My dear Lord Tenterden
Tokio, June 21, 1882

Would you consider me intrusive if I offer a few remarks on the British Treaty with Corea?
This and the American Treaty are believed here to be Li Hung Chang’s work. Besides opening Corea to the Western Powers, which had become essential to the security of China, there is, I fancy, much in these Treaties which is intended to the address of Western Powers in China, as well as to that of Japan. The declaration of dependency on China is a tu quoque to Japan for having persuaded Corea to declare herself independent in the Japan Treaty, and for Japan’s action in Loochoo. It may also be intended to guard against Corea acting wholly independently of China, as Siam has done. How we are to recognize this quasi-dependent condition, and at the same time to treat Corea as an equal, the King being placed on the same footing as the Queen, appears to me rather a puzzling problem. This declared suzerainty will be annoying to Russia and Japan, and will promote the aim of the former to attach the latter to her interests.
I am very sorry that Admiral Willes had no interpreter with him. He was, therefore, entirely in the hands of the Chinese Ma Taotai. Early in the day I had offered him Aston, who speaks Corean, and also knows the Chinese character; but the Admiral, on conferring with Wade, seems to have formed the idea―which, I think, is rather an extreme one―that any one coming from the side of Japan would be objectionable to the Coreans. As it appears, Aston is well and favourably known to the latter, as many of them have lately visited Japan, and been in constant communication with him at Kobe. Aston would, at least, have secured that the titles of the Queen would have been learned by the Corean Government, the capital would probably have been reached, a reception by the King arranged, and at least some information obtained as to the state of the country and its Government. Eventually I sent Aston on my own responsibility, because, in a note which I received from the Admiral, I saw that there was a possibility that Spence would fail him, as proved to be the case. Aston reached the Admiral just two hours after he had started on his return, but he allowed him to remain in the surveying vessel to collect information, and I have no doubt we shall receive an interesting Report.
If the Treaty is to come into operation in a year from this time a great deal of preparatory work should be done beforehand, or we shall have trouble at the commencement of our relations. A Tariff should be settled that will determine specific rates of duty on as many articles as possible. The ad valorem rates mentioned, and the tonnage dues (Article V) are very high, and are those which Li Hung Chang would like to see adopted in China. If we give them to Corea, will it not be difficult to withhold them from China and Japan? I have just been engaged in persuading the Japanese Government to abate their demands for high Tariff; but in view of this Corean Treaty, they may fly back to their original claims. The concessions, i.e., sites for the settlements of foreigners at the port, should be arranged, if possible, before the latter arrive, or we may have the same trouble which we had at first in Japan, and from which we have not yet recovered. By Article VI foreigners are not to carry native produce between the open ports, which is an unfortunate condition. In Japan I am specially instructed to maintain this privilege; but the Japanese will certainly continue to contend for it when they see that it is surrendered in the Corean case. It would please Li Hung Chang largely to deprive us of this right in China for the benefit of his Company of Chinese steamers. Article VI also reserves to the Coreans every power and function not expressly provided for in the Treaty. This, we may believe, will be used to cut down the privileges granted to the lowest possible limits, and in some cases to take away privileges which are necessary to the enjoyment of those expressly granted. The opium Article (VII) appears to me rather embarrassing, as it will be difficult for our Government to apply the “appropriate legislation” spoken of to foreign vessels. I am inclined to doubt whether the Chinese version says anything about “this appropriate legislation;” but of course Admiral Willes does not know what he signed in Chinese.
I venture to suggest that it would not be necessary―in the first instance, at least―to station a Diplomatic Agent at Seoul, and that our Minister at Peking would be our most fitting Agent. Seoul could be visited from Peking sooner than Shanghae. But I would strongly recommend that we should get a staff of three of four men at least on the ground as soon as possible, and these might be contributed both from the China and Japan Service. I am not aware that any of the men of the former Service know Corean. Aston has an extensive knowledge of it, and there is another man here who also knows it―Basil Hall Chamberlain―a very able man of about thirty, who is anxious to get into the public Service. Mr. Kennedy wrote to you about him last year. He knows the Chinese, Corean, and Japanese languages, having been out here nine years, and he is just leaving the Japanese Service. Of course it was hopeless, as I told him long ago, to look for employment in the China or Japan Service; but Corea is a new field, and it would be certainly to our interest to secure him. He might be first engaged as an Interpreter, and placed subsequently with reference to the claims of the Service men who may be sent to Corea. I presume that a Consul and an Assistant would at first be required at each of the three ports, and a Secretary of Consul at the capital, who might also be Consul for the port of Jinchyon (or Jinchuen), close at hand. I certainly think that Aston would be the best man for service at the capital, at least in the commencement; but on this point I may be better able to judge when he returns. If three or four men could be sent to Corea in the autumn, and allowed to reside at the capital, they would learned much of the language and acquired much information by the end of next spring, and might have put in train the Tariff (unless this is to be confided to the Chinese Customs), and other necessary arrangements.
Chamberlain, I may mention, is a nephew of General Sir Neville Chamberlain, of India. His grandfather was Sir Henry Chamberlain of our Diplomatic Service fifty years ago, and, curiously enough, his maternal grandfather was the celebrated writer, Captain Basil Hall, the first Englishman to visit Corea (1816) and to write upon it. I merely mention these particulars to show that the man comes of good stock.
It will be interesting to notice what action is taken by the German and French Ministers in Peking. I should think it probable that they will not be disposed to accept Commodore Schufeld’s Treaty without modification. Of course, in our case there was no negotiation whatever; the Coreans handed us Commodore Shufeldt’s Treaty, and we took it. The favoured nation clause alone would have been decidedly more advantageous, but I doubt whether the Coreans would have given it the Admiral; they had learned their lesson from Li Hung Chang at Tien-tsin, and were doubtless required to keep to it.
I have been obliged to write very hurriedly, which I beg you to excuse. Pray accept my few remarks for the little they may be worth, and acquit me of any desire to interfere in a question which may not be considered to come within my sphere. The trade in Corea must be very small for some time to come, and if the conditions under which we are to conduct it are to create disadvantages for us in China and Japan, we may not have acquired very valuable privileges. But perhaps there may be some opportunity of modifying or adding to the present Treaty by some supplementary clauses.

Very faithfully, &c.
(Signed)　　Harry S. Parkes