Mr. Kennedy to Earl Granville.-(Received August 13)

(No. 113 Confidential)
Yedo, June 29, 1880

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Marquis of Salisbury’s despatches Nos. 10 and 33 of the 29th January and the 3rd April respectively, transmitting to me copies of despatches from Her Majesty’s Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject of the strength of the Russian squadron in the Pacific.
Hitherto it has been impossible for me to obtain any trustworthy information in the above subject, as no Russian vessels of war have come to Japanese waters, exception one or two vessels of the so-called volunteer fleet, which have called for coals at nagasaki, on their way to Saghalien with convicts.
But within the past fortnight the increase of the numbers and strength of the Russian fleet in and on the way to the Chinese seas, and the impending presence of three Russian Admirals with four iron-clads has attracted universal attention.
The return also to Yokohama of the British and French Admirals, and of the Italian ship “Vettor Pisani” has afforded opportunities for obtaining information respecting the intentions of Russia in the Chinese seas.
The Russian Minister here, M. de Struve, has stated in conversation with Admiral Coote and with Admiral Duperré, and also with me, that the prospect of war between Russia and China has become so serious that the Russian Government has decided to send a formidable fleet to the Chinese coast, in order to prove to the Chinese Government the hopelessness of attempting to fight Russia on the sea, and also to place Russia in a position to act with promptitude in the event of a declaration of war.
I have had opportunities of discussing the question of the probabilities of war between Russia and China with most of my colleagues, as well as with the British and foreign naval authorities. As a result of these conversations, I have the honour to report that, in the opinion of the French authorities, Russia is bent on war with China in order to maintain her Eastern prestige, and possibly with a view to the annexation of the Corea.
Another, and perhaps more generally accepted opinion, is that Russia will, on the pretext of enforcing the observance of the Treaty of Kuldja, organize a blockade of the Gulf of Pechili, and of the three Treaty ports within it, and will eventually obtain from China a heavy money indemnity, with the addition of important commercial concessions, by which the interior of China will be opened to Russian trade.
The French authorities are certainly most anxious as to Russian designs, and for two reasons: in the first place, they fear that any hostile act towards China would be the signal for general massacre of Europeans in China, and especially of French missionaries; and, secondly, they believe that Russia would probably annex part or the whole of the Corea, which country France, and also Italy, is desirous to see opened to European trade.
The fate of Corea is supposed to depend on the solution of the difficulty pending between China and Russia. The Japanese Government and the foreign Representatives here believe that, unless Corea be permanently opened to foreign trade within a short time, by the conclusion of Treaties of Commerce with Europe and with America, she is destined to be annexed to the Russian Asiatic possessions. Such annexation would be deplored by the Japanese Government and the French and Italian Representatives especially. The two latter have both urged upon me the advantage of a combined action towards Corea, and have represented that a naval demonstration by the leading maritime nations before the capital of Corea would compel that Government to accede to a demand for opening the country to foreign trade. Both the French and Italian Representatives are under the impression that Corea would afford a new market for the supply of silk, besides which, the French have an additional motive in the fact that many French missionaries reside in Corea and also that they ought to efface the records of their failures to force themselves on Corea by obtaining a permanent right of trade with that country.
On this subject the Minister for Foreign Affairs lately informed me that the Russian Minister, in referring to the recent visits to Corean ports of British, French, and American vessels of war, declared to his Excellency that the Russian Government had no intention whatever of annexing any part of Corea. In reporting this conversation to me, Mr. Inouyé suggested that circumstances might alter the intentions of the Russian Government, and his Excellency strongly urged the expediency of the conclusion of Treaties of Friendship and Commerce by maritime nations with Corea as the only means of baffling the designs of Russia. His Excellency added that such an object could easily be attained by direct and combined action with the Government at Seoul, instead of isolated attempts at Fusan and Kanghoa, as had hitherto been the case.
Some hopes are entertained by my colleagues and by the Government of Japan of effecting friendly communications with the Corean Government through the Corean Envoy, who is expected to arrive here next month.
The Chinese Minister has repeatedly assured me that his Government has advised the Corean Government to open their country to foreigners.
In conclusion, I have the honour to state that, in all conversations on the subject of Corea, I have confined myself to the general statement that, so far as I am aware, Her Majesty’s Government have no present intention of entering into communication with the Government of Corea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J.G. Kennedy