Mr. Kennedy to Earl Granville.―(Received January 3, 1881)

(No. 179 Very Confidential)
Yedo, November 21, 1880

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 131, Very Confidential, of the 27th July last, I have the honour to report that trustworthy information has recently reached me of a great change having taken place in the attitude of the King and Government of Corea towards foreign Powers, and that they are now inclined to receive in a friendly manner both Envoys and communications from Powers desirous of entering into relations with them. This information has been conveyed to me, through Mr. Satow, by the native of Corea mentioned in the above despatch, who has now returned to Japan as the recognized Confidential Agent of his Government.
This Corean gentleman states that the recent change of attitude of the King and Government of Corea towards foreigners is due to several causes, amongst which he cites the leading ones to be: ―The letter addressed by the Chinese Minister here to the Corean Envoy during his recent mission to Japan; the advice given by the Japanese Second Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the same Corean Envoy, urging on the latter, as a measure of policy in the interests both of Corea and Japan, to open the country to foreigners; and lastly, the alarm felt by the King because of the presence of a formidable Russian fleet in Eastern waters.
Of these three causes the last mentioned has doubtless been the most efficacious; but it appears that the letter addressed by Mr. Ho to the Corean Envoy has produced its effect, for the Confidential Agent has communicated to me a draft of the reply which has been prepared to Mr. Ho’s letter, and of which the chief passages are to the following effect: ―
“The suggestion that Corea should enter into relations with America and other foreign Powers in order to obtain support against Russia is a good one, but from ancient times the practice of Corea has been not to have intercourse with foreign countries, and besides, the distance is so great that they cannot venture to make the first approaches towards entering into alliances for the purpose of obtaining help in their difficulties. But if a vessel came with a letter, they would receive the letter and reply courteously; and if navigators asked help in difficulties they would do all in their power to help. In this way they would discharge the duties of hospitality, and afterwards that country (America) would say that they had been well received, and propose to enter into relations.”
The letter winds up by expressing the opinion that the interests of China and Japan, as well as those of Corea, are involved in the success of this plan, and that the time is not one in which dreams of peace and ease should be indulged.
The Agent has shown to Mr. Satow, as his credentials, a passport for safe-conduct furnished to him by the King of Corea, and bearing his Majesty’s seal, wherein the bearer is described as travelling on confidential business of the Corean Government, and is specially recommended to all authorities.
He has also communicated to Mr. Satow two letters recently received by him from the capital whilst awaiting in the port of Fusan an opportunity of returning to Japan.
The first letter says that a Council had been held; that the King had very much changed his views; and that Hanabusa’s (The Japanese Minister to Corea) demands were likely to be conceded. That if an American Minister came to the capital they would be guided by circumstances as to granting his demands; that it seems probable that the residence of a Japanese Minister at the capital, the free circulation of Japanese throughout the country, and the opening of Ninsen would be conceded, and also, before long, the questions respecting the export of rice.
The second letter is from the son of the Prime Minister, who tells the Agent that the King and Court had very much changed their views, and he hoped that some Japanese of importance would pay them a visit. The writer also begs the Agent to communicate the above to Iwakura (Japanese Second Prime Minister) and Ito (Councilor of State), and persuade them to undergo a little present fatigue for the sake of future ease.
In communicating the above documents to Mr. Satow. the Agent strongly urged the advisability of the dispatch, without delay, of a British Envoy to the capital, accompanied by two or three ships of war, and furnished with full powers to conclude a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship.
In support of his proposal, the Agent alluded to the presence of the Russian fleet, and urged that under pressure of this danger the Corean Government would probably readily enter upon negotiations, whereas a few months hence the fleet might be dispersed or actively employed against Corea, whereby the opportunity might be lost.
The Agent also sketched out a draft Treaty of Commerce and Friendship, framed in a liberal spirit, with a fixed Tariff at 10 percent, upon the chief articles only of import.
The Agent is also in communication with my Chinese and German colleagues, but as yet I have no knowledge of his proceedings in those quarters, and, as his intercourse with Her Majesty’s Legation is conducted solely with Mr. Satow. I do not pretend to know of his existence, and abstain from inquiries respecting him.
My Italian colleague has recently again expressed to me his desire to effect the opening of Corean ports, and his hope that Great Britain, Italy, France, Germany and the United States will decide on a combined demonstration against Corea.
My German colleague likewise hopes for instructions from his Government.
There exists a general impression in official quarters, and especially amongst Japanese and Americans, that before long Corea will be opened to foreign commerce.
As regards Great Britain, I apprehend that Corea will not be much importance commercially, but, in view of possible complications between Russia and China, it has acquired a political importance for all nations trading in the far East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J.G. Kennedy