Sir H. Parkes to Earl Granville.―(Received February 5, 1883)

(No. 176 Confidential)
Tôkiô, December 29, 1882

My Lord,

THE principal Corean Envoy to Japan, Pak Yöng-hyo, visited me on the 23rd instant to take leave, as he was about to return to his country. He excused the absence of the Second Envoy on the ground of indisposition.
He at once directed the conversation to the subject of our Treaty with Corea, and inquired if I had heard anything as to its ratification. Having answered in the negative, he observed that he regretted the delay as he feared that if it were to continue, his country, owing to the high-handed course which China was adopting towards her, would sink without hope of succour. He was anxious to know what I thought on the subject.
I replied that I was not surprised at the delay, because I thought, as I had told him in our previous conversations on this subject (reported in my despatches Nos. 153 and 154 of the 24th October), that the unfortunate events which had occurred in Corea since the Treaty was made would oblige my Government to proceed with caution, even if they approved all the conditions of the Treaty, which I also thought was doubtful. And now, again, I had heard of the recent arrangements made between China and Corea at Tien-tsin, which I thought would place additional difficulty in the way of ratification. By these arrangements China would be able to trade with Corea on far more favourable terms than the Western Powers who had made Treaties with Corea. Japan was also placed by her Treaty in a much more advantageous position than those Powers. It would be useless, it appeared to me, for British or any other foreign merchants to endeavour to compete against the favoured treatment which Corea had accorded to those two nations.
The Envoy observed that the Tien-tsin arrangements to which I had alluded had been forced upon Corea by China, and this was the high-handed action to which he had referred. An Agreement had been concluded, but it had not yet been ratified by the King.
I replied that I did not doubt that he spoke his true feelings, but his language did not appear to be reconcilable with the action of the Corean Envoys who represented his country in China. The Agreement in question was the outcome, I believed, of much negotiation at Tien-tsin; the Envoys, I understood, had gone backwards and forwards between China and Corea while it was being conducted, and it might fairly be presumed, therefore, that the arrangements which had thus been concluded with China had been willingly made with the full knowledge and consent of the Corean Government and King. But, however this might be, that Agreement, I thought, must have the effect which I had named.
The Envoy said that he wished to talk with me very frankly, but begged me to accept all he had to say in strict confidence, and as emanating from himself alone. That, I rejoined, was exactly the character of my own remarks. He then made the following observations:―
“I grant that, judging from appearances, you may naturally conclude that the recent agreement between China and Corea has been made with the consent of the latter, but this is not the fact. It has been forced upon us by China, who has taken advantage of Corea’s weakness to dictate it. Japan made her Treaty with Corea direct, and, therefore, it is a satisfactory one. But when Corea had to negotiate with Western Powers, China intervened and drafted the Treaty, which she told us we should make with those Powers. In our ignorance of the subject, we thought that China must know what was the most proper course, and would advise us for the best. The unfavourable conditions of those Treaties were therefore adopted at her suggestion. We now perceive that, taking advantage of our inexperience, she has acted entirely with a view to her own interest and to the disadvantage of Corea, and that she now wishes to subordinate Corea completely to herself. We hoped that by entering into Treaty relations with Western Powers we should be guarded against such a result, and we still trust that the latter will afford us their support. Corea’s position is this. She has no army, as she did not need one for the government of her own people. She is, therefore, in the grasp of China, whom she cannot resist, and who can, therefore, compel Corea to do whatever she wishes. You are doubtless aware that in the draft of the Western Treaties a clause was inserted declaring Corea to be a dependency of China, but entirely independent both in her external and internal affairs. This clause was removed from the Treaties as signed, but it was transferred to the letters which the King addressed to the Sovereigns with whom he concluded those Treaties. This declaration of the independent position of the King was made with the full knowledge and approval of China, Now, however, she is interfering in every way in Corea, both in internal and external matters, and is depriving the King of his rights and his Government of their liberty of action. I have no words to express my indignation at the flagrant injustice of her proceedings.”
I inquired whether the above views were simply his own, or whether they were shared by the King and his Government. It was important also to know what were the feelings of the Corean people on the subject, as it was open to a nation to surrender its independence if it desired to do so. The Tien-tsin Agreement certainly seemed to greatly lower the position of the King of Corea, and might render it difficult for other Sovereigns to regard him as an equal.
The Envoy replied that when tie left Corea to come to Japan the King had expressed to him his strong repugnance to the aggressive spirit which was then being shown by China, and had desired him to lose no opportunity of making his feelings known. But the Agreement recently forced upon Corea at Tien-tsin, which places the King in a position of utter subjection to China, was a serious aggravation of anything that had before occurred. As to the feeling of the nation and the Government, he regretted to say that the people of Corea, in their present low condition, could not be taken into account; while, owing to so many of the public offices being held by hereditary tenure, a large proportion of the governing class were either spiritless or under the influence of old Chinese ideas; but the King and his party were strongly imbued with a desire to maintain the national independence. They perceived that if China continued in her present oppressive course, and if foreign Powers did not make Treaties with Corea, and there by recognize her national status, she would sink and never rise again.
I asked the Envoy whether his Government would be willing to give Western Powers the same privileges as they had given to China under the Tien-tsin Agreement. He replied that he was not authorized to say so, but he thought that they would willingly extend to those Powers any of the conditions of that Agreement that were not disadvantageous to Corea, provided that those Powers made proposals for amending their Treaties, or making new ones direct to Corea, and not through China.
Having asked him to name the conditions of the Tien-tsin Agreement which he regarded as disadvantageous to Corea, the Envoy observed that the conditions which they chiefly objected to were all those passages which subordinated the King to the Government of China, and practically deprived him of his sovereign rank; but that in addition to these they disapproved of the stipulation which opened the interior of Corea to China for purposes of travel and trade, as they considered that in the present state of the former country the safety of foreigners in the interior could not be guaranteed.
I observed that the said Agreement provided that the import and export duties to be paid by Chinese were 5 per cent, ad valorem. Would his Government be willing to admit foreign goods on the same terms?
The Envoy replied that he thought the Tariff of 10 to 30 per cent, on foreign imports, which was named in the Treaties with Western Powers, was too high, and would crush a nascent trade, but it had been specially recommended by China, 5 per cent., on the other hand, he thought was too low.
That rate, I observed, is the basis of the Tariffs concluded by China, and also by Japan, with all Western Powers.
In that case, he replied, Corea might also agree to it, though he still thought that it was too low.
It would be a very proper rate, I remarked, on some classes of goods, though I admitted that the more valuable commodities might bear a higher rate.
As to his observation that any proposals to amend their Treaties or to conclude new ones should be made by Western Powers direct to Corea, it appeared to me, I remarked, that a foreign Government would probably wish to receive some assurance that overtures of that nature would be favourably entertained by Corea before they made them.
He replied, that although he was leaving Japan, Kim ok Riun would remain here, and would serve, if necessary, as a channel of communication. And although I had told him that I was in no way concerned officially in Corean affairs, he begged me to do what I could to make known to the British Government the difficulties of his country, and also that Corea earnestly looked for the support of the Western Powers with whom she had made Treaties.
On returning his visit on the 26th instant I met both the Envoys, who remarked that they hoped I would report favourably about their country to my Government, and that the latter would approve of the British Treaty coming into force. I told them that as this was the last time I should have the pleasure of seeing them I would unreservedly state to them, but as my personal opinion only, that the present Treaty was of no value to my country. The remark led to a conversation between themselves, at the conclusion of which the Senior Envoy remarked that they agreed with me, and that if the British Government had any objections to offer to the present Treaty his Government would be glad to know them.
I then inquired whether a report, which had reached me, was true, that the Corean Government would object to foreigners in Corea observing their religion to the extent of erecting places of worship within the concessions that would be set apart for the residence on the latter.
The Senior Envoy replied that he feared the erection of churches would excite the people and occasion disorder. To this I observed that it was incumbent on any Government that made a Treaty to maintain order among its own people. Foreign churches were allowed by Treaty in China and Japan, and foreigners who respected their faith would rather not go to Corea than be deprived, if they went there, of liberty of religion. The Envoy observed that he could perceive that to prohibit the building of churches would offend the feelings of foreigners, but their erection, on the other hand, would offend the feeling of the Corean people, and if the Government endeavoured to repress that feeling, it might only make matters worse. He believed that this was a question which would eventually settle itself. If foreigners would refrain from building churches during the first two or three years of their stay in Corea, the hostile feeling towards foreign religion which was at present prevalent among the Corean people would abate, and the latter would become accustomed to the idea that the free observance of their worship should be permitted to foreigners.
I referred to this subject because my French colleague had told me that he had discussed the missionary question with the Envoy. He had stated to the latter that though liberty to proselytize might not be claimed for missionaries, still a foreigner being a missionary and a subject of one of the Powers who had lately concluded Treaties with Corea, would have the same rights as to residence in Corea as any other subject of the same Power, and that he saw no reason why a clause should not be inserted in a Treaty giving foreigners the right of building churches in their own concessions. The Envoy had replied that he thought this was impossible in the present state of popular feeling in his country. M. Tricon, I should add, entertains the opinion that the Corean Government is powerless to control its own people, and that the advent of foreigners there will not be unattended with trouble. He told the Envoy that the French Government had suspended their wish to negotiate a Treaty with Corea on hearing of the murders at Söul, because they considered that the country was not in a condition to enter into relations with foreign Powers, and to incur the responsibilities which those relations involved.
I should observe to your Lordship that in the course of the preceding conversations in which I have closely reported the language of the Envoy, I refrained from passing any criticisms on the action of China. The Envoy, Pak Yöng-hyo, is a young man of much intelligence and self-possession, and he spoke forcibly but without excitement. His remarks I thought of sufficient importance to justify the telegram which I sent to your Lordship on the 24th instant. He evidently feels strongly against China, and this feeling it may be presumed will not have been diminished by his communications with the Japanese Foreign Minister, and I believe I may add with the United States’ Minister at Tokio, as the latter in conversation with myself has unreservedly condemned the assumption by China of control over Corea, and has observed to me that his Government consider that the independence of Corea should be maintained.
Corea being a weak and an uncivilized State, may be expected to be insincere; her people are violent and ill-mannered, and greed and rapacity appear to be prominent characteristics of her officials. Though the various parties in her divided and incapable Government will pay court from time to time either to China or to Japan, as may best promote their own particular aims, or thwart those of their opponents, they all probably entertain for both those countries about an equal degree of aversion. Though glad to derive such a degree of support from China as will effectually protect them against Japan, they are equally ready to resent the patronage of the former when it involves subjection, and as a counterpoise to her domination, which has recently been imposed upon them in a way and to an extent which they did not anticipate, they now look for aid to the intervention of Western States. It would be vain, however, for the latter to suppose that the Coreans have conceived any real regard for foreigners, or are prepared to suddenly lay aside their old traditional hostility. A wide field, however, is presented for intrigue and dissimulation, and Corea may find that Japan and Russia will both be inclined to encourage them in resistance to China.
I have evidence that the discussions which led to the Agreement of Tien-tsin were not conducted between the Chinese and Corean Representatives in a way that was acceptable to the latter, and Pak Yöng-hyo was not incorrect in stating to me in the above conversation that that Agreement was dictated by China, and unwillingly concurred in by the Corean Agents. When the latter urged that other nations would probably claim the same privileges as were thus accorded to China, the Grand Secretary Li Hung Chang stated to them, in terms which must have wounded their susceptibilities, that they should remember that China was not the equal of Corea, but her superior, and that she did not make Treaties with Corea, but “Regulations,” which were communicated by order of the Emperor. The nations who treated with Corea were therefore in a wholly different position to China, and could not claim the same privileges, and he tauntingly added that if Corea really desired to silence any demands for equal treatment with China, she should inform the nations which made such demands that the Regulations in question were granted by China as a favour to one of her dependencies.
It will be evident, I think, that our ability to promote harmony between these Oriental nations, and to stimulate the impoverished Coreans to enter on industrial and commercial pursuits, must depend on the position we shall occupy in our earliest relations with Corea. It would be better, I submit, to hold entirely aloof from that country than to enter it on conditions inferior to those which we possess in China and Japan, It may be foreseen that the first foreign settlers in Corea will need foreign protection, and other Western nations will probably not be more eager than ourselves to incur, without the prospect of any adequate return, the cost of that obligation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES