Sir H.S. Parkes to Earl Granville.―(Received June 19)

(No. 64 Confidential)
Tôkiô, April 28, 1883

My Lord,

WITH reference to my previous despatch No. 63 of this date, I beg to inclose copies of the despatches which Mr. Aston forwarded from Söul by Her Majesty’s ship “Moorhen.”
These consist of a general account of his proceedings, and a Confidential despatch in which Mr. Aston reports the result of two interviews which he held on the 2nd and 9th instant with the Corean Foreign Ministers, and in the course of which the provisions of the Anglo-Corean Treaty signed on the 6th June last were discussed at some length.
As the English mail leaves to-day, I am obliged to reserve for the next opportunity the observations I shall have to submit to your Lordship on these subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES

Inclosure 1

Mr. Aston to Sir H.S. Parkes.

Söul, April 10, 1883
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch of the 6th March, I proceeded on the 12th of the same month to Nagasaki in the Peninsular and Oriental steamer “Khiva,” along with the two Corean officials, Mr. Kim Ok Kiun and Mr. So Kwang-poin[sic]. We arrived at Nagasaki on the 14th, but the “Moorhen” was prevented from sailing till the morning of the 17th by a strong westerly gale, against which it would have been impossible for her to make headway. We arrived at Roze Island anchorage on the morning of the 22nd. Messrs. Kim and So proceeded to the capital the next day, promising to make arrangements at once for Mr. Bonar and myself to follow as soon as possible; but it was not till the 28th that we were able to start for Söul.
In the meantime, I learnt that Mr. Hong Yöng Sik, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, was with Mr. Ma Kie Tchang, at the village of Hwa-do-chin, near Chemulpho, having come down from the capital in order to examine the proposed sites for a Settlement here. I took the opportunity of calling on the Vice-Minister, and as Mr. Ma was with him, the visit was taken as paid to both, and was returned the same evening. I said nothing about business matters further than hinting to the Vice-Minister that we should expect to be consulted in respect to the selection and laying-out of a Settlement. I learnt here that General Wu had left for China a day or two before; that Cho Nyöng-ha had ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs; and that Kim Ok Kiun had been appointed to an Under-Secretaryship in the same Department.
Mr. Ma said that everything was quiet, but that there was still danger of trouble from the anti-foreign party, so that it was necessary to keep the Chinese force at its original strength, viz., about 3,000 men. I was afterwards told by Mr. Takezoye that 2,000 men was nearer the mark, and that General Wu, before leaving for China, had expressed to him his intention of recommending to his Government the withdrawal of half the number. Mr. Ma admitted that there was no danger to himself personally, and said that he was in the habit of going about in Söul alone and unarmed. I observed, however, that whenever Mr. Ma went out at night he was accompanied by a guard of five or six armed Chinese soldiers. The Japanese guard remains at its former strength of about 200 men, and there is no present intention of making any change.
Suitable arrangements were made by the Corean authorities for our journey to the capital, a palanquin carried by four men, with four others to relieve them, having been provided for myself, and ponies for the rest of the party. A Corean luncheon was prepared for us at a halfway village, by order of the Governor of the Province of Kyöng-ki-do. Two clerks of the Foreign Office had come down from Söul expressly to superintend these arrangements.
The house of a Corean nobleman had been prepared for our reception, and although small according to European ideas, it was sufficiently comfortable, and compared favourably with many other houses which we had opportunities of inspecting. Several petty officers were deputed to attend to our wants, and it was the duty of one of these to report to the King every morning how we had passed the night.
Mr. Kim Ok Kiun called on me the same evening. He assured me that the minds of the people had become much more settled, and that no danger whatever was to be apprehended. He said he had found his Government favourably disposed in regard to Treaty matters.
On the 30th I went to the Foreign office and delivered your letter to the present Foreign Minister, His Excellency Min Yöng Mok. Mr. Ma came in afterwards, and the English version of your letter was handed to him for perusal. I next delivered my letters to the Primes Minister and to his Excellency Pak Yong-hyo. The latter told me that Mr. Kim Ok Kiun was now the real Director of the Foreign Office, though nominally holding a subordinate office. He suggested my calling also on Kim Pyöng Kuk, the second Minister of State, and on Cho Nyöng-ha and Min Thai-ho. The first-named Minister received me in a very cordial manner, but the other two were prevented by illness from receiving my visit.
I shall report in separate despatches the result of my interview with the Corean foreign Ministers on the 2nd and 9th instant, and of my endeavours to secure houses and building sites.
My reception has on the whole been as friendly as could reasonably have been expected. The Corean authorities spared no pains to make us comfortable, and have refused to let me refund to them the travelling and other expenses of my visit. I could see, however, that, although personally friendly to me, and sincerely anxious to establish friendly relations with us, they still entertain considerable suspicion of our objects, which it will take time altogether to remove. Amongst other attentions shown to me, a review of 300 of the King’s body-guards was given in the Royal park, and before our departure we were entertained by the Foreign Minister and his Excellency Pak Yöng-hyo at dinners, where a number of the leading officials were invited to meet us. On the other hand, I was told that Mr. Kim Ok Kiun had incurred much censure for bringing me over, and he was obliged to avoid coming to see me as often as he would have wished. There is no real cordial feeling towards foreigners outside a very small circle.
I trust to be able to leave Soul to-morrow, and to embark for Pusan in the “Daring” on the following day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W.G. Aston

Inclosure 2

Mr. Aston to Sir H.S. Parkes.

(Confidential)
Söul, April 11, 1881{1883}
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, having applied to the Corean Foreign Office on the 1st instant to depute an official to point out to me such available buildings as might be deemed suitable for the accommodation of a British Diplomatic Representative in the city, and to furnish me with information respecting the nature and cost of such building materials as might be procurable, I was invited by his Excellency Min Yöng Mok, the Corean Minister for Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the Foreign Office on the following day.
On arriving there I found assembled all the senior officials of the Foreign Department, with the exception of Mr. Ma Kie Tchang, the Chinese gentleman belonging to it. In addition to the Senior Minister there were present the Vice-Minister, Hong Yöng-sik, Kim Hong-jip, one of the signers of the Jinchuen Treaty, Kim Ok Kiun, and Cho Pyöng-phil.
After some conversation upon the subject of houses and sites for building, the Senior Minister handed me a copy of the Chinese text of Admiral Willes’ Treaty, which, as I had never had an opportunity of inspecting it, I had requested permission to see, asking me as he did so whether I thought it would be ratified. I replied that I had no information as to the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government in this respect, and was in no way authorized to speak for them, but that it appeared to me that there were some features in it which I was afraid would make it difficult to ratify it as it stands. He then invited me to point these out to him, which, as a convenient means of eliciting the opinions of the Corean Government, I had no hesitation in doing. I accordingly referred to the omission of Her Majesty’s title as Empress of India, and of any provision for the continuance of the present Treaty under the successors of the present Sovereigns of Great Britain and Ireland and Corea. Article II was passed over without remark.
In Article III there is a slight difference in meaning between the Chinese and English text, the clause which is in English, “If a British ship carries on a clandestine trade,” being in Chinese, “If such ship” (i.e., a ship which has put into a non-opened port in distress) “carries on a clandestine trade.” I showed the Minister that by a strict wording of this clause no punishment was provided in the case of a vessel which, without the excuse of bad weather or want of provisions, went to an unopened port in Corea and carried on a clandestine trade there. The Minster replied that he saw no difficulty here, as if vessels in distress were to be punished for clandestine trading there was still stronger reason for punishing one which did so without any such excuse. I said that in principle the Minister was perfectly right, but that these provisions of the Treaty would have to be applied by judicial officers who could be guided only by what they found before them, and would not be allowed to inflict punishments, however just in principle, which were not distinctly laid down in the Treaty. The provision in this Article for sending shipwrecked crews to their own country, I added, could not be conveniently carried out. This was seldom done in these countries, the usual practice being to send them to the nearest port where they could obtain employment.
Article IV I passed over on this occasion with the remark that the wording of it required to be amended, but at a subsequent interview with the same officials on the 9th instant I asked whether there was any objection to extend the operation of this clause so as to include offences by British subjects against other British subjects and foreigners, together with all judicial matters in which Corea was not concerned. To this the Minister replied that of course there could be no objection to this.
Up to this point the Corean Ministers unanimously expressed their concurrence in my remark, but in regard to Article V, the Tariff Clause, they informed me that they intended to leave it as it now stands, subject, however, to the qualification that no heavier duties would be levied on British commerce than on that of other nations.
I pointed out that a 10 per cent. duty would have a very injurious effect on a trade which was now quite insignificant though no duties whatever were charged, and that if we allowed to Corea a Tariff based on this principle, it might embarrass us in any future Tariff negotiations with China and Japan in which we might be engaged. In reply, the Ministers reminded me that the scale of duties laid down in this Article was a maximum scale only, and made profuse promises to deal liberally with Tariff matters when the Treaties were once concluded. They said a high rate of duty was of no consequence to them in comparison with fostering trade and placing their relations with foreign countries on a friendly footing. It should be remembered, they continued, that England was not the only country interested in this matter, and as America had already signified her intention to ratify the Treaty, it was difficult for them to propose a reduction to one country only. We might rely, however, on receiving favoured-nation treatment in this respect. I asked would the favoured-nation treatment apply to the Convention recently concluded with China. Mr. Kim Ok Kiun said it would, and Mr. Kim Hong-jip remarked that this Convention was not in force (or his word might mean, “would not be enforced”). I was then told that the 5 per cent. rate of duty named in this Convention was applicable to land duties only, and not to importations by sea. I noticed, however, a disposition on their part to get rid of this as well as certain other stipulations of the Chinese Convention. They felt no doubt that it would be used as an argument in favour of a 5 per cent. Tariff at the ports, and were perhaps also influenced by the consideration which the Japanese Minister told me he had brought to their notice, viz., that when Russia made a Treaty she would of course also claim a land frontier rate of 5 per cent. If Japan were granted a 5 per cent. rate, England, they said, would naturally be entitled to a similar privilege, but it must be remembered that it was not correct to say that the Japanese had the right of free trade. The principle of payment of duty had all along been admitted, and it was only the rate which had not been decided. I was led to suspect, by the sanguine tone of their remarks on this point, that they have been led to understand that Japan will not oppose a 10 per cent. Tariff if the other Powers consent to its adoption. The details of the Tariff the Corean Minsters intimated their intention of settling by themselves, and I am inclined to believe that they purpose to take the same course in regard to Customs, Land, and other Regulations.
It was explained to me that the mace according to which tonnage dues are to be reckoned is not the Corean mace of copper money, but the mace by weight of silver, and therefore identical with the Chines mace. This I said was a very high rate, and much heavier than the corresponding charges in China and Japan.
In regard to Article VI, the Corean Minsters informed me that they were averse to allowing foreigners to visit the interior for purposes of trade, and that they hoped to be able to cancel this stipulation in the Convention lately concluded with China. It had been introduced, they said, in return for a similar privilege granted to Corea subjects in China, to which I replied that the same privilege was allowed to Coreans visiting England. I added that so long as we were treated on an equality with other nations in this respect we should not complain, but any concession in this direction to China would certainly lead to similar claims being made by ourselves.
The stipulation in this Article reserving for Corean shipping the interport trade in native produce would, the Minister said, be also subject to the favoured-nation clause, but it was their desire to retain this trade in their own hands for the present, and they were confident that Japan, whose Treaty as it now stands contains no prohibition of interport carriage of native goods, would not object to make this concession to them. From some remarks dropped at various times by Mr. Kim Ok Kiun, I believed that there is a scheme on foot for establishing a native Corean Steam Navigation Company, holding a similar position to that which the Mitsu Bishi Company holds in Japan, and that they wish to retain this prohibition with a view to its protection.
The clause prohibiting Corean subjects from importing opium into England had not been introduced into the Treaty at the desire of the Corean Government, and they have no objection to its being expunged. They also observed that they would not object to insert in the Tariff a provision allowing the importation of opium for medicinal use.
In answer to a question whether it would not be sufficient to prohibit the export of grain from Inchhön (Jinchuen) in seasons of scarcity only, as at the other ports, it was explained to me that this clause was introduced more in order to reassure the minds of the Corean people than from any belief that it was really required. The grain of the Metropolitan province was never sufficient for the wants of the inhabitants, and any surplus for exportation would be found at Pusan or Wönsan, and not here. The same opinion was expressed to me by Mr. Sugimura, the Japanese Vice-Consul at Chemulpho, who, for this reason, augured unfavourably of the prospects of foreign trade at this port. He thought the trade here would never equal that of Pusan, but in this opinion I cannot agree with him.
In regard to the concluding Article of the Treaty (the favoured-nation clause), the Corean Ministers made a statement which very materially alters its character. They informed me that the non-retrospective character of this clause in the English version is owing simply to a mistranslation. The Chinese version, they said, was not intended to have, and has not, this force, and it was always wholly foreign to the intentions of the Corean Government to refuse to one nation privileges which they had already allowed to another. I said I had no doubt this statement would be received with satisfaction by Her Majesty’s Government, and that it would go far to remove the difficulties in the way of establishing friendly relations between the two countries. I must say, however, that the Chinese text seems capable of both interpretations, and that the circumstances under which the Treaty was drawn up suggest reasons for thinking that the meaning originally intended was that of the English text.
There was then some conversion respecting the necessity in any future Treaty of selecting one version as the authoritative one in case of a divergence of meaning of the two texts. The Senior Minister expressed a preference for Chinese, and Mr. Kim Ok Kiun suggested that a Corean version should be prepared and adopted as the standard. This suggestion is a very sensible one, as the Corean would be understood by a far larger proportion of the people. It is usual to issue notifications to the people in both Chinese and Corean, and if the Treaty is to be notified in the latter language, it would be well to have an officially-authorized version of it. Mr. Asayama, the Corean Interpreter to the Japanese Legation, says that the Corean language is capable of greater precision than the Chinese, and is preferred by the natives in intricate matters where precision is necessary. Mr. Kim Ok Kiun’s preference for a Corean version was no doubt prompted by his wish to avoid anything which might suggest the dependent relation of Corea to China. As you are aware, he is the leading man of the anti-Chinese party.
The Corean Ministers then requested me to represent to Her Majesty’s Government, through you, that it was their earnest desire to establish Treaty relations between the two countries as soon as possible, and they trusted that, in view of the explanation they had given regarding the favoured-nation clause, no difficulty would be found in doing so.
I said I believed this proposition might lead to a satisfactory result, but that I ought not to conceal from them my apprehension that their attitude in respect to the Tariff would cause difficulty and delay, and might altogether defeat this desirable object. I then said that I had omitted to mention a number of other objections to the Treaty as it now stands, but as none of them were likely to lead to any difference of opinion, I had not thought it worth while to occupy the time of the Ministers by dwelling on them. I subsequently suggested to Mr. Kim Ok Kiun, in a private conversation, that if his Government wished to have Treaty relations established as quickly as possible, some time might be saved if they declared their willingness to conclude a preliminary Treaty consisting of the first and last Articles of the present Treaty, with a provision to the effect that it should come into operation as soon as Her Majesty’s Government signified to the Corean Government their intention to ratify it. I made this suggestion knowing that it was nearly in accordance with the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government to Admiral Willes, and because it seemed to afford the only chance of allowing Corea to be opened to British subjects at the same time as to those of other Treaty Powers. If adopted, it would also enable us to avoid pledging ourselves to a direct approval of a high rate of Tariff, in case the Corean Government persisted in their refusal to make concessions in this respect. I took no further steps in the matter, but was informed by his Excellency Pak Yong-hyo and Mr. Kim Ok Kiun that this suggestion was favourably regarded by the Corean Government.
I was told that Ma Kie Tchang was not consulted in reference to these communications of the Corean Government, but that they were not concealed from him. I was unable to discover any trace of interference on his part, and believe that the language held to me by the Ministers is the genuine expression of the views of the Corean Government, and was not dictated to them by China. I have no doubt of the sincerity of their wish to enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain. In addition to mere obvious motives, they are aware that, until a Treaty has been concluded, English capitalists will not lend them the money which they so urgently require, and the anti-Chinese party hope that British influence will in some measure act as a counterpoise to that of China, which is exercised in a way very irritating to them. I should not be surprised if the other Treaty Powers were appealed to, under the Ist Article of the Treaty, to use their good offices with China in order to obtain the withdrawal of the Chinese force now stationed here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W.G. Aston