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한일회담외교문서

한일관계에 관한 사실들

  • 날짜
    1959년 12월 20일
  • 문서종류
    보고서
  • 형태사항
    영어 
December 20, 1959
FACTS ABOUT KOREA -JAPAN RELATIONS
The Republic of Korea, earnestly desiring to lay the foundation for a good neighborly relationship with Japan, participated in a series of three Korea -Japan conferences during the period of 1951 - 1953, and in a fourth conference in the 1958 - 1959 period. In the course of these conferences, it gradually came to light that the real intention of Japan was to retain the advantages of its long domination of Korea, and to delay settlement of the various issues in the belief that time would place Japan in a much stronger bargaining position.
Confronted with unceasing Japanese obstructions, the Republic of Korea has been frustrated in its sincere attempts to attain friendly settlement with Japan. The following facts and incidents illustrate Japanese attitudes as revealed at the Korea -Japan conferences:
1. In the summer of 1951 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was under negotiation, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers felt it necessary to define the status of Korean residents in Japan who, according to SCAP, were "non-Japanese having special status." Therefore, the SCAP authorities sponsored a meeting between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the authorities of occupied Japan, mainly for the purpose of defining the status of the Korean residents. By the end of the Pacific War, Koreans in Japan numbered more than two million, most of whom had been taken to Japan as military or labor draftees. After the end of the war, 1.4 million returned to the Republic of Korea, leaving more than 600,000 in Japan. The first Korea-Japan conference opened on October 20 under the auspices of SCAP. Both sides agreed that agenda items should be expanded to other problems pending between the two countries. But Japan gradually revealed reluctance to discuss the various problems in a sincere manner, believing that the negotiations could be conducted more favorably after April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty would come into force.
2. From the beginning, the Japanese side refused to admit the historical fact that during the forty years of Japanese occupation of Korea, hundreds of thousands of Koreans were deprived of their rights of employment in their homeland and compelled to emigrate to Japan to work in Japanese factories. A number of them were drafted for forced labor in Japan's munitions industries. The Japanese Government has closed its eyes to the historical background of the Korean residents issues.
3. At the 1951 meetings, the Korean side pressed the Japanese to begin negotiation of a fishery agreement in accord with Articles 9 and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But this sincere proposal by the Korean side was rejected by the Japanese on the pretext that the Japanese were not prepared for such talks. At this very moment, Japan had almost completed negotiations with the United States and Canada for conclusion of a tripartite fishery convention.
During the occupation period, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers was also cognizant of the need for regulating Japanese fishing activities and consequently issued several directives on the subject. SCAP memoranda dated January 22, 1946; October 28, 1947; and June 30, 1949, are most noteworthy. In compliance with SCAP directives, the Japanese authorities enacted several laws and regulations to enforce the directives. These included "essentials for regulating westward bottom dragnet fishing and trawler fishing," dated June 16, 1949, and a law "for preventing exhaustion of marine resources" dated May 10, 1950.
The SCAP directives set up a demarcation line in the center of the Eastern Sea beyond which Japanese fishing vessels were not allowed to go. This was an effort to prevent friction between Korea and Japan. However, Japanese fishing boats ignored the boundary line, crossed it, case close to the Korean coast and recklessly exploited marine resources in the seas adjacent to Korea, thus violating the purpose for which the demarcation line was established. It was estimated that some 2,500 Japanese fishing vessels involving 40,000 Japanese fishermen were thus engaged in secretly exploiting the marine resources of Korea. The annual net catch amounted to nearly 230,000 tons. Eighty-three cases of violation of the MacArthur Line were reported between 1947 and 1951, and there must have been countless others. The Japanese had monopolized the fisheries of Korea during the forty years of the Japanese occupation and appeared determined to continue with this policy.
With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September, 1951, and the subsequent restoration of sovereignty to Japan, the MacArthur Line was to be eliminated. Obviously, however, the necessity for such a line remained. It was apparent that with abolition of the MacArthur Line, swarming Japanese fleets would quickly despoil fishery resources in seas adjacent to the Korean peninsula. When the Japanese refused to conclude a fishery agreement, the Government of the Republic of Korea was compelled -- on January 18, 1952 -- to proclaim the Peace Line.
4. Another purpose of the Peace Line was to safeguard the sea defenses of Korea. In 1953, General Mark W. Clark, the United Nations Commander, proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone covering virtually the same area as the Peace Line. However, this Sea Defense Zone was lifted shortly after the signing of the Armistice. There was, therefore, an urgent need for the Government of the Republic of Korea to continue the Peace Line in order to fill the vacuum created by lifting of the Sea Defense Zone. Korea was still, technically as well as practically, at war with the Communists. It was incumbent upon the Korean Government to guard against Communist infiltration, subversion, and other disturbances by way of the sea routes. The Japanese side ignored the fact that the Peace Line serves the same purpose as did the Sea Defense Zone.
5. The question of return of vessels had been solved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in SCAPIN No.2168 and USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No.33, which specifically directed that those vessels registered with the Korean authorities and those located in Korea as of August 9, 1945, would be considered Korean vessels. Under these directives, considerable tonnage of vessels should have been transferred to Korea, but the Japanese Government did not fulfil these U.S. directives. At the meeting in 1951, the Japanese delegation argued about legal interpretation of the directives and adjourned the meetings on pretext that more detailed study of the vessels affected was necessary. Then, unexpectedly, the Japanese delegation proposed that the directives be ignored, and that Japan would "donate" to Korea. certain tonnage of vessels. The Korean side rejected this "solution," and demanded that Japan carry out the provisions of the SCAP and USAMGIK directives.
6. In February, 1952 the Korean Delegation presented an 8-point proposal regarding Korean claims against Japan. This proposal included: 1) Return of classical books and documents, art objects, and silver bullion taken away from Korea ; 2) repayment of the obligations and debts of the Government of Japan owed to the former Government-General of Chosun as of August 9, 1945; 3) return of the monetary accounts transferred or remitted from Korea on and/or since August 9, 1945 4) return of the properties in Japan of juridical persons with head offices in Korea as of August 9, 1945 5) repayment of national and/or public bonds and Bank of Japan notes, issued by the Japanese authorities, in possession of Korean nationals and/or juridical persons, the Japanese obligations to the conscripted Korean laborers, and other claims of Korean nationals or juridical persons against the Government of Japan and/or its nationals; 6) recognition of the legality of the Korean nationals and/or juridical person's ownership of shares or other securities issued by Japanese juridical persons; 7) return of all interest that had been or should have been yielded by the aforementioned properties and/or claims; 8) execute all these return and repayments within six months of the conclusion of this Agreement.
Instead of giving consideration to this proposal, the Japanese side absurdly laid claim to the former Japanese properties in Korea, which had been lawfully vested in the U.S. Military Government in Korea in accordance with its Ordinance No.33 and later transferred to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the ROK-US Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement of 1948. Presumably the Japanese made such claims in an attempt to escape payment of Korea's legitimate claims against Japan.
7. In January, 1953, at the invitation of General Clark, President Syngman Rhee visited Japan and met with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida to lay the groundwork for settlement of various problems between the two countries. The Republic of Korea's "live and let live" policy was enunciated in statements of President Rhee that Korea would "forgive and forget" if Japan showed sincerit in the settlement of outstanding issues. President Rhee said Korea was prepared to meet Japan "half way," and Mr. Yoshida agreed. The second Korea-Japan conference was held thereafter, but the Prime Minister's pledge was an empty one.
8. The third Korea-Japan Conference was held in October, 1953. But Japan opened the meeting with insults and slanders. The chief Japanese delegate, Kanichiro Kubota, challenged legality of the independence of the Republic of Korea. The remarks by the Japanese chief delegate covered the following points:
(1) The evacuation of the Japanese from Korea in 1945 was a violation of international law.
(2) The establishment of an independent Korean state before a Japanese peace treaty was signed was a violation of international law.
(3) Japan's property claims in Korea are inviolable.
(4) The Cairo Declaration describing the "enslavement" of the Korean people to Japan was based on wartime hysteria.
(5) Japan's occupation of Korea was beneficial to the Korean people.
Despite the Republic of Korea's repeated requests that the so-called Kubota statement be withdrawn, the Japanese would not do so and thus disrupted the third Korea-Japan Conference.
9. Once Japan had regained its sovereignty on April 28, 1952, various discriminatory measures and pressures were applied to the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan. The Japanese Government began arresting the residents, and placing them in the Detention Camp in Kyushu for unilateral deportation. The Japanese side unilaterally sent to Pusan 125 Korean residents of pre-war category in Lay, 1955, but Korean immigration officials returned them to Japan. The Japanese side then sent 77 of them back to Korea by producing forged papers classifying them as "illegal" entrants.
In January, 1955, the Japanese Government proposed that 404 prewar category Koreans be released and that the Korean side accept the deportation of illegal entrants. The Japanese declared they would refrain from arresting Koreans who belonged to the pre-war category thereafter. With that understanding, the Korean side accepted deportation of 707 illegal entrants from January through May, 1955. The Japanese Government released 277 out of 404 prewar Koreans who were under detention at that time. It was revealed, however, that the Japanese authorities subsequently arrested 257 pre-war category Koreans in breach of their promise not to do so.
10. Late in 1955 and early in 1956, Korea repeatedly and sincerely sought an equitable settlement of the issue of the Korean detainees at Omura and Japanese detainees at Pusan. The negotiation for this purpose was all but seccessful in November, 1955, when Korean Minister Kim in Tokyo and Japanese Justice Minister Hanamura Agreed on the settlement of the issue. The terms of the agreement were:
(a) Japan shall release all of the Korean detainees at detention camps in Japan who entered Japan before August, 1945, and
(b) Korea shall return to Japan those Japanese fishermen who completed their prison terms and also accept the deportation of Koreans who entered Japan illegally After August, 1945.
But this agreement was not materialized because of Japanese Foreign Ministry disavowal. The issue therefore remained deadlocked until the end of March, 1956, when another agreement was reached between Minister Kim and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. The terms of the agreement were substantially the same as before.
A Working Committee was established and negotiations started. But the Japanese side refused to implement the accord because the Ministry of Justice could not agree with the Foreign Ministry. The Japanese Government thus reneged on an agreement which its Foreign Minister had reached with a foreign envoy.
11. In an earnest desire to eliminate all sources of trouble between the two countries, the Government of the Republic of Korea made exhaustive efforts to bring about resumption of the overall talks. Preliminary talks were concluded December 31, 1957, with the signing of various agreements and conclusion of arrangements for the resumption of the overall talks. One of these agreements provided for mutual release of detainees. There was also an understanding that Korean art objects in Japanese possession be returned. The Republic of Korea fulfilled its share of the agreement by releasing Japanese fishermen who had served out their sentences as of December 31, 1957. But the Japanese side violated the accord by failing to return to the Republic of Korea all the Korean detainees, numbering 1,259.
12. The fourth Korea-Japan Conference was resumed on April 15, 1958. Both sides agreed to set up four major committee; Basic Relations, Fisheries and Peace Line, Problems of Korean Residents in Japan, and Korean Claims, which is sub-divided into sub-committees on vessels and other claims (return of gold and silver bullion and other monetary claims submitted by the Korean side and return of Korean art objects ). These talks went fairly well and entered into recess for the 1959 New Year's holidays. Both Governments agreed that the talks would be resumed in the early part of 1959. But on January 30, 1959, the Japanese Foreign Minister unilaterally declared before the Japanese Diet that Korean residents in Japan would be "allowed to go to the Communist north." There had been no prior consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea, and the problem was still on the agenda of the Korea -Japan Conference. Even so, the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister was upheld as a governmental policy at the Cabinet Meeting of February 13, 1959. This unilateral action on the part of the Japanese Government constituted a flagrant violation of the agreement of December 31, 1957.
13. In an attempt to give this deportation scheme a facade of "humanitarianism," the Japanese side sought to have the International Committee of the Red Cross participate. The Government of the Republic of Korea then proposed on July 30, 1959, the unconditional resumption of the Korea -Japan overall talks. The Conference was resumed on August 12, 1959, and it was agreed that the problem of Korean residents would be discussed with priority. On August 26, 1959, both sides agreed that there are three categories of Korean residents, namely: (1) those Koreans who wish to remain in Japan, (2) those Koreans who wish to be repatriated to the Republic of Korea, and (3) those Koreans who neither wish to remain in Japan nor wish to be repatriated to the Republic of Korea, if any. In sincere desire to forestall friction between Korea and Japan, the Republic of Korea proposed that it would receive the repatriation of all Koreans, regardless of political affiliation, provided that the Japanese Government pay due compensation for their sufferings in the past and place no restriction on removal of their properties. The Japanese Government so far has failed to respond with sincerity and is carrying out its political deportation of Koreans to the Communist north.
Even though accepting the Korean proposal for unconditional resumption of the Korea -Japan talks, the Japanese Government and Red Cross demonstrated their determination to go ahead with the deportation scheme by formally signing the so-called "Calcutta Agreement " and actually taking measures for it implementation. The Government of the Republic of Korea, still seeking a peaceful settlement, proposed on December 11, 1959, to refer the case to the International Court of Justice. But the Japanese placed Koreans aboard two deportation ships on December 14, 1959, and refused to respond to the peace appeal of the Republic of Korea on December 18, 1959.
14. With regard to the art objects to be returned to Korea, the Japanese side last summer provided a list of 489 items in their possession. But when Korea asked for return of the art objects, Japan claimed the list was solely for reference and that no decision had been made as to return.
