정보 No.13
For Information
January 14, 1960
No.13
Your Excellency,
Yesterday afternoon at 4:00 p.m. I went to see Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. J. Graham Parsons, at the State Department as previously scheduled. I was accompanied by our Minister Han.
Prior to going to the State Department, I familiarized myself with all the pertinent facts of the Korea-Japan negotiations and what Our Government requires of Japan for the settlement of the Korean residents' status as well as other related existing problems between the two countries in spite of the Japanese propaganda and double-talk to convince the world and to justify Japan's actions. In other words, I wanted to put on record what we felt in case Kishi and Fujiyama should bring up the matter when they get here to President Eisenhower and others.
Naturally, my reaction was that they wished to talk with me about this problem However, to my great surprise Mr. Parsons wanted to tell me about the matter of the United States-Japan revised security treaty so that there will be absolutely no misunderstanding on our part or on that of the Sixteen Nations that fought in Korea. In fact, they are having a meeting of the Sixteen Nations at the State Department in order to inform them on the same subject, as they did me yesterday.
First, Mr. Parsons wanted to apologize to our Government for the most regrettable incident of the shaving of the heads of the two Korean women by the order of an American Army Captain.
Then he brought up the matter of this U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which will be signed next week. After he explained the whole treaty and how the new security pact will strengthen the position of the Republic of Korea, particularly having Japan on the side of the Free World rather than her going neutral, I brought up the question of the "prior consultation" clause and asked them whether the United States Government has to consult with the Japanese Government before any military action involving U.S. forces in Japan or U.S. bases in Japan can be made and also what would America do in case Japan refused. Did it mean that American forces and the bases in Japan cannot be utilized in defending the Republic of Korea or any of the Far Eastern areas that have been attacked? He very honestly stated that that is not true. Whether Japan objects or not, the United States has a mutual security pact with Korea and with 40 or more other countries in the world. The "prior consultation" clause merely means that they will inform Japan just exactly what the United States is going to do, and since the United States forces in Korea are part of the United Nations forces under the Acheson-Yoshida Agreement which still stands and since Japan is also a member of the United Nations, there is absolutely nothing Japan can do except go along with it whether she likes it or not. I went so far as to state that it would be a very fine assurance to Korea as well as to the other Far Eastern countries that Japan cannot influence America's decision as to whether she should enter and defend other Far Eastern countries that Japan cannot influence America's decision as to whether she should enter and defend other Far Eastern countries in case of attack.
Mr. Parsons said they would like to think about that, but we can be absolutely sure that the United States is not forgetting Korea especially where they have a large force nor other parts of the Far East. When the revised security pact between the United States and Japan is signed, they will issue a joint communique which he feels will clarify many of these points.
Minister Han who accompanied me will submit a memorandum on the conversation.
Mr. Parsons then brought up the question of the realistic exchange rate as well as the tourist exchange rate -- how the State Department is pressured by other Departments of the U.S. Government as well as Congress relative to this matter. I told Mr. Parsons that we should drop this matter of a new exchange rate discussion at this time, and take up this matter again some time after July of this year.
I pointed out to him that after months of discussion our National Assembly has finally passed the budget. Now, if our government officials went to the legislature asking them to increase the budget even before it went into effect, it will terribly upset our whole economy; also, I said the Opposition Party members of the legislature would propagandize that the administration does not know what it is doing. For instance, if a new exchange rate should go into effect after half a year has gone by, possibly a supplementary budget could be submitted and passed, but certainly not now. I am sure the administration in the United States, I said, would be in a very embarrassing position if it had to submit a supplementary budget immediately after the budget had been passed by the legislature.
Mr. Parsons and his associates immediately saw my point and they actually agreed with me that I have a point there. I, therefore, urged the State Department to send a memorandum to Ambassador McConaughy to drop the matter at this time. Another reason which I gave, which was a very personal one to me, was that if the U.S. Government presses this matter too severely, I was convinced that the opposition Democratic Party might utilise this fact in their election campaign. I may have been wrong in making that statement to them, but I sincerely wanted to stop them from discussing this matter further.
Then I presented certain facts to Mr. Parsons for the record, and stated that if the Japanese bring up the question of Korea-Japan relations and particularly that of the deportation problem, the Republic of Korea requires Japan to do the following:
1) give proper compensation for the slave labor they have exacted from our people prior to, and during, World War II
2) all those who wish to be repatriated to Korea should be allowed to take all their assets with them; in other countries of the Free World one is given the privilege of taking one's property and other assets with one; to this they agreed
3) those Koreans who remain in Japan should be given a proper legal status so that they may remain in Japan without fear
4) Japan should return to the Republic of Korea all art objects belonging to Korea which Japan stole during their occupation of Korea for 40 years or more
5) the offer of compensation or resettlement fund should be paid in advance of the actual repatriation of our people
I then mentioned the Japanese propaganda about the Japanese fishermen held in Pusan they felt should be released and returned to Japan. I told Mr. Parsons that we Koreans have always lived up to our promises but Japan has always practiced a double-talk. I think the ICRC even went so far as to condemn the Japanese on the treatment of our Korean at the OMURA camp. However, if they will carry out the points mentioned above, I said our Government is willing to have this exchange of those fishermen who have served their terms in Pusan and exchange them for the Korean detainees.
