Lord Granville
Confidential 31
Tientsin
2 June 1882

My Lord,

I sent off yesterday a series of Despatches which will put Your Lordship in possession of the history of the Corean treaty, so far as the United States are concerned, and of my own action here, in furtherance of the instructions received by Admiral Willes.
My aid has since been invoked in another quarter. On the 25th or 26th May, Monsieur Dillon, the French Consul here who had been on a visit to Peking, returned with a message from his Minister, Monsieur Bouree, to the effect that, as regarded Corea, the French Government wished him to do whatever I might be doing; not to precede me, but to follow close. He accordingly begged for information. I gave him an outline of what I had been about, and, at the instance of Monsieur Dillon, I endeavoured to procure for him copy of the Chinese text of the Treaty and a letter to Ma Taotai, the Chinese Agent now in Corea; the same papers, in short, as I had been enabled to obtain for Admiral Willes.
The Grand Secretary Li, to who I applied, through an Agent in his confidence, for these papers, replied after a day’s delay, that he had handed over all his archives to his acting successor, the Governor General Chang Shu-sheng. The latter had sent me his card by a subordinate, with an expression of regret that he was as yet too busy to call on me. Accordingly, on the following day, 29th May, I called upon His Excellency.
When I told him of what had passed between Li Chung-tang and myself the day before, he professed ignorance of the whole question. He had not had time to read half the papers handed over to him. However, after an hour’s talk, during which he certainly showed no disposition to do what I asked, he promised either to let me have a letter for Ma Taotai when he came to return my visit next day, or if not then, perhaps in a day or two.
His Excellency, I knew, was coming to the settlement next day, 30th, to take leave of the Grand Secretary Li on board the steamer which was to convey the latter South. He came to me at 4 o’clock, and almost at once, of his own accord, opened the question. He had consulted Li Chung-tang, he said, on the subject of a letter to Ma, and the Chung-tang had pointed out a difficulty in the case of the French, which did not exist in the case of any other power. The only interest of the French was the Romish Missionary interest. The Coreans were hostile to Romish missionaries. Not a year passed without some trouble in connection with them; murders even not being uncommon. Mr. Holcombe, the American Charge d’Affaires, had been pressed to allow the insertion of an Article, prohibiting missionary teaching. To this he had replied that his Government could not in decency accede; so it was eventually agreed that nothing should be said about missionaries one way or the other. In answer to some observations of mine regarding the invidiousness of obliging France to make a different treaty from those of other powers, Chang ta-jen replied that that was not his desire; but that the relation of France to the missionary question being peculiar, he wished to have a clear understanding arrived at beforehand between France and Corea. He could hardly adopt my suggestion that, in that case, the French had best address themselves direct to Corea. Monsieur Bouree had better discuss the matter either with the Tsung-li Yamen at Peking, or if he could make it convenient to come to Tientsin, with Chang ta-jen himself.
All this was urged with sufficient politeness. On my side it was argued that, France being prepared to sign exactly the same treaty as England and the United States, if a treaty were refused her, she could hardly fail to feel offended both with China and Corea. It would be vain to expect France to declare in a treaty that she would not allow missionaries to preach Christianity. No western power, indeed, would make such a declaration. The simplest solution, beyond a doubt, would be to follow the course adopted by Mr. Holcombe in his draught treaty, namely, to leave the question untouched. This would enable France at once to conclude a treaty. I remarked, farther, that France was not the only country whose missionaries were of the Church of Rome. There were at this moment in China, British, German, Dutch, Belgian and Spanish missionaries of the same persuasion. “Yes,” said Chang ta-jen with a laugh, “but you do not support your missionaries to the same extent as the French.”
I forgot at the time that, as Governor General of the Two Kuang Provinces, Chang ta-jen has had to take part in a very angry discussion regarding a Romish missionary establishment in Kuangsi. If the French version of the Affair be correct, the vicaire apostolique concerned had accepted a compromise proposed by the Chinese Authorities themselves, but from the terms of which they subsequently receded. This alas! Is too possible.
To return as soon as Chang ta-jen was gone, I drew up a memorandum of what had passed between us. This I read to Monsieur Dillon. I may here state that I have known him ever since he arrived in Peking as a student twenty years ago, and that I have the highest opinion of his character. He is an exceedingly devout Catholic, but I have none the less heard him complained of indirectly for his insufficient support of certain missionary reclamations. I am satisfied that Monsieur Dillon would not support any claim that he thought not justified by the treaty. On the other hand, being the devout man that he is, he would be prepared, I feel sure, to go all lengths in advancing whatever he conceived to be the interest of his church.
He was naturally much shocked at learning the grounds of the Governor General’s reluctance to put him at once in the way of carrying out his Minister’s instructions, and begged me to suppress my memorandum. This, I pointed out to him, would be useless, as Chang ta-jen had spoken in the presence of three persons, two of whom were certain to repeat what they had heard. He left me to say goodbye to Li Chung-tang. I should mention that in reply to a question put to him, a month or two ago, at Shanghai, by a Romish missionary, Commodore Shufeldt is reported to have said that he purposed securing religious tolerance in Corea. Monsieur Dillon had counted upon this.
On the other part, to anticipate a little, he has since been informed, he says, by Chang Tajen, that Mr. Holcombe, when he agreed to leave out of his draught all reference to religious propagandism, did, under pressure from Li Chung-tang, verbally engage, in some sort, to prevent American missionaries from entering the country. I am satisfied that Mr. Holcombe, who himself commenced his career in China as a missionary, could never have given any promise of the kind.
I went later to take leave of Li Chung tang. I found Chang ta-jen seated with him. Monsieur Dillon, whom I met on my way to the ship, told me that he had found means to say a word regarding Corea, and that he thought that the two great men would yield if I supported him.
My intention had been not to speak of business, but Their Excellencies both began at once, and we had a warm, though very good-humoured, discussion for the best part of an hour, at the end of which an interpreter was sent for and was all but instructed to write the letter to Ma Taotai that I required.
I reckoned without my host, and Monsieur Dillon, who had received orders from his Minister to start at once with the papers he did not doubt the Chinese would supply him with, now proposed that he himself should be considered merely as a delegate of his Minister, sent to inform the Coreans of the desire of France to enter into friendly relations with Corea, and of the intention of the French Government shortly to make a treaty. Pending negotiation of this, France was prepared to accept for French citizens precisely the same conditions as the treaties of America and England might impose on their nationals.
I wrote this on the 31st, through a native interpreter, to Chang ta-jen, insisting much on the inutility of attempting to isolate France in the matter, and the danger of such a course. His answer was discouraging. Remarks, conveyed to me through two different channels, were to the effect that Monsieur Dillon wanted something more than I had put forward. On the first instant, however, Chang ta-jen did send me a letter addressed to Ma Taotai, which I was requested to hand to Monsieur Dillon.
Monsieur Dillon now appeared to fear that this letter, which of course was sealed, might contain instructions unfavourable to his mission, and he hesitated as to whether he should proceed. I admitted as a certainty that the letter would review the situation from the standpoint of the Chinese. The interpreter who brought it could tell me no more than that Ma Taotai had been enjoined to lend a helping hand. I thought that, if after pressing so eagerly for the letter, Monsieur Dillon were now to decline to make use of it, the Chinese would simply be confirmed in the suspicion already attributed to them, that the French had some policy in Corea not yet sufficiently declared. Monsieur Dillon’s great fear was not only that the anti-missionary question, to him personally most offensive, might be raised; I felt sure, of course, that it would be; but that the form of reference to it might be affronting to his Government. I recommended him to talk the matter well out with Ma Taotai, himself a Roman Catholic, though not, I fancy, one of the strictest, and to impress on him the expediency if formulation of objections on the part of Corea proved unavoidable, of so turning the phrase as to make it diplomatically acceptable. If from Ma Taotai he learned that there was more difficulty ahead than he had expected, the check would not be as serious as if a higher officer of his Government had been concerned: the gunboat that was to carry him was really under orders for Nagasaki, there to meet the French Admiral Meyer. Leaving his letter with Ma Taotai, if the latter could do nothing, he might inform him that he would accompany the gunboat to Nagasaki, and explain the case to Admiral Meyer. Monsieur Dillon had assured me most positively that his Admiral, to whom there appears to have been some idea originally of entrusting negotiations, would not, in any case, take more with him than a single vessel to Corea. Otherwise I should certainly not have given this counsel. But I must add that communication with Admiral Meyer was not to be avoided; the French gunboat, as I have stated, being under orders for Japan. Monsieur Dillon, indeed, left this in doubt whether the Commandant would be persuaded to regard the proposed visit to Corea, en route, as within his instructions.
The “Lutin” had already dropped down to the mouth of the river on the 31st. Monsieur Dillon finally determined to join her, and as soon as he left me, rode down to Taku for the purpose.
Your Lordship may reasonably inquire why I took all this trouble, and why I have reported it with so much minuteness. To answer the last question first, I think it not improbable, I regret to say, that we have not heard the last of this matter, and I think it right that Your Lordship should be aware how far I have made myself responsible for what may happen. I took the trouble, not only in recognition of a general obligation to render good offices, but in the hope of averting a complication that would, I think, be serious.
With a people so exclusive as the Coreans, I have been on the side of extreme moderation in this first beginning of intercourse with them. It is not unlikely that, in accepting so unambitious a treaty as Commodore Shufeldt’s, we may be thought to have exceeded in abnegation. Looking to the disastrous results of the French expedition in 1866, and of the American expedition in 1872, when in effect, after a somewhat pretentious demonstration, two great powers were obliged to retire, re infecta, before a fourth-class state’s resistance, I can imagine nothing more unfortunate than a renewed attempt to force upon these ignorant semi-savages, by violence, conditions of intercourse to which they are opposed. I am actuated, I need hardly affirm, by no feeling of hostility to the Romish missionary, in Corea or elsewhere. The cause of Romish missions, besides, appears to me to be receiving less political support from France at this moment than at any time since 1860; but there is not field of mission enterprise with a more tragical history, and I should be relieved if I could think any reliance were to be placed on the discretion of the adventurous Missions Etrangeres, the particular body to whom the Chistianisation of Corea belongs. No power can stay them but the Pope, and they are nationally French to a man. Herein, of course, is a special danger; but the attempt to exclude them would, I fear, result in even greater danger; for, as I have tried to make the Chinese here understand there are thousands of Frenchmen who, although indifferent to the cause of missions as a religious cause, would be perfectly ready to take up arms if they are thought their flag insulted. And this I conceived would be the natural impression of a Frenchman, on hearing that while China declined to help France as she had helped America and England, Corea refused to receive France as she had received the other two powers. Without a commencement of relations, France would be free, of course, to take what line she pleased, and unless I am greatly mistaken, nothing would better please some of those who are at this moment very loftily condemning the deplorable proceedings of France at Tonquin, than to see China entangled in a misunderstanding which after the part she has taken as the adviser of her vassal, she might be considered responsible for not preventing. In a word, if Corea were to be struck by France, I should expect trouble, on one side or the other from Russia, Japan, and as she is at present represented, from Germany.
I have chose, therefore, rather to assist France in establishing relations with Corea, than to encourage Corea, by my silence, to persist in a policy of exclusion which could not fail to be irritating to France.
I have, &c.

Thomas Francis Wade