Sir H.S. Parkes to The Earl of Derby.―(Recieved May 11)

(No. 57)
Confidential
Yedo, March 27, 1876

My Lord,

Mr. Moriyama, who is already well known to your Lordship as the Agent of the Japanese Government in Corea since 1868, and who formed one of the leading members of the recent Mission, called on me yesterday, upon my invitation, and gave me the following interesting account of the manner in which the Japanese negotiations in Corea were conducted.
Your Lordship may remember that when the Japanese Government decided to send Kuroda’s mission to Corea, they despatched an officer, Mr. Hirotsu, in advance to Fusan, in order to announce this intention to the Corean Government. Mr. Moriyama told me that the despatch which Mr. Hirotsu was instructed to deliver plainly told the Corean Government that the High Commissioner would proceed to the capital or its vicinity, and would demand satisfaction for the breach of the agreement concluded with Moriyama in 1874, and for the attack on the Japanese gun-boat. When the Mission reached Tsushima, Mr. Hirotsu reported that the despatch had been delivered at Fusan, but that the Corean local authorities earnestly deprecated the visit of the Mission to the capital. Mr. Kuroda, therefore, determined to proceed to Fusan, in order to make it plainly understood to the Corean authorities that he would carry out his instructions to the latter, and proceed with his ships to Kôk’wa. His stay of a week at Fusan enabled the Corean officers to see the number of his ships, and gave Mr. Moriyama opportunity to intimate to them in plain language that the Japanese Government would not accept anything less than the satisfaction they demanded.
The Japanese Commissioners being satisfied, from what they heard at Fusan, that the display of sufficient force would insure the success of the Mission, applied to their Government from Fusan for additional troops; but this application, as I reported to your Lordship at the time, was not entertained by the Government at Yedo.
When the ships assembled at the rendezvous off Isle Fournier, they were boarded by local officers, who offered presents, and said that the Government had instructed them to supply their wants. Nothing was accepted from them; and, in order to afford time for the authorities at the capital to know of the arrival of the fleet, they were told that in four or five days the ships would move up to the nearest convenient anchorage to Kôk’wa which proved to be Chôsan-to.
On arriving at Chôsan-to they were again visited by Corean officers, including several of the local authorities of Fusan, with whom Mr. Moriyama was well acquainted, and who now seemed anxious to propitiate him, and to induce him to give a friendly turn to the expected negotiations. Mr. Moriyama was instructed to inform them that the Japanese High Commissioners were willing to discuss the business of their mission with high functionaries of similar rank to themselves at Kôk’wa, but unless they were immediately met there by such Commissioners on the part of the Corean government, they would proceed on to the capital.
Shortly afterwards the were informed that Corean Commissioners would be sent to Kôk’wa and on the 5th February Mr. Moriyama and a Secretary were sent to that city to arrange for the reception of the Japanese Commissioners.
They landed at a point about three miles distant from Kôk’wa, and Mr. Moriyama was then again urged by the subordinate Corean officers, and even by the people of the place, to do his utmost to promote a friendly settlement. The authorities of Kôk’wa, however, made certain tentative efforts to treat him with less courtesy than he considered due to him, but these he immediately overruled. He insisted on the main gate of the reception hall being opened to him, and on the seat of honour being conceded to him. After securing a proper reception he said that he required accommodation for the Japanese High Commissioners and their guard of 1,500 men. The local authorities, who had made a display of ill-armed troops of about that number, or, as Moriyama believed, of men accoutred for the nonce as soldiers, protested their inability to provide such extensive accommodation, and urged the alarm which the landing of such a large Japanese force would occasion.
Mr. Moriyama then said that out of consideration for their feelings, the High Commissioners’ guard should be limited in the first instance to 500 men (being really the whole strength of their escort), but that another thousand men would be landed if they were needed. He also insisted on seeing the Corean Commissioners, and carried this point also after some evasions and excuses. The local officers at first said that the Commissioners were a long way off, but they eventually proved to be close at hand, and Mr. Moriyama was conducted to them in sedan chairs, befitting his rank.
