No. 41
Mr. Kennedy to Earl Granville—(Received May 9)

(No. 30 Confidential)
Yedo, March 24, 1881

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Russian fleet of about seventeen ships of war of all descriptions, which during the past winter months has been dispersed in the three Treaty ports of Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki, has now been summoned by Admiral Lessoksky, the Commander-in-chief, to assemble at Nagasaki.
Admiral Lessoksky, as your Lordship is aware, had the misfortune on the day before his arrival at Nagasaki from Vladivostok to break his leg during a storm at sea, and consequently has been unable to leave Nagasaki since his arrival in Japan.
The desire to confer with the commanding officers and to inspect the vessels composing his fleet would sufficiently explain the orders of Admiral Lessoksky for a general rendezvous at Nagasaki; especially at this season when the break up of the ice will enable the ships to revisit the Russian ports on the North Pacific.
The public press, however, both foreign and native, concur in attributing to Admiral Lessoksky the intention of developing Russian designs in the East by making a descent on the coasts of Corea with the object of annexing Port Lazareff and the intermediate country to the Russian possessions.
This view is shared by my French and Belgian Colleagues, who have both assured me as a personal conviction that Russia intends to occupy Port Lazareff before the withdrawal from these seas of their existing powerful fleet.
On the other hand, the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Peking has, I hear, distinctly informed the French Minister in China that Russia has no designs on Corea, and M. de Struve, the Russian Minister in this country, has given me assurances in the same sense.
In allusion to the above subject, M. de Struve told me that, should such a design still exist, he certainly had no knowledge of it; that in the event of war with China an occupation of Port Lazareff might have been possible and even necessary, but that, as peace seemed now assured, such necessity no longer existed.
I informed M. de Struve that I fully concurred in his view, and further stated to his Excellency that If Russia would open Corea to general commerce all nations would benefit thereby, but that if Russia should forcibly annex to her own territory any part of Corea, such a proceeding would be considered by all Powers as unjustifiable, and such conduct would set a bad example, which might be followed by others.
I do not know what value can be attached to the assurances of the Russian Representatives at Peking and Tokio, but I venture to suggest that the only person fully acquainted with possible Russian designs would be Admiral Lessoksky.
Many persons assert that the present moment is most favourable for Russian designs upon Corea, owing to the presence in these waters of an unusually large Russian fleet, and to the almost total absence of ships of war of other nations; but, on the other hand, it appears hardly possible that Russia, having just concluded a Treaty with China, should perpetrate an act of virtual hostility against that Power.
The Government of Japan, although in a perpetual state of alarm as to Russian designs, do not appear to apprehend any immediate action of Russia against Corea.
On the whole, it would appear that any immediate action by Russia on the Pacific is improbable.
The more likely course would seem to be that the greater part of the fleet should be ordered to the Mediterranean, and a smaller portion to Vladivostock for the summer months.But I presume that this, as well as other questions of Russian policy, may be affected by the recent untimely death of the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &e.
(Signed)　　J.G. KENNEDY