조청상민수륙무역장정 체결에 따른 1차 조영조약 개정 건의
제2차 조약 체결 과정
Sir H.S. Parkes to Earl Granville.―(Received January 29, 1883)
(No. 172 Confidential)
Tôkiô, December 21, 1882
My Lord,
IN the course of a visit which I paid to the Foreign Minster on the 18th instant, his Excellency spoke with evident displeasure of a new Treaty, as he called ti, which had been concluded between China and Corea. It denoted, he observed, that China intended to assume great powers of control over Corea, and to secure exclusive commercial privileges in that country. He believed this action to be chiefly directed against Japan, although it also materially affected the interests of those nations who were about to enter into Treaty relations with Corea. China evidently intended to keep her troops in that country; she continued to send there munitions of war; she had appointed a Chinese officer as Adviser to the Corean Government, and had attached to him foreigners in the China service to organize the Customs and to prospect the mines. He understood that she held the future customs revenue of Corea and certain of her mines as security for the loan of 500,000 taels which she had made to Corea. He believed that she even intended to remove the King of Corea to China because Japan had taken a similar course in regard to the King of Loochoo, and that she would not rest until she had made Corea a Chinese province. All this was done under the pretext of guarding against Japanese aggression in Corea, although Japan, by the moderation of her recent proceedings when her Legation was attacked, had given substantial proof that she entertained no designs of that nature. It was really retaliation for the past action of Japan in Formosa and Loochoo, but it would also have the effect of depriving other nations of the advantages they might expect to obtain from their new relations with Corea. He was anxious to know what course would be taken by the Powers who had made Treaties with Corea, and he desired that the action of the Japanese Government should be influenced by and should conform, if circumstances so permitted, with their proceedings.
I asked his Excellency to allow me to see the so-called Treaty between China and Corea, and eventually furnished me with a copy. I inclose a translation, which has been somewhat hastily prepared. It is not termed a Treaty, but Regulations for the Trade by Sea and Land between China and Corea, and the following is a summary of its conditions.
The preamble declares that Corea is a feudatory of China, and that, as intercourse on the seaboard of Corea has now been admitted with foreign nations, it becomes necessary to remove the prohibitions on maritime trade which have hitherto existed between China and that country. But it also clearly indicates that the relations between China and Corea rest on a different basis to those of Corea with foreign countries; the latter being governed by international compact and the former by the conditions of dependency in which Corean stands to China. Foreign nations, therefore, cannot claim identical treatment with China.
The 1st Article provides for the reciprocal appointment at the ports open to trade in China and Corea of officers or Commissioners who will have the management of commercial affairs. A higher functionary will be appointed by the King of Corea to reside at Ten-tsin and be in communication with the Minister superintendent of Northern Trade, but the latter is to be placed in direct relation with the King of Corea, and they, the Minister Superintendent and the King, will determine together the recall of any of the above-mentioned officers when misconduct may render this necessary.
The 2nd Article gives to the Chinese Commissioners of Trade in Corea large judicial powers. They are to have complete jurisdiction over Chinese subjects and joint jurisdiction with the Corean authorities in cases in which Corean subjects are defendants. The Corean Commissioners of Trade in China on the other hand, are to have no powers of jurisdiction over their own people. It also provides for the mutual extradition of offenders.
The 3rd Article stipulates for trade at the open ports, subject to the payment of such customs dues as have been determined between the two countries. These dues are not particularized, but the 5th Article, which treats on the trade by land, states that “the customs dues on imports and exports shall not exceed 5 percent. ad-valorem except upon red ginseng,” which by the 6th Article is to pay 15 percent. It does not appear clear whether it is intended that this or a different Tariff is to govern the maritime trade. Proceedings in shipwreck and fishing rights are also provided for.
The 4th Article stipulates for residence, the carriage of goods coastwise on payment of half duty, and also for access to the interior under passport either for purposes of travel or the purchase of native produce.
The 5th Article frees the land trade from the old restrictions and exactions, and provides that the necessary Regulations for this trade shall be made by the Minister Superintendent of Northern Trade and the King of Corea, subject to the approval of the Emperor of China.
The 6th Article prohibits all trade in foreign or Chinese opium, and the smuggling of ginseng.
The 7th Article provides that the King of Corea shall pay a subsidy to the Chinese Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company for a monthly steamer to run between China and Corea, and also that “the vessels of the Chinese navy shall furthermore visit the coast of Corean and call at the different ports to afford protection,” it being probably intended that such protection shall extend to Corea as well as to the Chinese subjects and their interests in that country.
The 8th Article provides for the revision of these Regulations when necessary by the Minister Superintendent of Northern Trade and the King of Corea, subject to ratification by the Emperor of China.
It is not surprising that these arrangements should occasion the japanese Government great annoyance, and the Foreign Minister is correct in his view of the effect which they are likely to have on the commercial interests of those nations who have recently concluded Treaties with Corea. If Chinese subjects in that country are to possess exclusively the advantages contained in these Regulations, it would be vain for foreign merchants to endeavour to compete with them, and the expense of providing commercial establishments in that country had better be avoided.
Although I cannot suppose it probable that the Chinese Government entertain the idea, as stated by the Foreign Minister, of removing the King of Corea, these Regulations show very clearly that they only regard him as the equal, in point of rank, of a Chinese Viceroy, and in entire subordination to the sovereign of China. It would be strangely inconsistent for the King to occupy such a very inferior position towards the latter, and at the same time one of perfect equality with Her Majesty and other sovereigns of Europe, although it would doubtless be flattering to Chinese pride to see the King accepted as an equal by those Sovereigns.
The extent to which China is disposed to clam authority over Corea is also indicated by the stipulation that in mixed cases occurring in Corea between Chinese and Coreans, Chinese officers are to exercise jurisdiction over Corean subjects even on Corean soil.
The feeling of the Foreign Minister is already being reechoed in the native Japanese press. I inclose a translation of a long article which appeared in print last evening, and is evidently inspired. It is intended as an appeal to the people to sanction the increase of the Japanese armaments, for which additional taxation is required. The identity of a portion of the following passage with the language used to me by the Foreign Minister is noteworthy, and the apprehensions expressed by the writer as to the consequences of the action of China in Corea, when viewed in regard to her relations with Russia, though possibly exaggerated, are not altogether groundless:-
“If China sees any chance she will annex Corea, and add it as a new province to her other eighteen. The father of the Corean King is already her prisoner. How much more, then, would she not unhesitatingly carry off the King? Corea is to be thus appropriated and converted into a province. The result at this critical moment will be that China’s complications with Russia on the North-West will extend as far as Corea, and that Russia will endeavour to recoup herself in the East for her losses in the North. Won¨san (Port Lazareff) will then be immediately occupied by a Russian fleet. In such a crisis other European Powers will doubtless interfere to frustrate the plans of Russia. All this will, of course, result in great misfortune to Corea, and China, in the absorption of the peninsula kingdom, will have brought calamity to herself.”
I regretted to hear from the Foreign Minister that the new Japanese Minister to China, Admiral Enomoto, had met with only a cool reception at Peking, and that the Grand Secretary Li Hung Chang, in conversation with the United States’ Minister at that capital, had used very unfriendly language towards Japan.
Although it may be considered that I am out of place in alluding in this despatch to such a very different subject as the revision of our Treaty with Japan, I nevertheless venture to offer the brief remark that if Admiral Willes’ Treaty with Corea should be ratified as it stands, it would then be hopeless to expect that the Japanese Government would make any of the concessions which I named in my Report on the Tôkiô conference as desirable to obtain in return for a higher Tariff. Those were: a more liberal passport system, access to the interior for the purpose of trade, and the employment by Japanese subjects of foreign shipping in the coasting trade. Admiral Willes’ Treaty secures none of these advantages in Corea, and even debars British subjects from carrying native produce between the open ports, while it at the same time grants to Corea a far higher Tariff than that proposed by Japan. It is not likely, in the event of that Treaty being ratified, that Japan, knowing well that it was the work of the Grand Secretary Li hung Chang, and seeing Corea obtain by it a higher Tariff than she claims, on the strength of her progress and long friendly relations, will make concessions to us which we have not even sought to gain in Corea, and which China, while she has secured them for her own people, has required Corea to withhold from all other Powers.