On seeing the Corean Commissioners, Mr. Moriyama informed them that he could tell them nothing as to the business of the Japanese Commissioners, and that his duty was then confined to seeing that proper arrangements were made for their reception.
These arrangements were concluded without delay, and on the following day, the 6th February, he returned to the ships. On the 8th February, the guard of about 400 men were landed, together, as Moriyama said, with eight or nine field pieces, four of which were Gatling guns. The High Commissioners followed on the 10th.
These arrangements took some time to complete, as the anchorage of the fleet was about twelve miles below Kôk’wa. (Mr. James, the English pilot, has informed me that the Japanese selected that anchorage in preference to a nearer one, which could have been reached by the Northern channel, in order that the Coreans might not be able to ascertain by close observation the actual strength of the ships, which, with the exception of one corvette, consisted only of light vessels).
The Japanese Commissioners landed and proceeded to Kôk’wa in considerable state, and on the 11th they had their first interview with the Corean commissioners. They said they had been sent by their Government to learn, firstly, why the Coreans had broken the Agreement of 1874, which they had made with Moriyama; and, secondly, why they had fired in September last upon the Japanese gunboat “Unyôkan.” The Corean Commissioners pleaded that the local officers of Fusan were to blame for the Agreement not having been carried out, as they had not reported what had occurred to the Government at the capital; and that the firing on the “Unyôkan” was a mistake, as the Coreans did not know that she was a Japanese vessel.
The Japanese Commissioners observed that the two charges having thus been fully admitted, the question of reparation remained to be considered, and, breaking off the interview suddenly, they said they would inform the Corean Commissioners the next day of the satisfaction they had to demand.
The interval was employed in working upon the fears of the Corean Commissioners, who indirectly were led to apprehend that the Japanese would follow a similar course to that which they had adopted in the Formosan affair, that they would demand from Corea a large indemnity, which the latter would be wholly unable to pay, and that it would then be open to the Japanese to make other onerous demands. They seemed, therefore, somewhat relieved when, at the interview next day, the Japanese Commissioners placed in their hands the draft of a Treaty which the latter said they would accept as satisfactory redress, provided it were at once agreed to. They were willing to allow the Corean Commissioners four or five days, but not more, to consider it.
The Corean Commissioners asked for ten days, as they had to submit the Japanese demands to the Government at the capital. The Japanese Commissioners replied that they would allow that time, provided that within the ten days the negotiations were completed, and the Treaty signed and exchanged.
The Corean Commissioners appeared to acquiesce, but on the ninth day they began to urge objections, and firstly on point of form. The draft Treaty gave the Mikado the title of “Kôtei” (Chinese, “Hwang-te,” or Emperor), and the King of Corea, “ô” (Chinese, “Wang,” or King). This did not denote equality between the two nations, which was professed in the Ist Article of the Treaty. As the Coreans could not adopt the title of Kôtei, they wished the Agreement to run in the names of the respective Commissioners only. This could not be acceded to by the Japanese Commissioners, who, however, expressed themselves willing to use the names of the two nations Kôtei―Dai Trippon and Dai Chôsen (Great Japan and Great Corea)―instead of the titles of the Sovereigns. The Corean Commissioners then began to raise other difficulties, which were met by the Japanese Commissioners threatening to break off negotiations. On the tenth day (22nd February) they did return to their ships, saying that they would give the Corean Commissioners two or three days to consider whether they would sign the Treaty as it stood, with no other alteration than the one above-named, as they (the Japanese Commissioners) would agree to no further modifications. On the 25th the assent of the Coreans reached the Japanese Commissioners, who proceded again to Kôkwa on the 26th, signed the Treaty at 9 A.M. on the 27th, re-embarked the same day, and on the 28th the fleet weighed and left Corea.
Mr. Moriyama, in remarking on the above successful result, observed that it was attributable entirely to the firm and straightforward tone adopted by the Japanese Commissioners.
