주메뉴 바로가기내용 바로가기하단 바로가기
상세검색
  • 디렉토리 검색
  • 작성·발신·수신일
    ~
근대한국외교문서

조선의 국제적 지위에 관한 井上馨와 회견 보고

제2차 조약 체결 과정
  • 발신자
    H.S. Parkes
  • 수신자
    G.L.G. Granville
  • 발송일
    1882년 9월 12일(음)(1882년 9월 12일)
  • 수신일
    1882년 10월 21일(음)(1882년 10월 21일)
  • 출전
    FO 46/288.
(No. 128 Secret)

My Lord, Tôkiô, September 12, 1882

AT my interview of yesterday with the Foreign Minister, which I have reported in my immediately-preceding despatch, his Excellency observed that he desired to mention, in the strictest confidence and secrecy, his views on a point connected with the Corean question which his Government regarded as one of great moment. This was, whether Corea should exist in future as an independent State, or be recognized as a dependency of China.
In considering this point he was prepared, he said, to admit at once that it would be difficult for Corea to preserve her integrity, unless she received either the material or the moral support of some more powerful State. If material support were needed it would be natural that that should be extended to her by a neighbouring Power. The countries adjoining Corea are China, Russia, and Japan. Japan was exceedingly desirous that Corea should occupy a position of independence, but Japan would not undertake the charge of her protection. China, on the other hand, seemed disposed to claim the position of Corea’s Suzerain, which would or should involve the responsibilities of protection; but was China able to defend Corea in case of need against the other Power which he had named? He was satisfied that she was not, and he was equally assured that Russia desired that Corea should be regarded as a dependency of China, because in the event of a conflict occurring between those two Powers, Russia would then be at liberty to fasten on Corea.
In saying this he was scarcely dealing with a hypothetical case. Russia was not satisfied with the Ili settlement, and her long line of contiguous frontier to China offered constant occasion of misunderstanding. She was continually adding to her military strength on the Corean border; she had 8,000 troops at Vladivostock, and had found two other strong posts, one at Khabaroffka, at the junction of the Usuri with the Amur, and another at a point in the same neighbourhood which he could not distinctly name. In case, therefore, of a dispute occurring between her and China, she was prepared at a moment's notice to take possession of the Corean ports of Gensan and Fusan, which were points of the greatest strategic importance, and China was wholly incompetent to prevent the capture or recover the loss of these places.
Russia, he knew, viewed with strong disfavour all attempts to bring Corea into relations with Western Powers. As an instance of this he might mention that when Commodore Shufeldt applied to Japan to assist him in his mission to Corea in 1881, the Russian Representative at Tôkiô strongly urged him to withhold all aid, using as an argument that by the opening of Corea to other nations Japan would be deprived of the monopoly of the trade. He (the Foreign Minister) had then replied that he could not actively assist the American Commodore because the Corean Government would resent any endeavour on the part of Japan to introduce Western nations to Corea, but, on the other hand, he could do nothing to thwart the efforts that any of those nations might see fit to take in order to establish relations with that country.
The recent action of China in Corea raised the question of the status of the latter, which would now have to be seriously considered by all those Powers who had relations with that country. He had therefore telegraphed on the 7th instant to the Japanese Ministers at London and Berlin, and to Mr. Ito, the Cabinet Minister, now travelling in Europe, informing them of the settlement recently effected by Mr. Hanabusa at Söul, but pointing out that the true position of Corea must now be determined. He had instructed them, therefore, to seek the opinion of the British and German Governments, and to express the hope of the Japanese Government that those Powers would ratify their Treaties with Corea as with an independent State, as he believed those Treaties contained no conditions which were in the least opposed to such independence. He had heard of letters of a compromising character having been written by the King of Corea; but it would be unsafe, he thought, to allow such letter, which were probably dictated under exceptional influences, to supersede or detract from the conditions of the Treaties themselves.
The importance of Corea, his Excellency added, should not be weighed by her commercial capacity, which appeared at present, it is true, to be very limited. But the country was known to possess gold and silver (500,000 dollars’ worth of the former having been bartered to Japan last year at Gensan alone), and, also, it was believed, deposits of iron and coal. Her material resources might, therefore, admit of development, but there was no doubt of the great political importance of her position, and viewing the question of her status from that point, he felt confident that the loss of her independence would prove positively disastrous, not only to Corea herself, but also to other nations who had large interests in the extreme East.
He did not expect, nor did he desire, that any of the Western nations who had concluded Treaties with Corea should directly undertake the protection of that State, but he hoped that in her case, as in that of the minor States of Europe, the moral support of greater Powers would prove sufficient to guard her against exterior aggression. He also hoped that free communications with the West would quickly stimulate a desire on the part of the Coreans for internal reforms, which would lead to the establishment of a stable Government, and, by quelling factional strife among the ruling classes, would afford the people opportunities of industrial effort, and of thereby ameliorating their present poverty-stricken condition.
His Excellency having asked my opinion on the subject, I replied that, while I appreciated the singleness of view which characterized his arguments, I could only report the latter to my Government for their consideration. He then begged me to do so both by wire and despatch, and I therefore forwarded to your Lordship my telegram of yesterday’s date.

I have, &c.
(Signed)  HARRY S. PARKES

색인어
이름
Shufeldt, Ito, Hanabusa, HARRY S. PARKES
지명
Tôkiô, Vladivostock, Khabaroffka, Usuri, Amur, Gensan, Fusan, Tôkiô, London, Berlin, Söul, Gensan
오류접수

본 사이트 자료 중 잘못된 정보를 발견하였거나 사용 중 불편한 사항이 있을 경우 알려주세요. 처리 현황은 오류게시판에서 확인하실 수 있습니다. 전화번호, 이메일 등 개인정보는 삭제하오니 유념하시기 바랍니다.

조선의 국제적 지위에 관한 井上馨와 회견 보고 자료번호 : gk.d_0007_1010