejected the Korean proposal for bringing the case to the International Court of Justice.
14. At the Fourth Korea-Japan talks in 1958, the Japanese side handed to the Korean side a list of 489 Korean art objects. Later, the Japanese explained that it was handed not for return but for reference by the Korean side.
15. If necessary, the Japanese side used to quote Korean remarks made in informal occasions as if it had been an understanding, while the Japanese side used to insist upon an exclusive high-level meeting for the purpose of giving no witness or evidence.
16. According to the Japanese argument in 1958, the SCAP instructions for return of Korean vessels are not binding upon Japan. The Japanese even declined to discuss on the question of "return".
17. When the Japanese side made a proposal for a fishery agreement in 1958, it gave wide publicity about the existence of the proposal without publicising the contents thereof. The Japanese move was not to solve the question but merely to put the Korean side into bad shape.
18. In December, 1956, the Korean Mission in Japan was assured by the responsible officials of the Japanese Government that no Korean would be sent to the northern part of Korea. According to the Japanese theory, however, the depertation of Koreans in Japan in 1959 is out of control by the Japanese Government because the Koreans concerned left Japan of their "free will".
19. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi wrote to President Rhee in 1958 expressing his determination to lead his Government in the formal talks so as to arrive at speedy settlement of the problems with all sincerity, this did not materialize by the actions by the Japanese Delegation.

 
이름
Mark W. Clark , Clark , Syngman Rhee , Kangichiro kubota , John M. Chang , Zentaro Kosaka , Syngman Rhee , Kubota , Kishi
지명
The Republic of Korea , Korea , Tokyo , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Japan , the Republic of Korea , the United States , Canada , Japan , the East Sea , Korea , Japan , Korea , Korea , Korea , Korea , Japan , the Korean peninsula , Korea , Japan , Korea , Korea , Korea , Korea , Japan , Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Korea , Japan , Korea , Korea , Japan , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Korea , Korea , Japan , Korea , Japan , Japan , Kyushu , Pusan , port of Pusan , Japan , Korea , Japan , Korea , Omura , Pusan , Tokyo , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Korea , Japan , Japan , the Republic of Korea , the Republic of Korea , the Republic of Korea , Korea , Tokyo , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Korea , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Japan , Korea , Japan , the Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea , Japan , Japan , Japan , Pusan , Japan , Pusan , Omura , the Communist north , Japan , Republic of Korea , Japan , the Communist north , Japan , Japan , the northern part of Korea , Japan , Japan
관서
Second Republic , the SCAP , the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the occupied Japan , the SCAP , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , The Korean Government , the Japanese Government , the Government of the Republic of Korea , the Government of the Republic of Korea , the Korean Government , United States Army Military Government in Korea , the Japanese Government , USAMGIK , the Government of Japan , the former Government-General of Chosun , the Japanese authorities , the Government of Japan , the U.S. Military Government in Korea , Government of the Republic of Korea , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , The Japanese Government , the Japanese authorities , The Korean Government , The Korean Government , The Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , the Government of the Republic of Korea , the Japanese Diet , the government of the Republic of Korea , the Japanese Government , the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Japan , the Government of the Republic of Korea , Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , The Government of the Republic of Korea , International Court of Justice , the new government of the Republic of Korea , Japanese Government , the Korean Government , the Japanese Foreign Ministry , Japanese Ministry of Justice , The Korean Government , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government , the International Court of Justice , the SCAP , the Japanese Government , the Japanese Government
단체
Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) , the Japanese delegation , the Japanese delegation , the Korean Delegation , the Bank of Japan , the Japanese Delegation , Committee on Basic Relations , Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line , Committee on Problems of Korean Residents in Japan , committee on Korean Claims , sub-committee on vessels , sub-committee on other claims , ICRC , Red Cross , the Committee on Basic Relations , the Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line , the Committee on Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan , the Committee on Korean Claims , the Committee on Korean Claims , the Committee on Fisheries and Peace Line , the Fisheries Committee , The Committee on Korean residents in Japan , the Japanese Delegation , the Korean Mission in Japan , the Korean Mission in Japan , the Japanese Delegation
문서
The SCAP Directives , SCAPIN No.2168 , the Agreed Minutes
기타
the San Francisco Peace treaty , SCAP , the San Francisco Peace Treaty , Articles 9 and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty , SCAP , SCAP , MacArthur Line , the San Francisco Peace Treaty , the MacArthur Line , the MacArthur Line , The Peace Line , the Peace Line , Sea Defense Zone , the Peace Line , Sea Defense Zone , the Armistice , the Sea Defense Zone , the Peace Line , the Sea Defense Zone , Ordinance No.33 , SCAP , Ordinance No.33 , the ROK-US Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement , international Law , international law , The Cairo Declaration , the San Francisco Peace Treaty , Calcutta Agreement , April Revolution , the Peace Treaty , Peace Treaty , the MacArthur Line , the Peace Line , the Peace Line , Clark Line , SCAP

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