I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES
(No. 172 Confidential)
Tôkiô, December 21, 1882
My Lord,
IN the course of a visit which I paid to the Foreign Minster on the 18th instant, his Excellency spoke with evident displeasure of a new Treaty, as he called ti, which had been concluded between China and Corea. It denoted, he observed, that China intended to assume great powers of control over Corea, and to secure exclusive commercial privileges in that country. He believed this action to be chiefly directed against Japan, although it also materially affected the interests of those nations who were about to enter into Treaty relations with Corea. China evidently intended to keep her troops in that country; she continued to send there munitions of war; she had appointed a Chinese officer as Adviser to the Corean Government, and had attached to him foreigners in the China service to organize the Customs and to prospect the mines. He understood that she held the future customs revenue of Corea and certain of her mines as security for the loan of 500,000 taels which she had made to Corea. He believed that she even intended to remove the King of Corea to China because Japan had taken a similar course in regard to the King of Loochoo, and that she would not rest until she had made Corea a Chinese province. All this was done under the pretext of guarding against Japanese aggression in Corea, although Japan, by the moderation of her recent proceedings when her Legation was attacked, had given substantial proof that she entertained no designs of that nature. It was really retaliation for the past action of Japan in Formosa and Loochoo, but it would also have the effect of depriving other nations of the advantages they might expect to obtain from their new relations with Corea. He was anxious to know what course would be taken by the Powers who had made Treaties with Corea, and he desired that the action of the Japanese Government should be influenced by and should conform, if circumstances so permitted, with their proceedings.
I asked his Excellency to allow me to see the so-called Treaty between China and Corea, and eventually furnished me with a copy. I inclose a translation, which has been somewhat hastily prepared. It is not termed a Treaty, but Regulations for the Trade by Sea and Land between China and Corea, and the following is a summary of its conditions.
The preamble declares that Corea is a feudatory of China, and that, as intercourse on the seaboard of Corea has now been admitted with foreign nations, it becomes necessary to remove the prohibitions on maritime trade which have hitherto existed between China and that country. But it also clearly indicates that the relations between China and Corea rest on a different basis to those of Corea with foreign countries; the latter being governed by international compact and the former by the conditions of dependency in which Corean stands to China. Foreign nations, therefore, cannot claim identical treatment with China.
The 1st Article provides for the reciprocal appointment at the ports open to trade in China and Corea of officers or Commissioners who will have the management of commercial affairs. A higher functionary will be appointed by the King of Corea to reside at Ten-tsin and be in communication with the Minister superintendent of Northern Trade, but the latter is to be placed in direct relation with the King of Corea, and they, the Minister Superintendent and the King, will determine together the recall of any of the above-mentioned officers when misconduct may render this necessary.
The 2nd Article gives to the Chinese Commissioners of Trade in Corea large judicial powers. They are to have complete jurisdiction over Chinese subjects and joint jurisdiction with the Corean authorities in cases in which Corean subjects are defendants. The Corean Commissioners of Trade in China on the other hand, are to have no powers of jurisdiction over their own people. It also provides for the mutual extradition of offenders.
The 3rd Article stipulates for trade at the open ports, subject to the payment of such customs dues as have been determined between the two countries. These dues are not particularized, but the 5th Article, which treats on the trade by land, states that “the customs dues on imports and exports shall not exceed 5 percent. ad-valorem except upon red ginseng,” which by the 6th Article is to pay 15 percent. It does not appear clear whether it is intended that this or a different Tariff is to govern the maritime trade. Proceedings in shipwreck and fishing rights are also provided for.
The 4th Article stipulates for residence, the carriage of goods coastwise on payment of half duty, and also for access to the interior under passport either for purposes of travel or the purchase of native produce.
The 5th Article frees the land trade from the old restrictions and exactions, and provides that the necessary Regulations for this trade shall be made by the Minister Superintendent of Northern Trade and the King of Corea, subject to the approval of the Emperor of China.
The 6th Article prohibits all trade in foreign or Chinese opium, and the smuggling of ginseng.
The 7th Article provides that the King of Corea shall pay a subsidy to the Chinese Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company for a monthly steamer to run between China and Corea, and also that “the vessels of the Chinese navy shall furthermore visit the coast of Corean and call at the different ports to afford protection,” it being probably intended that such protection shall extend to Corea as well as to the Chinese subjects and their interests in that country.
The 8th Article provides for the revision of these Regulations when necessary by the Minister Superintendent of Northern Trade and the King of Corea, subject to ratification by the Emperor of China.
It is not surprising that these arrangements should occasion the japanese Government great annoyance, and the Foreign Minister is correct in his view of the effect which they are likely to have on the commercial interests of those nations who have recently concluded Treaties with Corea. If Chinese subjects in that country are to possess exclusively the advantages contained in these Regulations, it would be vain for foreign merchants to endeavour to compete with them, and the expense of providing commercial establishments in that country had better be avoided.
Although I cannot suppose it probable that the Chinese Government entertain the idea, as stated by the Foreign Minister, of removing the King of Corea, these Regulations show very clearly that they only regard him as the equal, in point of rank, of a Chinese Viceroy, and in entire subordination to the sovereign of China. It would be strangely inconsistent for the King to occupy such a very inferior position towards the latter, and at the same time one of perfect equality with Her Majesty and other sovereigns of Europe, although it would doubtless be flattering to Chinese pride to see the King accepted as an equal by those Sovereigns.
The extent to which China is disposed to clam authority over Corea is also indicated by the stipulation that in mixed cases occurring in Corea between Chinese and Coreans, Chinese officers are to exercise jurisdiction over Corean subjects even on Corean soil.
The feeling of the Foreign Minister is already being reechoed in the native Japanese press. I inclose a translation of a long article which appeared in print last evening, and is evidently inspired. It is intended as an appeal to the people to sanction the increase of the Japanese armaments, for which additional taxation is required. The identity of a portion of the following passage with the language used to me by the Foreign Minister is noteworthy, and the apprehensions expressed by the writer as to the consequences of the action of China in Corea, when viewed in regard to her relations with Russia, though possibly exaggerated, are not altogether groundless:-
“If China sees any chance she will annex Corea, and add it as a new province to her other eighteen. The father of the Corean King is already her prisoner. How much more, then, would she not unhesitatingly carry off the King? Corea is to be thus appropriated and converted into a province. The result at this critical moment will be that China’s complications with Russia on the North-West will extend as far as Corea, and that Russia will endeavour to recoup herself in the East for her losses in the North. Won¨san (Port Lazareff) will then be immediately occupied by a Russian fleet. In such a crisis other European Powers will doubtless interfere to frustrate the plans of Russia. All this will, of course, result in great misfortune to Corea, and China, in the absorption of the peninsula kingdom, will have brought calamity to herself.”
I regretted to hear from the Foreign Minister that the new Japanese Minister to China, Admiral Enomoto, had met with only a cool reception at Peking, and that the Grand Secretary Li Hung Chang, in conversation with the United States’ Minister at that capital, had used very unfriendly language towards Japan.
Although it may be considered that I am out of place in alluding in this despatch to such a very different subject as the revision of our Treaty with Japan, I nevertheless venture to offer the brief remark that if Admiral Willes’ Treaty with Corea should be ratified as it stands, it would then be hopeless to expect that the Japanese Government would make any of the concessions which I named in my Report on the Tôkiô conference as desirable to obtain in return for a higher Tariff. Those were: a more liberal passport system, access to the interior for the purpose of trade, and the employment by Japanese subjects of foreign shipping in the coasting trade. Admiral Willes’ Treaty secures none of these advantages in Corea, and even debars British subjects from carrying native produce between the open ports, while it at the same time grants to Corea a far higher Tariff than that proposed by Japan. It is not likely, in the event of that Treaty being ratified, that Japan, knowing well that it was the work of the Grand Secretary Li hung Chang, and seeing Corea obtain by it a higher Tariff than she claims, on the strength of her progress and long friendly relations, will make concessions to us which we have not even sought to gain in Corea, and which China, while she has secured them for her own people, has required Corea to withhold from all other Powers.
I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES
색인어
- 이름
- H.S. Parkes, Granville, Li Hung Chang, Li hung Chang, HARRY S. PARKES
- 지명
- Tôkiô, Formosa, Loochoo, Ten-tsin, Won¨san, Port Lazareff, Peking, Tôkiô
- 사건
- a Treaty, but Regulations for the Trade by Sea and Land between China and Corea, Admiral Willes’ Treaty with Corea
