(No. 86)
Confidential
Yedo
May 23, 1876

My Lord,

Shortly after I received Your Lordship’s telegram of the 5th instant informing me that Her Majesty’s government were in communications with the French and German Governments on the subject of Corea and directing me to report my opinion as to the precise measures which should be adopted if it were thought desirable to open relations with that country, I endeavored to indicate within the narrow compass of a telegram, which I sent to your Lordship on the 12th instant, the course which I thought should be pursued in order to attain that object. I then stated that the Japanese Authorities, who are most competent to judge, are confident that nothing will be gained from the Coreans without a display of force, which is necessary not only to ensure the success of any negotiations, but also to prevent hostility on the part of the Coreans, that the sooner negotiations were undertaken the better as the Japanese Treaty alone was not likely to produce any material change in the disposition of the Coreans, and that some reaction might be looked for in Corea if the initiative action of the Japanese is not followed up by endeavors on the part of other Powers to establish intercourse with that country.
I now beg to support this opinion with a few further remarks.
My despatch No. 57, of the 27th March, will have shown Your Lordship how the Japanese Envoy obtained his treaty, that it was not voluntarily conceded by Corea, but was accepted only in satisfaction of the demands of Japan, which Corea believed the latter was prepared to enforce. I also stated that the informant, from whom I received this intelligence, had distinctly assured me that he believed the Coreans would make no concessions to any foreign visitors, unless they believed it would be more dangerous for them to reject than to listen to the proposals made to them. The same high Authority on Corean subjects has since stated to me that he believes nothing can be effected in Corea by any negotiator who may proceed there unsupported by an adequate force, that, with such support, success may be relied on, but that without it a foreign envoy would not only gain nothing, but would probably not be treated with due respect.
I certainly think that any force which may be sent to Corea for the protection of the representative of a Western power should be of a kind which could ensure his safety at the capital, in case he found it desirable to conduct his negotiations at that place. It should, therefore, comprise at least, four or five vessels of light draught which would be able to ascend the River to Se’oul. Concerted action on the part of such Powers as Great Britain, France, and Germany could not fail to have an impressive effect upon the Coreans, but if those powers are not prepared to act promptly I think valuable time would be lost. So little is known of the political condition of Corea that it is impossible to calculate how long the old Regent may remain out of power, but all accounts agree in stating that, if he were to recover his position, no hope could be entertained of opening relations with the Corean Government by amicable means. The present advisers of the King are believed to be more liberal and intelligent than those whom they have displaced, but even if they were disposed to do so, they could not appear to agree willingly to such an innovation as the admission of foreigners, and they would probably, therefore, derive support from the presence of a foreign force, as indicting a pressure which they could assign as a reason for concession.
The present Government appear to expect that the Treaty they have concluded with Japan will prompt Western Powers to advance similar demands, and it would be well that this anticipation should be realized before they have had time to consider how such demands may best be met with refusal. I have heard confidentially that the departure of the Japanese Envoys from Corea was followed by some unfavorable demonstration at Se’oul, and it remains to be seen what object the Corean Government have in sending so soon to Japan the Envoy, who, as reported in my Despatch No. 44 is shortly expected to arrive at Yedo. The Japanese Government do not fail to call to mind how, in their own case, when they concluded Treaties with several Foreign Powers in 1858, their first thought after the departure of the ships which brought the Foreign Envoys to their shores was how they might free themselves from the obligations they had contracted. But, whatever may be the object of the Envoy’s visit, some of the members of the Japanese Government see that only slight political or commercial gain will accrue from their Treaty with Corea unless it be followed up by similar agreements with other Powers, that the trade between Japan and Corea will be trifling unless stimulated and developed by means of simultaneous traffic with other countries, and that it is only by entering into relations with Western Powers that Corea can hope to derive political support against Russia.
I am inclined to believe therefore, that, in the event of Her Majesty’s Government wishing to open relations with Corea, some assistance might be derived from the Japanese Government, so far, at least, that, if invited to do so, they would probably be willing to give notice of the approach of a Mission to the Corean Government, to assure them of its pacific objects, and to recommend them to conclude with Great Britain, and other foreign Powers a treaty similar to that which they have concluded with Japan. The Corean Government, if they received such notice, would have no excuse for treating a Foreign Mission in a hostile manner. It would scarcely be less than an act of hostility on their part to refuse to treat shipwrecked seamen with humanity, or to afford relief to foreign ships entering their posts in distress, and it would be unreasonable to deny to other Foreign Powers intercourse of the same nature as that which they have now agreed to hold with Japan.
I mentioned in my telegram of the 10th instant that both Chinese and Japanese interpreters would be required in conducting negotiations with Corea. The necessity of such interpretation is obvious when it is seen that all official communications between the Japanese and Corean Governments are to be conducted in Chinese. By the 3rd Article of their Treaty, the Japanese Government, although stipulating for the right of addressing the Corean Government in Japanese, agree to send for a period of ten years a Chinese translation with all their communications, and the Corean Government, on the other hand, are to use the Chinese language in addressing the Japanese.
In connection with this subject, it affords me much pleasure to mention to Your Lordship that I have incidentally learned that in the negotiation of their Treaty with Corea, the Japanese Envoys derived considerable assistance from a Corean officer who has repeatedly visited Peking and made the acquaintance there of [NW. Mayers.] They found that, owing to the information and advice which that officer had received from [NW. Mayers] he was the most intelligent agent with whom they had to deal, and that, although holding no high rank his arguments with reference to foreign questions had weight with his superiors. I believed this to be the same officer whose conversations with [NW. Mayers] have been reported to Your Lordship from time to time by Thomas Wade, and it is gratifying to think that a British officer should have been able to exercise such a beneficial influence over a Corean mind. The circumstance encourages the hope that the ears of the Coreans are not wholly closed against reason, and that the intelligence thus awakened will prove as serviceable in the course of British interests as in those of Japan.
The visit of the Corean Envoy, who is expected to arrive in Yedo in a few days, may afford me an opportunity of learning more of the feelings of his Government towards foreigners. The shipwrecked Corean whom I handed over to the Japanese Government, as I reported in my despatch No. 70 of the 10th Ultimo, has been detained here in order that he may be delivered to the Envoy, and it will be curious to notice whether the rescue of this man by a British Ship, and his subsequent treatment in our hands will elicit any acknowledgment from this functionary.
I have, etc.

(signed) Harry S. Parkes