Mr. Johnson to Earl Granville

(Private and Confidential)
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
Hong Kong, January 20, 1883

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Julian Pauncefote’s despatch of the l0th October, 1882, replying to the communication I made on behalf of this Chamber to your Lordship on the subject of the Treaty recently negotiated between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Corea.
I have now to convey to your Lordship the thanks of the Chamber for the courteous and confidential invitation extended to the Committee to express its views upon the Treaty, a copy of which was inclosed with Sir Julian Pauncefote’s letter, and to set forth, with as much brevity as the subject permits, the opinions of the Committee upon the operation of the clauses which relate to trade and commerce.
The Committee has no doubt that Her Majesty’s Government, when entering into political relations with Corea, has regarded that kingdom as a State which is completely independent in respect of its domestic administration and its international responsibilities, though subject to a certain undefined suzerainty exercised by China, similar to that acknowledged by Annam and Burmah and hitherto satisfied by the rendition of an annual tribute. That such has also been the view held, until recently, by China herself, is clear from the evidence furnished by the express declarations of the Tsung-li Yamen of Peking in 1866 and 1871 on the occasion of French and American difficulties with Corea, when the Chinese Government disclaimed all responsibility for Corean affairs, and by her acquiescence in the recognition of the complete independence of Corea which was declared in the Japanese Treaty with that country concluded in 1876.
Since, however, the attack upon the Japanese Legation at Seoul last year, the Chinese Government appears to have changed its attitude, and to have asserted its claims to exercise control not only over the administration of the internal affairs of Corea, but also over its foreign relations. The Edict published some months ago in the “Peking Gazette,” notifying the punishment of the Dai-in-Kuri, refers to the King of Corea as being subject to Chinese law and authority, and in a document recently made public, styled “Regulations for the Conduct of Trade by Sea and Land between Chinese and Corean subjects,” the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang, late Viceroy of Pechili, is designated in terms of official equality with the King of Corea, as if the Ruler of that country were occupying a position delegated to him by the Emperor, analogous in point of rank and authority to that of a Governor-General of a Chinese province.
The Committee may hereafter deem it necessary to consider, in a separate communication to your Lordship, the terms of these Regulations and the special privileges which they appear to confer upon Chinese traders, and refer to them now, when discussing the bearing of the British Treaty, in order to bring prominently before Her Majesty’s Government the desirability of ascertaining the precise character of the relationship claimed by the Government of China quoad that of Corea, before Her Majesty is advised to ratify the Treaty negotiated by Admiral Willes.
As the Kingdom of Corea has never been claimed to be an integral part of the Chinese dominions. it is either a mediatized State under the protection of China, in which case the authority of its King to conclude Treaties with foreign nations may hereafter be questioned, or it is an independent country, with whose autonomy the Regulations referred to are inconsistent. It would be unfortunate if the recent interference of the Chinese Executive in the internal affairs of Corea should be hereafter adduced to throw doubt upon the international validity of any of the provisions of the foreign Treaties, on the faith of which commercial intercourse with Corea will have been entered upon and is to be conducted. The Committee, however, accepting the independence of Corea as a recognized international fact, ventures in the first place to offer to your Lordship some observations upon the Treaty as a whole, and, in the second, to consider seriatim the several clauses of that document which may seem to call for special comment.
The Committee assumes that Her Majesty’s Government has had some cogent reason, arising out of the political situation, for pushing forward to a rapid conclusion the negotiations with the Core an authorities, but admitting that there were good grounds of policy for entering into immediate relations with the country, the Committee respectfully submits that that object would have been as successfully, and much more conveniently, attained if preliminary negotiations had been confined to drawing up a short Treaty, expressive of national amity, and providing generally for political and commercial intercourse, leaving a Tariff of duties, and the special conditions under which foreign trade is to be carried on, to a supplementary and carefully considered Convention. The frequent disputes which have arisen about the interpretation to be placed upon certain clauses of the Treaty of Tien-tsin show the importance of drafting with peculiar care agreements, affecting national interests, which have to be drawn up in a language so full of obscurities even to the most experienced Sinologue as that of China, so as to avoid all misunderstanding when the stipulations and covenants to be observed on either side come to be made effective. The Committee cannot fail to perceive that the diplomatic instrument signed by Admiral Willes at Jin Chuen in June last has been very loosely compiled in point of form, and that many of its most important provisions have been expressed in most indefinite language, and further, that imperfections, similar to those now generally recognized as existing in the Treaties with China and Japan, have been repeated and intensified in this new Treaty. Moreover, after a careful consideration of the whole scope of the document, the Committee is apprehensive that the limitations which some of its stipulations impose upon foreign intercourse and trade will not only be injurious to the operation of the Treaty itself, but will seriously prejudice the position hitherto consistently maintained by the Representatives of Western nations at the Courts of Peking and Yedo in combating proposals to place similar restrictions upon trade with China and Japan.
There can be no doubt that, notwithstanding the vast material benefits which have resulted to the people of China during the last twenty years from the great increase in all branches (excepting in opium) of the foreign and coasting trade of the Empire, and which have been the direct consequence of the extended foreign intercourse opened up by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, the ruling classes of China are actuated at the present time by a desire to restrict, as far as possible, the application of foreign capital and enterprise to the further development of the resources of the country. The Committee may adduce the strenuous attempts which have recently been made to prevent the organization of various industries under foreign auspices at Shanghae in evidence of the present unsatisfactory attitude of the Chinese authorities, and earnestly desires to draw your Lordship’s attention to the great accession of strength which the reactionary party in China would derive from the stipulations of a Treaty voluntarily entered into by the Western Powers with a dependency of the Empire, if the opponents of progress should be able to point to conditions of exclusion in that Treaty disadvantageous to the foreigner, which have been yielded to the tributary State, but are denied to the country of the Suzerain.
In conclusion of these general remarks, your Lordship need hardly be reminded of the difficulty which would be placed in the way of a successful conduct of the existing negotiations for a revision of the Treaty with Japan, if the arguments of Her Majesty’s Minister at Yedo in favour of the adoption of a liberal foreign policy by the Japanese Cabinet should be met by unfavourable precedents, cited from the recent Agreement with Corea.
Proceeding now to consider some of the special stipulations of the Treaty -
Article II relates to the character of official relationship and communication between the two countries, with which it is scarcely the province of this Chamber to deal; but so great has been the inconvenience sustained in former years by the merchants in China under the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking, which seriously hindered free communication between foreign Consular officials and the provincial authorities, that the Committee feels it necessary to advert to the paragraph in the first clause of this Article which stipulates that “Officials shall have relations with the corresponding local authorities of equal rank upon a basis of mutual equality.” This stipulation is a very vague one according to the English text, and what it may imply in the Chinese text the Committee is unable to say. It may be read in an exclusive sense, and be taken to mean that officials of the one country may only communicate with officials of the same rank in the other. The war with China, commenced in 1856, would probably have been averted if Consul Parkes could have insisted upon personal communication with Governor-General Yeh, and the Committee suggests the expediency of providing that the commissioned officers of both countries, whether civil, naval, or military, shall be entitled to hold official intercommunication on terms of social equality, while observing the ordinary rules of precedence relating to official rank.
Article III, in the clause which provides that a British vessel shall, with her cargo, be seized and confiscated if found engaged in clandestine trade, is remarkable for repeating a grave shortcoming in the Tien-tsin Treaty which has been the occasion of a lasting controversy. Under this Article a vessel, alleged to be engaged in trading to a port not opened by the Treaty, may be confiscated by the Corean authorities of their own motion, and with or without trial, subject to no investigation by or appeal to British officials.
The Committee desires to enter the strongest protest against the confirmation of this clause, on two grounds:-
1. That the absence of any recognized practice or system of jurisprudence in Corea renders it impossible to repose confidence in the decisions of Corean officials who would be judges in their own cause without appeal; and
2. Because the power of confiscation is granted without the safeguard of any provision as to the nature of the proceedings which shall be taken to prove that the vessel shall have been really quiltyof the offence with which it may be charged.
The Treaty between Japan and Corea provides that in the event of a Japanese vessel being found engaged in smuggling goods “into any non-open port in Corea, it shall be seized by the Corean local authorities, and delivered over to the Agent of the Japanese Government residing at the nearest port. Such goods to be confiscated by him, and to be handed over to the Corean authorities.”
In the clause relating to the wreckage of British vessels on the coast of Corea, the local authorities should be made responsible, not only for taking the necessary measures for rendering assistance to the crew, and salving the vessel and cargo, but also for inflicting condign punishment upon all plunderers or wreckers.
Article V mainly relates to fiscal obligations, and the Committee cannot conceal its surprise and regret that after the e:-perience which has been gained of the unsatisfactory working of the Tien-tsin Treaty, owing to the looseness of certain of its stipulations which provide for and limit the Tariff of duties, Her Majesty’s Representative should have given his assent to clauses which cannot fail in operation to revive, in the case of Corea, difficulties and controversies similar to those which have arisen and still exist in carrying on trade with China.
It is no doubt necessary to concede to Corea, in principle, the right to levy duties and protect its own revenue laws; but before the Tariff which the Treaty prescribes is assented to, the Corean Government, as having had no previous experience in such matters, may reasonably be required to furnish to the British officials a Code of Customs Regulations, and of proceedings for adjudication in the case of a breach of fiscal rules. The want of such a Code, and the absence of any provision in the Tien-tsin Treaty for a system of trial or adjudication, led to the grossest miscarriage of justice during the earlier years of the establishment of the Foreign Customs Inspectorate in China, and the Committee hopes that Her Majesty’s Government will take adequate precautions for the protection of the property of British subjects against unjust Customs seizures when Corea becomes opened to foreign trade.
The Committee is of opinion that the Tariff of customs duties upon imports and exports generally should not exceed those levied in China under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and considers that the scale of ad valorem duties upon imports therein, viz.,5 per cent upon entry and 2% per cent. commutation of inland dues, should be adopted also in Corea, and would not be excessive, provided that measures should be taken to give satisfactory and complete effect to the stipulation in the concluding lines of paragraph 4 of this Article: “that no other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any sort shall be levied upon such imports either in the interior of Chosen or at the ports.” Here, however, appears to be repeated another defect in the Treaty of Tien-tsin, which provides no guarantees for redress in the event of a breach or evasion on the part of local officials of a similar stipulation in that document. The Committee suggests that the clause should run, “and that any other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any sort, which may be levied upon imports either in the interior of Chosen or at the ports, shall be recoverable from the Chosen Customs at the port of entry of such imports.”
The distinction between articles of daily use, which are to be subject to an ad valorem duty of 10 per cent., and articles of luxury, which are to pay more, is much too vague, and cannot fail to be productive of endless disputes. The Committee would propose that schedules of the several articles be drawn up and agreed upon with British officials before the Treaty is confirmed, and has, moreover, to point out that no provision is made for any drawback of duty in the case of goods which have paid import duty beingre-exported.
As regards tonnage dues, no stipulation appears that these levies shall be applied to their usual and legitimate purposes, viz., the lighting of the coast, and the improvement to rivers and harbours. No definition is given as to the character of the ton, whether of register or burthen, or of the money in which payment is to be made as to its being Corean or Chinese currency. In Chinese money the tax would be far too heavy.
A serious, and in the opinion of the Committee, a fatal objection remains to be urged against this Article as a whole, because it places British subjects on a more unfavourable footing than Japanese, who, by their Treaty of 1876 are, as the Committee understands, relieved from the payment of any import duties. As the “favoured nation clause” in Article XIV is not made retrospective in its effect, and as the Chinese under their “Regulations” claim a right in the case of the” subject State” of Corea to favoured treatment, different in its character from that which other nations on the ordinary footing would obtain, it is certain that, if duties are to be levied upon British trade on the scale authorized in Article V, British vessels and subjects will be virtually excluded from commerce with Corea. Article VI-The second clause of this Article refers to ports in Corea open to foreign commerce, and to the “concessions” within the limits of which British subjects may alone reside. The list of such open ports is not given in the Treaty, and no provision is made for the marking out or setting aside such “concessions.” Under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, the British Government became the lessee from the Government of China, at equitable prices, of an allotment of land at each port newly opened by the Treaty, for the purposes of occupation by British subjects, but the provisions of the Core an Treaty leave it to be a matter of conjecture us to the meaning which is to be attached to the term “concession.”
The second clause proceeds to stipulate that buildings or land may be leased and residences or warehouses may be constructed within the “concessions,” that no coercion or intimidation (presumably by British subjects) in the acquisition of land or buildings shall be permitted, and the land-rent shall be paid as fixed by the authorities of Corea; These stipulations imply that the acquisition of land is to be a matter of private arrangement between intending purchasers and the native owners, and while the language of the clause permits an unmerited and offensive imputation to be thrown on the character of British merchants, no safeguard is taken that exorbitant or prohibitory prices will not be demanded for land, and that the rents to be fixed by the authorities will not be excessive.
The third clause provides that all rights of jurisdiction over persons and property within the concessions remain vested in the authorities of Corea, except in so far as such rights have been expressly relinquished by the Treaty. As the only rights relinquished are those reserved by Article IV, and relate solely to civil and criminal cases between natives of Corea and British subjects, it follows that cases in which British subjects are concerned against each other, or those in which they are engaged with foreigners of other nationalities, will have to be adjudicated by the Corean authorities. The Committee cannot suppose that Her Majesty’s Government will sanction such an arrangement.
It is further to be remarked that it appears doubtful whether, by the terms of this Treaty, the native Government, as in the cases of the Treaties between China and Japan and Great Britain, has wa:ved the ordinary right of the Sovereign of the soil to tax the persons and property of British subjects within the areas of the concessions, and that no provision is made in it for the municipal government of those concessions. The difficulties which have from time to time arisen in the conduct of the municipal affairs of the foreign Settlements in China and Japan show the necessity of making arrangements, such as experience has shown to be adequate, to meet the serious questions and controversies which otherwise cannot fail to arise under similar circumstances in Corea. The Committee has now before it “a Code of Municipal Regulations of the Japanese Settlement of Fusan, in Corea,” dated the 9th November, 1881, under which “the entire charge of municipal affairs devolves on the permanent residents in the Settlement,” and does not doubt that Her Majesty’s Government will not permit British subjects to be placed in a more unfavourable position in the country than those of Japan.
The fourth clause prohibits British subjects from transporting foreign imports to the interior, or from proceeding thither to purchase native produce, and from transporting native produce from one open port to another open port.
As to the prohibition against British subjects visiting the interior, it will be seen that this stipulation involves a retrograde step, placing British subjects at a great disadvantage, when it is compared with the freedom of travel granted to foreigners in China and Japan, and with similar facilities given to Chinese and Japanese traders in Corea. Under the Chinese “Regulations,” Chinese merchants may open commercial establishments in Yang Wha Chiu and in the capital, and by applying to the Commissioner of Trade they may obtain passports to go into the interior for the purpose of trade or pleasure.
The prohibition against the transportation by British traders the clause does not mention British ships, though the stipulation may be supposed to includethem-of native produce between the open ports, the Committee regards as one of the most objectionable provisions in the Treaty. This prohibition cannot be defended on the ground that it affords a necessary protection to Corean shipping, because the Japanese enjoy the right of trading between the ports opened to them under their Treaty of 1876, and the Chinese under their “Regulations” will assuredly claim a similar privilege. The carrying trade, under such a disability as this attaching to British and foreign shipping generally, would be virtually handed over to the Japanese and Chinese flags, notwithstanding that the larger proportion of imports to Corea would be goods of British origin, and the Committee needs hardly remark upon the onerous charge for freight which the existence of a local carrying monopoly would impose on the manufactures of the United Kingdom and the trade generally of Corea, or as to the unfavourable effect which the abandonment of the coast trade with Corea would not fail to exercise upon the course of future negotiations for the revision of the existing Treaties with China and Japan.
The importance of the issues which are at stake in the maintenance of the provision that foreigners may share in the intermediate trade between the open ports is not to be measured by the effect which the abrogation of that provision would have upon the interests of foreign shipping alone, extensive as those interests are.
If foreign vessels should be excluded from the coast trade, foreigners would be practically shut out from all business, excepting at the ports which would have direct trade with foreign countries. Coasting freights under Chinese and Japanese flags alone, and the establishment of native guilds and monopolies which would follow the absence of competition in general business by other foreigners, would cause the control of the distributing traffic to pass into a few hands, and trade of all kinds, under the weight of exorbitant profits, would languish and decay. The evil effect of these monopolies may be understood when the stagnation of industry which prevails at the ports in China not open to foreign trade is compared with the activity and enterprise which are displayed by native merchants at the open ports, where they are exposed to competition with foreigners; and the Committee does not doubt that the maintenance of the progressive character of the external commerce and internal industry of China and Japan is very greatly dependent upon the possession by foreigners of the privilege of competing with natives for a share in the coasting traffic of these countries.
Article VII.-The extraordinary and apparently useless stipulation in this Article that subjects of Corea shall not be permitted to import opium into any British port would necessitate a legislative enactment on the part of the Imperial Parliament, and the Committee is unable to understand how the prohibition, declared in the second clause,against the engagement of foreign vessels other than British, is to be enforced, or offenders against it are to be punished, by any legislation which it is possible to devise on the part of the British Government.
Article VIII.-In the second clause, instead of the words “shall be confiscated; the Committee, for the reason already given in the case of vessels charged with offences, suggests the insertion of “may be seized, and shall be liable to confiscation, on satisfactory proof of intention to evade the prohibition being furnished to the British authorities.”
Article IX.-To the first clause there should be added: “Fire-arms and ammunition for sporting purposes or for purposes of self-defence. may be imported under special permits describing the quantity, value, and object of introduction.”
Article X.-In the second clause, after the words “local authorities, “the words “on being satisfied as to the justice of the charge made” should be inserted.
Article XII, while admitting that the Treaty is “incomplete in its provisions,” nevertheless stipulates that it shall remain in force for five years. The Treaty with Japan provides that the “Regulations under which Japanese trade is to be conducted” may be “revised whenever it may be found necessary by Commissions appointed by each country,”and a similar stipulation is to be found in the Chinese “Regulations.” The Committee is of opinion that the term of five years, as arranged by the British Treaty, would not be too long, provided that the covenants and engagements entered into on either side should be drawn up with carefulness and completeness by experienced negotiators.
Article XIII does not provide as to whether the English or Chinese text of the Treaty is to be accepted in the event of a dispute as to the proper meaning of its provislons. The Committee suggests an addition to this clause of “the English version is to be considered the accepted text in case of dispute.”
Article XIV.-The Committee regards the qualification of the ordinary “favoured nation clause,” admitted by this Article in its last lines, with great distrust. Under that qualification the provisions of all Treaties with Corea will be liable to be set aside, or rendered nugatory, by the grant to one foreign nation of favourable conditions, in which it may be specially interested, in exchange for nominal concessions in which it has no interest at all, but which may be of vital importance to the trade of other countries having Treaties with Corea. This qualification, if yielded to Corea, will probably be demanded by China and Japan, and be made use of in forcing the policy of the British Government in relation to the Treaties with these Powers to an extent which may not at present be foreseen.
The objection to this Article, as not being retrospective in its operation, has been already alluded to, and the Committee feels confident that Her Majesty’s Government will not permit British subjects trading with Corea, or residing in the country, to be placed under disabilities from which natives of China and Japan are exempted.
No stipulation is to be found in the Treaty as to the currency in which commercial operations are to be carried on, or in which duties are to be paid, and no provision is made for drawing up a detailed Tariff of duties. No mention is made of any regulations as to the standard weights and measures to be used in trade between foreigners and natives.
The Committee desires to refer to the great importance of the issues which are at stake as its apology to your Lordship for the length at which the provisions of the Treaty have been examined in this communication, and does not seek to disguise its expectation that sufficient cause has been shown why Her Majesty’s Government should be asked to refuse ratification of that document in its present shape.
The Committee trusts that your Lordship will use the authority and influence of Great Britain to secure beyond question the recognition of the national independence of the Corean Kingdom, which is obviously threatened by the recent highhanded declarations and proceedings of the Chinese officials, and will depute an experienced Diplomatic Representative to reopen communications with the Corean Government. It should not be difficult, in the light of the experience gained in China and Japan, to draw up an amended Treaty, under the wise and well-considered provisions of which not only would the people of Corea be admitted to the benefits of free commercial intercourse with the rest of the world, and their rights and interests be fully protected, but the trade of the United Kingdom with that country would be promoted and be placed on an equality of privilege with that enjoyed by other nations.

I have, &c.
(Signed)　　F. BULKELEY JOHNSON, Chairman.