Following is the text of the address given by Dr. Chin-O Yu, chief Korean delegate to the ROK-Japan Talks, at Harvard Club meeting on December 9, 1960.

"Present Situation in Korea"

The Characteristics of the A
In order to understand the present situation in Korea, one must go back to the April Revolution which brought about the fall of the Syngman Rhee government. "April Revolution" was unique in its nature. The revolution, initiated by the students' uprising on April 19, was responded in an instant by the whole citizens of Seoul as well as the entire nation. The uprising became to assume all the features of a revolution, when on April 25 the demonstrating students and citizens, at the sight of a group of college professors marching the streets in support of them, turned violent and destroyed government buildings, police offices and residences of leaders of the Liberal Party. Nearly 200 students and other demonstrators were killed in Seoul by the police, but the armed forces which were mobilized under a material law to dispel the rioters and restore order of the capital refused to fire. However, the burning passion of the demonstrators suddenly subsided following the issuance of a resignation statement by President Syngman Rhee. The Students had been marching on the streets and rushing around like wounded lions on whatever vehicles seized in their hands until the moment of Rhee's resignation statement in the morning of April 26. And yet the same students turned out to be busy in the afternoon of the same day in an effort to restore order of the city. Thus, the City of Seoul where not a single police could be seen recovered order before the sunset of the day by the efforts of the students who occupied all the police stations in the city and continued their work until 7 p.m. of the next day when their duties were turned over to the hands of the armed forces. The caretaker government headed by Mr. Chung Huh was being organized from the afternoon of 26th when the entire city was still under the control of the student.
All students, intellectuals and the press welcomed the downfall of the Syngman Rhee regime, and called the upheaval a revolution, though the upheaval was not so violent as a revolution would be. Several hundred students and other citizens lost their lives, it was true, but the sacrifice was considered rather small, and, what was to be noted was that none of the high officials of the Rhee regime was hurt by the demonstrators. It was quite natural that foreign correspondents named it "a quiet revolution" or "a restricted revolution." A few days later, I received a telephone call from a stranger. He, who identified himself as a father of a student of Korean University tole me that arguments had been going on the nature of the upheaval with his son who, contrary to his view that the upheaval was northing more than an upheaval, claimed it a revolution. He contended that the upheaval could not be looked upon as a revolution on the ground that, if it is to be called a revolution, it should have accompanied with more booldshed, and should have destructed the old regime more completely. Among other things, the continued, there was no fundamental change between the old and new regimes, since the Rhee regime had been claiming that it too was standing for democracy as the new government did, though the old regime had made many mistakes.
I replied on the spot that I held it not a simple political upheaval but a revolution. I told him that there were various types of revolution; violent one as well as peaceful one; one which would consume a short period as well as one requiring a longer period. I continued that a peaceful revolution which would consume a longer period would not necessarily be less effective than violent and radical one; that rather the former type of revolution could bring about more concrete results; that France experienced a bloody revolution in 1789 while Britain went through slow-moving changes, but this fact does not lead to a conclusion that France achieved a more advanced democratic system than Britain did. The student's father seemed to be unconvinced with my above remarks, but he finally came to silence when I asked him back the following: "If you insist the event as a simple political upheaval, how are you going to set the future political course of this country? I think it was a revolution, so I think it is now our duty to carry out democratic reformations in all the field of politics, economy, culture and daily life. What kind of political course do you want to deduce from your view that the revolution was no more than a political coup? We must not think that the revolution is over. A long way lies ahead of us for the accomplishment of the purposes of the revolution and we must struggle ahead along this way. If and when we should fail in this task, it will result in a mere political upheaval as you contend."
True it was that a constitution covering whole principles of democracy was adopted in 1948 when the ROK government was established, but it was not that the domestic political, economic and social conditions in Korea were mature enough to necessitate the adoption of such democratic system. Though the Koreans are a nation with a long history and civilization of their own, the tides of democracy were comparatively late in reaching them. Moreover, their yearnings for democracy had been completely suppressed by the Japanese occupation. Therefore, the adoption of the democratic Constitution in 1948 was a result not so much of the Korea People's own drive for democratic Constitution as of the influences of the Allied Powers who liberated the Korean people from Japan. In other words, it was a "Revolution von Aussen." For the first time in its history the Korean people have started a "Revolution von Innen" by the April Revolution. The reason why the democratic Revolution of the Korean people, the first one in their long history, suddenly stopped in the half way is, of course, the stark fact that Korea is divided into two, and that less than 20 miles north of Seoul, there are the Communist forces ready to cross the DMZ at any time. The common concern that haunted the students and intellectuals at the time of the April Revolution was that if the revolution turned more violent and retaliations against supporters of the former Rhee Regime intensified, it might provide the north Korean Communists with a golden opportunity to invade the Republic of Korea. Koreans were put in a dilemma: they had to accomplish the task of a revolution while maintaining order. This fact has had a vital bearing on the developments thereafter.
