No. 163
very Confidential
The Earl of Derby
Yedo
October 11, 1876

My Lord,

With reference to my Despatch No. 153 of the 26th ultimo, I should inform Your Lordship that on the 5th Instant I had another conversation with the Vice Prime Minister on the subject of how relations might be brought about between Corea and foreign powers.
His Excellency dwelt a good deal upon the difficulties with which the Corean Government would have to contend in departing from their old policy of exclusion. They had committed themselves to that policy towards the nation, and would find it very hard to turn round and sanction an opposite course. The stone-pillars referred to in the above-mentioned despatch as denouncing all foreigners as national enemies, had been set up by the Government themselves, and would be a standing record against them. He could appreciate their embarrassment as Japan was at one time in a similar position.
I replied that I thought the difficulty of Corea was not so great as that which Japan had so successfully encountered. Corea had no feudal system to contend with; the Government was not divided against itself as was the case with Japan under the Shogunate; and the will of the rulers of Corea was law to the nation. They had chosen at one time to call upon their people to treat foreigners as their enemies; and if they were satisfied, as they should be, that no case existed for maintaining that enmity any longer, and that it was now impolitic to do so, they might find a way of establishing friendly feeling in its stead. A reasonable Government would be glad to have an opportunity of announcing to their people that they were on good terms with the world; and in taking such a step the Corean Government would not have to contend with popular opposition, but probably only with diverse opinion among themselves. Their chief difficulty appeared to me to be one of amour propre, which I thought they might get over by assigning a change of circumstances as a ground for a change of policy. At one time they regarded foreigners as their enemies; now they had reason to look upon them as their friends. Their action should therefore be suited to this change of position.
His Excellency remarked that it was doubtful whether the Coreans were yet satisfied that foreigners are their friends, and they had no particular facts to point to as a reason to be given to their people for a change of policy.
I asked His Excellency what effect a foreign visit might have if paid purely for friendly purposes. Suppose, I said, that England should wish to thank Corea for her friendly reception of our surveying ships, or to acknowledge the good feeling shown by Corea in engaging, in the Supplementary Treaty recently concluded by Mr. Miyamoto, to treat shipwrecked foreigners with kindness, might not the Corean Government be able to point to a visit paid to them for such objects, as a proof that foreigners were no longer enemies, but friends?
His Excellency replied that he thought such a visit might have a very happy effect, if undertaken for the objects named, and not for the purpose of obtaining a Treaty. If good feeling were once established, Treaties would probably follow.
His Excellency then added, with some earnestness, that he was satisfied that relations between Corea and Foreign Powers, if they could be brought about in a friendly way, were essential to the independence of that country. A baby, he observed, could see that Russia wants to possess Corea, and the former, therefore, would not be pleased to see Corea concluding Treaties with western Powers. He was anxious to know what Powers were disposed to make Treaties with Corea, and what Russia would think or do, if she saw that Corea was willing to negotiate such Treaties.
I replied that although Russia might not care to see Corea entering into relations with Foreign Powers, she could not possibly object to her doing so. She would have to accept the situation, whatever that might be―preferring probably the absence of Treaties, but accommodating herself to their existence if they were made. The action of other countries in regard to negotiations with Corea would depend mainly upon that of Great Britain. If the latter thought it worthwhile to treat with Corea, and succeeded in doing so, several of the other leading nations, as France, Germany, and the United States, would doubtless follow her example.
I may here refer to a remark made me by Mr. Miyamoto, the Japanese Envoy who has just returned from Corea. In speaking of the difficulty of persuading the Coreans to accept relations with foreign countries, he observed that less opposition would probably be offered to England, if she were the first to make the attempt, than to other countries. The French, he said, are hated by the Coreans, and they do not think favourably of the Americans.
To return to my conversation with the Vice Prime Minister, I should add that His Excellency observed that he did not think China would make any endeavour to bring Corea into communication with foreign countries. Japan, on the other hand, he said, was quite disposed to make an earnest effort in that direction, as he could see that the interest of Japan in the independence of Corea, was second only to that of Corea herself. The work of persuasion, however, was one which it was very difficult for Japan to execute singlehanded; and he hinted to me that if England desired relations with Corea, she should do something herself to bring them about.
It occurs to me to suggest to your Lordship that perhaps a friendly visit of the kind above mentioned might serve to pave the way for ulterior negotiations. A vessel of war of some size, with one or two gun vessels in company―probably those employed upon the survey would be well suited―might proceed to Kokiva in the spring, and endeavour to open friendly communications with the Government at the capital. Subject to the opinion of Her Majesty’s Minister at Peking, I may venture to remark that the Chinese Secretary of that Legation would perhaps be the most fitting officer to be entrusted with this preliminary negotiation; but it would also, I think, be highly desirable that he should be accompanied by an officer from this Legation proficient in the Japanese language, and familiar with Japanese relations with Corea.
The possibility of England and other countries seeking the assistance of Japan in establishing relations with Corea, has already struck the attention of the native press and I enclose a translation of a leading article containing an interesting argument on this subject; and professing to disapprove of Japan interfering for such an object. The writer considers that it would be impossible for Japan to please both Corean and western Powers, and observes that England will probably be able to accomplish her own work in Corea, without coming to Japan for help.
I have, &c.

H.S. Parkes