October 11, 1956

No.29
To : Minister Yong Shik Kim
From: The President
I have received your letters Nos. 60, 61 and 62 dated October 4th together with the attached memorandums for which I thank you.
As things seem to be developing in our favor now we have to concentrate on them. Our position should be made clear and definite to both the U.S. and Japan.
In the memorandum summarizing instructions I had personally given you, I find that you did not quite understand some of the points I told you. For instance, we should not use the word "interpretation" and only state that this is the State Department's decision in reference to Korean claims.
As you may have seen from the copy of my letter No.90 to Ambassador Yang I asked him to request the State Department to dispense with the word 'opinion' because it only makes the statement more vague and complicated. If the State Department makes certain interpretations now they may make a different interpretation later and therefore we want something more definite.
Even among ourselves we should never use the word 'opinion'.
We know the Japanese government is sufficiently pressed by the Japanese people to have their fishermen released as soon as possible. We know also that Ambassador Allison will continue to advise the Japanese government to withdraw the property claims. He should also urge them to act on it and the sooner the better. General Lemnitzer has been thoroughly convinced that Japan has no right to claim any property in Korea. In this connection we must emphasize the fact that when the Japanese government releases the note of April 29, 1952, it must state that the Kubota statement will also be withdrawn.
I think it is better for us not to mention the amount of gold reserve. The Japanese have created among the Americans the impression that the gold reserve amounts to
very little. If the Japanese should demand that we name the sum we must ask them if they will pay and when and how. Let them commit themselves and then we will name the sum.
The question of Korean residers should not be mixed up with the property and gold reserve issues. It must be kept aside until certain questions they raise are more or less related to the residents' issue. My idea is the more we demand the harder it will be for them to agree to the settlement of the previous demands we made, so we will settle them first and the others later. Whether that can be worked out or not I am leaving to your judgment. But it seams to me that an effort should be made to settle our minimum requests first and when that is done we could bring up other demands.
In your talks with Ambassador Allison and General Lemnitzer you should always raise the question of compensation for past labor and tell them that the Japanese will have to pay something in that connection. Therefore I am asking you to rewrite the memorandum touching upon the property withdrawal and retraction of the Kubota statement, which must be included in the simultaneous release.
Whenever the Korean residents' question is raised and whenever the Japanese bring up the question of 48 Koreans to be sent to north Korea you may tell them the Koreans believe Japan is trying to send these 48 people to north Korea only to open the way for the 600,000 residents to be also sent to north Korea; therefore the Korean government and people are deeply concerned about it.
This is all connected with the pro-Japanese communist policy of normalizing diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. We are definitely against any dealing with the communists and if Japan unites with Russia we cannot deal with Japan because of the fact that she will smuggle into north Korea goods, weapons and underground agents. Therefore Korea stands opposed to Japan's close relations with the communists against America which has built it up economically and otherwise to its present status as the most powerful nation in Asia.
Japan must stand on the side of democracy and be loyal to her benefactor nation, the United States.
In reference to the repatration of Korean residents you should mention that the Japanese have admitted they will make some compensation to the 2 million Koreans although the Japanese say there are only 900,000 Koreans in Japan. We will take that as the correct figure and demand Japanese pay $500 to each of them. This question will not be raised again if the Japs pay this sum. Then the Korean Government will announce to the Koreans in Japan that all loyal Koreans must return and that each of them will receive $500 each from the Japanese government, but that those who refuse will forfeit their Korean citizenship and never be allowed to lend on Korean soil.
This will settle the question of Korean residents in Japan, but Japan must pay this minimum sum now. If she refuses we may raise the sum later according to changes in the situation.
In regard to the fishermen held in Pusan you will see from the letter I wrote to Ambassador Yang where we stand and I want you to act accordingly. There is no sense in repeating it now as you have already received a copy of my instructions to the Ambassador.
I want you to make the above clear to the Japs and to our American friends, but you cannot tell it too often. Explain all this separately to General Lemnitzer and whenever Admiral Stump visits Japan be sure to brief him thoroughly on the situation.