Sir H.S. Parkes to Earl Granville.―(Received January 2, 1884)

(No. 37 Confidential)
Söul, November 3, 1883

My Lord,

IN your telegram No. 21 of the 21st September, your Lordship instructed me that it was not necessary to make any special communications to the Chinese Government on the subject of my mission to Corea. I therefore gave the Yamên no intimation on the subject until three days before my departure, when I had to call there on other business. I then thought it necessary to state to the Ministers, at the close of the interview, that I had to leave Peking for about a month, and that during my absence Mr. Grosvenor would be in charge of the Legation. They asked me where I was going, and on my replying “to Corea,” they made no further observation.
On passing afterwards through Tien-tsin I called on the Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, on the 21st ultimo. I could not have avoided doing so, as he had received me with much friendly demonstration on my way to Peking, and had then particularly desired to see me soon again.
I also wished to speak with his Excellency on the subject of the recent disturbances at Canton. I told him, as I had already stated to the Yamên, that I considered I had reason to complain of the conduct of the Viceroy of the Two-kuang for having failed to keep the turbulent class of that city under proper control, in order, as it appeared to me, that he might be able to plead popular animosity to foreigners as an excuse for not extending to the latter that ample protection which the Chinese Government were bound to afford. He had even instigated excitement by proclaiming to the people that he had demanded that the man Logan should be tried again; and as that would certainly not be allowed, the Viceroy would be responsible for any fresh outbreak that might be caused by our non-compliance with the untenable demand which he had so imprudently made public.
I spoke at length and with earnestness on this subject, as well as on the communications relating to it which had passed between the Yamên and myself, because I felt it to be important, particularly in view of my absence in Corea, to impress the Grand Secretary, as I had already endeavoured to impress the Ministers of the Yamên, with the view that the Viceroy at Canton must be made sensible of his responsibilities and of the peril of the course he had chosen to follow.
I was glad to find that the Grand Secretary evinced more practical perception than the Ministers of the Yamên. The latter, he observed, had sent him all the correspondence, and he admitted that the objections which the Viceroy at Canton had taken to the legal procedure at Logan’s trial, and to the sentence passed by the Chief Justice, were based on mistaken information. He assured me very positively that I need not apprehend any repetition of disturbance, and he appeared chiefly anxious that the claims which I told him his Government would have to meet should not be over stated. On this point, I observed to his Excellency that I had already instructed Her Majesty’s Consul at Canton to do his best to see that the claims presented by British subjects should be limited to losses of a substantive character.
His Excellency then remarked that he had been informed by the Yamên that I was proceeding to Corea. “That country,” he added, “is a dependency of China, and all business connected with it is in my charge. Why do you not come to me before proceeding there, and what are you going to do there?”
I replied that I was instructed by my Government to negotiate a new Treaty with Corea.
“But why,” his Excellency proceeded, “without first coming to me; I made the Treaties of last year with Corea, and without me you would have done nothing. Why are you not frank with me on this subject?”
I replied that I was quite disposed to be frank with His Excellency, and in response to his appeal to my candour would at once express my regret that his Excellency had not made more satisfactory Treaties, as in that case I might have been saved the trouble of an uninviting expedition.
“What is there to object to in those Treaties?” he then inquired.
I answered that it would take up too much of His Excellency’s time if I were to engage in a discussion on the merits of those Treaties. I would simply therefore refer to the Tariff alone, which, if it were accepted, would make all foreign trade impossible, and would render the Treaties worthless.
His Excellency then observed that I had been long in Japan, and he feared that I wished to play the Japanese game and prevent the Coreans obtaining a proper revenue from their trade. The Japanese had deceived the Coreans; they had been trading with the latter for eight years, and had not yet paid them a farthing of duty.
I replied that I was not generally charged with playing a Japanese game, and certainly not by the Japanese themselves. On the contrary, I agreed with his Excellency that the Coreans had been unfairly treated by the Japanese in regard to duties, and all that I wanted to secure on that point was a fair Tariff, which would enable the Coreans to carry on a trade with my country which would be advantageous to themselves as well as to us.
His Excellency then observed: “I believe you want more than that; you want to expunge the opium clause from your Treaty.”
I remarked that my Government did not object to the import of opium being prohibited by the Coreans, and I myself should be glad to know that the latter would never use the drug in the form of an indulgence, though as a medicine it was simply invaluable. The opium which the Coreans would have to be guarded against would not be Indian, which they could not afford to buy, but the cheaper opium, which was now so extensively grown throughout China, and which I feared would be imported into Corea by Chinese. China was now the largest opium producing country in the world, and his Excellency was doubtless aware that it was grown in Manchuria, on the very frontier of Corea.
