Sir H.S. Parkes to Earl Granville.-(Received July 16)

(No. 98 Confidential)
Tokio, June 10, 1883

My Lord,

I PROPOSE in this despatch to offer some general observations on the prospect of modifying by future negotiation the Treaty concluded by Admiral Willes with Corea. They are naturally based on the insight gained into the views of the Corean Government by Mr. Aston in the course of his two recent visits to Soul, as reported in his letters to me of the 11th April and 29th May, which I forwarded to your Lordship in my despatches Nos. 64 and 91 of the 28th April and 31st ultimo.
I will mention at the commencement, as the point which appears to me to be chiefly worthy of your Lordship’s attention, that on the first of these visits, and in the course of the discussion on the Treaty reported by Mr. Aston in his despatch of the 11th April, he elicited from the Corean Ministry of Foreign Affairs the important admission that the Corean Government consider that the favoured nation clause, being the XIVth Article of Admiral Willes’ Treaty possesses a retrospective character. They declared that the non-retrospective meaning conveyed by the English version of this clause was wholly attributable to mistranslation, that the Chinese version was not intended to have and had not that meaning, and that it was wholly foreign to the intentions of the Corean Government to refuse to one nation privileges which they had already allowed to another.
It is to be hoped that Government will steadily adhere in future to this formal declaration of the construction which they put upon the Chinese text. It would ill become us to contest an interpretation which is so satisfactory to ourselves, which is declared by the Corean Government to express their meaning, and which may possibly be technically correct. Whether this declaration denotes a change in their original views, or whether, in other words, they ever intended that the said clause should have a non-retrospective application, is at least open to question. I recollect that Admiral Willes observed to me on arriving here from Corea in June last, that he had endeavoured to obtain the insertion in the English text of a sentence which would have clearly given the clause a retrospective character, but that it was omitted at the instance of Ma Taotai, who assured the Admiral that the Corean Government would refuse to admit it. But I believe we have no proof that this assertion was made by Ma Taotai on the authority of the Corean Government, or even with their knowledge, while it cannot be doubted that that officer in arranging the business of the British Treaty, which was marked by an entire absence of negotiation, acted rather as the agent of the Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, than of the Corean Government. It was unfortunate that circumstances should have obliged Admiral Willes to place himself entirely in his hands.
Mr. Aston mentions in his Report of the 11th April that he had never seen the Chinese text of Admiral Willes’ Treaty until a copy of it was handed to him by the Corean Foreign Minister (or President of the Foreign Board). This copy is also the first one which I have seen of that text, for although Admiral Willes had kindly and voluntarily communicated to me a copy of the English version of his Treaty, he declined to allow me to inspect the Chinese counterpart.
The objection to the non-retrospective character of the English text, which would at once strike any one acquainted with the subject, and which doubtless occurred to Admiral Willes, is that it would exclude us from the benefits of the Japanese Treaties with Corea of the 26th February and the 24th August, 1876, and from those of any compacts existing between Corea and China which would admit of being applied to ourselves. The conditions of the political and commercial relations between those two countries were lately defined, as your Lordship is aware, by the Agreement or Convention called “Trade Regulations,” which was made at Tientsin at the close of last year, and which, apart from its peculiar political stipulations, secures much larger commercial privileges for Chinese subjects in Corea than those obtained by Japan under the above-mentioned Treaties.
The members of the Foreign Board unhesitatingly assured Mr. Aston that their Government would apply the favoured-nations treatment to the said Convention or Regulations as well as to their Treaties with Japan, but they were careful to add that the Convention itself was not in force (or, as the Corean Envoy to Japan observed to me, see my despatch No. 176 of the 29th December last, it had not been ratified by the King), while, in regard to the Japanese Treaties, they expected to prevail on the Government of Japan to agree to some material modifications and to accept a similar Tariff to that named in the European Treaties. The Japanese, I may mention, are trading in Corea without any Tariff at all. They, however, do not deny the right of the Corean Government to levy customs duties on their trade, and some progress had been made in the negotiation of a Tariff, which, would probably have been arranged on a 5 percent. basis, when the offer of a 10 to 30 percent. rate by the American, British, and German negotiators suddenly raised the expectations of the Corean Government, and effectually checked the consideration of the more reasonable proposals of the Japanese Government, which were far better adapted to promote the development of a limited and nascent trade.
The Corean Government, actuated by the party in that Government which is opposed to Chinese domination, and whose views on the Chinese Convention may be gathered from the unfavourable observations of the Corean Envoy to Japan, which I reported in my despatch No. 176 of the 29th December, have, I believe, represented to the Chinese Government, since that Convention was concluded, that it would be difficult for them to withhold from foreign Powers the special privileges granted by that Convention to China, and have therefore urged that those privileges should be withdrawn. The Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, appears to be disposed to meet this demand, as M. von Möllendorff stated to Mr. Aston (see his letter of the 23rd April inclosed in my despatch No. 65 of the 28th April) that the Viceroy had promised to allow the Corean Government any concessions in commercial matters which they might require in order to place their relations with foreign Powers on a satisfactory footing. That the Chinese Government were therefore prepared to relinquish their right of trade in the interior and at the capital, and their promised monopoly of the interport or coasting trade, and would also agree to a similar Tariff on their maritime trade as that of the European Treaties with Corea, reserving, however, a 5 per cent. rate on their frontier trade in which foreigners could not participate.
Although it appears to me that most of M. Möllendorff’s sanguine assertions should be accepted with considerable reserve, there may be some truth in this particular statement, because the Viceroy may now perceive that, in obtaining for Chinese subjects under that Convention special advantages of so extensive a nature as would practically secure to them a monopoly of the Corean commerce, and thus render useless to foreign Powers the Treaties they have concluded at his instigation, he has overreached himself and imperilled the first object he probably had in view in promoting those Treaties, namely, to found upon them claims for similar restrictions and the same high rate of duties in the Treaties between China and European Powers. The surrender of the special advantages of the Corean Trade Regulations would be a small price to pay for the support which such claims would derive -in the way of argument at least -from the acceptance by China of the same terms as those Powers in regard to maritime trade with Corea, especially when it is remembered that prior to the negotiation of the said Regulations China possessed no maritime trade with Corea, and it therefore matters little to her whether that prospective trade is fettered at the outset with restrictions or high duties so long as she exclusively retains a frontier commerce with a Tariff of 5 per cent. and a monopoly of the trade in ginseng.
The willingness of the Corean Government to extend to us the same treatment in respect of maritime trade as they observe towards China would therefore prove of little or no value if the latter should make to Corea the concessions indicated by M. von Möllendorff. It is of more importance to us that the Japanese Government should not agree, in the same way, to the abandonment of their Treaty privileges, and accept, as the Corean Government hope they may be disposed to do, similar disadvantageous conditions to those of the American, British, and German Treaties. The position of the Japanese Government is one of some embarrassment. On the one hand, they are fully aware that the high duties of those Treaties would greatly reduce the Japanese trade with Corea, which, although hitherto exempt from the payment of any imposts, and fostered by advances to dealers from a Japanese bank supported by Government funds, is even now in a stationary condition, and limited to an annual value of little more than 500,000l. On the other hand, they are bidding against China for the alliance of Corea, and therefore would not wish to be placed in a less friendly attitude towards that country than that which is assumed by China. The influence of local American agents will not be wanting to prompt the Japanese Government to give to Corea similar terms to those which the United States have accepted, and they may suggest to that Government that the latter may found upon the relinquishment of their present privileges claims for similar concessions from European Powers. The Japanese Government, however, must be aware that the policy of the United States entails no sacrifice on their part, while its adoptions by Japan would seriously prejudice her existing commercial interests in Corea. The postponement of the exchange of the ratifications of the British and German Treaties may therefore have the effect of inducing them to pursue a temporizing course, and to adapt their action to the policy of those Governments, instead of to that of the United States.
I regard that postponement as the most desirable step that could have been adopted in our interest. The United States, I venture to think, will gain but little by their ratification of a defective Treaty; and if the experience which will be acquired in the course of the present year should show, as I believe it will, that the conditions of that Treaty are not calculated to promote trade, and that it therefore fails to satisfy the strong desire of the Corean Government for a Customs revenue, they will be more inclined than they now are to offer us acceptable terms. The Corean Government are anxious, not only to obtain a Customs revenue, but to borrow money from abroad. They will look in vain for such aid from the capitalists of the United States, and they know that, in the absence of Treaties, they cannot hope to obtain it from England or European Powers. The progressive party, as pointed out by Mr. Aston, have a further object in desiring relations with those Powers, namely, a hope that their influence may serve as a counterpoise to that of China, and be exerted, among other ways, in obtaining the withdrawal of the Chinese force which now occupies the capital. They may be disappointed in both these ulterior objects, seeing how limited is the security, according to our present knowledge, that they can offer for loans, and how doubtful is the capacity of the Corean Government, on the admission of M. von Möllendorff, their most earnest advocate, to maintain order among their own people with their own means, and to guard against mutinous outrages on the part of their ill-organized soldiery, such as those which occurred in July last, and which were directed against their King and Queen and the Ministers of the Corean Government.
Your Lordship instructed me, in your telegram of the 23rd April, to direct Mr. Aston to sound the Corean Government as to whether they would be willing to put England and Germany on the same footing as China, or to reopen negotiations with a view of assimilating the Treaties to those in force between us and China and Japan. This instruction, your Lordship will perceive, was in some measure anticipated by Mr. Aston’s communications with the Corean Government, which he has reported in his letter of the 11th April, and which elicited from the Corean Government the assurance that they would extend to us the same treatment as they accorded to China and Japan. I did not omit to instruct Mr. Aston, on the occasion of his second visit, to endeavour to ascertain whether they would be willing to assimilate their Treaty with us to those of China and Japan; but his Report of the 29th ultimo, inclosed in my despatch No. 91. of the 31st ultimo, shows that the President of the Foreign Board was unwilling to commit his Government to any further admissions, and that he shielded himself under the reserve that he could only treat on such subjects with a duly accredited Plenipotentiary.
He authorized M. von Möllendorff, however, to communicate to Mr. Aston a draft of a paper prepared by the former, and called “General Trade Regulations of Corea,” which shows that the Corean Government are disposed to accept the China and Japan Treaties as their guide as far as they may deem it convenient to do so, seeing that many of the terms of that draft are taken from those Treaties. I feel it unnecessary to enter into a critical examination of this document, seeing that the President stated that it was only a draft for consideration, which was not binding on his Government, and had been simply communicated as a proposal to that of Japan, but I venture to offer a few brief remarks on some of its leading features.
The first thought which occurs to me is that it shows that the draftsman -M. von Möllendorff-does not possess a practical or intimate knowledge of his subject. The arrangement is defective, and he appears to have been chiefly careful to multiply penalties, some of which are manifestly unreasonable, and heavier than those imposed in China and Japan. The most favourable point in it is the offer to open the coast trade of Corea to vessels of all nationalities for a period of five years, which is too short a term to give value to the concession; but it is interesting to observe that the complete interdiction of this trade which is contained in the American Treaty, and is repeated in our own and the German Treaty, was characterized by M. von Möllendorff as “a shallow device of Ma Taotai for securing to China a monopoly of this trade” (see Mr. Aston’s Report of the 29th May). It appears to improve the Tariff basis of those Treaties by declaring that “all imported goods shall pay an ad valoren duty of 10 per cent., with the exception of medicines, which will pay less, and by limiting the 30 per cent. rate to only a few articles; but this apparent improvement is entirely nullified by the further condition that, “in order to protect native produce, the Tariff may from time to time be changed on four months’ notice being given by the Custom-house.” Drawback of duty is allowed on foreign goods when re-exported, but in the case of any Tariff above a 5 per cent. basis this would simply be an indispensable condition. The tonnage dues are retained at the exorbitant rate of the three foreign Treaties, which could only be borne by vessels carrying full and valuable freights, such as are not likely to be obtained by those engaging in the Corean trade.
I do not think it probable that the Japanese Government will be willing to agree to these Regulations, as they are open to all the objections which, as I reported in my despatch No. 76 of the 14th ultimo, are taken by the Foreign Minister of Japan to the conditions of the American, British, and German Treaties. The XIth Article of the Japanese Treaty with Corea of the 26th February, 1876, the XIth Article of the Supplementary Treaty of the 24th August of the same year, and the XIth Article of the Regulations attached to the latter Treaty, contain the important and most salutary condition that all the Regulations under which Japanese trade is to be conducted with Corea, or any provisions which it may be necessary to add to the Articles of the first-named Treaty in order to develop its meaning and facilitate its observance, are to be settled by Commissioners appointed by each country. This condition, unfortunately, has not been secured to ourselves by Admiral Willes’ Treaty, and it is one which the Corean Government doubtless desire the Japanese Government to abandon, but I scarcely believe that the latter will be persuaded to take such a suicidal step, although they have endeavoured to gain a similar degree of liberty and of Customs autonomy in their own proposals to foreign Powers respecting the revision of their Treaties. In consequence of the Foreign Minister having been absent from Tökio I have been unable to ascertain his views on the subject, but the Vice-Minister who is temporarily acting in his stead has observed to me that the proposed Trade Regulations of the Corean Government appear to him to be wholly unacceptable.
I reported in my despatch No. 60 of the 21st April that I had instructed Mr. Aston to endeavour to ascertain whether the Corean Government would be willing to agree to a short Treaty of two or three Articles which would give us the advantage of the most-favoured-nation treatment without binding us to the objectionable commercial clauses of our Treaty, and he has reported, in his letters to me of the 11th April and 29th May, that the suggestion was favorably regarded by the Corean Government, but that the President of the Foreign Board was precluded from saying so to him because he was not accredited to the Corean Government as a Plenipetentiary. To give some degree of definiteness to this proposal Mr. Aston drafted with M. Möllendorff a Memorandum on this subject, which the latter undertook to lay before the Corean Government and of which I inclosed a copy in my despatch No. 93 of the 31st ultimo. Guided by the additional light obtained by Mr. Aston’s Reports, and by the determination of Her Majesty’s Government to postpone the exchange of the ratifications of our Treaty until the end of the year, I am now less disposed to advocate the adoption of this course. I think it would be preferable that Her Majesty’s Government should propose to the Corean Government to negotiate with them a new Treaty in place of that concluded by Admiral Willes, and I trust that I shall not be considered presumptuous in offering to submit to your Lordship’s consideration a draft Treaty, which I shall hope to forward by the succeeding American mail. It appears to me that it would be highly unadvisable that we should agree to terms with Corea which we have not already granted or are prepared to grant to China and Japan, and my recommendations will therefore be conceived in that sense.
I have still to offer to your Lordship some observations on the political information respecting Corea and its Government which has been gained by Mr. Aston, and on his proceedings in the matter of the consular sites, but I feel that I should not longer delay to express the high opinion I entertain of the valuable services he has rendered during his two recent visits to that country. His own Reports speak so forcibly for themselves that I feel it unnecessary to dwell upon the ability, knowledge, and judgement which they so clearly indicate, but I consider it to be due to him to state that, independently of the charge confided to him by your Lordship to secure the postponement of the exchange of the ratiflcations of the British and German Treaties, the information he gained on his first visit has amply justified his nation on that occasion, even if that information had been limited to the declaration he obtained from the Corean Government that they consider themselves pledged by favoured nation clause of our Treaty to extend to us all the privileges which they had already allowed to any other nation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Harry S. PARKES