2) Confusion in the wake of the Arpil Revolution.
(A) In the afternoon of April 25, when several hundreds of my fellow professors were marching the streets in the direction of the National Assembly, holding over their heads numerous placards with slogans of revolution, I hurried into my study and drafted a paper entitled "A Private Opinion on How to Meet with the Present Situation." This "Opinion" was published in the following morning edition of the Dong-A Ilbo, an influential daily newspaper. In it, I proposed in essence: a) that the National Assembly be dissolved; b) that a caretaker government be formed and a general election be held; and c) that the new National Assembly adopt a new Constitution and form a new government in accordance with that Constitutions.
But the actual political process took place in the following order:
a) formation of a caretaker government
b) adoption of a new Constitution
c) general election
d) formation of a new government.
Thus the adoption of a new constitution, the basic work to be done by the revolutionary forces, was done by the existing National Assembly which was still dominated by the Liberal Party that had supported the old regime. The dilemma of the April Revolution became clear again at this point. Changes had to be made, but order had to be maintained.
In the turmoils of the revolution, a new political force rapidly appeared on the political scene. It was the "progressive" elements that had rigidly been suppressed by the Syngman Rhee regime for the reason that they advocated "co-existence with communism." They had been placed in the political limbo after the execution in 1958 of Cho bong Am, head of the Progressive Party, who challenged Syngman Rhee in the 1956 presidential election, on alleged charges of conspiring secretly with the north Korean puppets. No wonder they played no part at the time of the revolution. But under the political liberties restored by the revolution, these "progressives" appeared on the stage again and were given a pretty strong support by certain quarters of the press.
For some time after the April Revolution, various "progressive" parties reached a peak of their popularity, and in the general election of last July, they challenged the conservatives by putting up several hundred candidates. However, they were given a most harsh judgment by the people. Only two of candidates from the "progressive" elements were elected to the National Assembly. They suffered round defeats even in such alleged "progressive" strongholds as Pusan and Taegu. One of the reasons for their defeat might be attributed to the fact that they were divided into several warring factions instead of being united into a party. But the fatal reason was that they failed to distinguish themselves from the Communists. Some of them openly advocated "co-existence with Communism" and called for economic and cultural exchanges between the north and the south for an ultimate political integration. This led to their complete defeat. The Korean -- poor farmers, laborers or even beggars alike -- had painfully experienced what communism really was during the Korean War, and did not east their votes for communists or fellow travellers.
The results of the general election spelled a landsliding victory of the opposition Democratic Party. However, this overwhelming victory had the consequence of planting the seeds of future confusion. The ambitions of the politicians of the Democratic Party which had reached more than four fifths of the seats of the House of Representatives were excessively abetted, and in the course of the formation of the new Cabinet, the power struggle between the new and "old" factions within the Democratic Party, came to the surface and resulted at last in the breakup of the Party into two -- the Democratic Party and the New Democratic Party. The present Chang cabinet comes from the Democratic Party (former "new" faction). It recently has succeeded in attaining a bare majority in the House of Representatives after several months' dire efforts.
(B) Confusion rise cross in the economic field.
It is common anywhere any time that political transition invariably breeds economic confusion. However, the peculiarity of the economic structure in Korea helped accelerate this confusion. That is, the comparative weight which political power holds over economic in Korea is much heavier than in other countries.
Is it usually said that in capitalist countries, the interests of the capitalists are in one way or another reflected on the politics. However, the situation is adverse in Korea. Whereas the amount of private capital in Korea is negligible, the Government almost monopolizes big capital. It can readily be proved by several examples. First, about 80 per cent of Korean national wealth, excluding farms and forests, which had previously been owned by the Japanese Government or Japanese nationals, were turned over in whole to the Koran Government by the United States Military Authority in Korea. Second, the economic assistance from the United States, which is absolutely needed to meet Korea's annual expenditures, is given on a government to government basis, thus making the economic control of the Korean Government absolutely over its populace.
On account of these reasons, it was almost impossible for major industries, except some of those in smaller scale, to stand on their own independently of governmental support. In fact, this subjugation of industry to political power was the main cause of the corruption of the government. Therefore, the fall of the Rhee regime had the accompanying effect of driving the major industries to a cross-road of "life or death." Some important figures of the industry were actually punished. Others were branded as "illegal profiteers," the harshier in proportion to the scale of their enterprises.
This resulted in bringing about an extreme contraction of economy. Finance became tight, plants ceased producing, important new projects in steel and oil refinery were discarded. The greatest headache for the new Korean Government is to map out the measures to meet the demands of the revolutionary masses for the punishment to meet the "Illegal profiteers" without further paralyzing the industries. The sooner these measures are taken, the better would it be for the future of Korea.
(C) The social confusion was aggravated by certain movements of the students who had been the leading force of the April Revolution. The students, who had easily toppled the dictatorial regime, now turned to their own universities and schools for reform. Countless conflicts occurred, involving boycott of "incompetent" teachers, despotic presidents, deans, principals or chairmen of foundations, and the demand for reduction of tuitions.
These situation were aggravated by the outburst of complaints from the teachers themselves. In various areas of the country, teachers came out with slogans demanding for improvement of treatment, guaranty of status and democratization of school administration. Taking advantage of this tide, teachers' union movements were launched in the northern and southern Kyung Sang Provinces. In last June and July, it seemed as if a majority of the teachers of primary schools and middle and high schools in these areas joined this teachers' union movement.
Confusion in the educational field is still going on. But it is also showing signs of subsiding after the culmination in the Yonsei University conflict, which attracted an unusual attention of the public because the chairman of its foundation and the president of the university were both Americans.
3) Neutrality Movement and Its Future
After the general election of last July and the formation of the new government in late August in accordance with the amended constitution, gradual restoration of order was expected, when a new problem suddenly popped up and produced serious repercussions throughout the Korean society. It was the problem of the "unification through neutralization" of Korea. Since it concerns itself with the vital question of unifying Korea, it may be worth while to spend some time in reviewing the problem.
The north Korean puppets have long contended in their propaganda campaign that all foreign troops be withdrawn from the Korean peninsular, that a parley between leaders of the north and the south be held to discuss the unification problem. It was beyond expectation that a same sort of contention should come from the mouths of students in the south. The question was first raised at a nation-wide discussion meeting of college students on the unification issue, under the auspices of Korea University students. The contention of these students that Korea be unified by means of neutralizing the unified Korea drew the support of about one third of the students present at the meeting. At first, it attracted little attention of the public, but as time went on, importance of the matter became gradually recognized.
The gist of their view was that Korea had been divided by the United States and the Soviet Union against the will of the Korean people, that although the Republic of Korea had for long advocated unification through a general election under the supervision of the United Nations, the plan was an unrealistic one as long as the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union continued, that the Koreans were a homogeneous people, that the agrarian south and the industrial north, in division, could not make their ends meets as an economic entity, compelling them to reply on foreign aid, that, therefore, Korea should be freed from the influences of both the United States and Soviet Union and be unified on the basis of the principle of self-determination, and that, thus, a neutral government be established which would not side with any of these two powers.
The professors who conducted the discussion commented on the idea of unification bases on neutralism that it was utterly unrealistic, and it seemed to be passing away without drawing serious attention of the public. However, the foreign community in Seoul showed a serious concern over the idea, embarrassed by its possible implications. Then came the suggestion of Senator Mansfield for the unification of Korea based on an Austrian pattern of neutrality. The problem became to draw attention the leaders concerned in Korea.
Needless to say that this idea has its foot on the urgency and importance of the realization of the unification. It is true that during the past years the north Korean communists have been busy in laying out various methods of unification seemingly practicable under the given situation and been taking every chance to appeal to the Korean people both in the north and the south over radio media, while the Republic of Korea simply repeated refusing all of the offers from the communists with a simple word of 'no', upholding only the general election under U.N. supervision. Such differences of attitude, it must be admitted, gave a wrong impression that while the north Korean communists have been eager for the realization of the unification, the leaders in the south have been rather idle at it and tended to reply only upon the economic and military assistance from the United States. Thus, the idea of neutralism claimed by the students in the south is significant in that it was a sort of first movement showing a positive attitude toward the unification problem from the side of the Republic of Korea.
However, it must be noted that this idea of neutralism is an unrealistic illusion in itself. First, they discard the point that the neutrality can have a sense only when a nation's international relations is taken into consideration, i.e. neutrality of nation from both the United States and Soviet Union, but it cannot be a principle of the political, economic or social institutions of nation. Although there can be a neutrality from both camps of the United States and Soviet Union, there is no such principle to be applied to the governmental system, that is neutral from both, principles of free enterprise and communism. Secondly, it is, therefore, pointed that the neutralism idea fails to recognize that the neutrality must be preceeded by the unification of the nation. Neutrality was made possible in Austria because there already existed a single government. On the same reason, Korea must have unified democratic government before entering into the question of neutralism. I wonder how the two organizations based on two opposing principles could be made neutral. Thirdly, even after a successful realization of the democratic unification of Korea, in order to achieve neutrality, it has to be strong enough both economically and militarily to protect and maintain that neutrality from a possible aggression. If it lacks in ability to cope with such aggression, the neutralization idea would be an illusion. Fourthly, for the neutralization of Korea, there should be a convincing proof and guaranty from neighboring and interested nations that its neutrality should be secured. Any idea of neutralization not based on such an international assurance may be tantamount to a false idea of 'money' to get neutralized from stealers.
Those who hold neutralization idea develop their reasoning from the premise that a general election under U.N. supervision, which has been put forward by the Republic of Korea and the U.N. is 'unrealistic'. Is the unification plan really so unrealistic as they claim?
We will proceed to trace the causes why this plan has not been materialized so far. As we are well aware of, the plan presented by the ROK and the U.N. has not been workable due to the objection to it by the north Korean communist regime and its communist allies.
Whatever reason they may fabricate, the real cause of the communists. objection to the plan is that in case of the execution of the plan with their acceptance of it, they see no chance at all for holding by themselves the hegemony in the national assembly and the government to be established by such a general election throughout the north and the south under U.N. supervision. It is, therefore, clear that the plan will remain 'unrealistic' so long as the communists see no possibility for their victory out of the general election. Only when hopes for a victory would be in sight to the communist, this plan will be accepted at once by them.
In fact, prospect for the communists' acceptance of this plan is, to the pleasure of the north Korean communists, being increased. In other word, chances for their victory in the general election throughout Korea are viewed as being improved. It does not necessarily imply that the communist would occupy a majority in the national assembly thus to be formed. Splits into factions of the democratic politicians, a familiar picture in the politics of free countries, will certainly be made use of by the communists for their own purpose. Despite the imminent menace of the communists a phenomenon of fatal splits among the democratic politicians in their struggles for power is observed in the Republic of Korea.
The question lies not in the neutralization but in the unification and in the safeguarding of the democratic system in the unified Korea. Overlooking these points, the idea of neutralization will inevitably serve to bring about splits and confusions in the ROK only to result in the increase of danger for the communization of Korea.
4) Conclusion
In conclusion, the ROK is confronted with a great danger. The people of the ROK have won democracy by their own will and power for the first time in their long history. However, due to lack of experience, many mistakes and confusions are being caused in their practice of democracy. Such mistakes and confusions will add to the chance for the communists. The communists are taking advantage of confusions in the ROK to the fullest extent. They even show the sign of possible acceptance of a general election under U.N. supervision to which they have so far opposed. The ROK must be prepared to cope with the possible acceptance of such election by the communists regardless of whether they might actually accept it or not.
The preparations mean firstly that democracy in Korea be set on a solid foundation, and secondly that the economic strength be advanced enough to back up the democracy. When the day comes that the people of the ROK can enjoy a stabilized life with advancement of the economy and that their daily life is led by democratic principles, the dream of communizing Korea will disappear for ever. Hopes for a brighter future of Korea can only be found in minimizing Waste of energy for the unnecessary political struggles, the neutralization arguments and so on, and in concentrating it toward purification of politics and advancement of economic strength.