His Excellency at once changed the subject, and told me that the Corean Government had recently made a much lower Tariff, and also a set of improved trade Regulations, and he hoped I should be satisfied with them. But what he particularly desired was, I should discuss fully Corean business with himself.
I begged his Excellency to give me a copy of these Regulations and Tariff, and he at once complied with my request. Having taken a cursory glance at their contents, I observed to his Excellency that they appeared to me to contain some substantial improvements on his Treaties of last year, which would doubtless facilitate the work with which I was charged. Our position was simply this. In a couple of months from the present date we were bound either to accept Admiral Willes’ Treaty of last year, or to reject it and try to make a new one. My Government having intrusted me with the negotiation required for the latter purpose the brief period I had named was practically reduced to a single month, as I must return before the navigation of the Peiho became closed by ice. I was therefore so pressed for time that a single day was of importance to me, and as passages had been engaged for me and my suite in a vessel that might leave Tien-tsin that afternoon, I regretted that this circumstance would deprive me of the benefit I should derive from his Excellency’s intimate acquaintance with Corean affairs, if I could stay to discuss these with him. My mission, however, instead of being conceived, as his Excellency seemed to suppose, in the interest of the Japanese, was in fact opposed to that interest, as eight-tenths of the import trade now being conducted by Japan with Corea consisted of British goods, which we should prefer to supply to the Coreans ourselves. A fair Tariff would enable us to engage directly in that trade, while the Treaties made by his Excellency would effectually exclude us from it, and would enable the Japanese to retain it in their own hands. It was his Excellency, therefore, rather than myself, who might be charged with having hitherto played the Japanese game, and the same charge might be laid against his Government with greater force in regard to other matters than the Corean question.
His Excellency the Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, having asked me what I meant by the latter remark, I proceeded to observe that I had noticed with concern, as I recently passed through Shanghae, that his Government had opposed serious obstructions to the efforts made at the port by foreigners of several nationalities to improve the silk industry of the country. Several filatures had been established at great cost, in which many hundreds of Chinese workwomen were profitably employed in increasing, by superior reeling, the value and quality of Chinese silk, which would enable it to compete with that of Japan. The Governors of Chehkiang and Kiangsu, I had been told, were now placing such a high internal tax on cocoons as would cut off the supply of raw material from those filatures, and would probably cause them to be closed. In that case the Japanese silk industry would greatly gain, as filatures had been actively encouraged by the Government of that country during the last ten years with very satisfactory results. The export of silk from Japan had been steadily increasing, while that of China had shown a proportionate decline, and it was evident that if this state of things continued for a few more years the position of the two countries in respect to the important industry of silk would be reversed, and Japan would excel China in both the quantity and quality of her silk. In this matter China appeared to me to be playing the Japanese game in a degree which was actually suicidal. I intended to take up the question with the Yamên on my return from Corea, but from my brief experience of the unimpressionable character of that Board, I was by no means sanguine as to the result of my representations.
The Grand Secretary seemed surprised at some of my observations, and particularly desired me to give him a Memorandum on the subject. The silk question, he said, concerned the Viceroys of other provinces, who were by no means always inclined to listen to his advice. He stood almost alone as a progressist, and was obnoxious in consequence to many of his countrymen.
On terminating the interview, I observed that I believed the Chinese Government had an Agent in Corea, and that I should be glad if his Excellency would apprize him that, as my mission was calculated to promote the wishes of the Chinese Government in regard to that country, it would be desirable that he should place himself in friendly communication with me. I understood his Excellency to say that he would furnish me with letters to the Agent. Mr. Ma Kien-chang, who is now attached to his Excellency’s staff, and was present at the interview, and who took, as your Lordship is aware, an active part in the management of Admiral Willes’ Treaty, called on me later in the day and delivered to me an official letter addressed to his brother, Mr. Kien-chang, who succeeded him as Chinese Agent in Corea. He told me that he was not certain whether his brother was then in Corea or Chefoo. On arriving at the latter place I ascertained that he was at Chefoo, and I therefore sent him the letter. When I had left the Chefoo anchorage I was overtaken by a Chinese gun-boat sent out by Mr. Ma Kien-chang, to request that I would take him to Corea in Her Majesty’s ship “Sapphire;” but I felt that I could neither impose on Captain Fullerton such a serious inconvenience, nor accede to the delay which it would have occasioned. I am at a loss to understand the object of Mr. Ma in making this request, as I find that he has been superseded here by another Agent, and that he had ceased, before he left Corea, to attract either influence or respect.
I may add that the new Agent, named Ch'ên Shu-tang, who was at one time Chinese Consul at San Francisco, has thus far held aloof from me on the plea of sickness.

I have, &c.
(signed)HARRY S. PARKES