동북아역사넷

상세검색 공유하기 모바일 메뉴 검색 공유
닫기

상세검색

닫기
사건명
기사명
작성·수신·발신자
본문
해제
사료라이브러리 열기
ID :NAHF.gk.d_0007_0070IDURL
사료라이브러리 열기
  • 글씨크게
  • 글씨작게
  • 프린트
  • 텍스트
  • 오류신고

일본의 조선교섭 준비 보고

조약 체결 이전 영국의 조선 관련 보고

 
  • 발신자F.R. Plunkett
  • 수신자Derby
  • 발송일1875년 12월 13일(음)
  • 수신일1876년 1월 30일(음)
  • 출전FO 410/15; AADM pp. 7-10.
Mr. Plunkett to the Earl of Derby.―(Received January 30 1876)

(No. 171)
Yedo, December 13, 1875

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 167 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to lay before your Lordship a brief statement of the various events which have occurred in this capital during the last fortnight in connection with the Corean question.
Sir Harry Parkes has kept your Lordship fully informed of all the phases through which this question has passed since the year 1873. I need, therefore, only refer to his last despatch, No. 150 of the 26th of October, in which he reported that, in spite of the attack upon the gun vessel “Unyokan,” the prevalence of Japanese opinion appeared then to be in favour of a peaceful policy; but that, whether it would so continue or not, would probably depend upon the news which might be subsequently received from Mr. Moriyama. He had also frequently informed your Lordship that the exigencies of their internal policy might, at any moment, force the Japanese Government to vield to a war cry.
Mr. Moriyama arrived in Yedo early in November.
The question whether an apology should be demanded for the attack on the “Unyokan” continued to be frequently discussed In the Japanese newspapers, but generally in a peaceful spirit; and there was nothing to indicate that a hostile expedition to Corea was imminent. On the contrary, the general impression was that the leaders, at least, of the Government and the majority of the people were adverse to extreme measures.
I inclose, as a fair example of the then prevailing tone, a translation of an interesting article taken from the “Nichi Nichi Shimbun” of November 24.
Sir Harry Parkes has explained, in his despatch No. 159 of the 23rd ultimo, the causes which were supposed to have led to the retirement of the Sa Daijin Shimadzu Saburô. It subsequently, however, appeared that, although obliged to succumb to his opponents in the Cabinet, his influence was still so great that it was deemed necessary not to break with him entirely, for, on the 25th ultimo, he was appointed to a high, but purely honorary post in the Emperor’s household.
Since the date of the withdrawal of Shimadzu from the Cabinet, there have been a succession of disquieting rumours; whether by design or accident is not very certain, but the number of two-sworded men in the streets suddenly increased to a very remarkable extent; extra guards were placed round the residences of the Ministers; and a general apprehension existed, although scarcely avowed, that riots might at any moment be expected.
On the 27th ultimo, Mr. Moriyama paid me a friendly visit, and remained for a considerable time, during which the conversation naturally turned almost exclusively upon Corea. He spoke in enthusiastic terms of what could be done; of the riches of certain portions of Corea in rice, Indian corn, and minerals; of the facility with which a small body of troops could produce great results; and, finally, how, having devoted his life to the subject, he trusted yet to be the Perry of the Corean Peninsula. His tone was that of an enthusiast, and he declared openly his conviction that, except by force, nothing could be obtained. He added also, as his opinion, that the sooner force was employed the better it would be for Japan.
These, however, were only his own views; the Government, he said, was more inclined to temporize, and desired to avoid war as long as possible. He assured me that nothing was yet decided, and he laughed at the report then current in the Japanese papers that General Saigo was about to be despatched on a mission to Corea.
On the 2nd instant I had occasion to meet Mr. Sameshima, the Assistant Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and inquired of him what news there was from Corea, and whether there was any truth in the report of disturbances having taken race, or being apprehended, in consequence of the late change in the Cabinet? He denied emphatically that there was any reason for fearing a disturbance of the public peace, and, with reference to Corea, said that there was nothing new.
Next day there appeared a paragraph in the “Choya Shimbun” giving as a rumour that one of the less prominent of the Cabinet Ministers had been selected to proceed on a special mission to the capital of Corea; and the “Nisshin Shinjishi” of the same date announced that Mr. Kuro-ôka, an official of the Marine Department, had been sent to Vladivostok on Government business.
On the 4th instant the “Nichi Nichi Shimbun” announced the approaching departure of Mr. Hirotsu, who had served for some years at Sorio as second in rank to Mr. Moriyama, and that about the 15th instant a certain personage would proceed to Corea, accompanied by some troops.
On the 6th the “Stochi Shimbun” announced that Mr. Kuroda was the Cabinet Minister who had been selected for the mission, and that Mr. Hirotsu had left Yedo already.
It is believed that the latter gentleman has been sent to prepare the way for Mr. Kuroda, by requesting the officials of Fusankai to inform the Central Government that a Japanese Special Envoy will shortly appear in the capital. It is hoped that this may conciliate them, and induce them to receive the mission properly.
In view of these reports, I thought it my duty, on the 6th instant, to endeavour to ascertain whether what had often been predicted by Her Majesty’s Minister had already come to pass, viz., that the Government, finding themselves threatened with internal troubles, had accepted a foreign war as an outlet for the unruly passions of their Southern subjects.
