No.21

TOKYO, September 12, 1957

Excellency:
1. Your Excellency's letter No.94 of Sept. 6 has been received with appreciation and I have been much impressed by Your Excellency's warm words about my recent hospitalization. I am happy to report to Your Excellency that I am now fully well.
2. Last week I reported that the administratire level talk with the Japanese side is now at a standstill, however, both sides are agreed that it does not mean complete rupture of the preliminary talk itself.
It seems now that the Japanese side is studying on ways and means whereby to break the current deadlock. It is also very clear to us that Japan will not accept our revision proposal, especially on the property claim issue, and that, if we continuously persists in this point, the whole preliminary talk is in danger of being totally ruptured.
3. Under these circumstances, feeling the necessity to gather inside information of the Japanese Government and ascertain its attitude, I together with Minister Yiu invited Deputy Cabinet Secretary Tatsuo Tanaka to a dinner last Monday (Sept. 9). Incidentally, Tanaka hails from Yamaguchi Prefecture where he was formerly elected to governorship for a few terms in the early post-surrender years. He, being from the same province as Prime Minister Kishi, is much concerned about the outcome of the current talk on the reciprocal release of the detainees and the resumption of the formal talk. Also, he exercises quite a voice in the Kishi Cabinet the lapse of only a few years since he entered central politics.
At the diner table our side insisted upon Japan's acceptance of our original revision proposal. Tanaka, citing the alleged strong opposition among top Liberal-Democratic party leaders as well as bureaucratic circles such as the Foreign and Finance Ministries and the Economic Planning Board, stated that Japan's outright acceptance of our proposal was inconceivable in consideration of the substance of the matter.
After a series of arguments lasting more than two hours, one idea was suggested. That is to say:
a. With regard to the draft Note Verbale on the withdrawal of the Kubota statement and the Japanese property claims, and the draft Joint Communique, the original drafts made on June 14 will remain unchanged.
b. However, with regard to Article 4 of the draft Agreed Minutes, our revision plan will be accepted.
The above idea has come out from the following considerations:
In view of Japan's domestic repercussion, no change will be made in the draft Note Verbale and the Joint Communique drawn up on June 14. On the other hand, a clause to the effect that the Korean claims will not be affected by the US memorandum in question, will be added to Article 4 of the draft Agreed Minutes. Thus, the main point of our revision plan on the property claims issue is substantially accepted.
Mr. Tanaka further stated in this regard that he would persuade Prime Minister Kishi on this trial compromise proposal. However, before doing it, he wanted to know also of our definite view in this regard.
4. One thing to be pointed out is that since the preliminary talk got deadlocked, the Japanese Foreign Ministry seems to be making every effort to make the talk successful, though, on the other hand, making it clear that our original revision plan, if as it is, will not be acceptable to them.
In this connection a few days ago Counselor Miyake of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (who is directly in charge of the administrative side of the talk for the Japanese side) indicated to our officials that the two countries would be placed in considerable difficulty, unless the current negotiations were concluded successfully before the forthcoming UN General Assembly and the International Red Cross Convention scheduled for late October (in India). From this remark it seems that in case the detainee issue is not settled by then Japan might take steps to appeal to the so-called world opinion in an attempt to put us in a bad light, particularly regarding the so-called Japanese fishermen case. It is, therefore, considered necessary for us to be fully prepared for such eventuality, unless settlement is reached on the detainee issue and the resumption of the formal conference.
5. All the above-mentioned situation leads me to believe that it is also to our advantage to conclude the current talks on the reciprocal detainee-release and the resumption of the formal talk, without much delay.
It seems to me that, judging from the afore-mentioned development, the current preliminary talk has now reached the decisive point, because arguments have been almost exhausted mutually, leaving very little room for further debate.
I would be very grateful, if the Government give due consideration to the above-mentioned situation and give me instructions. If the Government considers it helpful, I would be very happy to report his development in person and be instructed personally by Your Excellency on the future policy of our Government vis-a-vis Japan.
With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I remain,
Most respectfully,
/s/
Yu Taik Kim