15. As regard the vessels to be returned to the Republic of Korea, the Japanese side raised no question as to the legality of the relevant SCAP instruction in the past, but are now raising pseudo-legal arguments that Japan should not be bound by it. They thus show little interest or intention to return these vessels to the Korean side, as ordered by SCAP.
16. When the Japanese presented a proposed fisheries agreement in November, 1958, they did not make public the contents of their proposal. This was an attempt to put the Korean side on the defensive.
This Japanese proposal provided a Korean fishing zone of 6 to 12 miles from the Korean coasts, while leaving waters beyond that in the joint Fishery Resources preservation Zone.
17. After the Japanese Government granted exit permits to 20 of 48 Koreans who had allegedly wanted to go to the Communist north, Minister Yong Shik Kim, then Chief of the Korean Mission in Japan, continued informal talks with Japanese Foreign Office officials with a view to preventing the recurrence of such incidents.
On December 15, 1956, Minister Kim received assurance from Mr. Nakagawa, Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, that "Japan will not send any Koreans to north Korea and no Japanese vessels will be allowed to carry them to north Korea."
Earlier, the same assurance was given to Minister Kim by another high official of the Japanese Government. When in the morning of December 7, 1956, Minister Kim called on Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister Kadowaki, and protested against the action of the Japanese authorities in permitting the exit of the twenty Koreans, Mr. Kadowaki replied that a) his Government had not been informed of the departure of the twenty Koreans beforehand and the local immigration officials issued them the exit permits without knowing the delicate situation; b) Japan would not permit additional Koreans to go to north Korea and that no Japanese vessels should be used for such purpose.
However, in 1959, violating all these prior assurances, the Japanese Government came to maintain that the departure of Koreans in Japan for the northern part of Korea of their own "free will" and under the assistance of the Red Cross Society, was beyond the scope of the former assurances and accordingly was of no concern to the Japanese Government.
18. In May, 1958, when Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi wrote a letter to .President Syngman Rhee, he expressed his determination to lead his Government toward speedy and sincere settlement of Korea -Japan problems on a basis of good neighborliness. But this pledge was not heeded by the Japanese Delegation at the Conference table. There is much documentary evidence to prove how the Japanese have violated their solemn pledges. If the Japanese side continues to show insincerity and to refuse to reach settlement of the pending issues, Korea may have no choice but to release the confidential documents involved. This would bring the world to full realization of Japan's wrongful and intransigent attitude toward Korea -Japan problems.

색인어
이름
Mark W. Clark, Syngman Rhee, Kanichiro Kubota, Yong Shik Kim, Nobusuke Kishi, Syngman Rhee
지명
KOREA, JAPAN, The Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, the United States, Canada, the Eastern Sea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Kyushu, Pusan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Omura, Pusan, Tokyo, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, The Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, north Korea, north Korea, Japan, north Korea, Japan, the northern part of Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan
관서
the Government of the Republic of Korea, The Japanese Government, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Korean Government, the Japanese Government, USAMGIK, the Government of Japan, General of Chosun, the Government of Japan, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea, The Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, The Japanese Government, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Japanese Government, The Government of the Republic of Korea, the Japanese Government, The Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, The Government of the Republic of Korea, the International Court of Justice, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government
단체
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Cross Society
문서
SCAPIN No.2168, USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No.33, the agreement of December 31, 1957
기타
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the status of Korean residents in Japan, the status of the Korean residents, the Pacific War, The first Korea-Japan conference, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japanese occupation of Korea, the Korean residents issues, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the MacArthur Line, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the MacArthur Line, the MacArthur Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, Sea Defense Zone, the Peace Line, Sea Defense Zone, the Peace Line, the Sea Defense Zone, the Peace Line, the Sea Defense Zone, Return of classical books and documents, art objects, and silver bullion, Bank of Japan notes, the former Japanese properties in Korea, the ROK-US Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement of 1948, The second Korea-Japan conference, The third Korea-Japan Conference, Japan's property claims in Korea, The Cairo Declaration, Japan's occupation of Korea, Kubota statement, the third Korea-Japan Conference, the issue of the Korean detainees, the deportation of Koreans, The fourth Korea-Japan Conference, Peace Line, Problems of Korean Residents in Japan, return of Korean art objects, Korean residents in Japan, the problem of Korean residents, political deportation of Koreans to the Communist north, Calcutta Agreement, return of the art objects, joint Fishery Resources preservation Zone
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한일관계에 관한 사실들 자료번호 : kj.d_0008_0030_1850