Dear Sir;

Referring back to the history of Corean matter since the month of June last, you will remember that His Excellency Li Hung-chang told me that he had sent a messenger or a message to Corea advising the Government to make a treaty of amity and commerce with the Government of the United States.
The Viceroy stated that he expected an answer within ninety days, and that he thought a treaty might be perfected with His Excellency’s assistance, which he was willing to afford under certain circumstances.
When Mr.Angell, our late Minister passed through Tientsin en route to the United States, the Viceroy informed him that he had as yet received no communication from the Corea, although more than four months had elapsed since the message was supposed to have been sent, and he added that he did not know positively when a reply might be expected.
Yesterday (15th instant) Mr. Lo-Fong-loh the Viceroy Naval Secretary, called me, authorized by H.E. to say that a Corean offices had reached here and "that Corea was now willing to make a treaty with the United States”.
I sent word back to the Viceroy that I did not know whether our Government wished to negotiate now with Corea or not, but if it should be so disposed, I thought it possible that I might receive the Commission or our Minister at Peking might be conferred upon the authority. At all events I did not think anything would be undertaken before the coming spring.
Although this matter was supposed to be confidential between the Viceroy and myself and was brought about during my visit to him in August of last year, yet Mr.Angell informed me at Peking that Sir.Thomas Wade had been asked by the Viceroy to inaugurate a negotiation between England and that country.
I am therefore inclined to think that the Viceroy has again mentioned the subject to Sir.Thomas Wade, during some of the conferences which have passed between them within the past ten days.
The Viceroy sent me a civil message of regret that he could not see me, ― owing to his constant occupation, before leaving for Pao Ting Fu on the day after tomorrow.
If you consider the foregoing message of sufficient importance to telegraph to Washington, supposing you to be in possession of a cypher I can send if from here direct as the Shanghai line is now rowing order.
The value of a treaty with Corea would be more in the prestige than any immediate substantial results, if we are to make one, we should be the first.