December 2, 1959

TO : His Excellency the President
FROM : Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
SUBJECT : A Strategy to drive the Japanese to an embarrassing position threatening them by suggesting the possible ICJ proceedings
As for Minister Yong Shik Kim 's suggestion the other day on the possibility of bringing the deportation case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, this Ministry, in its Recommendation KPO/603 of November 30, 1959, made extensive analysis and observation on the advantages and disadvantages of taking such a measure. I am respectfully of the opinion that, bringing actually the case before the Court, our Government may, take advantage of this idea very usefully in driving the Japanese into an embassassing position as to the deportation scheme by taking the following strategy:
1. At a formal meeting with the Japanese side, our side would state that the Japanese Government had originated the deportation scheme in flagrant violation of the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957 and that, as the Japanese Government is still attempting to pack thi its scheme by failing to settle the issue through diplomatic talks, the Korean Government is going to decide to refer this case to the ICJ, particularly over the breach of international obligation on the part of the Japanese Government, impressing them as if we were actually intending to seek a judicial settlement. He is ▣...▣ that at this atage the Japanese can hardly agree to bringing the case to the ICJ
2. Should the Japanese Government refuse, we would embark upon a vigorous propaganda campaign against Japan, denouncing its obstinate determination to carry out the depotation scheme as contemplated in flagrant violation of the Agreed Minutes and charging that the Japanese are afraid of settinig the issue before the ICJ, inasmuch as the Japanese scheme is completely "deportation"scheme is the literary sense of the words. By that, we would
3. Should the Japanese Government agree, we would ask them to suspend, as a first step, implementation of the deportation scheme. We may argue that the Japanese Government is obliged to desist from taking any unilateral measure until, at least, the judgment or any relevant action of the Court is made, inasmuch as it agreed to seek a judicial settlement. We may also argue that it would be impossible, in view of the shortness of time involved, to have the Court opened before the departure of the so-called first "repatriation" ship and that, therefore, it would be natural and proper for the Japanese Government to suspend first the implementation of the deportation scheme and then seek the judicial settlement. If the Japanese Government should refuse to comply with this request of, we would be able to make an effective propaganda campaign without actually bringing the case before the Court. On the other hand, if the Japanese Government should comply with our request, then the implementation of the deportation scheme would be suspended, at least for the time being. In such case, suspension of the deportation scheme at this time would be tantamount to its virtual collapse because the disputes and rift which would arise between the Japanese and the Korean Communist elements in Japan would certainly render impracticable further progress of the deportation scheme. We would then be in such a favorable position as to map out, rather easily, further tactics to block the deportation scheme for good without ever bringing the case before the ICJ.
If this recommendation meets with your Excellency's approval, the minister will instruct to Tokyo mission & Diligation to employ this tactics in due course of time.
Most respectfully