Sir H. Parkes to the Earl of Derby.-(Received February 21)

(No. 5 Confidential)
Yedo, January 10, 1876

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch, Confidential, No. 182, of the 31st ultimo, I have now to add that the High Commissioner Kuroda left Yedo on his Corean Mission on the 6th instant. The squadron consisted of two vessels of war and three transports, and the military force embarked appears to have been limited to the three companies previously spoken of, or 750 men.
The day before the, departure of the expedition, I was visited by Mr. Moriyama, who has so long represented his Government at the Japanese Settlement of Sorio at Fusankai, and who is one of the members of the Mission.
As no one is more able than he is to form an opinion as to the manner in which the Coreans are likely to receive the Mission, I endeavoured to ascertain his views on this point. He told me plainly that he could not say how they would be received. He did not think the Coreans would fire upon the ships, as they would have received ample notice of their arrival, and the ships would do all they could to avoid the Corean forts. What he apprehended was that the Coreans might not send officers to meet and treat with them at Kôkwa. The High Commissioner might, in that case, find it necessary to send him (Moriyama) on to the capital, and the Coreans might fire upon him on his way there. What the High Commissioner would do in the event of encountering either open attack’ or negative opposition in the form of refusal to treat, it was impossible to say. He (Mr. Moriyama) was disposed to expect some good result from the excitement which the approach of the Japanese expedition would create at the Corean capital. They knew that Mr. Hirotsu, who had been sent on beforehand to give notice of the despatch of the Mission, had landed at Sorio on the 17th December, and was to be met by a Corean officer on the 19th. The announcement made by Mr. Hirotsu would, therefore, be known at Seoul by the 25th, and would probably give rise to considerable commotion there. If this were directed against the party in power who are opposed to foreign intercourse, the objects of the Mission might be materially facilitated. It was part of the Japanese plan, therefore, that the Mission should arrive before this excitement could calm down.
Whatever might be the event, he did not look for an early settlement, and thought that the proceedings of the Japanese must take time. In one sense, their difficulties had been increased and, in another sense, lessened by the action of the French and Americans in Corea. Both those nations had committed, the error of retiring too precipitately, and had thus given the Coreans room to boast that they had driven them away. On the other hand, their expeditions had contributed to the discussions and divisions which now exist in Corea on the general question of foreign intercourse.
At the time of the American expedition, the opponents of foreigners advocated resistance and the removal of the capital inland, while the other party held that the American demands were perfectly reasonable, and clamoured for the degradation and execution of the old Regent.
Similar excitement would probably again occur on the arrival of the Japanese expedition. The Japanese, however, if obliged to use force, must be prepared to follow it up, and to hold their ground until a final settlement was arrived at. With the means they possessed of making war, he did not think that hostilities would be long protracted, and he believed that the capture of the capital, if it had to be undertaken, would prove a decisive blow.
On the practical question of whether the Séoul or Hankong River could be entered at this season of the year I found that Mr. Moriyama, rightly or wrongly, anticipates no difficulty. The Government, he says, are satisfied from information derived from Corean informants, that the ice will not be thick enough to impede navigation. He also told me, as an ascertained fact, that ships can go in and out of Port Lazareff (on the east coast of Corea) all the year round, and, further, that only a month ago the Tumen River, which forms the frontier between the Russian .and Corean territory, was still open.
The question of peace or war would depend greatly, he admitted, on the nature of· the Japanese demands, and I gathered from him that in presenting these, the High Commissioner would be greatly influenced by the course of events. The Japanese Government have to determine whether they shall be satisfied with concessions which will preserve appearances only, or whether they shall insist upon others of a substantial character, Demands made with the former object might be met by the fulfilment of the agreement concluded last year by the Coreans with Mr. Moriyama, by which formal communication between the two Governments was , to be established, and by obtaining some apology for the attack on the “Unyokan,” and some improvement in the very objectionable manner in which intercourse and trade are at present conducted between the Goreans and Japanese at Sorio. But the Japanese Government are not likely to be content, or to satisfy those whom they have to please with such a moderate result. The feeling is no doubt widely ,entertained that it is the Mission of Japan to open Corea effectively, at least to their own people, and that the latter should obtain similar rights in Corea to those which foreigners have acquired in Japan. Judging the Coreans by themselves, they also believe that the former will yield to demands which are supported by force, provided they are not encouraged to hold out by China. The probable action, however, of the latter Power causes them some perplexity, and I think there is little doubt that it is with the view of depriving the Coreans of Chinese support and advice that they send forward their Mission in mid-winter when speedy communication between Corea and China will be impracticable. Mention, however, was recently made in Chinese newspapers of the despatch of two Chinese Envoys to Corea in November last for the assigned object of investing the son of the young King with the title of heir aparent. It is possible1 therefore, that these Envoys may be at Seoul at the time that Kuroda’s Mission arrives at Kokwa, and that Chinese influence may, therefore, not be wanting in the proceedings which will ensue.
The Japanese Government wish to open three Corean ports to Japanese trade—Kokwa, or some port on the west coast, Fusankai, and Port Lazareff—and these are the places which it is highly desirable to see open in the interest of foreigners generally. Unless this resnlt{result} be soon attained, there is, I think, much room to fear that the two latter ports are destined to pass into the hands of Russia. I append two articles from the Japanese press which have appeared since the date of my despatch of the 31st ultimo, and which, like those formerly forwarded, do not speak approvingly of the Government policy. It is possible, however, that the Government would probably have encountered popular censure if they had not determined’ to close with the Corean question. They have done so, however, suddenly, and from motives of policy, and are greatly influenced, as I believe, by the help promised them by Russia, which they probably regard as a counterpoise to any opposition they may meet with from China. I can only repeat, however, that this one-sided alliance, as far as I am able to judge, is attended with danger, not only to Japan and Corea, but also to our own interests in these regions, and to those of other European Powers, and it is this feeling which prompts me again to submit to your Lordship’s consideration the desirability of our being prepared to take some part in measures having the object of opening Corea to the world before a position is secured there by Russia, which, in the event of war, would place at her feet our commerce in China and Japan. I have only to add that, in view of probable eventualities, the Japanese Government have already called out the reserves of the year, a step which under usual circumstances would not be taken before the spring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES