SUMMARY
1. At the first Korea-Japan talks convened on and from October 20, 1952, the Japanese side employed every tactic to delay the proceedings of the talks because it believed that it could bargain in a stronger position after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.
2. In dealing with the problem of those Koreans who had been forcibly brought to Japan during the wartime, the Japanese side closed eyes to the special historical background of them.
3. In the fall of 1951, the Korean side proposed to the Japanese side for an early conclusion of a fishery agreement for which Japan undertook obligation by the Peace Treaty, the Japanese side declined to commence negotiation stating that it was not prepared to do so. As the MacArthur Line was to be lifted at that time, the Korean side could not but take a measure. Thus the Peace Line was proclaimed.
4. The purpose of the Peace Line is multiple. It is to conserve fishery resources and to prevent unnecessary frictions at sea between Korea and Japan. Another function of the Line is to prevent the Communists from infiltratinginto the Republic of Korea, as the Clark Line intended to do. Japan denied it.
5. When the question of return of vessels was discussed at the first Korea-Japan talks in 1951, the Japanese side evaded its obligations directed by the SCAP, presenting a ridiculous theory of "donation," of vessels.
6. In 1952, the Japanese side came out with an absurd assertion that it has claim to the defunct Japanese properties in Korea, solely for the purpose of countering our claims against Japan,
7. Early in 1953, Japanese Prime Minister agreed with President Syngman Rhee to settle the issues pending between the two countries as soon as possible. This ended in an empty pledge.
8. At the third Korea-Japan talks in 1953, the Japanese Delegation came to the conference table to question even the legality of the independence of the Republic of Korea. Japanese Chief Delegate Kubota made remarks insulting the Republic of Korea covering five points of argument.
9. As soon as Japan regained her sovereignty in April, 1952, the Japanese Government redoubled its efforts to take a discriminatory measure against Korean residents in Japan and deport as many Koreans as possible. In 1955, Japan actually transported some to Pusan though the Korean Government sent them back to Japan.
10. In 1955, Chief of the Korean Mission in Japan agreed with Japanese Minister of Justice for mutual release of detainees, but it could not be implemented because the Japanese Foreign Ministry voiced an objection thereto. In 1956, Chief of the same Mission agreed with Japanese Foreign Minister on the same subject, but the agreement became abortive because the Japanese Ministry of Justice opposed its implementation.
11. The Korean Government completely fulfilled its obligations undertaken by the terms signed on December 31, 1957 for releasing Japanese detainees in Pusan, while the Japanese Government failed to reciprocate by repatriating the Korean detainees at Omura.
12. According to the Agreed Minutes of December 31, 1957, the Japanese Government cannot unilaterally dispose of the problem of Korean residents in Japan. But it did so in carrying out deportation of Koreans to the Communist north.
13. After the Fourth Korea-Japan talks were resumed on August 12, 1959, the Japanese side agreed to place on the agenda "the problem of those who neither wish to remain in Japan nor wish to repatriate to the Republic of Korea" for discussion at the overall talks. Despite the said understanding, it carried out the deportation of Koreans in Japan to the Communist north on December 14, 1959. Japan even rejected the Korean proposal for bringing the case to the International Court of Justice.
14. At the Fourth Korea-Japan talks in 1958, the Japanese side handed to the Korean side a list of 489 Korean art objects. Later, the Japanese explained that it was handed not for return but for reference by the Korean side.
15. If necessary, the Japanese side used to quote Korean remarks made in informal occasions as if it had been an understanding, while the Japanese side used to insist upon an exclusive high-level meeting for the purpose of giving no witness or evidence.
16. According to the Japanese argument in 1958, the SCAP instructions for return of Korean vessels are not binding upon Japan. The Japanese even declined to discuss on the question of "return".
17. When the Japanese side made a proposal for a fishery agreement in 1958, it gave wide publicity about the existence of the proposal without publicising the contents thereof. The Japanese move was not to solve the question but merely to put the Korean side into bad shape.
18. In December, 1956, the Korean Mission in Japan was assured by the responsible officials of the Japanese Government that no Korean would be sent to the northern part of Korea. According to the Japanese theory, however, the depertation of Koreans in Japan in 1959 is out of control by the Japanese Government because the Koreans concerned left Japan of their "free will".
19. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi wrote to President Rhee in 1958 expressing his determination to lead his Government in the formal talks so as to arrive at speedy settlement of the problems with all sincerity, this did not materialize by the actions by the Japanese Delegation.