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한일회담외교문서

한일관계와 일본의 대아시아 외교정책에 대한 한국의 입장

  • 작성자
    외무부장관
  • 날짜
    1957년 9월 1일
  • 문서종류
    보고서
  • 형태사항
    영어 
KOREAN VIEW OF KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD ASIA
CONTENTS ..... Page
I. BRIEF SURVEY OF KOREA-JAPAN CONFERENCES ..... 1
II. OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ..... 9
1. Property Claims ..... 9
2. Peace Line ..... 18
3. Korean Residents in Japan ..... 29
III. KOREA-JAPAN TALKS AT THE PRESENT STAGE ..... 34
IV. KOREAN VIEW OF JAPANESE AIMS IN ASIA ..... 42
 
September 1, 1957
Prepared by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea
September 1, 1957
The Korea-Japan preliminary talks currently going on in Tokyo between officials of the Korean Mission and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs are "preliminary" in their nature. The talks do not intend to settle all the questions pending between Korea and Japan, but to make prior arrangements for resuming the overall talks which were held three times in the past but unsuccessfully ended, and at the same time, for releasing simultaneously detainees in Japan and Korea. The present talks are seeking some basic principles on most important issues on the basis of which the overall talks, if convened, should proceed. At the present stage, most stalling the talks is the discrepancy of view concerning interpretation of Article 4 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, particularly in connection with "the Statement of the U.S. Position on the Interpretation of Article 4 with Respect to the Korean-Japanese Claims Settlement", which the U.S. Goverment informally handed both Korea and Japan.
In order to understand the issues presently under debate, records of the past three Korea-Japan conferences, their outstanding problems, the preliminary talks as they now stand, and the Japanese foreign policies toward Asia are briefly surveyed in the papers attached herewith.
I. BRIEF SURVEY OF KOREA-JAPAN CONFERENCE (1951-53 )
The Republic of Korea, soon after the formation of its Government, sought to establish a good neighborly relation with Japan, forgetting unplasant past, and only tried to lay a firm foundation of friendship upon which a cordial relation could be developed in the future between the two countries. It has always been the intention of this country to forget and forgive the cruel Japanese occupation of Korea that ended in 1945. That is why we have participated in a series of three conferences with Japan during the period of 1951-53, assiduosly seeking to settle the differences between the two countries.
We hoped that a new start would be made by successful settlement of outstanding problems between the two countries. This hope, however, came completely to naught in the above-mentioned negotiations. Instead of frankly recognizing the liberation of Korea from slavery and its consequences, the Japanese Government sought, though in vain, to retain the fruits of their old domination of Korea as much as they could. From the beginning of the Korea-Japan Conference in 1951, it became crystal-clear that Japan intended to delay the settlement of outstanding problems, apparently, in the belief that as time passed the Japanese Government would be in a stronger bargaining position. Accordingly, at the conference in 1951 and 1953, Japan tried to restrict agenda to only a few of the issues, excluding the discussion of many a crucial problem.
It also became apparent that Japan's real intention was not to settle anything, but to retain the advantages and profits gained from its long occupation of Korea. The full revelation of this Japanese intention came in the third conference of October, 1953. The Japanese Chief Delegate Kanichiro Kubota declared that the "establishment of an independent state of Korea before the signing of Japanese Peace Treaty was a violation of international law," and that "Japan's occupation of Korea for 36 years was benevolent and beneficial to Korea". Japan was, in other words, laying the basis for continued hegemony over this country - all illegal, aggressive policies that neither Korea nor the Free World could ever accept.
The conference had broken down when the Japanese Delegation stood firmly on the above insulting Kubota statement and refused to make any apology or to withdraw it.
In the following pages, brief survey will be made on the Korea-Japan Conferences, the first in 1951-52, the second in 1953 and the third in 1953, in which the main agenda at issue were:
1) Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan; 2) Property Claims; and 3) Fisheries Problem; and so forth.
(i) First Conference ... October 1951 - April 1952
(a) First Half ... October 20 - November 28, 1951
The first preliminary discussions revealed wide difference of opinions about the agenda. Both sides agreed that the legal status of Korean residents in Japan required immediate settlement, but the Japanese wanted to limit the discussions to the said subject excluding all others. The Korean delegate, on the other hand, took the logical view that amicable relations between the two countries required full and frank discussion and settlement of all points at issue. The Korean delegation also believed, that, unless this were done with a mutual spirit of give-and-take, the unsettled issues would remain as fostering sores which might inevitably infect all relations between Korea and Japan. Postponement of discussion would, according to the Korean viewpoint, aggravate and make the eventual settlement of issues more difficult.
It was obvious from the beginning that the Japanese delegate, believing that Japan would be in a much more advantageous position after the Peace Treaty came into effect (in April. 1952), and Japan was again completely independent, deliberately stalled the meetings, and prevented any effective consultations. However, as the Japanese discovered that their stalling tactics were viewed with extreme disfavor by some other countries, they modified their position and showed (or at least pretended to show) a degree of sincerity. Thus, on November 28, 1951, the Japanese Delegation agreed to seek settlement in February, 1952, of problems including (1) legal status of Korean residents in Japan; (2) ship ownership; (3) property rights and claims; (4) fisheries agreement: (5) fundamental relationship. Preliminary talks were recessed on the same day to allow both Delegations to prepare for the first full session early the following year (1952).
(b) Second Half ... February 15 - April 21, 1952
The second half of the first conference was convened in Tokyo on February 15, 1952. Five committees were formed, each to make a specific study of an assigned issue. Both sides agreed to give priority to the above-mentioned five issues which were deemed to be the most important. Other problems were to be postponed for later discussion.
Unfortunately, the committees made little progress. Although the Korean delegation, acting on the instructions from its Government, was eager to reach an overall agreement which would pave the way to the normalization of relations with Japan, the Japanese delegation adopted "slow-down" tactics to delay any real progress obviously in the belief that, with the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty, Japan would be in a much more favorable bargaining position. The obstructive tactics of the Japanese delegation was clearly reflected in the proceedings of each of the committees.
As examples:
1. Committee for Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan;
The committee finished a tentative draft agreement except on a few questions. This agreement included confirmation of Korean nationality of the Koreans in Japan, granting permanent residence to the Korean residents in Japan upon their application, etc.
The Korean delegation asked that the Koreans residing in Japan since prior to the end of War be given full recognition of their vested interests and rights. In this connection, it is to be recalled that hundreds of thousands were forcibly drafted to work in Japanese war industries. The Japanese delegation, however, instead of squarely facing up the problem which so vitally affected both Korea and Japan, took refuge behind vague evasion and delay, and the committee, therefore, reached no satisfactory agreement on the problems.
2. Committee for Vessels;
The question of ship ownership had actually and already been solved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in SCAPIN No.2168 and USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No.33, which specifically directed that ships in Korean waters as of August 9, 1945 and those registered with the Korean authorities would be considered Korean vessels. Under these directives, considerable ship tonnage should have been transferred to Korea, but this was not done. The Japanese delegation merely questioned the propriety of the directives, and, constantly, adjourned the meetings on the excuse that more detailed study of the vessels affected by the directives was necessary. Then, unexpectedly, the Japanese delegation proposed that the directives be completely ignored, and that Japan would turn over to Korea fifteen commercial ships (5,610 tons), nine fishing vessels (336 tons), and five other vessels which had been loaned to the Korean Government. Needless to say, the Korean side firmly rejected this "solution", and demanded that Japan carry out the provisions of the SCAP and USAMGIK directives which were internationally binding.
3. Committee for Basic Relations;
The Korean delegation asked that a clause be incorporated in the eventual Korea-Japan treaty by which Japan would renouce the legality of the Annexation Treaty which Japan had forced Korea to accept in 1910. The Korean side felt that such an official renunciation by Japan would go far toward removing basic Korean suspicion of Japan's intentions toward Korea. The Japanese delegation, however, refused to consider renouncing the Treaty of Annexation on the suspicious ground that to do so would unnecessarily offend Japanese national feelings.
4. Committee for Fisheries Problem;
The Japanese admitted that their Government had acknowledged the principle of self-abstention in fisheries agreements concluded with the United States, Canada, and other countries, but they demanded untrammelled rights to exploit all waters adjacent to Korea without limitation, basing their demand on the principle of freedom of fisheries on the high seas beyond the three mile limit. They refused to consider the Korean viewpoint that the two nations would discover ways to ensure fisheries conservation for the mutual good both countries.
5. Committee of Property Claims;
In accordance with USAMGIK Ordinance No.33 dated December 6, 1945, all properties owned by the Japanese government and Japanese nationals (including juridical persons) in the area under the jurisdiction of USAMGIK as of or after August 9, 1945, were vested with and owned by USAMGIK and all properties in this category were transferred in full to the Korean Government by the terms of the Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement between Korea and the United States which was signed on September 11, 1948 and became effective on September 20, 1948.
The Japanese Government officially recognized and acquiesced in this disposition of the properties concerned by the signing of the Peace Treaty at San Francisco. Article 4 (b) of that treaty specifically states that Japan recognizes the legality of the disposal of the former Japanese properties in Korea by USAMGIK Ordinance. Nevertheless, to the surprise of the Korean delegation, the Japanese delegation on the committee claimed full Japanese ownership of the former Japanese properties.
These fantastic claims were obviously intended to break up the Korea-Japan Conference and were sucessful in doing so. Thus, after one hundred meetings over a period of six months, the first. Korea-Japan Conference came to an end on April 21, 1952.
(ii) Second Conference ... April 14 - July 23, 1953
The Second Korea-Japan Conference was convened in Tokyo on April 14, 1953. As in the previous conference, the conference was broken into five committees, each of which was to consider one of the following issues: (1) Fundamental Relations; (2) Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan; (3) Ship Ownership; (4) Property Claims; and (5) Fisheries Issues.
Initially, the conference appeared to make a considerable progress. The Japanese side refrained from introducing extraneous issues, and the discussions were conducted in a business-like manner. Unfortunately, on the questions of ship onwership and fisheries conservation there was no basis for agreement. Instead of discussing the ship ownership problem, the Japanese delegation deliberately delayed meetings, introduced irrelevant subjects, and generally attempted to confuse the issues.
Similarly, the committee considering the fisheries problems became hopelessly deadlocked, as the Japanese delegation insisted on the Japanese right to uncontrolled and unhampered exploitation of Korean coastal waters. The Japanese bitterly attacked the Peace Line which had been established by the Korean Government to protect Korean fishing grounds and to establish a defense line against Communist infiltration from the sea. They refused to admit that the Peace Line would be equally beneficial to both countries, or that, if observed in good faith by both sides, the possibilities of future maritime and fisheries dispute between Korea and Japan would be reduced to a minimum.
Little real progress was made, and at the request of the Japanese delegation, the Second Korea-Japan Conference was indefinitely adjourned on July 23, 1953.
(iii) Third Conference ... October 6 - October 21, 1953
The Korea-Japan Conference, which had been in adjournment for more than two months, was resumed on October 6. However, the second plenary session of the conference was barely over when the end was already in sight. At the committee meeting on the controversial property claims, Japanese Chief Delegate Kubota made the following remarks:
(1) The evacuation of the Japanese from Korea in 1945 was a violation of international law;
(2) The establishment of an independent Korean state before a Japanese peace treaty was signed was a violation of international law;
(3) Japan's property claims in Korea are inviolable.
(4) The Cairo Declaration describing the "enslavement" of the Korean people to Japan was based on wartime hysteria;
(5) Japan's occupation of Korea was beneficial to the Korean people.
The above statements were so fantastically insulting that the Korean delegation demanded that the Japanese side immediately withdraw the remarks, but the Japanese side refused to comply. Thereupon, the Korean delegation boycotted the two subsequent committee meetings, and the third plenary session of the Conference was called on October 20. After a sharp exchange of views between negotiators on the property claims issue, Korean Minister Yong Shik Kim demanded explanations from the Japanese delegate on his five point remarks, but the Japanese explanation was entirely insincere, illogical, and irrational.
The fourth plenary session was held on the following day, but the Japanese side again refused to retract the misstatement, and, consequently, the conference broke off.
II. OUTSTANDING ISSUES
1. Property Claims
(a) The So-Called Japanese Claims
The Japanese delegation, on 6 March 1952, submitted a proposal entitled "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND CLAIMS." The gist of this proposal was that Japan still retained full ownership of the former Japanese properties in Korea. The Korean delegation immediately pointed out the illegality and immorality of this claims, making it crystal-clear that, unless the Japanese had an alternate proposal, further negotiations would be fruitless. Yet there was no trace of reflection on the part of Japan. Rather, the Japanese side showed signs of attempts to delay the settlement of this issue by calling for the establishment of a permanent committee to deal with this proposal.
It is true, as the Japanese side indicated, that the key point for solving the problem on property and claims between the Republic of Korea and Japan lies in how Japan construes the spirit of the USAMGIK Ordinance No.33, which Japan recognized under the paragraph (b) of Article 4 of the Peace Treaty. The Japanese side asserted that the said Military Ordinance No.33, providing that "Properties of Japan or its nationals in Koren are vested in and owned by the U.S. Military Government in Korea" is not the provision for the acquisition of ownership for confiscation, but the one for that of the trust ownership for the custody of enemy property. However, in the above Military Ordinance, there is no such an expression as to justify this view of the Japanese side. On the contrary, the Ordinance directly provides for the acquisition of ownership by the U.S. Military Government in Korea which has never been described in usual enemy property custody acts. Accordingly, in view of the fact that all those vested properties (including the proceeds) were unconditionally transferred by the U.S. Military Government to the Government of the Republic of Korea to be used to the benefit of its nationals in accordance with the "Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States" dated September 11, 1948, the assertion of the Japanese side has no ground.
In this connection, it is worth abserving how Japanese assets outside Japan-proper were disposed of by the Allied Powers in the Peace Treaty.
First, concerning Japanese properties in the Allied countries, it is provided in Article 14 of the Peace Treaty that the authorization to finally dispose them is given to the Allied countries themselves, and the private owners were accorded, only the rights to be granted by their national laws.
Secondly, as to Japanese assets in countries which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, it is provided in Article 16 of said Treaty that no authorization to dispose of them is given to the private owners and all of them are transferred to the international Committee of the Red Cross.
Thirdly, regarding Japanese assets in the liberated country, such as the Republic of Korea, Article 4 of the said Treaty has made Japan recognize the disposition by the said Military Ordinance No.33 - the disposition by which all Japanese assets in Korea were vested in and owned by the U.S. Military Government in Korea and, thereafter, transferred to the Government of the Republic of Korea. That is to say, in Korea, the Allied Powers took the disposition by or under the said Military Ordinance No.33 as one of the dispositions to let all Japanese assets, outside Japan-proper, be non-Japanese all over the world. Accordingly, in all those dispositions, private ownership was just ignored or at least regarded lightly.
The Japanese side admits that, though the confiscation of its private properties in the Allied, neutral, and the Axis countries by their respective laws is a violation of the principle of non-confiscation of properties owned by the individuals of enemy country under international law, it was possible only through Japan's consent in accordance with the Peace Treaty. However, Japan asserts that since the confiscation of the former Japanese properties in Korea by the U.S. Military Government in Korea under or by its directive constituted a violation of the said principle of international law set forth in Article 46 of "the Hague Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare," Japan cannot recognize as valid any disposition which is inconsistent with the said principle except those dispositions done by the Occupation Forces in line with international law and customs.
Nonethless, Japan has recognized the USAMGIK Ordinance No.33 without any reservation as explicitly stipulated in Article 4, paragraph (b) of the Peace Treaty, Therefore, if the explanation of the Japanese side is that, though the confiscation of those Japanese assets outside Japan Proper by Allied Powers is a violation of the principles of non-confiscation of private property of hostile country under international law, it is only possible as Japan concurred to the disposition in Articles 14 and 16 of the said Treaty, then, even if the disposition to transfer the final ownership of the former Japanese assets in Korea to the U.S. Military Government in Korea and later to the Government of the Republic of Korea by the former in accordance with the Korea-US Agreement of September 11, 1948 constituted a violation of the principle of non-confiscation of private property, this disposition has also been legitimately granted by Japan with the same reason, as in the case of the properties in the Allied, neutral, and Axis countries, as Japan accepted the provision of Article 4, paragraph (b).
Is there any difference, in their effects, between the unconditional recognition of the above-mentioned Ordinance NO.33 and the concurrence to Articles 14 and 16 of the said Treaty? As far as a legal and objective interpretation goes, the Japan's recognition of Article 4, paragraph (b) and its concurrence to Article 14 and 16 of the said Treaty are same in their nature as well as their effect.
Furthermore, Japanese side, insisting on the Importance of the principle of non-confiscation of private ownership prescribed in Article 46 of the afore-mentioned "the Hague Regulation," and the principle of respecting private ownership as set forth in Article 17 of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," has been trying to conveniently ignore the new growth and development of an international precedent, in regard to the manner of dealing assets outside the defeated country, since the World War I and II, which authorizes the victor nation to dispose, if necessary, even those privately owned properties located outside the defeated country. This precedent is a spontaneous outcome of a higher and loftier ideal, notwithstanding the thought of respecting private property, to liquidate those unjustly acquired properties through imperialistic and colonialistic exploitation.
In the case of Korea, such a disposition was made only on the properties of Japan or its nationals in Korea, and as to the properties of Korea or its nationals in Korea or that of Japan or its nationals within Japan Proper, the thought of the said respecting private ownership was fully maintained. Therefore, the Korean side cannot help expressing its great regret for such conclusion of the Japanese side that, without understanding such a historical reality and by very hasty and easy-going interpretation to be convenient for itself, the disposition for the final acquisition of ownership under or by the Military Ordinance No.33 and the unconditional transfer of ownership to the Government of the Republic of Korea were violations of international law.
In short, all properties of Japan or its nationals in Korea on or after August 9, 1945 were vested in and owned by the U.S. Military Government in Korea on September 25, 1945, under its Ordinance No.33, recognized by Japan pursuant to the paragraph (b) of Article 4 in the Peace Treaty, and, thereafter, owned by the Government of the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States dated September 11, 1948. Accordingly, there is no property of Japan or its nationals in Korea.
As stated above, it is nothing but an action based on its vested ownership that the Government of the Republic of Korea disposed of those vested properties under its policy.
In the above, the fundamental position of the Korean side has been clarified in connection with the view of the Japanese side. However, in short, the Korean side cannot but be of such a deep impression that the Japanese side, in its elements, has not yet been aloof from the idea of the old relation of domination.
The Japanese side asserts its original rights to the properties in Korea possessed by Japan or its nationals as of August 9, 1945, and asks for the reaffirmation by the Korean side thereon. However, such an assertion may be of implication to bring forth a new economic annexation and to seek for another "slavery condition of Korea", that was clearly specified in the Cairo Declaration.
Article 4, paragraph (b) of the Peace Treaty is considered to have been provided in consideration of the political independence of the Republic of Korea, which Japan recognized in accordance with Article 2, paragraph (a), and which cannot be attained without vesting the former Japanese properties in Korea to the Republic of Korea. Therefore, a refusal to accept Article 4, paragraph (b) in its true meaning will be tantamount to denying the real independence of the Republic of Korea.
It seems, however, that few Japanese believed their absurd claims could really be satisfied. There is a well-known story that such fantastic Japanese claims were fabricated by the Japanese Foreign Office merely for the purpose of utilizing them to offset the Korean claims against Japan, and the Japanese actually did it.
(b) Korean Claims
Compared with the fantastic and absurd property claims made by Japan, those proposed by our side are too logical and reasonable. Our claims are too readily justified. The Japanese occupation of Korea was an act of violence and of greed unilaterally taken by Japanese against the will of the Korean people. The Cairo Declaration pertinently noted the state of enslavement of the Korean people and promised to establish an independent and sovereign state. The inhumanity and unjustice of the Japanese occupation was a notorious fact throughout the world. No amount of reparation can match this gross sacrifices and sufferings. Yet, Korea limited her claims against Japan to a most reasonable extent.
In accordance with the decision made at the plenary session of the first Korea-Japan Conference, a committee to deal with this issue of property right, and claims was formed. Subsequently, this committee held numerous sessions in discussion of this matter. From the beginning, the attitude of the Korean delegation was very generous and conciliatory in the light of the tremendous sacrifices and losses sustained by the Korean people during the forty years of Japanese occupation. Yet, the Japanese attitude was most absurd and irrational. They showed not a bit of repentance for their ruthless tyranny and exploitation during the occupation period.
At the first session of this committee, on 21 February 1952, Korean delegation submitted a proposal entitled "PRINCIPLES OF AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN WITH REGARD TO PROPERTY AND CLAIMS." In this proposal, Korea made the following property claims against Japan:
i) To return the classical books and documents, arts, and silver bullions taken away from Korea;
ii) to repay the obligations and debts of the Government of Japan owed to the former Government-General of Chosen as of August 9, 1945;
iii) to return the monetary accounts transferred or remitted from Korea on and/or since August 9, 1945;
iv) to return the properties in Japan of the juridical persons with head offices in Korea as of August 9, 1945;
v) to repay the national and/or public bonds and the Bank / of Japan of Japan notes, issued by the Japanese authorities, which are in possession of Korean nationals and/or juridical persons, the Japanese obligations to the conscripted Korean laborers, and other claims of Korean nationals or its juridical persons against the Government of Japan and/or its nationals;
vi) to recognize the legality of the Korean natural and/or juridical persons' ownership of the shares or other securities issued by Japanese juridical persons;
vii) to return all the interests as had been or would have been yielded by the afore-mentioned properties and/or claims; and
viii) to put into execution all these above-mentioned returns and repayments of accounts relating to obligations within six months at the latest after the conclusion of this Agreement.
Given a general consideration, Korea's claims against Japan can be divided into three broad parts.
Part 1 concerns the restitution of actual objects such as gold and silver bullions, art-works, antiques, ships, etc. Of the requests with regard to these objects, a detailed list was conveyed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers.
Part 2 concerns the fixed debts. This part has no connection with the outcome of the War because they are already fixed relations of claims and debts.
Part 3 covers the losses of manpower and materials inflicted upon Korea during the courses of the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. Japan still owes a large sum of unpaid salaries to Korean labor-draftees conscripted compulsorily by the Japanese authorities. Japan also should make indemnity pays for those who had died during the course of their conscription and should take consolation measures for the bereaved families. Of course, Korea can claim reparations for the entire losses sustained during the whole period of Japanese occupation. But in view of the fundamental spirit of Korea's claims against Japan, Korea limited her claims to the losses directly brought on by the two Wars.
This was a minimum legal claims on the part of Korea based on a spirit of reconciliation and friendliness. It is quite natural and proper for the Republic of Korea to demand reparations for the losses suffered by the Korean people under Japanese rule, such as the imprisonment and massacre of patriotic Koreans engaged in independent movements, the deprivation of the fundamental human rights of the Koreans, the compulsory collection of foodstuffs, the exploitation of labor, and so forth. Yet Korea refrained from claiming them in the belief that the fundamental spirit of our claims against Japan is not to punish her for the past grievancies, but to request a fair and reasonable restitution and compensation.
However, the Japanese side responded to this proposal with a most culpable attitude. They submitted their own proposal, making fantastic and illegal claims on their former properties in Korea. This attitude became the cause of breaking off the first Korea-Japan Conference.
2. Peace Line
(a) Vital Facts About Korean Fishery Industry
(i) Fishing in Korea is a very important industry which provides nearly 85 per cent of animal-protein for its people and occupies an essential position in Korean economy as a whole, Since Korea is surrounded by seas on three sides the East by the East Sea, the West by the Yellow Sea, and the South by the Korean Straits the national life in Korea inevitably has been closely connected with the fishing industries and dependent upon the abundant fishery resources found in its surrounding waters and in the two currents, cold and warm, running along its long coastlines. More than 700,000 Koreans are engaged in fishing, and this means that approximately two or three million Korean people are relying on fishing for their livelihood. Fishery products are not only their chief source of livelihood, but also one of the major products of Korea; and fishery products have a very vital role to play in our national economy.
(ii) Korea's fisheries were started with very simple fishing gears and methoeds. When the fishing tools were rather primitive and the fruits of scientific knowledge were not fully utilized in the fishing method, fishing in Korea was naturally limited to the coastal waters, carried on by small fishing vessels. At that time, the prevalent thought was that the aquatic resources were inexhaustible. But, with the development of scientific techniques on fishing, the fishing gears and methods were gradually placed on modern scale. Subsequently, the waters surrounding the Korean peninsular, to a considerable extent, have been used as fishing grounds by Korean fishermen.
Realizing the increasing importance of fishing industry in its economy, Korea accordingly began to take measures for the protection and conservation of aquatic resources in its adjacent waters. The Imperial Government of Korea (the lee Dynasty), as early as in 1908, promulgated the Korean Fishery Act, the first modern fishery regulations that Korea ever had.
With the so-called Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the situations became utterly different. The Japanese fishing fleets, which had already modernized their fishing gears and methods by then, swarmed into the Korean waters and engaged in indiscriminate and depredatory exploitation of the maritime resources therein. Thus, the aquatic resources in the adjacent seas of Korea were exposed to the danger of complete drain-off, and the affect of such reckless fishing by large-scale Japanese fishing boats, especially, by the trawl-equipped vessels, soon became apparent. Under these circumstances, the Japanese themselves could not but recognize the truth, and, consequently, enacted "Government-General Ordinance No.109", prohibiting trawler fishing within the 12-mile-limit from the Korean coastal lines. Even this legislation was not successful in serving the contemplated purpose due to the ever-increasing number of Japanese fishing boats. Added to the above fact, Japan, during its 40-year's occupation of Korea, monopolized fishing rights in what is properly Korean waters and, consequently stunted the development of Korean fishing industry. Only during the period of the Second World War, when Japan was preoccupied with carrying-out of their aggressive war, the fishery resources in the
Korean waters were somewhat restored.
(iii) When the liberation came in 1945, one of the most serious problems Korea faced was how to develop the fishery resources and simultaneously preserve the fisheries resources in the coastal waters of Korea, in view of the fact that unrestricted fishing activities will definitely bring forth the harmful result to the detriment of the national economy of Korea. With its inferior fishing vessels and equipments owing to the suppressive policies of Japan, there was no way to cope with such advanced and aggressive fishing fleets as Japan's. However this problem was automatically solved thanks to the occupation policies of the Allied Powers in Japan.
The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), the then reigning authority in Japan, was also cognizant of the need for regulating Japanese fishing activities and consequently issued several Directives to the Japanese Government on the matter. SCAP memoranda to the Japanese Government dated January 22, 1946; October 28, 1947; and June 30, 1949 are most noteworthy. In compliance with SCAP Directives, the Japanese Government itself enacted several laws to enforce the Directives. Namely, they announced "Essentials for regulating westward bottom dragnet fishing and trawler fishing" dated June 16, 1949 and also promulgated "Law for preventing exhaustion of marine resources" dated May 10, 1950.
The SCAP Directives set up a demarcation line in the centre of Japan Sea beyond which Japanese fishing vessels were not allowed to go out for fishing. The line which was commonly called "MacArthur Line" was designed not only to regulate Japanese fishing but to prevent possible frictions over fishery between Korea and Japan. However, Japanese fishing boats ignored the boundary-line, crossed it, came near Korean coast and recklessly exploited marine resources in adjacent seas of Korea, thus ruining the very purpose for which the demarcation line was established. It was estimated that some 2,500 Japanese fishing vessels involving 40,000 Japanese fishermen were being engaged in secretly exploiting the marine resources in Korea with the annual net fishing amount of nearly 230,000 tons. As many as 83 cases of violation of the MacArthur line were reported during the period between 1947 and 1951. They are only known cases and there are naturally many more unknown cases of violations.
In the face of these circumstances, the Republic of Korea was compelled to take minimum measures to protect its adjacent seas from Japanese fishing encroachment which was expected to become more rampant after she has regained her sovereignty.
(b) Peace Line was Necessitated
With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the subsequent restoration of sovereignty by Japan, the MacArthur Line was to be lifted. Obviously, however, the necessity for such a line remained. To net this situation, the San Francisco Treaty provided in Article 9 that "Japan will enter promptly with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas." Taking account of the fact that Korea was not, to our regret, a party to the Treaty, the Allied Powers kindly made Korea entitled to the benefits of Article 9 as well as of Articles 2, 4, and 12 by the provision of Article 21 of the Treaty.
In view of the geographical proximity of Korea and Japan and also of the special relationship between the two countries owing to the historical background of the Japanese domination of Korea, the need for the prompt conclusion of a just and practical fishery agreement was obvious, should there ever be developed friendly relations between them. Thus, Korea proposed in October 1951 to Japan to negotiate for the settlement of several outstanding problems including fishery agreement with a view to laying a firm foundation for future friendship.
Through the good offices of the SCAP, negotiations began on October 20, 1951. But, soon it became evident that Japan had no sincere desire for an early conclusion of fishery agreement. The apparent inner thought was that when Japan would have regained her sovereignty, she would assort freedom of fishery on high seas and exploit freely the fishery resources in Korean coastal waters. She would refuse or delay as long as she pleased the conclusion of fishery agreement, and if she would ever have an agreement, only on her own terms.
It was all too certain that, with the abolition of the MacArthur line, the enrush of swarming Japanese fleets thus freed would in a matter of months devour the fishery resouces in adjacent seas of Korea, which had been conserved by Korea for the past many decades. The destruction of fishery recources would not be limited to those in the so-called high seas around Korea. The naturesof fishery resources being as they are, those in Korean territorial waters would also be drained off, and in any case Korea's fishing industry which provided Korean people with nearly 85% of all animal protein would be doomed.
There had to be a measure to protect fishery resources in Korean coastal seas from uncontrolled and destructive exploitation by the Japanese and thus protect one of the vital interests of Korea. With this consideration and also to meet other important needs, which will be explained below, the Korean Government proclaimed on January 18, 1952, in accordance with well-established international precedents, the Presidential Proclamation setting forth boundary-line (which later came to be called "Peace Line") around the adjacent seas of Korea within which the Republic of Korea would have sole jurisdiction. The Proclamation, however, makes it clear that it does not interfere with the rights of free navigation on the high seas.
(c) Peace Line Justified Legally and Politically
(i) There have been some disputations as to the legality of the Peace Line under the international law and the Japanese Government has invariably been asserting that it was illegal. The alleged ground for such disputation is that fishery is free on high seas for all nations, and no nation can claim valid jurisdiction over fishery on high seas. This so-called principle of freedom of fighery on high seas had been an universal international rule in the past, when fishing gear was relatively primitive and the fishery resources were considered inexhaustible. At such time the high seas could best be left free for all to fish in and the freedom of fishing served all nations and humanity at large as a useful and valid international rule. However, the development of fishing gear and scientific knowledges on fisheries not only rendered the fishery resources of the world exhaustible but made the conservation and protection of fishery resources a common task for all nations. Under this new condition, the old freedom of fishing on high seas no longer holds, because the basic conditions that produced the principle and made it valid and useful no longer obtain.
The world is now in need of a new principle on fisheries that could meet the requirements of new condition. A general movement toward this direction is already under way, especially, on the side of smaller nations, who were in general the less-privileged or the victims under the old rule. To mention some of the examples, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Equador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Morocco, Syria, and Iceland have more or lees extended their jurisdiction by unilateral decree or legislation over high seas beyond the classical three miles limit of territorial waters for fishery purposes. The marked common trend in this movement is the claim for the recognition of special interest of the coastal states.
(ii) The Presidential Proclamation was enacted on the foundation of international precendents. It was based on the theory of conservation zone, which found its way into the international law with the remarkable development of scientific and large-scale fishing gear and method and the inevitable realization that the aquatic resources were not inexhaustible. The conservation zone, therefore, is aimed at protecting and preserving the maximum sustained productivity of living maritime resources. This principle is the expression of the growing notion that the biological measure should precede the legal rights, and that the so-called freedom of the high seas is not merely a natural privilege but carries with it the international responsibility to protect the productivity of the living resources therein.
Thus, the need for the regulation of fishing on the high seas has gradually developed which resulted in the conclusion of several international conventions. Seas are no longer beyond effective control. They have been controlled and utilized by maritime powers mainly to their own interests. Apart from the freedom of navigation, the principle of freedom of fishing on high seas, it can be said, has served only major maritime powers. The sharp discrepancies between the facts and rule and the inequity of the rule resulted in a legitimate and forceful movement by a number of nations toward the formulation of a new rule which found its expression in numerous unilateral acts and proclamations on the subject.
Many nations including the United States have taken measures to place a large part of northern Pacific under its jurisdiction for the conservation of marine resources. President Truman issued two Proclamations under the date of September 28,1945, one of which was with respect to the coastal fisheries. The Proclamation calls attention to "the inadequacy of present arrangements for the protection of perpetuation of the fishery resources" contiguous to the coasts of the United States and to need of "improving the jurisdic tional basis for conservation measures and international cooperation in this field." In consequence, the Proclamation provides that "the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States." It says, however, that "the character as high seas of the areas in which such conservation zones are established and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way tons affected. Prodded by this action, a large number of nations, out-numbering 40, has since followed suit.
(iii) The International Law Commission, which had been studying the status of high seas for many years, with Mr. J.P.A. Francois, a prominent Dutch scholar as special rapporteur, adopted at its eight session in April 1956, the Draft Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, in which the special interests of the coastal state in the preservation of marine resources in its adjacent waters were explicity recognized. The most noteworthy provision is the stipulations of Article 55 in which unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial seas were granted to the coastal state.
Another international conference to be reckoned with in this respect is the Rome Fishery Conference held in April, 1955, persuant to the resolution by UN General Assembly at its 512th session. The main purpose of this Conference was to draw up recommendations regarding the technical fields on fishery to be submitted to the UN International Law Commission for its reference and utilization. At this meeting, the proposal for the "special right of the coastal State for the preservation of marine resources" was adopted by a vote of 18-17, thus paving the way for further extension of the special interests of the coastal state.
Admittedly, the new principle of the special interest of coastal states and their jurisdiction of fishery is not a steadfast universal international rule yet. For that matter, neither is the freedom of fishery a universal international rule any longer. This is a transition period from an old and passing rule to a new and fast-forming rule. But, for the Peace Line in its fishery aspect well established precedents are already there. For all candidness, therefore, it must be admitted that the Peace Line is "legal" in the fullest possible sense of the ward in such a transition period of international law as now.
In considering the technical matters involved, the Japanese delegation at the above-mentioned Conference presented a grossly-distorted picture of the life history and oecology of the stocks of fish captured in the coastal areas of Japan in order to unjustly claim that some stocks of fish are the one or same species with those captured in the Korean waters. It was, however, completely refuted by the Korean delegation with undisputable scientific evidence based on the research conducted by the competent authorities of Korea.
(iv) Added to the legal vindication mentioned above, political and practical considerations further justify the Peace Line fully and beyond any dispute. As emphasized in above, the Peace Line is purported to be and actually is a measure for maintenance of peace between Korea and Japan. It is a unique historical and political product of Korea-Japan relations. There is no parallel of it anywhere in the world and no rigid application of any general rule as such can fit into this unique case without seriously compromising justice and peace.
For instance, one of the conditions that necessitated the Peace Line was the poor development of Korean fishing industry, and for this Japan was responsible in a large measure. A concrete and down-to-earth Justice dictates the cognizance of all such facts. A consensus in the Rome Fishery Conference was that there was no uniformrule for the solution of fishery problems everywhere, but special problems could best be solved by special rules, No other place than here can be thought of where this better applies.
(d) Multiple Purposes of the Peace Line
The above covers one aspect of the multiple purposes of the Peace Line, i.e., the fishery conservation and the protection of Korean fishing industry. There are, however, involved far more important purposes or issues than fishery matters, namely, the peace between Korea and Japan and the survival of Korea as an independent nation. Suppose there is no measure for regulation of fishery, agreed or unilateral, to fill the vacuum produced by the lifting of MacArthur Line. As envisaged above, Japanese fishing fleets would swarm into Korean coastal seas, intermingle with and over-whelm inferior Korean fisheries. Under such circumstances fishermen of the two nations would inevitably clash each other, causing numerous tragic incidents and producing bitter animosity between the two nations. Coupled with the historical background, such a development of affairs would unmistakably nip in the bud of any possibility of future friendship between the two nations.
Therefore, the only way to future friendship is to effectively forestall such development of events. In the face of the lack of cooperation on the part of Japan, there was no other choice for Korea than to establish the Peace Line to ensure peace and to keep the way to the friendship open. And in the establishment of the Peace Line due regard for equity and fairness was assured by drawing the Line to run midway between the two countries.
Another purpose to be served by the Peace Line is the sea defense of Korea against aggression. This need for a defense line around Korea was belatedly recognized in 1953 by General Mark W. Clark, United Nations Commander, when he proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone, covering largely the same area encompassed by the Peace Line. It is a generally recognized rule that a state or a belligerent may establish a sea defense zone in wartime.
The Sea Defense Zone, however, was lifted shortly after signing of the Armistice. From whatever consideration the United Nations Command may have abolished the sea defense zone, for Korea the need for such a zone continues and Korea is still, technically as well as practically, at war with the Communists after the Armistice. Korea has to guard against Communist aggression, overt or covert, infiltration, subversion and fostering of economic disturbance by means of smuggling or otherwise. The Government has to see to it that the security of the nation is guaranteed. The recent international situation in this area is all the more calling for a sea defense zone like the Peace Line for Korea, owing sepecially to the recent opportunist attitude of Japan towards the Communist nations and of Japan's serving as a way-station for Communist infiltration into Korea.
(e) Change of Japanese Attitude is Essential
It is most pertinent to point out the significant contrast between the Japanese attitude toward Korea and that toward other powers on fishery problems or others. Japan has two working international laws on fishery, namely, abstention principle for stronger powers and freedom of high seas for smaller nations.
She applied the former law for the United States and Canada in 1951 and for Red China in 1955. In latter case it is said that the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement was signed for Japan by a civilian gruop under the acquiescence of the Government. In whatever sophisticated form it may be, the substance remains that Japan agreed to abstain from fishing or not to fish - now, does the former expression practically differ from the latter?
But, as against Korea, Japan is adamant in holding the old principle and assurmes an aggressive attitude. Japanese Government not only refuses to recognize the Peace Line but also actively encourages its people to violate it. Japanese officials even avow that the Peace Line problem can be settled along with the growing of Japanese armed strength. This is certainly not the attitude of a good neighbour seeking friendly relations.
3. Korean Residents in Japan
The plight of more than 600,000 Koreans residing in Japan under the unfair and prejudiced treatment of the postwar Japanese regime is one of the tragic problems.
During forty years of Japanese domination of Korea, many Koreans, deprived of their right of employment in the home-land, were driven to go to Japan or Manchuria as laborers to work in Japanese industries. Such a movement was given added impetus by Japan's labor requirements during World War II. In addition, many Koreans who had forcibly been drafted into the Japanese Armed Forces were stationed in Japan. Taking into account of the causes of Koreans migration to Japan, those Koreans in Japan should be given special consideration in treatment by the Japanese.
This issue, which so vitally affected both Korea and Japan, had become a motive to initiate Korea-Japan conference, and a series of talks were held to settle the legal status of them and to improve their treatment.
The Koreans delegation requested that the Koreans residing in Japan since before August 9, 1945 be given full recognition of vested interests and rights and that national treatment being accorded to them shall not be withdrawn except for franchise.
The Japanese Government, however, was not cooperative with Korea and, instead of showing any sincerity to the Korean demand which accords to the principle of justice and equity, detained, in the substandard camp, hundreds of legal Korean residents without charges or due process of law and tried to deport them unilaterally insisting that deportation is a matter within the jurisdiction of domestic law. This assertion clearly run counter to the agreement reached between the two countries that described no deportation pending the consent of the both parties.
There is no doubt that this situation is lamentable from the humanitarian point of view, as well as from the view point of improving Korea-Japan relations.
Japan has also sought to make deceptive propaganda capital about the treatment of Japanese fisherman held at Pusan. These assertions are disproved by the record. The death rate at Omura has been many times higher than that at Pusan -- and the Korean Government has followed a policy of returning to Japan those who are i11 or infirm. Omura detainees, on the other hand, have not been released, and there are authenticated cases of extreme harshness on the part of Japanese guards of treatment that is reminiscent of that in the infamous Japanese "death camps" of the World War II period. The International Red Cross inspected both Pusan and Omura, and reported conditions at the Korean camp acceptable, while saying those at the Japanese camp were deplorable and a disgrace to a supposedly civilized country.
Korea has consistently .ought an equitable settlement of the detainee issue on a basis of humanitarianism toward both Japanese and Koreans. The negotiation for this purpose was all but successful in November 1955 when the Korean Minister Yong Shik Kim in Tokyo and Japanese Justice Minister Hanamura agreed on the settlement of the question. The terms of the agreement were:
(a) Japan shall release all of the Korean detainees at detention camps in Japan who entered Japan before August 1945; and instead,
(b) Korea shall return to Japan those Japanese fishermen who completed their prison terms and also accept the deportation of Koreans who entered Japan illegally after August 1945.
But this agreement could not be materialized because of the Japanese Government's treacherous disavowal of the agreements itself. It was reported that the Japanese Foreign Ministry was opposed to the agreement. The issue, therefore, had to remain deadlocked untill April 2 when another agreement was made between Minister Kim and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. The terms of the agreement were substantially same as the former agreement, viz:
(a) The Korean Government shall release Japanese fishermen who completed their prison terms;
(b) The Korean Government will accept the deportation of illegal Korean entrants after the World War II;
(c) The Japanese Government shall release all Korean detainees who entered Japan before the end of the World War II; Whether they will remain in Japan or be repatriated to Korea will be decided by their own will; and
(d) Arrangements for the implementation of this agreement will be further made at a working-committee consisting of represontatives of the two Governments.
Pursuant to the above agreement, a Working Committee was composed, and negotiations started. But, Japan again demonstrated its proclivity for breaking promises. Completely ignoring the Kim-Shigemitsu agreement, a representative of the Japanese Justice Ministry demanded that either all of those releasees be sent back to Korea or Korea should agree to accept any releasees, subsequently committing crimes, and, consequently, the negotiations broke off. How can one trust the Government that can not carry out the agreement reached by the Foreign Minister on the plea of the objection by other Ministry?
This Japanese policy of duplicity and betrayal culminated in the deportation of 20 Korean resident in Japan to north Korea. With the Japanese attempt to repatriate a large number of the Korean residents to the Republic of Korea completely shattered, the Japanese Government in turn maneuvered to send 48 Korean nationals to north Korea under the dubious pretext that they demanded to be repatriated to north Korea. Taking advantage of this alleged demand, the Japanese Government, through its Red Cross Society, made strenuous efforts to provide those Koreans with travel documents by the International Red Cross, and, subsequently, maintained close contacts with north Korean Red Cross Chapter. Upon finding this hideous plot, the Korean Government lodged strong protests with the Japanese Government against taking such an illegal and immoral action.
There can be no doubt as to the obvious fact that those Koreans, regardless of their political affiliations, are unequivocally nationals of the Republic of Korea, and they are not displaced persona who are in need of humanitarian aid of Red Cross, but they have long been settled in Japan as permanent legal residents since before the end of the World War II. It was also pointed out that the deportation of the Korean residents in Japan to north Korea would only promote political causes of the Korean Communists in the north and of Japan's. It was clearly represented, therefore, that any act of the Japanese Government to send the Koreans in Japan to north Korea will be tantamount to a most unfriendly act toward Korea. Furthermore, this issue had been a hard core of controversy pending settlement by negotiations between Korea and Japan. Any unilateral action taken regarding this matter is in violation of international law and justice.
Yet all those protests were of no avail. They were utterly ignored by Japan. While the Japanese Government studiously refrained from discussing this matter with Korea, it tried unsuccessfully to obtain transportation facilities from British shipping companies for this illegal and immoral voyage. In desperate efforts, it even attempted to use Soviet vessels. To block this hideous international intrigue, the Korean National Red Cross also filed vigorous protests with the international Committee of Red Cross to the effect that interference on the part of the ICRC in this deportation issue is an infringement on the sovereign rights of the Republic of Korea and, contrary to its assertions, constitutes a crime against humanity. The ICRC, in every respect, is not a competent body to deal with this matter. At the result of these vigorous efforts, the plot looked stalled for a while.
The Japanese, however, were not hampered by Korea's manifest protest. Japan finally sent 20 out of the disputed 48 Koreans in Japan to north Korea aboard a Norwegian freighter vessel (named Hai Lee) via Shanghai on December 6, 1956. They were provided with exit visas issued by the Japanese Government. It can hardly be believable for a country professing, in appearance at least, the desire to establish a normal relation with the neighbor to do purposefully the very thing that the neighbor is most strongly opposed to. In every implication, such a development of affairs poses a serious question. It is not to be considered a controversy involving only these Koreans in
question. There is ample reason to fear that Japan might proceed with the plot to dump the bulk of the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan to the north Korean communists.
With these repeated illegal actions on the part of Japan, one can not but doubt the sincerity of the Japanese Government.
III. KOREA-JAPAN TALKS AT THE PRESENT STABE
Korea's efforts to resume the Korea-Japan Conference was renewed in the spring of 1957. But in the view of the Korean Government at that time, the repetitious way of opening formal conference had little chance of adjusting difference of opinions on the various outstanding problems, and it was indispensable to previously outline some fundamental principles on which the two Governments would proceed at the formal conference table. Such Korean position being agreed on by the Japanese side, the representatives of the two Governments met again in informal way to prepare themselves for the resumption of formal Korea-Japan conference, and to effect the mutual release of Korean detainees in Japanese Detention Camps and Japanese fishermen in Pusan, which would certainly create good atmosphere for the resumption of the formal talks. (The talks were, therefore, called the Korea-Japan Preliminary Talks.)
Throughout the preliminary talks held during 17 months up to the present, the prime objective for the Japanese side has been to repatriate their fishermen who served out their sentences on charges of violation of the Korean law for Conservation of Fishery Resources and have been under detention in Pusan Aliens Camp.
The Japanese original assertion was that the release of detainees was a prerequisite to any further talks between the two countries on pending issues. As for the resumption of the formal conference, they did not show an adequate sincerity though they had no objection to the resumption of the formal conference itself if it enabled them to repatriate Japanese fishermen.
On the contrary, the Korean side considered it necessary to resume without delay the formal conference and prior to such resumption of the conference, to seek an agreement on some fundamental principles on which, the conference, if reopened, would smoothly proceed, so that it might not come again to deadlock as the previous three sessions did so. In the view of the Korean side, the mutual release of the detainees was, of course, an important problem to be settled urgently, but it was to ba effected simultaneously with the resumption of the formal conference, considaring that the detainee issue would never have happened if the basic issues pending between the two countries has been settled. In this atmosphere, the so-called Kim-Nakagawa preliminary talks spent almost one year without reaching any important agreement.
After appointment of Ambassador Yu Taik Kim as new chief of the Korean Mission in Japan on May 16, 1957, the Republic of Korea renewed its efforts to conclude the procrastinated preliminary talks. Since May 16, 1957, the preliminary talks held seventeen sessions at the administrative level as of August 31, 1957. The main problems discussed in those sessions were as follows:
1. The problem on withdrawal of the so-called Kuboda statement and of Japanese claims to property in Korea;
2. The problem on measures to be taken in releasing Korean detainees in Japan and Japanese fishermen in Korea, and related matters;
3. Agenda for the formal conference to be resumed, and some principles on which the formal conference, if convened, should proceed, particularly in connection with the "Statement of U.S. Position on Interpretation of Article 4 of the Japanese Peace Treaty With Respect to the Korean-Japanese Claims Settlement";
4. The problem of returning Korean art objects, the immediate transfer of which is possible.
Aside from the wording question, it may be said that difference of opinions, which were the subject for discussion for long duration of the present preliminary negotiation, were almost adjusted. One of the most important points which are left unsettled is on the problem of Korea-Japan property claims, particularly in connection with the U.S. Memorandum.
The Japanese side agrees to withdraw the claims to their former property in Korea made by the Japanese Delegation at the Korea-Japan Talks on March 6, 1952, but only on the basis of the so-called U.S. Memorandum, because they probably believe that if the U.S. Memorandum is unconditionally accepted by both sides, they can have a ground for argument that a part of Korean claims against Japan is extinguished. There is some ambiguous wording in the U.S. Memorandum which may lead to a distorted interpretation of the U.S. Memorandum and, accordingly, on the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As a result of long and painstaking negotiation, the Japanese side agreed to insert into the document concerned such words "... the Japanese side has no objection to discussing for settlement such Korean claims with sincerity" or "... the said U.S. Statement does not signify the reciprocal renunciation of the property claims." But in the Korean view, these vague commitments are inadequate if the settlement of Korean claims against Japan is to be made on a reasonable basis. The Korean side, therefore, proposed to add to the draft document the words "... and the U.S. Memorandum does not affect Korean claims in any way." The Korean proposal means that the Korean side has no objection to accepting the so-called U.S. Memorandum if it is not interpreted as affecting in any way the Korean claims against Japan. On the contrary, the Japanese side pressed the Korean side to accept the U.S. Memorandum unconditionally without any clarification of the meaning set forth in the said Memorandum. The Japanese side even declined to comment on the degree in which the U.S. Memorandum may affect the Korean claims against Japan. In the view of the Korean side, the part of the U.S. Memorandum which states that Japan has no claims against Korea is not new solution and nothing but confirmation of what have been already settled, because Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is self-explanatory to recognize that Japan has no claims against Korea.
The U.S. Government is, however, of the view that the disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Korea is relevant to the Korean claims against Japan, which shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Republic of Korea and Japan. In other words, the argument that the Korean claims against
Japan are entirely separate matter from the alleged Japanese claims against Korea is not in line with the U.S. interpretation of
Article 4 of the Treaty. In this regard, though it is clear that the subject of special arrangements between Korea and Japan, according to paragraph (a) of Article 4, shall be (1) on the
dispisition of property of Japan and its nationals in Korea and (2) on the disposition in Japan of property of Korea and Korean
residents and of claims, including debts, of Korea and Korean
residents, it is to be noted that this paragraph is subject to paragraph (b) of the same Article which is intended to signify that the question of disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Korea was settled once and for all. It is, therefore, induced that the special arrangements in paragraph (a) of the same Article virtually provides for nothing but the problem of Korean claims against Japan. It may be said that the question of "the disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Korea" may have been inserted into the paragraph in question not because such disposition of property was supposed to be actually the subject for special arrangements between the two parties but because the provision in question referring to the question of claims between the defeated nation and the authorities of her lost territory, was to take such form from theoretical viewpoint. In other words, Article 4(a) serves not to refer to substantial effect of the wording but to explain merely that there may be, as in other Peace Treaties, two categories of property claims, that is, (1) Korean claims against Japan and (2) Japanese claims against Korea. Thus, there is no reason why these two claims should be considered in the same light.
It is also noted that there is nothing whatsoever in the same paragraph which even vaguely stipulates cohesion between the disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals, on one hand, and the disposition of Korean property and claims against Japan, on the other hand. Furthermore, no provision exists throughout the Japanese Peace Treaty which may enable us to reason that paragraph (a) of the Article in question is in any way related to paragraph (b) of the same Article. Accordingly, the Korean claim against Japan is the matter entirely separated from the disposition of the former Japanese property in Korea.
The U.S. Government revealed its unpreparedness and ambiguous notion on this question when it stated in the so-called U.S. Memorandum that "When it came to Korean claims against Japan and Japanese nationals, the drafters of the Peace Treaty did not consider that they had before them either sufficient facts or sufficient analysis of applicable legal theories to lay down a solution in the Treaty, ..." Despite of this, however, they abruptly jumped upon a hasty conclusion misinterpreting and surpassing the original real meaning of the said Treaty provision, in saying that "although it was obvious that such claims had already been met to some degree by the vesting of Japanese-owned property in Korea."
As we understand, Japanese claims against Korea amount virtually 85% of total property of Korea. If we are to take into consideration of this sort of Japanese claims, the other would be no substance which Korean claims against Japan bring to Korea.
As the above referred facts reflects the basic stand of Japan toward Korea, Japan has deliberately been delaying to settle the problems at issue. Japan, however, has made a great pretense of desire to establish normal and friendly relations with Korea. But this is the side of the coin shown in propaganda addressed to the world. For Korea there is only insincerity, duplicity, outright betrayal, and the never-ceasing attempt to place all the blame upon the Korean side. Some instances of this record have been cited in connection with the property claims, fisheries problems, and the detainee issue. But many other cases can be submitted in evidence, too. Another area of Japanese distortion is that of trade. Korea has bought heavily from Japan during post-war years, and the Japanese Government has talked much of trade promotion and the advantages to be gained by both countries. But at the very same time the Japanese Government has been refusing customs clearance of a considerable quantity of edible seaweed of Korean origin.
This refusal to accept laver imports which previously were agreed upon between the two countries has caused severe loss to Korean traders and has virtually ruined the laver industry, which is highly important to the Korean economy. The reasons are entirely political, since Japan is far from self-sufficient in laver and since the end-effect actually has been to force the market price so high that many Japanese families cannot buy their favored foodstuff. What Japan apparently wants is one-way, colonial type trade with Korea, while reserving two-way trade for Red China, which has been branded as an aggressor by the United Nations and whose war-making potentiality will be greatly increased by the availability of Japanese goods of strategic importance.
Korea cannot help continuing to doubt that Japan has the slightest intention of showing the sincerity necessary to establish normal and friendly relations with this country. However, being afraid of international reproach for its unchanged attitude, Japan frequently propagates to conceal its own insincerity that Korea has not been active for an early settlement. Nothing can bo farther from the truth than this. There is nothing that Korea can do to improve relations with Japan unless the Japanese change their basic policy toward Korea. If there are to be developments for the resuming of negotiations, it is entirely up to Japan
(V) THE KOREAN VIEW ON JAPANESE AIMS IN ASIA
1. Japan's Asian Diplomacy: It's True Nature
Japan pretends to be a peace-loving nation. It claims to repent of its past history as an imperialistic and colonialistic power; it is also supposed to be democratic.
According to its own claims, Japan has been making every possible effort for the maintenance of international peace and security since it regained independence in 1952. These efforts are allegedly in conformity with the so-called "no-War constitution" and the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
Under the pretext that it wishes to contribute to the mitigation of tensions created by the struggle between the Free World and the Communist block, Japan now declares that the basic principle of its foreign policy is to be cooperative with the United States and other demoratic nations, and at the same time to have political, economic, and cultural ties with Soviet Russia and its satellites. The real aim of the Japanese, however, is to amass profit and power by playing off the Democracies and the Communists against one another. Thus far, this policy has been all too successful.
In the area of Asian diplomacy, Japan propagandizes a line that "Asia must be for Asians," and that this can be achieved only through the friendly cooperation of Asian peoples -- a cooperation based on mutual understanding and dependence. Yet even while making this pretense, Japan advocates Asian economic development through the trinity of capital from the United States, the natural resources of Asia, and the techniques and control of Japan. Such a plan is nothing more than the old Asian co-prosperity spher under a new name, and is designed to give Japan economic dominance in the Far East.
Japan already has used others to attain the highest standard of living in Asia. It capitalized upon the Korean war to rebuild its industry at the expense of the United States. Yet in the war itself, the Japanese contributed precisely nothing to defeat Communism. Additionally, much of the early aid money appropriated for Korea was spent in Japan and further contributed to the growth of Japanese industry. Other funds have come from the billions of dollars spent by the U.S. military establishment in Japan, and through local procurement for those forces. Having attained such a standard of living as a virtual gift from America, the Japanese want to keep and even enhance it by monopolizing the vast economic and industrial potential of the Asian area. Japan has not forgotten its old ambition to exploit the underdeveloped countries of this part of the world -- not for the sake of those countries, but for the enrichment of Japan.
Japan already has a large share of the Asian market. In 1956 its Asian exports totaled $1022 millions, or 40.8 per cent of the Japanese total for the year. But for the Japanese this is not enough. They want to do all the manufacturing for this part of the world, and to relegate other nations and peoples to the role of food and raw-materials suppliers. That is what the Japanese mean by "cooperation among Asians."
Japan also gives too many signs of seeking political hegemony over other Asians. Industrial dominance is only the first step. Already Japan talks of itself as the spokesman for Asia, and it has joined the Afro-Asian group with the idea of furthering this ambition, not of contributing to the solidarity of the Free World or the development of democracy. The final goal may well be the creation of a new Japanese colonial empire.
Never since its debut in international society has Japan shown any sincerity in its relations with other countries. The people of Korea learned this through the Treaty of Protectorate in 1905, the Treaty of Annexation of 1910, and a harsh occupation that lasted for four decades. The people of China learned in the bitter, costly fighting of 1932-45. And Asian peoples all the way to India learned it in the terrible days of 1941-45, when Japan made its bid for an empire of all the Far Eastern peoples -- with Japanese in the role of neo-Romans. Is this still what Japan wants in Asia?
