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1차 조영조약에 대한 橫濱 상공회의소 의견 상신

제2차 조약 체결 과정

 
  • 발신자J.P. Mollison
  • 수신자G.L.G. Granville
  • 발송일1883년 1월 9일(음)
  • 수신일1883년 2월 20일(음)
  • 출전FO 405/33; AADM pp. 141-3.
Mr. Mollison to Earl Granville.―(Received February 20)

Yokohama General chamber of Commerce, Yokohama,
January 9, 1883

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship’s letter, dated 10th October lst, intimating that you would be glad to receive and give due consideration to any observations the Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce might wish to make on the proposed Treaty with Corea; and I have also to acknowledge receipt of copy of said Treaty under cover from his Excellency Sir Harry S. Parkes.
The Committee of the Chamber have carefully considered the proposed Treaty, and now venture to submit to your Lordship the following comments upon its provisions;-
Tariff.―The Tariff, or rather the absence of a Tariff, is the first conspicuous feature, for the simple statement that a duty not exceeding 10 per cent. shall be charged on articles of daily use, and not exceeding 30 per cent. on luxuries, amounts to nothing, in the absence of provision for allowing British officials a voice in the question of whether a particular article shall be charged as a necessary or a luxury, and especially as it is reserved to the Corean authorities to fix all duties without reference to British officials. This of itself is a bad precedent; but when taken in conjunction with the excessive rates of duty proposed to be levied becomes doubly so, bearing in mind the revision of the Treaties with Japan now pending, and also possible future negotiations with China having the same end in view.
Further, it is not clear from the Treaty whether the percentage of duty is to be estimated on the first cost at the place of production, or on the lay-down cost of the goods in Corea, as per invoice, including freight and insurance charges.
It may be noted here that, in their intercourse by Treaty with Corea, the Japanese pay no import duties whatever, and also, in the same connection, that in the matter of tonnage dues those proposed to be levied on British vessels are out of all proportion to what are paid by Japanese vessels.
Leasing Land.―Here again advantages are granted to Japanese by Treaty which are denied to British subjects, the most noticeable being that the former are only required to pay the same ground-rent as is charged to Coreans themselves, whereas the latter, it is stipulated, shall pay whatever rent the Corean authorities may see fit to impose. Moreover, the British Treaty would appear to contemplate the foreign settlements being subject to Corean municipal law, an arrangement which, judging from the accounts which have been received as to the state of Corean towns, roads, &c., it is feared would be found extremely unsatisfactory.
Coast Trade.―The stipulation closing the trade between the open ports in Corea, in native produce, to British shipping is a feature in the proposed Treaty open to several objections, besides again affording a precedent that Japan and China would not be slow to avail themselves of. Such trade, denied to British ships, would not fall into the hands of Coreans, who have practically no mercantile marine, but of the japanese and Chinese, who are not affected by any similar prohibition. One of the Chinese Shipping Companies is believed to have already secured exceptional privileges in this respect. In connection with the coast trade, it may not be out of place to notice here that in cases of smuggling it is stipulated in the British Treaty that both vessel and cargo shall be seized and confiscated, whereas the Japanese Treaty states that cargo only shall be so dealt with.
Export of Grain.―The entire prohibition of the export of grain from Jin’chuen, the port nearest to the capital of Corea, seems unnecessary in view of the preceding clause, by which the Government of Corea reserves to itself the right of temporarily suspending the trade at any or all of the ports whenever it may appear desirable to do so. It should be remembered that Corea has no manufactures, and for a long time to come must pay for imported goods, as she in now doing, by agricultural produce, and any restrictions on the export of grain will therefore have a directly injurious effect on the import trade. In the event of the exercise of this right of prohibition being contemplated, ample notice should be given beforehand to prevent the injury to trade which a sudden measure of this kind would undoubtedly cause. It may be pointed out that, according to the terms of the Japanese Treaty, the export of grain is free from all the open ports, without exception, and that no right of prohibition is reserved.
Trade Regulations.―These it is stipulated shall be framed in conformity with international law, but there is no provision that British officials shall have the voice in their preparation which the comparative importance of British interests (shown by the fact that almost the whole of the imports at present are of British origin) demands. It is also stated that these Regulations shall be drawn up after an interval of five years, whereas it is patent that they should be ready when the country is opened. The Japanese Treaty of 1876 with Corea provided for the drawing up of Trade Regulations “by Special Commissioners appointed by the two Countries” prior to the opening of the ports, and at a later period provision was made for revision whenever necessary “by Commissioners appointed by each country.”
Treaty Ports.―The Treaty does not mention what ports are to be thrown open to British trade, but it is presumed they will be the same as the Japanese have fixed upon, viz, Wönsan, Fusan, and Jin’chuen. As the last-named is in some respects objectionable, it is desirable, before finally deciding on it, to ascertain whether some more eligible port cannot be found near the capital.
Opium.―The stipulation prohibiting Coreans from importing opium into England seems unnecessary, and could not be enforced (should the occasion arise) without special legislation.
Article XIV.―From a commercial point of view, this is the most objectionable clause in the whole Treaty, as by it British merchants are excluded from advantages previously acquired by other nations in Corea, and Great Britain is therefore placed in the position, not of the most favoured nation, but after both Japan and China.
The Japanese, as has already been stated, pay no import duties, and only insignificant shipping fees, and it is not likely that they will consent to allow the Coreans to charge the high rates of duties, &c., of the British Tariff. Under these circumstances, it is plain that it will be totally impossible for British merchants to compete with them, except by resorting to the somewhat ignominious plan of conducting their business in the names of Japanese.
The commercial position of the Chinese in Corea is not quite so clear, as we have no precise knowledge of the privileges they possessed in that country prior to the negotiation of the proposed British Treaty. Whatever these privileges may be, however, that Treaty debars British subjects from any participation in them. And According to intelligence just received from China, it appears that arrangements have recently been concluded, which gives to China a Tariff of 5 per cent. on imports and exports, and to her merchants the right to go into the interior of Corea to purchase native produce, and to trade in native produce between the open ports, both of which are expressly prohibited to British merchants under the proposed Treaty. It is understood, moreover, that it is maintained by China that foreigners are to be excluded from participation in the above-named privileges.
All that is claimed by British merchants in Corea is a fair field and no favour. But so long as the Treaty places them at such a manifest disadvantage in respect to the Japanese, and no doubt also to the Chinese, it may be confidently predicted that British trade with Corea will be carried on, as at present, by these intermediaries, and that few British merchants will establish themselves in the country.
Jurisdiction.―It hardly falls within the province of a commercial body to offer an opinion the Jurisdiction Clauses of the Treaty, but the Committee may be pardoned for saying that it appears strange, while reserving British jurisdiction in all case in which a Corean is plaintiff and a British subject defendant, to leave to Corean law and Corean Tribunals cases in which both parties are British subjects, and cases between British subjects and foreigners.
The arrangements as to criminal jurisdiction are open to similar objection. This result, we presume, could never have been intended, but it is essential that on an important point of this kind no doubt should be left possible. There is none in the case of Chinese or Japanese subjects in Corea; they are amenable in their persons and property solely to the jurisdiction of their own authorities, and they are expressly exempted from the control of Corean law.
In view of the considerations above named, the Committee regret that they can only report to your Lordship on the proposed Treaty in an unfavourable sense. They have to object to its containing no Tariff, Customs, Trade, or Municipal Regulations, nor any provision for negotiating these before the opening of the ports to trade; to the excessive duties which, under its provisions, could be imposed on British trade by the Corean Government at will; to the liberty given to the latter to determine, as they may see fit, the land-rents to be paid by British subjects; to the power which they will possess to confiscate ships and cargoes, and subject British subjects, in many important respects, to Corean laws and Corean Tribunals, which are known to be in a barbarous condition; and they object to and burdened by disadvantages which would render it impossible for them to compete with the latter, and would, in short, deprive them of all inducement to establish themselves in business in that country. Believing, as they do, that little or no commerce could be conducted by British merchants under this Treaty, they respectfully recommend that it should not be ratified by Her Majesty’s Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES P. MOLLISON, Chairman

 
이름
Mollison , Granville , Harry S. Parkes , JAMES P. MOLLISON
지명
Yokohama , Wönsan , Fusan , Jin’chuen
관서
Yokohama General chamber of Commerce , Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce
사건
The Japanese Treaty of 1876 with Corea

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