Another point that the Japanese propaganda mentions is that the Republic of Korea refuses to purchase Japanese goods. I said this is absolutely false, and that if they would check the trade balance between the Republic of Korea and Japan, it is very plain that Japan is the country which does not buy from Korea. They even refuse to buy Korean rice which the Japanese people prefer to any other rice produced in Japan or anywhere else. Besides, I pointed out two years ago our whole laver production was destroyed because the Japanese Government refused to buy it although the Japanese people liked it very much.
I then stated to Mr. Parsons that if and when Japan agrees to the points I have mentioned above and mass repatriation actually takes place, I sincerely hoped America would give us some financial assistance for the resettlement of all these Korean repatriates. However, the financial assistance given by the United States should not be confused with Japanese compensation payments.
Mr. Parsons listened to my appeal with a great deal of sympathy and he said that he understood that the resettlement of over half a million people is a great problem.
Finally, I asked him to begin the conference for the conclusion of the agreement for facilities in the areas in use by U.S. forces in Korea. I said it had been too long delayed. Mr. Parsons said that they are in the midst of discussing this particular problem with the Pentagen, but sometime real soon they will have some good news for us. The meeting lasted for over one hour.
With renewed sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I remain,
Your Excellency,
Yesterday afternoon at 4:00 p.m. I went to see Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. J. Graham Parsons, at the State Department as previously scheduled. I was accompanied by our Minister Han.
Prior to going to the State Department, I familiarized myself with all the pertinent facts of the Korea-Japan negotiations and what Our Government requires of Japan for the settlement of the Korean residents' status as well as other related existing problems between the two countries in spite of the Japanese propaganda and double-talk to convince the world and to justify Japan's actions. In other words, I wanted to put on record what we felt in case Kishi and Fujiyama should bring up the matter when they get here to President Eisenhower and others.
Naturally, my reaction was that they wished to talk with me about this problem However, to my great surprise Mr. Parsons wanted to tell me about the matter of the United States-Japan revised security treaty so that there will be absolutely no misunderstanding on our part or on that of the Sixteen Nations that fought in Korea. In fact, they are having a meeting of the Sixteen Nations at the State Department in order to inform them on the same subject, as they did me yesterday.
First, Mr. Parsons wanted to apologize to our Government for the most regrettable incident of the shaving of the heads of the two Korean women by the order of an American Army Captain.
Then he brought up the matter of this U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which will be signed next week. After he explained the whole treaty and how the new security pact will strengthen the position of the Republic of Korea, particularly having Japan on the side of the Free World rather than her going neutral, I brought up the question of the "prior consultation" clause and asked them whether the United States Government has to consult with the Japanese Government before any military action involving U.S. forces in Japan or U.S. bases in Japan can be made and also what would America do in case Japan refused. Did it mean that American forces and the bases in Japan cannot be utilized in defending the Republic of Korea or any of the Far Eastern areas that have been attacked? He very honestly stated that that is not true. Whether Japan objects or not, the United States has a mutual security pact with Korea and with 40 or more other countries in the world. The "prior consultation" clause merely means that they will inform Japan just exactly what the United States is going to do, and since the United States forces in Korea are part of the United Nations forces under the Acheson-Yoshida Agreement which still stands and since Japan is also a member of the United Nations, there is absolutely nothing Japan can do except go along with it whether she likes it or not. I went so far as to state that it would be a very fine assurance to Korea as well as to the other Far Eastern countries that Japan cannot influence America's decision as to whether she should enter and defend other Far Eastern countries that Japan cannot influence America's decision as to whether she should enter and defend other Far Eastern countries in case of attack.
Mr. Parsons said they would like to think about that, but we can be absolutely sure that the United States is not forgetting Korea especially where they have a large force nor other parts of the Far East. When the revised security pact between the United States and Japan is signed, they will issue a joint communique which he feels will clarify many of these points.
Minister Han who accompanied me will submit a memorandum on the conversation.
Mr. Parsons then brought up the question of the realistic exchange rate as well as the tourist exchange rate -- how the State Department is pressured by other Departments of the U.S. Government as well as Congress relative to this matter. I told Mr. Parsons that we should drop this matter of a new exchange rate discussion at this time, and take up this matter again some time after July of this year.
