Sir H.S. Parkes to the Earl of Derby (Received September 5)

(No. 94 Confidential)
Yedo, July 24, 1875

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatches Nos. 91 and 92 (the latter of which was forwarded by English mail on the 21st instant), I should now add that I have ascertained from another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Terashima, that the Mission of Moriyama to Corea has been entirely unsuccessful. It was thought that he would gain access to higher authorities than those he had previously met, and that negotiations which would advance relations between Japan and Corea would be entered on. To promote this object, he was provided with a friendly letter from the Foreign Minister of Japan to the Government of Corea, and the delivery of this letter was to form the preliminary step in his proceedings.
After several months’ detention, however, at the Japanese Settlement in Corea (Sorio), he has failed to effect even this primary object, in consequence of the Corean authorities having refused to meet him, or to receive the letter from his hands, if he visited them in European costume. The action of the Corean Government amounted, Terashima observed, to the rejection of intercourse with Japan. He could not yet say, however, what might be the consequence of such behaviour. Moriyama had not yet been withdrawn, and it was understood that the local Corean authorities of Fusankai had made further references to the capital (Seoul). But he admitted that Japanese gun-vessels were in the meantime employed in surveying the Corean coast, and he dropped the observation that their surveying operations had been very successful.
Another Japanese Minister observed to me, on the 22nd instant, that he considered the Corean question had assumed a serious appearance. He believed that Moriyama would shortly return to Japan, and that it would be difficult to avoid war with Corea.
I have heard other Japanese officers in high position make similar remarks, and one observed to me that, in determining upon the measures to be adopted against Corea, Japan must take into account the probable action of China and Russia. The position of the latter Power, however, did not appear to occasion the speaker any anxiety.
In reporting on this subject to Lord Granville, in my despatch No. 91 of the 3rd of November, 1873, I mentioned that Soyéshima, who had just resigned the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, had stated to me in positive language that Russia would be neutral in a war between Japan and Corea. In reply to the inquiry put by myself as to how this neutrality would be secured, Soyéshima replied, “By giving them Saghalin;” and, in answer to a further question whether such an offer had been made, he observed, “No, but I am sure it would be accepted.”
Since then, the Japanese portion of Saghalin has been offered to and accepted by Russia, and it remains to be seen whether the chain of Kurile rocks, beset during the greater part of the year by ice, form the only consideration which Japan has received for this transfer. It may be supposed that the understanding upon which Soyéshima placed so much reliance in the autumn of 1873 admitted of confirmation or renewal in the spring of 1875.
It is unnecessary for me to observe that war between Japan and Corea would furnish Russia with an opportunity of prosecuting her own aims either on the Corean or the Chinese frontier, which it would be idle to suppose she would not take advantage of. The value to Russia of Port Lazaret (sic.), in Broughton Bay (east coast of Corea, latitude 39′ 20″), which is free throughout the year from ice, and to which I referred in my despatch No. 92, is one of those points which naturally occur to the mind in this connection. When Vice-Admiral Shadwell visited the Russian Settlements of Possiette, Vladivostok, and Aniwa, in the autumn of 1873, he estimated the force then in garrison at those three places at 4,000 men, and the acquisition of the whole of Saghalin will naturally lead to the increase of this force.
In Japan I believe that public opinion will be in favour of a war with Corea, and it remains to be seen whether the Government will care to endeavour to stem this feeling. The affair of Formosa has given increased confidence to the country, and in particular to the soldiery, who do not trouble themselves about the cost of wars. Being assured probably of the neutrality or the support of Russia, and believing also that Corea cannot expect active aid from China, the Government of Japan may count upon encountering no interference from other Powers in a quarrel with Corea, and feel that they are able to cope with her alone.
Under these circumstances, I venture to submit that the attention of Her Majesty’s Government should be directed to Corea, and that measures should be taken to prevent the possible operations of Japan or other Powers in these seas having the effect of securing to them exclusive advantages or acting prejudicially to British interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES