September, 1956

 

(Report from Tokyo)

 

"Finally speaking, Japan would have been better off if ahe had not undertaken to hold diplomatic talks with the Russians. Before Shigemitsu left for Moscow, Kono did not brief him or cofide in his his (Kono) talk with Euganin last April, and the present tragedy began from that stage. We realized our handicap after our arrival at Moscow. As you know, our trouble first began with the selection of a chief delegate. Kono was much against Shigemitsu and wanted Defense Minister Sunada to represent Japan, but he failed and Shigemitsu was chosen. We Knew, while in Moscow, the reason why Kono was so against Shigemitsu."

 

"The salks officially began on July 30 and from the very first day there was trouble over the territorial issue. It took us three days to argue this problem with Shepilov insisting the S. Kuriles form an interal part of Soviet territory and that a peace treaty to be formed should stipulate a clear cut border line between the two countries as well the return to Japan of the Habomai and the Shikotan. At the end of three days, we shelved the territorial problem aside and discussed cultural, trade and other problems on which we reached some agreement.

 

Shigemitsu then told Shepilov that since territorial issue must be settled politically, he would like to meet Bulganin and Khrushchev. After many days of waiting, Shigemitsu finally managed to see Bulganin on August 10th. Miseki, the counselor at the Japanese Embassy in Sweden acted as Shigemitsu's interpreter. Bulganin told Shigemitsu he had heard the talks had reached a deadlock over the territorials issue which he thought regrettable because when Kono was in Moscow last April, he(Bulganin) had definitely proposed a plan to Kono and had told the latter that if Japan agreed to it, the Russian side was willing to open talks to discuss the mutual problems, and that if Japan did not agree with the plan, there was no use of holding the talks. Bulganin told Shigemitsu, Kono had asked for three days to think the plan over. After the three days, Kono told Bulganin that Japan was agreed to the openig of the Soviet-Japan talks on July 30. Bulgain said that when Kono ◆◆◆ed to the talks on ◆◆◆y, he had taken for granted Japan had accepted the Russian views on the territorial issue. For this reason, Bnlganin said Rusisa made enormous concessions in regard to the fishery problem, such as the increase in the catch by Japan from 50,000 tons to 65,000 tons. For shigemitsu to come now with a totally different attitude was something he could not understand and that it showed Japan had not changed its views since the Matsumoto talk with halik in London last year.

 

"After the meeting, Niseki told Shigemit Bulganin had used a very insulting and arrogant attitude toward Shigemitsu. Bulganin also siad that he had with him the record of his talk with cono and would see to it that shigenitsu had a copy. Chig emit su has a copy now, and this is as the reason why the Hatoyama group is making so much fuss. As far as anyone knows, no one is familiar with the contents except Shigemitsu, Matsumoto and Niseki and perhaps, Shimoda, the treaty bureau chief of the Foreign Ministry. It was later learned from Niseki that the purported Russian condition was as follows:

If Japan recognizes the Russian draft concerning free passage of warships through straits adjacent to Japan, Russia will agree to the Japanese request to shelve the question of the S. Kuriles for future discussion, and that abomai and the Shikotan will be returned to Japan. If Japan does not recognize the Russian sea traffic law, Russia will claim sovereignty over the s, Kuriles and draw up a clearcut border line between the two countries, this, to be so stipulated in a peace treaty to be formulated.

 

If Japan accepts the Russian proposal, it will mean a nullification of the Japan-u.s. security pact and further a violation by Japan of the SF peace treaty. kus sia is making this request not so much to place Japan in a difficult position, but to aggravate the U.S. That day, Chigemit su was made and furiously accused Hatoyama and Kono of this arrangement and not telling him about it.

 

"we ◆◆◆◆◆ ◆◆◆◆◆◆ kono had ◆◆◆◆◆ to time ◆◆◆◆◆◆◆ plan. He should not do this to his ◆◆◆try ◆◆◆◆◆ ◆◆◆◆tant ◆◆◆◆◆ problems was at that time. ◆◆◆ the person may kono did not tell ◆◆◆◆◆◆◆ of Bulganin's preposal is something we do not understand. For a while, Shignitsu wtopped making reports to ◆◆◆ Goverment and for this he was attached, but would have done the same. Then kono told Bulganin that he ◆ared to the holding of the soviet-Japan talks in July, Bulganin understood it as Japan's agreement to the hussian view on the S. kurles. And the present trouble rose from this misunderstanding. It is inconceivable in the lignt of Japan's present position to recognize the Russia traffice proposal of free passage of Ruussian warships through Japanese waters, and even if Japan were to do so, Russia will never return the S, Kuriles. if kono had refused bulganin's plan, this trouble would lave been avoided, Lut at that time the fishery problem was at stake and kono, in his position as the representative could not act strongly toward the Russians and made this commitment unwittingly to the Russians. At any rate, the Shigemitsu-Bulganin talk on August 10 is being kept strictly confidential at the request of the government which sent ex-vice foreign minister Sonoda to San Francisco to ask Shigemitsu to keep his mouth shut.

 

"Shigemitsu reported to the governinent that although it was not his view, Japan has to conede the S. Kuriles to Russia in order to form a peace treaty with Russia. Shigemitsu knew the government would not agree to this, but he made this report to spite Haotyama and Kono.

 

"When Shgenitsu met Shepilov again after his meeting with bulganin, he was reminded that what Bulganin had told Shigemitsu was the Russian condition and that if Japan decides to form a peace treaty with Russia on such terms, it will be satisfactory to Russia. In that case, (1) Russia will retum the Habomai and the Shikotan 6 months after the signing of the peace treaty for the reason that the islands are at present fortified as military bases and these will have to be removed or destroyed. (2) preparations will be made for the return to Japan of 1,300 prisoners of war. Shepilov said that Russia has no proofs there ◆…◆ that maby Japan-◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆ners in Russia, ◆◆◆◆◆◆ will consider when over the entry of JApan into the enited ◆◆◆◆ns. ◆...◆ made between Kono and Bulganin stil ◆◆◆ into force immediatly after the signing of the peace treaty.

 

"Shigemitsu replied tthat he will have to refer the governnent.

 

"Russia will never return the islands which they have occupied for so long. These islands are important to Russia both as military bases and as warm-water ports necessary for the development of Liberia. Japan demanding the return of the S. kurites is likely publicly declaring she does not want a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. There is definitely no hope of getting them back. Bulganin's insistence on the sea traffic issue is merely to aggravate the U,S. knowing the relations between the two countries and this was to tease kono into a corner. Acceptance of the Russian demands will mean a big victory for the Rus-sians because it will nullify the U.S. -Japan security pact and violate the SF peace treaty, but they know Japan will never do it.

 

"It was learned that Shigemitsu had reported to Hatoyana on August 11 of his talk with the Russians and that if Japan does not concede to the Russiang there can be no peace treaty. After hearing this, Kono told Hatoyama to make the trip to Moscow himself and settle the problem, and to this day, this matter is still being discussed. Even if Hatoyama's proposed visit to Yoscow becomes a reality, from our observation of the Russians, he will not be able to do anything. However, there is no telling what understanding kono will reach with the Russians in Tokyo, something the foreign minister will not know about.

 

"As Shigemitsu has told the press, Japan got nothing from the Russians excspt insults and humiliations and if it can be said that we gained something, it was a deeper knowledge of the Russians and their ways. This might help us in our dealings with them in future.

 

"The ◆...◆ and deplensant ◆…◆ when Shigemitsu ◆…◆ the sacond world war Japan ◆a◆◆ndered to the ◆◆◆◆◆ under the provisens of the Potsdam declaration and not the Kelta agreement which was agreed ipon only by the U.S. and the Soviet Union before Japan's sarrender. ShipiLov's face changed color and ne questioned Shigenitsu whether it was not he who signed Japan's unconditional surrender as the then foreign minister on board the SS Missouri.

 

"The talks failed and the Foreign Minister left for London to attend the Suca conference. When he met with Dulles, the latter made his statement which caused a sensation at home and even now is being debated on. At that time Dulls pointed out to Shigenitsu that in case Japan recognizes Soviet sovereignty over the Kurilos and the S. Sakhalin it would be a violation of Article 26 of the SF peace treaty because the treaty contained a provision which prohibited Japan from granting more favorable peace terms to Communist nations than it granted to the Allies who signed the original treaty. Shigemitsu told Dulles that the article does not apply to territorial matters except to trade and cultural problems, but Dulles, a lawyer and the very person who drafted the Creaty, gave a detailed explanation of the articleto Shigemitsu. Shige-mitsu then stated that since the territorial issue is the cause of deadlock of the Soviet-Japan talks, an international conference should be held to decide the fate of the Kuriles and the Sakhalin. To this Dulles stated very frankly that although the u.s. is sympathetic and understanding of Japan's problems, such a conference was not feasible under the present circunstances because the Russians will bring up the territorial status of Formosa and other problems.

 

"The U.S. knew from the very beginning the talks would fail but the proposed visit to loscow of liatoyama alarmed then not too little and they are rather concerned because if Kono follows ilatoyama the two might cook up some very embarrassing problems which will bring forth unpleasant consequences."