Seoul, 30 December 1953

Dear Minister Kim:
Your letter to the President dated December 24th has been referred to me. Your request for instructions as to which parts of the Japanese draft statement are objectionable will, I hope, be satisfied by this letter. In fact, my letter to you dated December 19th with related enclosures should have met your request, but it seems that it had not reached you before you wrote your letter to the President.
In the first place, the Japanese Government should make a statement of retraction before the conference begins. This is a point we should insist on. Then, as a pre-conference statement, the drafted one is too wordy.
Now, the main objectionable parts are quoted hereunder: -
1. “It is regretted that misunderstandings arose over these informal, extemporaneous remarks which were made by the chief Japanese delegate in his capacity as observer at the meeting.”
This sentence is unacceptable. The reason was fully given in my previous letter of December 19th mentioned above.
2. “Now, I believe a careful examination of the record will show that the chief Japanese delegate did not at any time say precisely any of these things. Whatever may have been said on an informal basis at the time, however, we wish at this time to make clear the views of the Japanese government regarding the several problems involved.”
This is a diplomatic denial. We cannot accept this kind of evasive explanation.
3. Then comes our objection to the concessive clause “whatever the legal niceties of the matter”. We insist on expunging this clause.
4. We object to the sentence “An examination of the Japanese record of the proceedings does not show that the chief Japanese delegate stated that repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea was contrary to international law”. The explanation that follows this quoted sentence is also not quite to our taste.
5. “In the past conference the Japanese and Korean delegations have exchanged a great many words over the disposition of Japanese property in Korea by the U.S. Military Government and the legal issues involved, and little purpose would be served in going over the same ground again now. The Japanese government, however, wishes to make this point absolutely clear: The Japanese government signed and ratified the treaty of peace with the allied powers without reservations of any kind, and will continue, as it has in the past, faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the treaty without exception.”
This carefully-worded passage means no budge at all from the old Japanese stand on its former property in Korea. It clearly indicates that the argument will be revived when the conference reconvenes. We suggest the whole thing be re-written into something as follows:
“The Japanese government will carry out all the provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty which it has signed and ratified and will never revive its claims to its and its nationals’ former properties in Korea.”
We particularly object to the clause “as it has” for Japan has never in the past faithfully carried out the terms of the Treaty so far as its former properties in Korea were concerned.
6. “The Japanese people feel with some reason that during their administration of Korea they invested a great deal in buildings, railroads and other improvements which in the long run benefitted not only the Japanese residents but the Korean people themselves. They recognize, however, that to the Korean people, these contributions, whatever they might be, did not in any sense compensate for the loss of their national independence and sometimes the very real hardships and sufferings.”
We object to this paragraph. It is nothing but presenting the same Kuboda view with slightly different words.
There may be other objectionable parts, but I skip them. You might easily find them out yourself, if there be any.
When Mr. Robertson paid me a visit here just before his departure, our conversation centered round the Korea-Japan talks. At parting, he asked me to draw up a statement to be used by the Japanese government, cutting out all the objectionable parts from the original Japanese draft and working into the text whatever points I wish.
I replied that I did not wish to appear to be dictating to the Japanese government, nor did I see any such need, for the Japanese government knew only too well what points are acceptable to us and what not. It did not need my coaching, I said.

 

Sincerely yours,
Y.T. Pyun

The Honorable Yong Shik Kim
Korean Mission
Tokyo