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조선 문제 관련 李鴻章 및 總署와 교섭 보고

제1차 조약 체결 과정

 
  • 발신자T.F. Wade
  • 수신자G.L.G. Granville
  • 발송일1882년 5월 12일(음)
  • 출전FO 17/895.
No. 17 Confidential
Tientsin
May 12, 1882

My Lord,

In continuation of my Despatch No. 16 of this date I have the honour to lay before Your Lordship some matter that will more particularly explain the position of the Corean question.
It has not a very ancient history as far as we are concerned. It is eighteen years only since, during my first charge, the Tsungli-Yamen was urged to impress on Corea the importance to her own independence of intercourse with foreign Powers, but the answer of the Yamen, throughout, has been almost invariably that, although dependent on China as her Suzerain, Corea had an autonomic constitution, and that China could go no further than the tender of advice, which the ultra-conservatism of Corea was certain to reject. Various instances of her indisposition to change were adduced by the Chinese Ministers; among the rest, her opposition to the introduction of Buddhism notwithstanding its very general adoption in China.
The truth, I cannot doubt, has been that although the Chinese Government, thanks to the continued representations of foreign advisors, became more or less awake to the danger to which her exclusivism was exposing Corea, it could not bring itself directly to recommend its dependent to break with its old traditions. Both Suzerain and dependent again were of course confirmed in their adherence to these by the unfortunate expeditions of France and America in 1866 and 1872.
The petty encroachments of Russians along the Corean frontier, complaints of which from time to time reached us, had not to all appearance committed either Government to any serious effort, if even to remonstrance; but within the last few years the attitude of Japan had begun to excite considerable alarm. The intercourse between the Japanese and Coreans at the few points of contact recently become accessible to Japan was not such as to dispose the latter to an extension of their acquaintance with foreigners; but the Chinese were more directly affected by the absorption by Japan of another of their dependencies, Lewchewan which touched their pride.
As usual however, their first thought was to relieve themselves alike from danger and humiliation by the employment of an intermediary, and they accordingly appealed to General Grant when, on his tour round the world, he visited Peking. I arrived shortly after General Grant’s departure from Tientsin in the Spring of 1879, and was also requested to move Her Majesty’s Government to intervene by the Grand Secretary Li. As my report to the Marquess of Salisbury will show, I recommended the association of France and Germany in any negotiation of the kind desired, premising however, that the good offices of the latter could not be counted on till the revision of the German Treaty, as I believed needlessly postponed, should be completed. The cooperation of the four Powers secured, I did not think that Russia would care to be left out. The Grand Secretary dropped the negotiation with me abruptly. The Yamen never referred to it. The mediation of General Grant at Yedo produced at the same time no result beyond the recommencement of pourparlers between China and Japan which at this moment appear as far from termination as ever. It will be seen presently why I return here to this Lewchewan question at such length.
Meanwhile, during the earlier part of the quarrel with Russia in 1880, which at one time looked so ugly, the Japanese secured to neglect no opportunity of disturbing the Chinese, and their disquiet was naturally increased to the utmost by the appearance in Japanese waters of the imposing Russian Squadron known as the “patriotic” or “commercial.”
Admiral Coote, then commanding in these seas, as was but natural, found little disposition on the part of the Russians to show him or tell him anything that they could conceal: but with the French Commander in Chief, Admiral Charles Duperre, they were or affected to be very much more outspoken. He went over all their ships and they informed him with much detail of their resources and designs.
They said that they had in all fourteen thousand men at Vladivostok; which was certainly an immense exaggeration, though the statement fell short of what was accepted as accurate at Peking.
But the main object for which this fleet had been collected, he gathered, was the annexation of so much of Corea as would give the Russians Port Lazareff. Admiral Duperre had himself, in 1855, made a survey of this port which he communicated to the Russians. When peace was concluded without concession of it, the Russian Naval Officers did not conceal their disappointment. Monsieur Koyander the Charge D’Affaires, it is true, had loudly protested throughout that annexation of any kind was the thing farthest from the thoughts of the Russian Government.
The impression produced at Peking, however, was that Russia contemplated annexation not only of a slice of Corea, but of the whole peninsula, and when I was on my way through Tientsin to Chefoo, in October 1880, the Grand Secretary Li, begged me to persuade Admiral Coote, whom I was going to meet, to carry me over at once to Corea for the purpose of making a Treaty.
I pointed out that, however high His Excellency’s position and credit still in a step of this kind I could do nothing as British Minister without an understanding with Tsungli-Yamen, which arrived at, I must next apply for authority to my own Government. The Grand Secretary was very instant notwithstanding; assuring me, when I reminded him of the danger of irregular movements towards the Coreans, as proved by the reception of the French and Americans, that he could secure me against failure etc. Admiral Coote, with whom I communicated on the subject at Chefoo, as I expected, was entirely of the same mind as myself.
I returned to Tientsin from Chefoo within the week, and visiting the Grand Secretary the night I landed, I found him still full of a Treaty with Corea. On the following day, however, he called upon me, and as I had proposed as soon as I should reach Peking to approach the Yamen on the subject, I began as soon as he was seated, “Well then, as regards Corea, Your Excellency assures me that you can secure our reception as friends.”
To my utter surprise, he threw up his hands in manifest terror, and almost shrieked out “Not I! Not I! I would not venture to secure it. Wait a little. The Russians desire the northeast corner where they wish for a port. The Coreans will resist them but will be beaten. When they are beaten then you and other nations will present yourselves and make treaties.”
I ascertained presently that on his way to see me he had spent an hour at the Russian Consulate. The news that negotiations between Tseng-How-Yeh and Monsieur de Giers were at last under way, had been very recently received, and the Russian Consul had been evidently instructed to disabuse the Grand Secretary of the idea that the mere renewal of the discussion assumed to have been ended by the Treaty signed by Ching how, had by any means rendered a rupture with Russia impossible. A beginning had been made but nothing more. A similar intimation, I learned at Peking, had been made by Monsieur Koyander to the Yamen, of which the leading Minister was the late Grand Secretary Shen, the most trickey and cowardly of men.
I may have casually sounded the Yamen regarding Corea in the course of the following two or three months, but I find no record of any conversation on the subject before the 7th of February 1881. When I availed myself of the known currency of certain rumours to speak.
I inclose an extract from the Journal of my interviews with the Ministers of what passed on that day.
The executed item of the convention, my recommendation, namely that, in order to avoid the offence to Russia which the action of any single Power eminently that of England, might occasion, Corea should be prompted to invite all Powers alike to enter into relations with her, was telegraphed the same afternoon to Your Lordship in reply to a Telegram which reached me as I returned to the [ _____ ].
I followed this up next day by a second visit to the Yamen, hoping that I might have turned the receipt of Your Lordship’s Telegram to account. But the Ministers who received me were uninfluential men, and some time elapsed before I was enabled to get the ear of the Vice President Wang-Wen-Shao who, since the recent death of the Grand Secretary Shen, had become the Minister of most real importance in the conduct of foreign affairs. He was at the same time member of the Grand Council.
The Vice President Wang discouraged any attempt on my part to open Corea. The time he said was not come etc. But the Chinese Government, as I have since satisfied myself, was entertaining already definite proposals to open Corea to the United States.
I shall here close this dispatch.
I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s most obedient, humble servant,

Thomas Francis Wade

Inclosure

Corea
Interview with Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamen, February 7th 1881

Sir T. Wade remarked that, as Their Excellencies were doubtless supplied with translations of matter from the foreign press that bore upon questions affecting China, they had probably informed themselves of the speculations that were rife as to the designs of Russia with regard to Corea.
The Minister Wang replied in the affirmative, and added that the suspicious that seemed to be universally entertained appeared to him to be well grounded.
Sir T. Wade went on to say that without attributing this or that or any motive to Russia, there could be no doubt that the presence of so large a force on the Corean frontier would enable the Russian Government, if they felt so inclined, to discover a pretext for entering Corea, whether for purposes of annexation or otherwise; and, as he had several times already urged upon the Yamen, they would do well in the interests of Corea, and indeed on their own, to press the Corea Government to open the country to foreigners.
Wong ta jen replied that they had been urging this course upon Corea any time the last two years. At first without any success; for the opposition was almost universal. Of late, however, there had been a considerable change in their tone, and since last autumn the majority including the Court, had come round to the opinion that the country should be opened. He might almost say that they had been convinced, and the Yamen were now only waiting for a definite pledge from them that they would accept any overtures that might be made to them by a foreign power.
The Minister Mao added that if they were given time, he felt sure that the Coreans would overcome their prejudices against foreign intercourse.
Delay, Sir T. Wade pointed out, was just what was dangerous. If Russia meant to do anything in Corea, though, he repeated, he did not say positively she did, she certainly would not wait for the Coreans to overcome their prejudices. At the same time, it had occurred to him that matters might be so managed that some delay might be secured. It was perfectly certain that a feeling of jealousy would be caused if any one power were to be beforehand with another power in visiting Corea for the purpose of negotiating a treaty and the Russian Government in particular would resent any attempt to steal a march upon them. In suggesting a means of avoiding the ill feeling that might be caused by any one nationality obtaining precedence over another, Sir T. Wade would assure the Yamen that he was not actuated by any interested motives. Corea was not so wealthy a country, and the establishment of relations with her did not promise such enormous commercial advantages, as would induce any country to struggle to be the first in the field. To avoid, however, the ill feeling which he had explained might be caused by the visit of one representative to the country in advance of others, Sir T. Wade would suggest that the Yamen should obtain from the Corean government an authorization to announce to the Treaty Powers the readiness of the Corean Government to enter into commercial relations with foreign countries; and that the Yamen should then invite the Representatives of the Treaty Powers to send agents to Corea to travel through the country and acquaint themselves with its commercial conditions, with a view to concluding treaties with the Corean Government at a future date. Previous rebuffs had rendered most Representatives wary of subjecting themselves to any further incivilities from the Corean Government, and it was this consideration that had deterred Sir T. Wade on two occasions, namely in 1876 and 1880, from visiting Corea, as he did not wish to cause any complications which his government might feel bound to take notice of. In his opinion a definite promise that they would receive Foreign Representatives if they came to the Corean Capital, should be obtained from the Corean Government; after which the plan he proposed might be adopted.
The Ministers replied that this statement was all that they were at present waiting for. Meanwhile they were greatly obliged to Sir T. Wade for his advice, which they would take careful note of.

Inclosure

Interview with Ministers of the Tsungli Yamen—February 8, 1881

Sir T. Wade called at the Yamen to communicate to the Ministers the substance of a telegram he had found waiting him on his return from the Yamen on the previous day, on the subject of the opening of Corea.
The only Ministers present were Mao Changhoi and Chungli who said that careful note had been taken of the remarks that had been made by Sir T. Wade on the previous day, and they would shortly be submitted to the Prince of Kung. As yet no decision had been taken as to the action that would be adopted; but as spoon as any arrangement had been come to, the Yamen would communicate with Sir T. Wade.

 
이름
General Grant , Li , the Marquess of Salisbury , General Grant , Admiral Coote , Charles Duperre , Duperre , Monsieur Koyander , the Grand Secretary Li , Admiral Coote , Admiral Coote , Tseng-How-Yeh , Monsieur de Giers , Monsieur Koyander , Grand Secretary Shen , Wang-Wen-Shao , Grand Secretary Shen , Wang , Thomas Francis Wade , T. Wade , Wang , T. Wade , Wong ta jen , The Minister Mao , T. Wade , T. Wade , T. Wade , T. Wade , T. Wade , T. Wade , Mao Changhoi , Chungli , T. Wade , the Prince of Kung , T. Wade
지명
Tientsin , Peking , Tientsin , Yedo , Vladivostok , Peking , Port Lazareff , Peking , Tientsin , Chefoo , Chefoo , Tientsin , Chefoo , Peking , Peking
관서
the Tsungli-Yamen , the Yamen , The Yamen , Tsungli-Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Tsung-li Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , Tsungli Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen , the Yamen

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