2. What Japan Really Seeks in Asia
To the Japanese Foreign Office, so-called "Asian diplomacy" has come to mean "economic penetration," especially in Southeast Asia. This has become the dominant goal of Nobusuke Kishi's policies. Ever since his appointment as Foreign Minister, the business leader Aiichiro Fujiyama has been concentrating on this objective -- capitalizing upon knowledge gained and contacts created while touring Southeast Asian countries before his assumption of office. Kishi himself is planning still another trip to that area. The first intention of Kishi and Fujiyama is to set up an Asian Economic Development Fund, with Technical Cooperation centers in Japan. Kishi attempted to sell this plan to the United States on his recent trip, apparently with only moderate success. But he has not given up, and Fujiyama will pursue the campaign when he goes to Washington this fall. Kishi also will try to enlist the active support of Southeast Asia when he visits six more of that area's countries. Additionally, he has the task of lulling Asian suspicions of Japan, which were strongly and openly voiced the moment the plans for Japanese economic penetration were made public.
Japan has been desperately trying to make economic colonialism appear attractive. It has argued that the Colombo plan provides only technical assistance, and that this is inadequate for the economic development of so rich and vast an area. It has further said that U.S. foreign aid is accompanied by too many conditions, and that loans of the World Bank are too strict and bear interest rates that are too high, The answer, the Japanese therefore say, is development under Japan's direction -- with plenty of American dollars, Japanese techniques, no strings, and no strict conditions. Nothing is said of what will hapen when all of Asia is economically dependent upon Japan.
Thus far other Asians are not being deceived by this propaganda. The strings of the Japanese plan cannot be concealed by saying they are not there. The purchase of Japanese machinery, for example, would make participating countries dependent upon Japanese replacements, Japanese parts, and Japanese know-how. Other control and restrictive measures also are contemplated but not publicized by Japan. With the technical cooperation centers in Japan, the participating countries would be compelled to purchase Japanese equipment. After that, the resulting enterprises would be at the mercy of Japan, just as were the incomplete industries of Japanese-colonized area during the early part of this century.
In the problems of reparations with Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, et al., Japan is contriving to lead these reparations agreements or negotiations to a favorable turn with a view to exploiting them as a stepping stone for economic penetration into those countries. As is clearly shown in the case of the Philippines, Japan, instead of making decent reparations from conscience, insisted upon such conditions as would lead the recipient country to depend on Japanese industries. The Philippines-Japan Reparations Agreement, which was signed at last in Manila on May 9, 1956 after a long haggling, provides that of the total sum of $550,000,000, $500 million will be paid in Japanese industrial products and the remaining $50 million, in the form of services, both technical and processing. Such a flow of Japanese goods into the Philippines will in the long run prove as an omen for the expansion of markets for Japanese products in the whole area of the Philippines.
In the case of Indonesia, the situation is all the more same. Though the total sum involved is quite small compared with the exorbitant sacrifices incurred by the Indonesian people, the Japanese are obstinately reluctant, or at least hesitant, to make due ▣...▣ to this victimised country under various pretexts. This attitude clearly indicates the real intention of Japan in reparations problem to conclude it only on the condition that it is palatable to Japan's economic expansion, Even those who stand on the side of quick settlement of the reparations problem with Indonesia are based on the line of reasoning that the sooner the pending issue can be settled and normal relations are resumed with Indonesia, the greater will be the chances of expanding trade and that the furnishing of industrial facilities and equipment, even though not remunerative per se, would in the end help in the development of Japan's overseas markets for heavy industrial items.
As previously pointed out, the most part of the reparations sum is paid in the form of Japanese industrial products in installment payment system. In this connection, Japan refuses to deliver capital goods at the choice of the recipients but of Japan itself. Japan also furnishes the recipient countries with service goods as a part of reparations settlement; it is of course not the intention of Japan to help the recipients but to solve under-employment problem now prevailing in Japan by sending thousands of jobless technicians to those countries. The Japanese openly avow that the most desirable thing for Japan is to have the development of Southeast Asian countries directly related with Japan's progress and pattern
Thus, Japan seeks to hasten its industrial development at the cost of the recipient countries by forcing them to accept whatsoever Japan may offer and takes various measures to curb the normal economic development of the recipients by depriving them of the opportunity to develop their own industries capable to produce the same items as those coming from Japan. This will certainly result in making the recipients dependent upon the supply of Japanese capital goods and techniques.
Japan itself has also admitted that the purpose does not stem from conscience, but from the desire for economic penetration. Fortunately, especially in the cases of the Philippines, the peoples and countries of Southeast Asia see through the flimsy pretexts of the Japanese. As the Philippines Ambassador to Tokyo had said, there is as yet no evidence that Japan is to be trusted.
Another matter to be reckoned with is the possibility of coordinating the reparation payments with the so-called joint United States-Japan program for Southeast Asia development.
Those ominous series of affairs, marking Japan's resurgence as a powe ful industrial power, invite utmost caution since there is the great possibility of the economic interests of Southeast Asia being imperilled or set back be having those countries in the area placed in a francly subordinate position to Japan. It would be most dangerous, therefore, on the part of the Southeast Asian countries to weaken and yield, enabling Japan to gain by peaceful means such objectives as she failed to get by force of armes in the last war.
3. American Assistance to Japan
It presum a bly is to check Communist expansion that the United States has encouraged, knowingly or unknowingly, the plans of Japan for Asian domination. The United States apparently has failed to realize the dangerous implications of a policy that will strengthen Japan and create the possibility that the Japanese may join forces with the Communists in dividing Asian power.
Especially since the summer of 1950, fundamental U.S. policy toward Japan has been predicated upon the dangerous premise that a militarily and economically strong Japan would serve as a powerful deterrent to Communist aggression. American has strengthened Japan's military power in substantial degree, and has stabilized the Japanese economy with the idea that Japan would become the arsenal of Asia. A plan now under consideration would permit Japan to buy modern arms from the United States for yen currency, which then would be spent for Japanese-manufactured weapons to be given other Asian countries under the U.S. defense assistance program. Japan already has an industrial head-start on the rest of Asia, and such American aid inevitably will widen the gap and make Japanese industrial dominance inevitable.
Unfortunately, this miscalculated policy has been aided and abetted by a small group of influential Americans. These friends of Japan have forgotten the past, and have risked both U.S. security and the future of free, democratic Asia. They have closed their eyes to the aggressiveness, the militarism, and the pro-communist tendencies of present-day Japan. Those who look at Asia realistically see striking parallels between this situation and that which obtained in the years that preceded Pearl Harbor. American security calls for equality in Asian strength, not for the encouragement of one dominant power. Furthermore, it calls for emphasis on help to those nations that are dedicated to the principles of democracy, and Japan has given few signs of such dedication.
Pro-Japanese Americans received a rude setback in the first reaction to their scheme to get 500 million dollars for Japan as the first installment on the Southeast Asia exploitation plan. No sooner had the proposal been leaked out in Washington than Free Asians voiced the strongest opposition to the acceptance of Japan as the controlling nation in such a development. Advocates of the plan are temprarily silenced, but this does not mean that the Japanese are not still determined to carry it through. So also with the Japanese weapons plan Asia must continue to be on the alert for renewed attempts to make Japan dominant in this part of the world.
This conspiracy to raise Japan to a position of principal Asian leadership has a long history. Open advocacy of it came in February of 1956, when in the so-called Johnston Report, the former Chairman of the U.S. International Development Advisory Board, which is attached to the Office of the President, called for American backing of Japan as the economic czar or Asia. Addressing the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, he recommended the establishment of an international public corporation for Southeast Asian economic development. Capitalized at more than one billion dollars, the corporation would make loans of 20 to 50 years' duration. Half of the fund would come from the U.S. Government and private American investors, the other half from Asian countries. But Japan would play the leading role and would attain the economic control.
There are other sound reasons to believe that Japan is not to be trusted in such a position. Japanese ties with Communism are stronger, not weaker. The Communist Party is legal in Japan and is growing. The Socialists openly advocate cooperation with Communism and the expulsion of U.S. influence. Japan has recognized the Soviet Union, and is developing trade, cultural, and governmental relations with Red China. The CHINCOM embargo has been repudiated by the Japanese, who already are shipping strategic goods to the mortal enemy of Free Asia, Japan also stoops to trade with Communist north Korea and north Vietnam. How can the United States trust a country that practices anti-Americanism at the same time it encourages pro-Communism?
Also illustrating Japan's aggressive intentions is the Ryukyus question. These islands were independent and civilized long before the Japanese came to their shores for purposes of colonialism and exploitation. The United States assumed trusteeship at the end of World War II, and General Douglas MacArthur implied that the islands would be groomed for a resumption of full sovereignty -- much as was the case with the Philippines. Subsequently, the United States made Okinawa into one of its most important Far Eastern bases.
Since 1945, the Ryukyus have fostered a strong independence movement, and this has received the sympathetic attention of other Asian countries, which hoped that the United States would encourage and stimulate it. Notwithstanding the Japan has continued to agitate for a return of the Ryukyus to Japanese colonial status. It has asked for administration control, to begin with, and pro-Japanese interests in America have been successful in persuading the United States to admit Japan's dubious "▣...▣ sovereignty" over the islands. Actually, the Ryukyus never belonged to Japan any more than Korea did, It must now be the tast of Free Asia to convince the United States of this, and to prevent the carrying through the plot to sacrifice the Ryukyus is right of self-determination.
Japan wants the islands only for their military value and for purposes of economic exploitation.
4. Desirable System of Asian Collective Security
Too many American policies toward Asia are based upon the fundamental fallacy that Japan is destined to be the strongest and most progressive of Far Eastern nations. If this attitude is perpetuated, Asian division and conflict is inevitable. In order to guard against Japanese dominance economically, politically, and militarily, it is incumbent upon the other Free Asian nations, which already have been victimized by Japan's ambitions, to get together in a common effort to correct the assumptions of the United States and to formulate a workable plan of collective security. This plan must be strongly opposed to militarism and colonialism. It must be based upon equality in all things, and it must assure that no one Asian nation ever will become strong enough to dominate the others. Whether aggression comes from Communism or from Japanese militarism will sake not the slightest difference to those who are enslaved.
Collective security has not been extensively developed in this part of the world. Europe has the integrated system of NATO, but Asia has only such bilateral defense agreements as those between the United States and Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines --- plus a triple alliance, ANZUS, and a multiple but weak alliance, SEATO. Above all, there is no system for preventing the rise of renewed Japanese imperialism.
Asian collective security systems are not tied in with each other; the only common ingredient is the United States. SEATO, which includes the Philippines and Thailand, excludes the strongest free military powers in the area: Korea, China, and Vietnam. There is a great need to combine and integrate Free Asian collective security-- to make it truly collective. The United States has indicated that it might be willing to consider a combined SEATO-NEATO, but only if the constituent countries were interested and took the original initiative. The obstacle is Japan, which is such an object of Asian distrust that other Far Eastern countries will not consider a defensive arrangement in which Japan would have a dominant role.
The answer to this problem, as indicated before, is American recognition of the fact equality is the key to Asian defense and economic systems. If the United States were to require that Japan renounce its aggressive intentions, and make amends to those who have been wronged, and if the United States would further see to it that Japan was no stronger -- in any way - than any other Asian country, universal Asian collective security would quickly became not only a possibility but a certainty.
American favoritism of Japan is dangerous not only because of Japan's pro-Communist inclinations, but also because of Japanese hopes to "get even" with the United States for the defeat visited upon them in World War II. The United States would do well to recall the international conditions preceding the Russo-Japanese War. Great Britain entered into an alliance with Japan in 1902, and that arrangement had the support and encouragement of the United States, which hoped thus to check the expansion of Russia. That policy later was to lead to Pearl Harbor the Pacific War. Instead of creating a balance of power, the balance was upset and Japan was permitted to seek control of the whole Far East.
Today the United States appears to believe that Japan can become the big obstacle to the further spread of Communism nearly as much, if at all, as it is in expanding Japanese territory, power, and control. Japan, inother words, is to be watched just as closely as the Communists. The dynamics of economics, population, ideology, and history would indicate this, even if the actions of Japan did not.
The task for Asian collective security, then, is to create a system which guards not only against Communist aggression, but also against Japanese or any other aggression. It can be done; in fact it must be done. The way lies through equality: through a doctrine of one for all and all for one. The United States has the prestige, the influence, and the power to bring an all-Asian alliance into being. Once the ambitions of Japan are controlled, the Japanese presumably would be members-- but in a position no stronger than the other members.
Unless the United States comes to realize this, and takes appropriate action, Asia will acquire a system of collective security anyway. But by the very nature of the situation, it will have to be an anti-Japanese as well as an anti-Communist alliance. The requirement in Asia is to fight any and all aggression, not just that of one system or ideology. Asians want to be free, they want to be secure, they want to prosper, and they want to be regarded as the equals of one another and of all other countries. and peoples. The sooner these conditions are met, the sooner the tides of aggression can be turned back for once and for all.

색인어
이름
Kanichiro Kubota, Kubota, Yong Shik Kim, Truman, J.P.A. Francois, Mark W. Clark, Yong Shik Kim, Hanamura, Shigemitsu, Shigemitsu, Hai Lee, Nakagawa, Yu Taik Kim, Nobusuke Kishi, Aiichiro Fujiyama, Kishi, Kishi, Fujiyama, Kishi, Fujiyama, Kishi, Colombo, Douglas MacArthur
지명
Japan, ASIA, Tokyo, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Asia, The Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Tokyo, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, the United States, Canada, Korea, Korea, United States, Korea, Tokyo, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korean, Korea, Japan, Korea, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Japan, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Koren, the Republic of Korea, the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, United States, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Republic of Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, East Sea, the Yellow Sea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Equador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Morocco, Syria, Iceland, the United States, the United States, the United States, the United States, Dutch, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, the United States, Canada, Red China, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Manchuria, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Pusan, Omura, Pusan, Japan, Omura, Pusan, Omura, Korea, Tokyo, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, north Korea, the Republic of Korea, north Korea, north Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, north Korea, Japan, north Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, north Korea, Shanghai, Japan, Japan, Japan, Pusan, the Republic of Korea, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, Korea, Red China, Korea, Japan, Japan, Korea, Korea, Japan, Korea, Japan, Japan, Japan, the United States, Soviet Russia, Japan, Asia, Japan, the United States, Japan, the Far East, Japan, Asia, the United States, Korea, Japan, Japan, America, the Asian area, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Asia, Japan, Korea, China, India, Japan, Japan, Asia, Japan, Asia, Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian countries, Japan, the United States, Washington, Southeast Asia, Japan, Japan, Asia, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Southeast Asian countries, Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, Japan, Manila, the Philippines, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Indonesia, Indonesia, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Tokyo, Japan, Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Japan, the Southeast Asian countries, Japan, Japan, the United States, Japan, The United States, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, Asia, Japan, the United States, Japan, Asia, Japan, Asia, Japan, Asia, Pearl Harbor, Japan, Japan, Southeast Asia, Japan, Asia, Japan, Japan, Japan, Asia, Japan, Japan, Japan, Japan, the Soviet Union, Red China, Japan, Communist north Korea, north Vietnam, United States, the Ryukyus, The United States, the Philippines, the United States, Okinawa, the Ryukyus, United States, Japan, Ryukyus, America, the United States, Ryukyus, Japan, Korea, United States, Ryukyus, Japan, Asia, Japan, the United States, Europe, Asia, United States, Korea, Japan, China, Philippines, the United States, the Philippines, Thailand, Korea, China, Vietnam, The United States, Japan, Japan, the United States, Japan, the United States, Japan, Japan, United States, The United States, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, Russia, Pearl Harbor, Japan, Far East, the United States, Japan, Japan, The United States, Japan, the United States, Asia, Asia
관서
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Goverment, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, USAMGIK, Korean authorities, the Korean Government, USAMGIK, USAMGIK, the Japanese government, USAMGIK, USAMGIK, the Korean Government, The Japanese Government, USAMGIK, the Korean Government, USAMGIK, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the U.S. Military Government, Government of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, U.S. Military Government in Korea, Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the Republic of Korea, the Japanese Foreign Office, the Government of Japan, Government-General of Chosen, the Japanese authorities, the Government of Japan, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, The Imperial Government of Korea, The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the SCAP, the Korean Government, Japanese Government, authorities of Korea, the United Nations Command, Japanese Government, the Japanese Armed Forces, The Japanese Government, the Korean Government, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, The Korean Government, The Korean Government, The Japanese Government, the Japanese Justice Ministry, the Japanese Government, Japanese Government, the Korean Government, Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the Korean Government, U.S. Government, The U.S. Government, the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government, the U.S. military, the Japanese Foreign Office, the U.S. International Development Advisory Board, the Office of the President, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Government
단체
the Korean Mission, The Korean delegation, The Japanese delegation, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese delegation, The Korean delegation, Japanese delegation, the Japanese delegation, the Japanese delegation, the Japanese delegation, Korean delegation, the Korean delegation, The Japanese delegation, The Korean delegation, the Allied Powers, the international Committee of the Red Cross, Allied Powers, the Allied Powers in Japan, the Allied Powers, Allied Powers, UN International Law Commission, The Koreans delegation, The International Red Cross, Red Cross Society, International Red Cross, north Korean Red Cross, Red Cross, the Korean National Red Cross, international Committee of Red Cross, the ICRC, ICRC, the Korean Mission in Japan, the United Nations, the Democracies, Communists, Afro-Asian group, The Communist Party, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, SEATO, SEATO, NEATO
문서
the Statement of the U.S. Position, Military Ordinance, Military Ordinance, Military Ordinance, Military Ordinance, the Military Ordinance No.33, SCAP memoranda, SCAP Directives, The SCAP Directives, Statement of U.S. Position, U.S. Memorandum, U.S. Memorandum, the U.S. Memorandum, the U.S. Memorandum, the U.S. Memorandum, U.S. Statement, U.S. Memorandum, the U.S. Memorandum, the U.S. Memorandum, U.S. Memorandum, U.S. Memorandum, Johnston Report
기타
Japanese Peace Treaty, Japanese Peace Treaty, Kubota statement, the Peace Treaty, the Peace Treaty, SCAPIN, SCAP, Annexation Treaty, Treaty of Annexation, Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement, the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, the Peace Line, The Cairo Declaration, the Peace Treaty, the Peace Treaty, the Peace Treaty, Peace Treaty, the Hague Regulation, USAMGIK Ordinance, Peace Treaty, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Peace Treaty, the Cairo Declaration, Peace Treaty, The Cairo Declaration, the Korean Fishery Act, Government-General Ordinance, MacArthur Line, the MacArthur line, San Francisco Peace Treaty, the MacArthur Line, the San Francisco Treaty, the MacArthur line, the Peace Line, Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, MacArthur Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Peace Line, the Armistice, the Armistice, the Peace Line for Korea, Peace Line, the Peace Line, Kuboda statement, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese Peace Treaty, United Nations Charter, Treaty of Protectorate, Treaty of Annexation, Philippines-Japan Reparations Agreement
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