Following the rules of Western diplomacy instead of those of the East, they asked, he said, for nothing which they did not intend to obtain. On the other hand, as they did not wish to make difficulties for Corea, they demanded nothing which she could not easily grant. But, he added, she only yielded to us, and will only yield to others what she feels compelled to grant.
The possibility of other nations coming to Corea and making similar demands to those made by Japan is fully foreseen by them, and they are in some measure prepared for it. They have copies of all the Treaties concluded between China and foreign Powers, and possess the Peking translation of Wheaton's International Law. One of the officers met by Moriyama had been a constant visitor at Peking for twenty years, and had also been to Hong Kong, so that they are not uninformed as to the different nationalities of Europe and America. They express great aversion to foreigners, and give as the reason the French and American attacks, and the fear that foreigners wish to take their country. They are chiefly afraid of Russia, and see that the contiguity of that Power is the chief source of their danger. Mr. Moriyama took pains, he said, to point out to those Corean officers with whom he came in contact, that weak Powers could not stand by their own strength, but only by cultivation friendly relations with other Powers, and he cited to them, as an instance of this, the case of Turkey, which had been supported by other Powers against the neighbour whom Corea so greatly dreaded.
Mr. Moriyama expressed anxiety that the independence of Corea should be a reality and not a name. The Treaty with Japan may do something, he observed, to promote that independence, but it will not alone suffice. Similar Treaties with other Powers are also needed.
I observed that the conduct of the Coreans had hitherto been such as not to attract much sympathy on the part of Western Powers, who had hitherto felt that to visit Corea was to risk insult or attack, and that the object to be gained was held by some to be scarcely worth the trouble that collision would involve.
He replied that he did not think the Coreans would not attack a foreign vessel, but that they would doubtless make no concessions to any foreign visitors unless they believed that it would be more dangerous for them to reject them than to listen to their proposals. The young King and his present Ministers were certainly more intelligent and more liberally disposed than the old Regent and his party, but it would not do for them to appear to depart from a long time-honoured policy of their own free will. At the same time, he added, they are utterly unable to engage in a quarrel with any foreign Power. They have no army worthy of the name, and no navy. The permanent army consists probably of only a few thousand men, and their arms and artillery are similar to the obsolete weapons of China. A couple of Japanese regiments (1,200 men each) would suffice, he said, to take and hold the capital.
He did not advocate, however, that this weakness of the Coreans should be taken undue advantage of. On the contrary, he hoped that their long exclusion would be taking into consideration, and that while some dictation in dealing with them was doubtless necessary, he thought every endeavour would be made to dispel their mistrust, and give them more generous ideas. The illiberality and ignorance of the Corean Government entailed much misery on the people, who were oppressively taxed, whose industry had no scope, and who could therefore accumulate no wealth. Most of them only managed to gain a miserable livelihood, and wide tracts of country were left uncultivated. For these reasons he did not expect much from the trade which was now to be opened with Japan, but this, he believed, would gradually increase if it were only allowed natural development.
I have thought it well to report this conversation to your Lordship, which appears to me specially interesting as coming from a Japanese in Mr. MoriyaMa’s position. He begged, however, that the information he had given me might be treated as strictly confidential, and that his name should not be quoted as the authority for these remarks.
It may not be out of place for me to inclose in this despatch a description of Corea, which has appeared in print, and which has been written by one of the leading secretaries of Kuroda’s Mission, as it furnishes some further information confirmatory of the above remarks respecting the capacity of Corea for trade, and the condition of the Corean people.

I have, &c.
(Signed) 　　HARRY S. PARKES

P.S.―With reference to Mr. MoriyaMa’s account of the negotiations, I should mention that the Foreign Minister took pains to assure me, on the 25th instant, that the Treaty had been obtained by Mr. Kuroda without the employment of menace of any kind.