I pointed out to him that after months of discussion our National Assembly has finally passed the budget. Now, if our government officials went to the legislature asking them to increase the budget even before it went into effect, it will terribly upset our whole economy; also, I said the Opposition Party members of the legislature would propagandize that the administration does not know what it is doing. For instance, if a new exchange rate should go into effect after half a year has gone by, possibly a supplementary budget could be submitted and passed, but certainly not now. I am sure the administration in the United States, I said, would be in a very embarrassing position if it had to submit a supplementary budget immediately after the budget had been passed by the legislature.
Mr. Parsons and his associates immediately saw my point and they actually agreed with me that I have a point there. I, therefore, urged the State Department to send a memorandum to Ambassador McConaughy to drop the matter at this time. Another reason which I gave, which was a very personal one to me, was that if the U.S. Government presses this matter too severely, I was convinced that the opposition Democratic Party might utilise this fact in their election campaign. I may have been wrong in making that statement to them, but I sincerely wanted to stop them from discussing this matter further.
Then I presented certain facts to Mr. Parsons for the record, and stated that if the Japanese bring up the question of Korea-Japan relations and particularly that of the deportation problem, the Republic of Korea requires Japan to do the following:
1) give proper compensation for the slave labor they have exacted from our people prior to, and during, World War II
2) all those who wish to be repatriated to Korea should be allowed to take all their assets with them; in other countries of the Free World one is given the privilege of taking one's property and other assets with one; to this they agreed
3) those Koreans who remain in Japan should be given a proper legal status so that they may remain in Japan without fear
4) Japan should return to the Republic of Korea all art objects belonging to Korea which Japan stole during their occupation of Korea for 40 years or more
5) the offer of compensation or resettlement fund should be paid in advance of the actual repatriation of our people
I then mentioned the Japanese propaganda about the Japanese fishermen held in Pusan they felt should be released and returned to Japan. I told Mr. Parsons that we Koreans have always lived up to our promises but Japan has always practiced a double-talk. I think the ICRC even went so far as to condemn the Japanese on the treatment of our Korean at the OMURA camp. However, if they will carry out the points mentioned above, I said our Government is willing to have this exchange of those fishermen who have served their terms in Pusan and exchange them for the Korean detainees.
Another point that the Japanese propaganda mentions is that the Republic of Korea refuses to purchase Japanese goods. I said this is absolutely false, and that if they would check the trade balance between the Republic of Korea and Japan, it is very plain that Japan is the country which does not buy from Korea. They even refuse to buy Korean rice which the Japanese people prefer to any other rice produced in Japan or anywhere else. Besides, I pointed out two years ago our whole laver production was destroyed because the Japanese Government refused to buy it although the Japanese people liked it very much.
I then stated to Mr. Parsons that if and when Japan agrees to the points I have mentioned above and mass repatriation actually takes place, I sincerely hoped America would give us some financial assistance for the resettlement of all these Korean repatriates. However, the financial assistance given by the United States should not be confused with Japanese compensation payments.
Mr. Parsons listened to my appeal with a great deal of sympathy and he said that he understood that the resettlement of over half a million people is a great problem.
Finally, I asked him to begin the conference for the conclusion of the agreement for facilities in the areas in use by U.S. forces in Korea. I said it had been too long delayed. Mr. Parsons said that they are in the midst of discussing this particular problem with the Pentagen, but sometime real soon they will have some good news for us. The meeting lasted for over one hour.
With renewed sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I remain,
Respectfully yours,
You Chan Yang
You Chan Yang
His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea Seoul
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea Seoul
색인어
- 이름
- J. Graham Parsons, Eisenhower, Parsons, Parsons, Acheson, Parsons, Parsons, Parsons, McConaughy, Parsons, Parsons, Parsons, Parsons, Parsons
- 지명
- Japan, Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, America, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Far Eastern areas, Japan, United States, Korea, Japan, the United States, the United States forces in Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Far Eastern countries, Japan, Far Eastern countries, Japan, Far Eastern countries, United States, Korea, the Far East, the United States, Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Pusan, Japan, Japan, OMURA camp, Pusan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, America, the United States
- 관서
- State Department, the State Department, State Department, American Army, the United States Government, the Japanese Government, U.S. forces in Japan, U.S. bases in Japan, American forces, bases in Japan, the State Department, Departments of the U.S. Government, Congress, the State Department, U.S. Government, the Japanese Government, U.S. forces in Korea, Pentagen
- 단체
- the United Nations forces, the United Nations, Democratic Party, ICRC
- 기타
- U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
