Sir H.S. Parkes to Earl Granville.-(Received February 1, 1884)

(No. 42)
Tien-tsin, December 6, 1883

My Lord,

I PROPOSE to furnish in this despatch some account of my negotiations at Söul.
I reported the commencement of those negotiations in my despatch No. 38 of the 7th ultimo. I then mentioned that on the 3rd ultimo the German Minister and myself took the initiatory step of delivering our proposals to the Corean Plenipotentiary in the form of a draft Tariff, with Regulations of Trade annexed, and a statement of the principles on which we desire to construct the Tariff, and that these proposals were read through clause by clause on that day by our Secretaries with the Ministers of the Foreign Office. The observations made by the latter, as the reading proceeded, afforded an insight into the objections we should have to encounter, and enabled us to perceive that, though the Corean Government were willing to amend the Treaties of last year, they were strongly opposed to their rejection. They also complained of delay on the part of both our Governments, as eighteen months had nearly elapsed since those Treaties were concluded, and they expressed considerable disappointment at finding that neither I nor Herr Zappe had brought a reply to the letter addressed last year by the King of Corea both to Her Majesty and the Emperor of Germany.
Herr Zappe and myself therefore thought it desirable to take up these points ourselves at the opening conference with the Corean Plenipotentiary, which took place on the 5th. His Excellency was assisted at this and at all the subsequent conferences by Kim Hong-jip and Li Tso-yöu, Vice-Ministers of the Foreign Office, and Herr von Möllendorff, who holds similar rank in the service of the Corean Government.
Speaking for Herr Zappe and myself, I at once entered on a review of the antecedents which had led to our present mission. I observed that the Treaties of last year were, in fact, a proposal on the part of the Corean Government to the Governments of Great Britain and Germany. They were drawn up by the Corean Governments, with the assistance of that of China, and the contents of them were not known to our Governments until they reached home. They were accompanied in each instance by a letter from the King of Corea to our respective Sovereigns, which was appreciated as a friendly act on His Majesty’s part. Our Governments had scarcely received the Treaties when they heard that disastrous events had occurred in Corea; that a serious revolt had broken out in the capital, which appeared to overthrow the King’s authority; that the Queen and many of His Majesty’s Ministers had been killed; that the Japanese Legation in Söul had been attacked and destroyed; and that the Japanese Minister, who had received no protection from the Government, had escaped with great difficulty, and that several of his retinue had been killed in the struggle. Later on they heard that the capital had been occupied by Chinese troops, and that the King’s father, who was charged with having instigated the revolt, had been taken as a prisoner to China. These deplorable events obliged our Governments to pause before they proceeded with the consideration of the Treaties, as they naturally felt that while the country was disturbed the lives and property of their subjects would not be safe in Corea. Owing to the distance of the latter country from Europe, and in particular to the very scant means of communication, it was not until the beginning of this year that our Governments heard of the settlement of the difficulty with Japan, and were assured that order had been restored. They then entered on the consideration of the Treaties, but as it was found that these contained various objectionable provisions, for the removal of which fresh negotiation would be required, and as the time named for the exchange of the ratifications was close at hand, they proposed to the Corean Government to extend that date until the close of the year, in order to obtain time for the due consideration of the questions concerned. The Corean Government having agreed to this proposal, our Governments then proceeded to frame their counter-proposals, and, as a mark of respect and consideration for the former, they appointed special Plenipotentiaries of rank to conduct the necessary negotiation. Her Majesty’s Government, in accrediting Her Majesty’s Minister to China to the Court of Corea, had given the latter a proof of friendly and considerate estimation, while the German Government had paid the Corean Government a similar compliment by sending out a Minister Plenipotentiary from Europe, and he had made the long voyage to Corea with unexampled celerity. This statement, I observed, must satisfy the Corean Government that our Government could not be justly charged with delay.
