Confidential
No. 125
The Marquis of Salisbury KG
Yedo
December 2, 1878

My Lord,

I reported in my Despatch No. 118 of the 25th ultimo that the Japanese Government had sent Mr. Hanabusa, one of the First Secretaries of the Foreign Department, to Corea in order to endeavour to adjust a difference which had arisen at Fusan in consequence of the Corean Authorities having lately imposed duties on Japanese Trade amounting apparently to about fifteen or twenty per cent, and which were considered by the Japanese to be prohibitory.
In a conversation which I have since had with Mr. Terashima, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency observed that, although it was understood when Japan made her treaty with Corea that Customs duties should not be levied by either government on the trade between the two Countries, still he could not deny that Corea had the right to impose such duties, provided they were of moderate amount, if she wished to do so, as Japan also had the right to impose duties on Corean imports. But that it had been distinctly stipulated in an Agreement, which had not been made public, that no charges of the character of inland duties should be levied by the Corean Authorities, and the charges now complained of were of that description. He believed however that Mr. Hanabusa would be able to persuade the Corean Authorities to agree to a rational arrangement. This issue was a narrow one as the Corean Authorities alone desired to impose these charges; the Corean people were opposed to them and were on the side of the Japanese in the matter.
On my suggesting a doubt as to whether Mr. Hanabusa would find that the local Corean Authorities were able to discuss and settle a question which could probably be only competently treated by the Central Government, His Excellency remarked that Mr. Hanabusa would be guided by circumstances. In the absence of functionaries empowered to treat with him direct he could convey his representations to the local Corean Authorities through the Japanese Consular officer at Fusan, and he would not attempt to proceed to the Corean capital without receiving further instructions from Yedo.
His Excellency added that the accounts which had found their way into the Japanese press of the collision which had occurred between the Japanese residents of Fusan and the Coreans were derived from private letters, and were, he believed, exaggerated. It was true that a party of Japanese had proceeded to the city of Sorio to present a protest against the levy of charges complained of, that they had been stoned by the Coreans, and had used staves of wood with some effect in self-defence, but the number of the party was by no means as great as had been stated―he believed it was less that fourteen―and that no serious wounds had been inflicted on either side.
I enclose a statement from a local paper which describes this demonstration. It says that the Japanese residents at Fusan, being dissatisfied with the mild action of their Consular Officer, had resolved to take the matter into their own hands, and overawe the Corean Authorities by delivering their own protest against the charges imposed upon their trade. That a body of about a hundred and sixty had proceeded to Sorio and for this purpose, and that in the disturbance which ensued, about thirty Coreans were wounded and six Japanese. It is also stated elsewhere that in consequence of this demonstration the Corean Authorities agreed to allow the delivery, free of the new charges, of such goods as had been purchased by Japanese before those charges were imposed.
I believe it is the intention of the Japanese Government to proceed deliberately and cautiously with the discussion of this affair, but in dealing with it they will probably find it difficult to avoid that consideration of other questions, such as that of the two other ports which according to the Treaty should have been opened in October 1877. I believe that the Japanese wish to obtain one Port on the East Coast, and one on the West. As the former, they have named the fine harbour of Yun-san well known to the Russians as Port Lazareff, while they appear to have not yet made up their minds as to the Port on the West coast. I heard from a Japanese Minister that the Corean Government had refused to open Yun-san, and that they do nothing to facilitate the choice of either one or the other of the tow Ports.
It is not impossible therefore that the current of these negotiations may not run as smoothly as could be desired. War with Corea has long had many advocates in this country, and although I believe the Government continue to be opposed to such views, they may yet find it difficult in case of anything unforeseen occurring, such as the failure of Mr. Hanabusa’s mission, or a fresh collision between the Japanese and Coreans at Fusan, to control the agitation which might thereby be created either among their political opponents or their excitable troops. It may also be concluded I think that under such circumstances Russian arguments would not be wanting to encourage them to engage in hostilities with Corea, which have already been freely talked of in the Japanese press.
In this connection I beg to invite the special attention of Your Lordship to the enclosed Article from a native journal which has a semi-official character. It seems to be intended to allay excitement by showing that the object of Mr. Hanabusa’s mission is to persuade the Corean Government by friendly negotiation to agree to a fair tariff and such other commercial arrangements as are required in the mutual interest of both countries, and it argues that full allowance should be made for the ignorance of the Coreans on the subject of trade, and for their repugnance to foreign intercourse, which is similar to that which at no remote date was entertained by the Japanese themselves. The writer then proceeds to dwell with considerable force on the important political position of Corea. It may be a poor country, but Japan cannot allow it to be annexed or occupied by any other power. The great Eastern question which has so long agitated Europe has now he observes reached the centre of Asia, and will soon extend to Corea, for “Corea is the Turkey of the East of Asia, and Fusan is Constantinople. If it falls into the hands of Russia, and if she can combine both land and naval forces at Fusan she will then have no difficulty in advancing towards Japan on one side while she can also threaten China on the other.” He remarks that the present want by Russia of a good harbour on the Pacific border of her dominons naturally attracts her insatiable greed for territory in that direction, but he adds “if Russia be suffered to take possession of Corea in the East of Asia, this would be like furnishing a tiger with wings or supplying a thief with a key.” He refers to Tsushima as showing that as early as 1862 Russia had designs on that important island, although he fails to describe correctly the part taken by Admiral Sir James Hope in obliging the Russian vessel which had remained there for months, and had put up buildings on shore, to retire from the position she had assumed. As China, he believes, has no power to do anything in the East, it rests with Japan to maintain the balance of power in that quarter by securing the independence of Corea. To effect this object friendly relations should be preserved between the two countries and Japan should seek to lead Corean gradually onward in the path of civilization, and endeavor to induce her to enter into treaties with England, France, and other countries. He concludes by observing that preparations should be made in anticipation of possible and indeed probable events.
Judging from conversations which I have had with the Chinese Minister at this Court I have reason to think that his Government, or certain members of it, are as deeply impressed as this Japanese writer is with the danger of Russian aggression in Corea. He is evidently sensible that China is far more vulnerable in that direction and in Manchuria than in Kashgar, or on the confines of Ili, and he is convinced that the only way by which Corea may be preserved as a nation is for her to open her Ports to the Commerce of European Powers. He has also mentioned to me in strict confidence that Li Hungchang has very lately written to the Chief Minister of the Corean Government to the following effect―“The time has come for you to relinquish your old policy of foreign exclusion, and to show that you comprehend the true situation of your country as regards Russia whose frontier joins yours, and who has now formed large military establishments on that frontier. Japan is friendly to you; she wishes you to open your Ports and has asked for Yun-san. Russia is opposed to the opening of Yun-san, or any of your ports, but you should not fail to understand her real object in desiring to see you maintain your present exclusion. In order to defeat that object you should keep on good terms with Japan, but more than this you should enter into friendly relations with other countries, and that without loss of time.”
I have thought it desirable to report these particulars to Your Lordship as either the proceedings of Japan in Corea, or the course of events in Central Asia may at any moment bring Corea into a degree of prominence, well deserving of the attention of Her Majesty’s Government, who may not think it expedient that Russia should acquire the commanding position in these seas which the possession of one or more good ports in Corea would give her. I am not prepared to place much confidence in the endeavours either of Japan or of China to induce that country to place itself in relations with the world, as efforts would not be wanting to divert Japan from steadily pursuing such a policy by holding out the temptations of a Russian alliance, while the slowness of Chinese action does not give promise of the counsel above-mentioned being earnestly impressed upon Corea, unless a lively sense of her own danger should induce China to do so. But it appears to me that such endeavours either on the part of Japan or China are deserving of encouragement, and that the preservation of the integrity of Corea affects Great Britain almost as largely as it does those two countries.
I have, &c.

Harry S. Parkes