I accordingly called on Mr. Sameshima, and sent Mr. M‘Clatchie to Mr. Moriyama, but, unfortunately, neither of these gentlemen were at home; and one of the foreign Representatives on whom I called expressed his decided opinion that there was no cause for apprehension, as the Government were strong enough to resist the pressure put upon them by the war party. He had seen Mr. Sameshima and the Minister of Marine that very morning, and had been told there was nothing new.
On the 7th instant, Mr. Mori Arinori, the new Japanese Minister at Peking, who had left Yedo for China on the 24th ultimo, and then suddenly returned to this capital on the excuse of his steamer having broken down in the Inland Sea, left equally suddenly for the South in a small steamer belonging to the Yokohama Custom-house.
His proceedings have been much commented on, for it was generally believed that he had only accepted the appointment to Peking in view of the negotiations which would ensue with China on the Corean question.
On the same afternoon I received a private note from Mr. Terashima, asking me to call at the Foreign Department, as he wished to speak about procedure in Courts of Appeal, a question which Sir Harry Parkes had desired me to attend to during his temporary absence from Yedo.
I accordingly called on his Excellency at the appointed hour, when he made me the communication I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 167 of the 9th instant.
Mr. Moriyama was on this day promoted to be a Shôjô of Foreign Affairs.
Next morning (the 10th) I received, quite unexpectedly, a visit from Mr. Soyeshima (Mr. TerashiMa’s predecessor in office), with whom I was not acquainted, and who, finding Her Majesty’s Minister was away, requested to see me.
After a very few complimentary phrases, the conversation turned on the approaching mission of Mr. Kuroda.
Mr. SoyeshiMa’s proclivities in favour of a Corean war are well known, and have been more especially reported in Sir H. Parkes’s No. 91 of the 3rd November, 1873.
It was at that period that the present Cabinet was consolidated, and Mr. Soyeshima and the rest of the war party had to yield to the more peaceful policy of Messrs. Sanjo and Iwakura.
On this occasion Mr. Soyeshima went almost word for word over the same ground, and used the same arguments as he did to Her Majesty’s Minister in 1873. Two year’s reflection would not appear to have moderated his views to any appreciable extent.
He maintained that Japan was now well prepared for an attack on Corea, as she had about 40,000 men drilled and armed on the latest European principles, and behind this force were all the Samurai class, accustomed to arms, and thirsting only for the fray. He himself, he said, had begged to be allowed to join the expedition, and there were thousands of others ready to proceed at a moment’s notice.
I ventured to inquire whether ha had not somewhat exaggerated the number of drilled troops at the disposal of the Government, and also asked whether he considered it would be quite wise to send all those troops, on which the Government is supposed to be able to count, out of the country at a moment when there was said to be a considerable fermentation going on within it.
Mr. Soyeshima would not for a moment allow that any inconvenience possibly could arise. The nation wanted war, and if it got it in Corea the whole population would be satisfied. Money which was now hoarded would flow in from all sides, and the Government need have no fear whatever of internal disturbances.
As to Russia she would secretly approve and would watch events, ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might arise. He did not think Japan had much to fear from Russia, even if she did, perhaps, secure some harbour for herself further south than Possiette. Mr. Soyeshima went on to explain that, in his opinion, the best thing for Japan would be to occupy and annex the large Island of Quelpart, and also to land troops on the Island of Kôkwa, at the mouth of the Seoul River. Any force on this island would effectually blockade the Corean capital, and by preventing the approach of junks stop the supply of rice for its inhabitants.
The capital being surrounded by mountains is usually provisioned entirely by the river, and any lengthy stoppage of the traffic on it must, according to him, infallibly bring the Corean Government to reason.
As I had already done in my interview with Mr. Terashima, I carefully abstained from expressing any approval, and I allowed Mr. Soyeshima to talk on as long as he was inclined.
On the 12th instant a Proclamation was published announcing that Mr. Kuroda was about to be despatched to Corea as Special and Plenipotentiary High Commissioner, and the “Stochi Shimbun” announced that the mission will sail about the 18th or 19th instant.
I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship’s information, translations of the various articles to which I have made reference.
Since the Mission has been decided on, the Japanese papers have not ventured to express any very decided opinion; but it would seem from the two extracts of the papers of the 12th that the public qutie see the gravity of the position, and understand that, whatever hopes the Government may profess to entertain of a peaceful solution, the despatch of a High Commissioner, with three men-of-war and a considerable body of troops, to a country where they are sure not to be received, can only be prelude to actual hostilities.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of Sir H. Parkes),
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT

 
이름
Plunkett , Derby , Harry Parkes , Moriyama , Moriyama , Harry Parkes , Shimadzu Saburô , Shimadzu , Moriyama , Saigo , Sameshima , Kuro-ôka , Hirotsu , Moriyama , Kuroda , Hirotsu , Kuroda , Sameshima , M‘Clatchie , Moriyama , Sameshima , Mori Arinori , Terashima , Harry Parkes , Moriyama , Soyeshima , TerashiMa’s , Kuroda , SoyeshiMa , H. Parkes , Soyeshima , Sanjo , Iwakura , Soyeshima , Soyeshima , Soyeshima , Terashima , Soyeshima , Kuroda , H. Parkes , F. R. PLUNKETT
지명
Yedo , Yedo , Vladivostok , Sorio , Yedo , Peking , Yedo , Peking , Yedo , Possiette , Island of Quelpart , Island of Kôkwa , Seoul River
관서
the Yokohama Custom-house , Foreign Department

태그 :

태그등록
이전페이지 리스트보기 맨 위로