I felt that I should also explain why the circumstances of the case did not permit of Herr Zappe and myself having the honour, in addition to that of being appointed Ministers Plenipotentiary to Corea, of being the bearers of replies from our respective Sovereigns to the letters of the King. We had to inform the Corean Government that the Treaties of last year could not be ratified, and to propose, in place of them, new Treaties. It remained to be seen whether the Corean Government would accept our proposals, and, therefore, whether Treaty relations would be established between our respective countries; but it was obvious that until such relations were established, it would be premature for the various Sovereigns to enter into personal communications with each other. If the result of the present negotiations should prove satisfactory, we felt confident that the King of Corea would not experience any want of cordiality on the part of our Sovereigns in this respect.
Proceeding then to the subject of our proposals, I pointed out that it would be impossible to retain the old Treaty, and to negotiate, as I understood the Corean Government desired, a Supplementary Treaty containing the various changes and additions which would have to be introduced. Two such Treaties would conflict with each other, and could not work harmoniously. The concessions made last year by Corea to China, also those which had been more recently made to Japan, and those which the Corean Government had proposed this year to that of Austria-Hungary, would have to be included, together with the amendments proposed by our Governments. And although many of the provisions of the Treaties of last year, with some modifications as to wording might be retained, it would be far better, in order to prevent trouble in the future, to recast them afresh and replace them with new ones. The draft Treaties which we had placed in the hands of the Corean Plenipotentiary were the result of a long experience in China and Japan, and terms which had been accepted by those Powers could not be considered disadvantageous to Corea. The object in view was to establish friendly and satisfactory relations between Corea and two of the leading States of Europe, such as would enable Corea to develop her dormant commercial resources, and open out to her people a wide field of industrial activity. The Treaties of last year, however well meant by the Corean Government, would not have secured that object, and would not have afforded satisfaction to any of the parties concerned. Those which we now proposed would, on the contrary, enable the wishes of the Corean Government to be fulfilled, they would secure great and permanent advantage to Corea, both political and commercial; and, if concluded, would not fail to be highly serviceable to Corea in her negotiations with other European Powers. Having made the above statement, which was entirely endorsed by Herr Zappe, I then invited the Corean Plenipotentiary to enter on the consideration of our proposals.
His Excellency thanked me for this full explanation of the position. He observed that he could now perceive that there had been no avoidable delay on the part of the British and German Governments, and could understand why the letters of the King had not been replied to. His Government attached great importance to the acknowledgment of those letters, as they considered that such correspondence denoted the independence of Corea, but he saw in the appointment of Ministers of the rank of Herr Zappe and myself a recognition of Corea’s position which would be appreciated by his Government. The latter had thought that as the American Government had ratified their Treaty, the Governments of Great Britain and Germany might have done the same, and that if, after trial, the Treaties had been found defective, they might have been modified. But as those Governments took a different view, he was prepared to discuss their counter-proposals on their merits.
To this I replied that it was much easier to correct a defective measure before than after it had come into operation, and that, as the British and German Governments knew from their long experience of Oriental intercourse that the Treaties of last year would not work well, and would certainly occasion trouble and difficulties, it would have been both useless and unwise on their part to give a trial to arrangements which they knew would fail.
The consideration of our draft Treaty was then entered on. I need not detail the various objections which were at first raised by Corean Plenipotentiary, as these embraced nearly all the points of difference between the Treaties of last year and those which we proposed. Some of these objections were soon withdrawn, but we perceived that the points on which we should have to meet with most opposition were those which related to the formation and administration of the foreign Settlements at the ports, the Regulations relating to customs or other matters to which British and German subjects would be amenable in Corea, trade in the interior of the country, the interport or carrying trade between the open ports, the erection by foreigners of places of worship, and the text of the Treaty that was to determine disputes. Admiral Willes’ Treaty had provided (by Articles V and VI) that the authorities of Corea were to make (or “fix”) all Regulations, and simply “communicate them to the proper officials of the British Government to be by the latter notified to their subjects and duly observed;” that “all rights of jurisdiction over persons and property within the foreign Settlements remain vested in the authorities of Chosen,” that “British subjects are not permitted either to transport foreign imports to the interior, or to proceed thither to purchase native produce, nor are they permitted to transport native produce from one open port to another open port.” British subjects are not protected by that Treaty in the observance of their religion, nor is provision made therein as to which of the two languages, English or Chinese, shall be accepted as the original text. On all these points we had to maintain that the British and German authorities should have a voice in all arrangements respecting the laying out and government of the Settlements within which their people were to reside; that all Regulations to which they were to be subject should be jointly made by the said authorities and those of Corea; that British and German subjects should be allowed the free exercise of their religion; that trade in the interior and the transport of all kinds of merchandize, whether foreign or native, between the open ports should be allowed; and that the English version of the Treaties, in the case of Germany as well as of Great Britain, should be regarded as the original text.
We also found that the Corean Ministers were strongly inclined to oppose the Trade Regulations and the Customs Tariff which we proposed to annex to the Treaty. They had only recently concluded a long negotiation with the Japanese Government on these subjects, resulting in a Convention which came into operation on the 3rd ultimo, but which I had not seen before I arrived in Corea. It comprises a long Code of forty-two Trade regulations, which contain much redundant and defective wording, besides various objectionable stipulations, while the Tariff is arranged on a cumbersome and complicated method, and the rates of duty are too high in many instances. The Corean Ministers represented to us that these Regulations and Tariff had been established by the Corean Government as a general national statute which they were willing to extend to all foreign nations seeking Treaty relations with them. We had to point out that as a statute they greatly needed amendment, while as they had been incorporated in a Treaty with Japan we considered that we could claim such of their provisions as we thought it desirable to adopt; that the Regulations we proposed were far simpler in character, and would be found more effective in practice, as they provided severer penalties for offences against the revenue, and that our Tariff, although lower than that concluded with Japan, was based upon well-recognized principles of taxation, and was better calculated to encourage trade.
In my despatch No. 38 of the 7th ultimo I reported that after discussion on these various points had been continued for three days we arrived at a general agreement with the Corean Plenipotentiary on the provisions of the Treaty, and also that his Excellency had accepted our Regulations and Tariff as a basis of negotiation on those subjects. We afterwards found that this understanding was by no means so complete as we could have desired, and that the negotiations which followed involved a tedious repetition of discussion which were continued incessantly from the 7th to the 24th ultimo.
Thus the Tariff, which we proceeded to consider in detail on the 7th, closely occupied our attention for a whole week. The Import Tariff which had been arranged with Japan, or, as the Corean Ministers preferred to style it, “the Corean Tariff,” comprised seven rates of ad valorem duty, namely, 5, 8, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 per cent., and was specially favourable to articles of Japanese production. The Tariff proposed by Herr Zappe and myself was based upon four rates only, namely, 5, 7½, 10, and 20 per cent., and secured due consideration for articles of European growth and manufacture.
In the 5 per cent. class we placed raw productions, some manufactured articles of common quality and ordinary use, oils, mineral or vegetable, and partially manufactured articles, as “unmanufactured” metals and yarns of all kinds. The 7½ per cent. class formed the most important section, as it included manufactures of all kinds in cotton, wool, or linen, and mixtures of these materials and of silk, carpeting, chemicals, dyes, leather, manufactured metals, hardware, cutlery, &c. The 10 per cent. class comprised manufactures wholly of silk, beer and wines, plated ware, glass ware, pictures, clocks and watches, and manufactured articles of similar finish and value. The 20 per cent. class was limited to costly articles of luxury, as amber, coral, jade, ivory, jewellery, precious stones, old and silver plate, furs, scents, and spirits.
About 200 articles were named in our Tariff, and the merits of each article was discussed by the Corean Ministers with remarkable minuteness and tenacity. In order to effect an agreement we had eventually to yield to them on some points of minor importance, which we chiefly regretted because they interfered with the symmetry of our arrangement. Thus we had to move timber, salt, vegetable oils, chemicals, &c., from the 5 per cent. to the 7½ per cent. class, to advance furniture, leather manufactures, hard woods, and a few other articles from the 7½ to the 10 per cent. class, and to place tobacco and spices under the 20 per cent. rate. But we used these concessions in regard to commodities in which we have but little concern, as a shield for the important interests of our European trade. Cotton and woolen manufactures and dyes, which will probably form six-tenths of the foreign trade with Corea, will pay a 7½ per cent. rate of duty, cotton yarns, metals, sugar, drugs, medicines, and kerosene, which may comprise three-tenths of that trade, will pay 5 per cent., and the remaining tenth of the trade will certainly not pay more than a 10 per cent. rate. The result, therefore, is an average rate of 7 per cent. I felt that 7½ per cent. must be the limit of that average, as it is the amount of the import and transit duties of China combined, and was recommended by the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce in their letter to your Lordship of the 20th January last. The payment of the Tariff duty will frank goods throughout the country, as it is provided by section 4 of Article V of the Treaty that all imports, when conveyed into the interior, shall not be subject to any additional tax, excise, or transit duty whatsover.
The only allusion made to opium in the Treaty appears in the Tariff in the list of prohibited goods, which is confined to adulterated drugs and medicines, arms and munitions of war, counterfeit coins, and “opium, except medicinal opium.”
The Export Tariff is very simple, as it consists of one uniform rate of 5 per cent. on all Corean productions.
Pressure of time obliges me to pass without comment our discussions on the Trade Regulations attached to the Treaty. These, like the Tariff, occupied considerable attention, but in the end the Corean Plenipotentiary agreed to set aside the so-called Corean Regulations, and to adopt those which we proposed in their place.
We had hoped by the 15th November that our discussions were drawing to a close, but on meeting the Corean Plenipotentiary on that day to read over the final drafts, his Excellency renewed various objections which we thought had been disposed of, and strenuously opposed in particular the omission of the following clause of the British and German Treaties of last year (Article VI): “It is, however, mutually agreed and understood between the High Contracting Powers that whenever the King of Chosen shall have so far modified and reformed the statutes and judicial procedure of his kingdom that in the judgement of the British Government they conform to the laws and course of justice in England [Germany] the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction shall be abandoned, and thereafter British subjects, when within the limits of the Kingdom of Chosen, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the native authorities.”
I had inserted this clause in the draft Treaty which I submitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 108 (Tôkiô) of the 22nd June, because I thought that in principle it was unobjectionable, and that it formed a convenient declaration of the grounds upon which extra-territorial jurisdiction in Oriental countries is based, and further that it attests the necessity of maintaining that jurisdiction until the “laws and course of Justice” in those countries become similar to our own. But Herr Zappe had received positive instructions to omit this clause, and I therefore supported him in insisting that it could not be inserted in the Treaty. The Corean Plenipotentiary was equally persistent in demanding that it should be inserted, and, on the question being referred to the Council of the Government, he was supported by the latter in his resistance, and even went so far as to announce to us that unless we yielded the point negotiations must be broken off. I am not satisfied that this threat would have been carried out, but it caused our business to come to a stand for several days, and occasioned Herr Zappe and myself no small amount of trouble and anxiety. A written expression of regret from the Corean Plenipotentiary that the negotiations should fail on this single question, which he at the same time declared was the sole point of difference between us, and on which he recommended us to apply to our Governments for fresh instructions, enabled us to propose that a Declaration framed in the following words shall be attached to the Treaty;-
“It is hereby declared that the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction over British subjects in Corea granted by this Treaty shall be relinquished when, in the judgment of the British Government, the laws and legal procedure of Corea shall have been so far modified and reformed as to remove the objections which now exist to British subjects being placed under Corean jurisdiction, and Corean Judges shall have attained similar legal qualifications and a similar independent position to those of British Judges.”
This proposal was eventually accepted by the Corean Plenipotentiary, and I need not point out to your Lordship that the contention resulted in the gain of advantage to ourselves. We have seen in the case of Japan that an oriental country may think itself justified in claiming the abolition of extra-territoriality on the ground of the compilation, made by foreigners in its employ, of a Code of laws based on Western principles of legislation. But such a Code is of limited value, and is insufficient in itself to insure adequate protection of rights and liberties unless it is applied under a sound system of procedure, and administered by properly qualified judges, invested with a position which gives them complete independence in the discharge of their highly important duties. With good laws, efficient procedure, and properly qualified and independent Judges, extra-territorial jurisdiction in Oriental countries would naturally cease and determine, and I am gratified to have been the means of appending to a Treaty with one of those States a statement, which may not be limited in its application to Corea alone, declaring that we shall be willing to relinquish that jurisdiction whenever the above-mentioned conditions shall have been fulfilled.
Another discussion, which involved an inconvenient loss time, arose in the course of the preparation of the Chinese version of the Treaty on the first section of Article V, which provides that “at each of the ports or places open to foreign trade, British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from any foreign port, or from any Corean open port, to sell to or to buy from any Corean subject or others, and to export to any foreign or Corean open port, all kinds of merchandize not prohibited by this Treaty, on paying the duties of the Tariff annexed Thereto.” This provision clearly secures to British subjects the right to engage in the trade between the open ports of Corea, by whatever name that trade may be called-"interport,” “carrying,” or “coasting” trade-though I hold that the latter is an inappropriate term, as it covers a far wider field than a trade which is expressly limited to the open or Treaty ports.
The Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong observed in their letter to your Lordship that they regarded the prohibition against the transportation by British traders of native produce between the open ports “as one of the most objectionable provisions in the Treaty” (signed by Admiral Willes). Herr Zappe was specially instructed to secure the interport trade, and I considered that my own instructions (as I had inserted the above provision in my draft Treaty) were to the same effect. I therefore repeatedly told the Corean Plenipotentiary in our discussions on the interport trade question that this Article was intended to secure, and, if agreed to, would secure, that right, and I pointed out that the same provision appeared in the British Treaty with Japan (Article XIV, Treaty of 1858), and in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty with that country (Article XI, Treaty of 1869), and that, under those Treaties we had always exercised that right. The section in question was eventually agreed to, but in the Chinese version of that section the Corean Plenipotentiary objected to the use of a Chinese character (“yun”) which means “carrying,” or “conveying,” and desired to substitute another (“tsai”) which means “to load,” and also “to carry as ship’s freight,” in the passages where in the English version the words “to import” and “to export” occur. I should have attached little importance to this objection if it had not appeared to indicate a desire on the part of the Corean Plenipotentiary-which appeared to me to be attributable to certain foreign influence-to create a divergence of meaning between the English and the Chinese versions of the Treaty, as the weight which has Excellency seemed to attach to the selection of one of two terms of almost, if not quite, identical meaning was otherwise unaccountable, particularly in the face of his repeated assurances that whichever character might be adopted the question must be governed by the wording of the English text as provided by Article XII. In the end the character “tsai” was substituted for “yun” in the section in question, but the latter character was retained in numerous other passages of the Treaty and Regulations, which clearly showed that the two were used in an identical sense. In order, however, to prevent any possible misconstruction in future, I thought it prudent to hand to his Excellency the note verbale of which I inclose a copy, stating that I agreed to the insertion of the character “tsai” instead of “yun” in the section in question on the faith of his Excellency’s assurances that the change which he desired related solely to a point of style, and affected in no degree the stipulations contained in the English text of that section. His Excellency expressed himself perfectly satisfied with this note, which became part of the record of our proceedings, and I should not trouble your Lordship with this detail if I had not to account for the time occupied by our negotiations, which were interrupted by this incident throughout two valuable days.
The right to travel and trade in the interior of Corea, secured by section 6 of Article IV of the present Treaty, formed also an important subject of consideration. The Corean Plenipotentiary at first represented that, although his Government were disposed to concede this right when it could be safely exercised, they considered that it would be premature to agree to it before the people in the interior had become better acquainted with foreigners. Herr Zappe and myself were not unwilling to admit the apparent force of this argument, and therefore proposed that the right should not be exercised for a term of three years from the date of the Treaties coming into effect; but while engaged in this discussion it came to our knowledge that a mining concession had been granted by the Corean Government to a well-known British firm in the East, and that the agents of that firm were then on the point of going into the interior to work the mineral deposits thus assigned to them. In the face of this fact it became impossible for me to conclude an arrangement which would have had the appearance of securing an exclusive privilege, namely, that of doing business in the interior, for a period of three years, to a particular British firm, nor could Herr Zappe consent to exclude German subjects from participating, whenever they might meet with the opportunity of doing so, in a right which had already been granted to the subjects of another nation. We were therefore obliged to fall back upon our original proposal, in which, under the force or circumstances created by the act of the Corean Government, the Corean Plenipotentiary felt bound to acquiesce. The liberty to travel and trade in the interior is therefore at once secured by this Treaty, although, as your Lordship is aware, it continues to be withheld in Japan.
In consequence of Chinese subjects being allowed, under Regulations made last year between Corea and China, to open commercial establishments at Hanyang (or Sŏul, the capital of Corea), I had named that city in the draft Treaty I submitted to your Lordship as one of the places which should be open to British trade; and as my German colleague and myself were both authorized to demand any privileges that had been accorded by Corea to China or Japan, we inserted Hanyang among the ports and places named in section I of Article IV of the present Treaty. The Corean Plenipotentiary contended for its omission on the ground that his Government were negotiating with the Chinese Government for the surrender by the latter of commercial access to Hanyang. As Yanghwa Chin, which is also to be opened under the same section, is within 5 miles of the capital, the right of residence for purposes of trade in the latter city is not of essential importance, so long as all foreigners are equally excluded from it, and we therefore arranged this question by appending a Declaration to the Treaty stating that if the Chinese Government should hereafter surrender the right of opening commercial establishments in Hanyang, the same right shall not be claimed for British (or German) subjects, provided that it be not granted by the Corean Government to the subjects of any other Power.
The Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang has informed me, since my arrival here, that the question has not come before his Government, and that he did not see why a proposal to exclude Chinese traders from Hanyang, if made by the Corean Government, should be entertained by that of China.
Freedom in respect to religious rights is secured to British subjects resident in Corea by section 2 of Article IV, which provides that “they shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion.” Following my original draft Treaty, we had at first claimed that British and German subjects should have the right of erecting “places of worship” at the ports or places open to foreign trade. This phrase was considered obnoxious by his Excellency, and after we had firmly maintained in our argument that our people could not be required by the Corean Government to ignore their religion, we proposed to substitute for it the words above mentioned, and to this his Excellency agreed. The stipulation as it now stands is more comprehensive than our original proposal, and clearly includes the right to erect places of worship whenever these may be needed.
The Treaty, in the form in which it now appears, with the Regulations, Tariff, and Protocol annexed, was finally agreed to by the Corean Plenipotentiary on the evening of the 24th ultimo. In order to state in brief the advantages which it contains, I may observe that it contains every condition named in the draft Treaty which I submitted last June to your Lordship’s consideration, and which your Lordship and the German Government approved as a basis of negotiation. A comparison of that draft with the Treaty as signed will show that in the main it has been closely adhered to, although improvements have been introduced in wording and arrangement; and here I should not omit to acknowledge that for many of these amendments, especially those which appear in the Trade Regulations as well as in the Tariff, which was only roughly sketched in my original draft, I am greatly indebted to the able suggestions and efficient co-operation of my collegue, the Minister Plenipotentiary of Germany.
I should also point out that all the additional conditions which Herr Zappe and myself were instructed to propose have been secured. In my case, those conditions, as made known to me in your Lordship’s telegrams of the 3rd and 17th October, were the following:-
1. The omission of opium from the body of the Treaty, and its entry as contraband in the Tariff Schedule. This has been done, and I am bound to say that, although it involved the omission of the Article (VII) on this subject of the Treaties of last year, the Corean Plenipotentiary offered no objection to that Article being thus expunged.
2. The insertion in the favoured-nation Article (after the sentence, “shall participate in all privileges, immunities, and advantages”) of the words especially in relation to import and export duties on goods and manufactures, and also the words, “this Article shall be interpreted in the most liberal sense.”
I secured the insertion of the first of these two sentences (see Article X of the Treaty), but the Corean Plenipotentiary was unwilling to accept the latter one. I should observe that the consideration of this Article involved considerable discussion, as his Excellency contended strongly that it should contain the conditional clause which appears in the British and German Treaties of last year, but to this neither Herr Zappe nor myself could agree. The former was also instructed to omit the reciprocal clause in favour of Corea which forms the second paragraph of Article XII of my draft Treaty, and he was not instructed to make either of the two stipulations which your Lordship had instructed me to insert. We eventually carried our point in regard to the omission both of the conditional clause of last year's Treaties and also of the reciprocal clause in favour of Corea of my draft Treaty, whilst, as already mentioned, I secured the insertion of the words, “especially in relation to import and export duties on goods and manufactures.” But I was obliged to yield in regard to the words, “this Article shall be interpreted in the most liberal sense,” as the Corean Plenipotentiary was evidently distrustful of their meaning and object, and my German colleague attached no value to their insertion. If the reciprocal clause in favour of Corea had been retained, I might then have satisfied the Corean Plenipotentiary that these words involved no reflection on the liberal disposition of the Corean Government, as it would have been applicable to both of the High Contracting Powers; but I was deprived of this argument by the omission of that clause. Having with great difficulty prevailed on his Excellency to surrender the conditional clause of the Treaties of last year, it became evident that an important advantage should not be risked by prolonging the discussion on a minor point, and I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will approve of my having agreed, under the pressure of the circumstances above stated, to omit the sentence in question.
3. Your Lordship instructed me to insert a clause in the Treaty making it apply to all British Colonies, unless any exception is notified by Her Majesty’s Government within one year of the exchange of ratifications.
This instruction has been observed but as the German Plenipotentiary could not insert such a provision in his Treaty, and as it was desirable that the two Treaties should be, as far as possible, identical, I trust that your Lordship will approve of my having placed it in the form of a Declaration in the Protocol which is attached to the Treaty.
The additional conditions which Herr Zappe was instructed to secure were:-
1. To withdraw disputes between the subjects of two different Treaty Powers from the jurisdiction of the native Tribunals.
I had considered that this condition was secured by the wording of section I of Article III of my draft Treaty, as it provided that “jurisdiction over the persons and property of British subjects shall be vested exclusively in the duly authorized British authorities,” and that therefore any foreigner having to prosecute a complaint against a British subject must bring his case into the British Court. But, in order to meet the wishes of the German Government on this point, we added the words, “The British [German] authorities shall hear and determine all cases brought against British [German] subjects by any British [German] or other foreign subject or citizen without the intervention of the Corean authorities” (see Article III, section I).
2. The acceptance by the Corean Government of the “Strand or Salvage Regulations” which were promulgated by the Chinese Government in 1876.
The Corean Plenipotentiary informed us that his Government had already adopted these Regulations, and his Excellency communicated to us officially a copy of the Decree making them law in Corea.
3. The issue of drawback certificates and the application of tonnage dues to lighting the sea-coast and facilitating navigation.
Both these provisions were inserted in my draft Treaty (see sections 2 and 7 of Article V), and they appear in the same position in the Treaties which we signed.
4. The permission to foreign merchants to accompany and sell their goods in the interior of the country and the opening of the coasting trade.
These two provisions are likewise contained in my draft Treaty (see Article IV, section 4, and Article V, section 1), and they are inserted in the same Articles in the Treaties now concluded.
The German Government, as your Lordship informed me, claimed these concessions on the ground that they appear in the draft of a Treaty proposed by the Corean Government to that of Austria-Hungary. The Corean Plenipotentiary, however, denied all knowledge of this draft Treaty, and Herr von Möllendorff, who is named therein as one of the Corean Plenipotentiaries, explained an occurrence with which the Corean Government appeared to be entirely unacquainted. During a visit which he had paid to Shanghae last spring, he conversed with M. Haas, the Acting Consul-General for Austria-Hungary at that port, on the desirability of a Treaty being concluded between that Power and Corea, and stated the terms which he believed the Corean Government would be disposed to grant. He denied having compiled the draft Treaty with M. Hass, and declared his surprise at hearing that his suggestions had assumed that shape. They could not, he asserted, be called proposals on the part of the Corean Government, and he disclaimed having named himself as one of the Corean Plenipotentiaries. M. Haas is now in the service of the Corean Government as Secretary to Herr von Möllendorff.
Our discussions having terminated, as I have already stated, on the evening of the 24th ultimo, both Treaties, British and German, were signed in triplicate on the 26th. One the 27th Herr Zappe and myself were received by the King in a very gracious manner at separate audiences, upon which I propose to report in another despatch. On the 28th paid official visits of leave to the Corean Ministers, and was called on by them and other Corean dignitaries. On the 29th I left Sŏul for Chemulpo in advance of Herr Zappe, as he was not equally pressed for time, and as he was proceeding to Japan he kindly provided Mr. Aston with a direct passage to his post. I embarked the same evening in Her Majesty’s ship “Sapphire,” as I have already reported to your Lordship.
Your Lordship having instructed me to act throughout this negotiation in concert with the German Plenipotentiary, I should not omit to state that all our proceedings were conjointly conducted in perfect harmony and with the most cordial understanding, and we moreover had the satisfaction of knowing that each rendered the other material assistance.
I beg to offer my grateful appreciation of the large discretionary powers in this negotiation which your Lordship was pleased to intrust to me, and to express the hope that the confidence with which I have thus been honoured has been exercised in a manner that will meet with the approval of Her Majesty’s Government.
It remains for me to endeavour to duly acknowledge the services which I have received from my staff. In regard to Mr. Aston, I can only say that his assistance was invaluable, whether in regard to the soundness of his counsel, his proficiency in the Corean, language or the position he has attained as Persona grata with the Corean Ministers.
Mr. Maude, Second Secretary of this Legation, and Mr. Hillier, the Acting Chinese Secretary, rendered me in their respective capacities most zealous and efficient support, and greatly contributed to the dispatch which I venture to believe-when the nature of the difficulties encountered and the character of the work accomplished is considered-will be seen to have marked this negotiation. I may say that the excellent translation of the Chinese version of the Treaty is Mr. Hillier's labour, and also that his mastery of that language and his possession of other qualities which insure influence and advantage in dealings with Orientals have proved of great service to me on this occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES

Inclosure 1

Note Verbale

SOME discussion having arisen between the British and the Corean Plenipotentiary in consequence of the latter having proposed to substitute the character “tsai” for “yün” in several places in the Chinese version of Article V of the Treaty, the British Plenipotentiary thinks it desirable to state, in order to prevent future misconception, that he has acquiesced in this proposal on the faith of the assurance of the Corean Plenipotentiary that the change which the latter proposed relates solely to a point of style, and affects in no degree the stipulations contained in the English text of that Article.

(Signed) HARRY S. PARKER